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**Introduction: In This Issue**

The Inaugural issue of *MISR* announced that its aim was two-fold: first, broadcast the intellectual work undertaken at *MISR* to the wider scholarly community; and second, aim to energize and promote debate in the broader scholarly community.

This issue marks a step in that long journey. The bulk of the issue draws on chapters from doctoral thesis successfully defended over the past year. Haydee Bangerezako’s essay, *Indirect Writing and the Construction of Burundi’s History*, analyzes history writing in the era of colonial indirect rule. Because it borrowed its categories and conceptions from the colonial project, Bangerezako dubs this genre of writing ‘indirect history.’ The essay focuses on the narratives produced by African chiefs reinterpreting the past within the colonial epistemological framework. Bangerezako argues that their work was marked by an internal tension. As they projected colonial ideas onto the past, these writers privileged a dynastic past, embraced the Hamitic hypothesis and presumed male authority, but their oral accounts at the same time challenged these underlying assumptions.

In his essay, *Colonial Developmentalism and Politics: From Occupation as Rupture to Colonial Legacy*, Yonas Ashine Demisse brings to bear a critical light on Ethiopian scholarship of the Italian colonial occupation and on the historiography of that period. He does this in three different ways. Instead of the standard representation of Italian colonial rule as a failed project mired in war and crisis, Ashine rethinks the occupation as driven by a developmentalist policy whose objective was to mobilize an alternative social base from non-Christian and non-Amharic speaking subjects. Ashine thus casts the legacy of Italian occupation as an early, even pioneering phase of state developmentalism in Ethiopia. Finally, through a reading of newspapers as ethnographic sites, he suggests that we consider Haylå-Sellassé’s post-liberation policy of developmental-ism and de-tribalization as an early attempt to decolonize.

Joseph Kasule’s essay, “Ffe tuli ku kituufu, abalala bali ku byaabwé,” *The Intra-Salaf Debate and Violent State Intervention in Uganda’s Muslim Community*, seeks to throw light on murders of Muslim clerics and personalities between 2012 and 2016 by relating these developments to internal debates among the group of Salaf Muslims in Uganda on how to respond to the status of Muslims as a minority group in Uganda. He focuses on the different tendencies in this debate indicative of the deep division this debate produced in the Islamic reformist movement: some seeking a political reform of the state, others forming the ADF rebel movement to effect an Islamic revolution, a third group seeking autonomy from the state to concentrate on Dawah; and finally a group that opted for collaboration with the state to secure social-political-economic benefits for itself. Kasule argues that it is the competition between these diverse Muslim publics that degenerated into intra-Muslim violence and ultimately threatened the very survival of the Muslim community they had intended to reform, while undermining the political gains of the ruling NRM whose patronage some had sought. Eventually, violence bred more violence, feeding on itself.

Lisa Damon’s bibliographical essay, *What do Binaries Do? Tracing the Effect of Social Science Categories on Knowledge Production in the Great Lakes*, is not the product of a doctoral thesis but part of preparation for doctoral fieldwork. The article argues that the bulk of social science work on the Great Lakes region of Central Africa over the past hundred years has relied heavily on two binaries: the native and the foreigner and modernity and tradition. The author asks: How have they guided and circumscribed epistemological production on and of the Great Lakes? The essay probes the literature on migration, which seeks to territorialize people both geographically and historically as native and migrant or first-comer
and newcomer. To understand changing notions of land, and of power struggles around it, she reads scholarly debates on Bantu/Hamitic migrations, colonial labor migration and post-colonial refugees. Through a reading of three sets of debates—the modes of production debates, the politics of land tenure over time, and the relationship of women to the land—the essay shows how the binaries come to overlap, with the migrant considered a harbinger of modernity and the native a guardian of tradition. The paper concludes by framing questions that may allow us to move beyond a critique of existing categories to imagining new ones.

The concluding section of this issue presents three commentaries—by Samson Bezabeh, Lyn Ossome and Mahmood Mamdani—on Sylvia Tamale’s Inaugural Professorial lecture, Nudity, Protest and the Law in Uganda, delivered on October 28, 2016, http://www.searcwl.ac.zw/downloads/Tamale_Inaugural_Lecture.pdf. The lecture opens thus: “Allow me to begin with the story that inspired my choice of topic. Around 8.15 on the morning of Monday April 18, 2016, I was just leaving home to go to work when my cell phone rang. On the line was a friend whose words sounded frantic and desperate: “Sylvia you’re the nearest one; you’ve got to help... Oh my god! It’s on Facebook... Stella has stripped naked at MISR!” It explains why research fellows at MISR found it difficult to resist the invitation to comment on it critically. We do so with modesty, generosity and in friendship.

We hope you enjoy this offering.

Mahmood Mamdani
September 2018
Contributors to this Issue

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Indirect Writing: Colonial Rule and the Construction of Burundi’s History

Haydée Bangerezako

Abstract This paper defines the relationship between colonial rule and the production of historical narratives in Burundi as indirect writing. Indirect writing is a collaborative process of writing in which the missionary, colonial administrator, researcher set out to construct the history of the colonized by setting questions, and the colonized elite provide answers adapted to the historical narratives pushed forth by the former. This produces historical accounts based in the elite’s interest in the coloniser and colonized. Indirect writing projected colonial ideas onto the past, while the colonial mode of rule reproduced the racial hierarchical model constructed in historical narratives. Africans involved in the co-authorship privileged a dynastic past, the Hamitic hypothesis, and male authority in the oral accounts they offered. Though their contribution is marginalized in the scholarship, African chiefs produced their own narratives and re-interpreted the past within the colonial epistemological framework, all while challenging it at the same time. The paper shows the agency of the colonial chief as a historical actor and narrator of the past, and how he shapes the indirect history co-produced with missionaries, researchers and colonial administration.

Keywords Burundi, indirect writing, historical narratives, colonial chief, Hamitic hypothesis, chronology, Hutu, Tutsi, oral stories.

Introduction

“He [Pierre Baranyanka] was then sent in 1916 as umushingantahe to Kigoma [Tanzania] to the governor Malfayt, he was with Nyenama, Mboneko, Nzeye, son of Ntarugera; they had gone to represent the king to arrange the affairs of Urundi, they accompanied the resident of Urundi who was in Kitega at the time. In Kitega there was Mr Rijckmans, a judge Delhoy (?) The resident: van Hende (?). They spend 15 days (in Kigoma) they went to decide if they wanted Belgians or Germans, who they preferred. They preferred the Belgians, they had already arranged the thing here, they went to report their decision.” In an interview with historian Georges Smets in 1935, Baranyanka describes his mediating role in the Germans’ replacement by the Belgians.

The historical narrative of Burundi composed by White Father missionaries, European explorers and scholars, colonial administrators and colonial chiefs imagined and defined the precolonial history as a story of a conquering Hamite race, the Batutsi. In this telling, the Batutsi were the natural rulers of the native, autochthonous serfs, the Bahutu. Such historical narratives supported a

1 A Mushingantahe (Bashingantahe – plural) plays the role of the judge, wise person, settling disputes and seeking reconciliation at the same time at various levels, from the hill-level to the royal court.
2 Pierre Rckmans, resident of Burundi from 1920 to 1925.
3 Historian Georges Smets used the question marks to express uncertainty over the names in an interview with Pierre Baranyanka on the 19 May 1935, in George Smets archives, file F, Centre de Civilisation Burundaise, Ministère de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de la Culture, Bujumbura, 1935.
4 Ibid.
5 This is an influential group of Pères Blances or White Fathers, from the Société des Missionnaires d’Afrique – founded in 1868 by Cardinal Lavigerie, archbishop of Algiers.
hierarchical political model of direct-indirect rule. History writing was used as a tool to cater to both the colonizer and the colonized in their search for political legitimacy through historical narratives. This paper studies the relationship between colonial rule and history writing and specifically the agency of a colonial, ‘non-native’ chief who becomes a narrator of the past. The historical colonial craft depicted co-authorship: the collaboration as a form of indirect writing in which the colonizer set the questions while the colonized provided answers to suit the colonizer’s interpretation, producing a new historical narrative based in the elite’s interest. In an interview with historian Georges Smets in 1935, cited above, Pierre Baranyanka—a royal and colonial chief—depicted the shift from German to Belgian rule as a negotiated pact made between Burundi’s kingdom’s representatives and Belgians in order to illustrate the agency of the Barundi leaders. Viewed as an informant by missionaries and colonial administrator, the colonial chief transformed himself into a popular historian, using oral stories to narrate the past and ultimately challenging colonial representation.

Prior to the colonial occupation, the precolonial chief was accountable to the mwami and his or her people as a ‘divider and redistributor’ who did not rule alone; there were multiple power centres. This leadership structure was replaced by the installment of a male chief with unlimited powers, accountable only to the European colonial administrator.

This paper presents the relationship of history writing and colonial political rule: it will explore how Baranyanka, as interpreter of the past in his role as a colonial chief, was an informant who produced narratives tailored to colonial arguments. Baranyanka produced a history that challenged the colonial view that Rwanda was a superior kingdom to Burundi and presented the neighbouring kingdom as an equal. Furthermore, Baranyanka used gender to challenge the missionaries and prove that biblical knowledge was already known in the Burundian kingdom. This contribution was made in the Christian Kirundi-language newspaper, Ruzizira Amarembe, after an editor’s call for an official past in December 1945. The newspaper shows Baranyanka as a political and historical actor, using oral stories to contribute and challenge an indirect history that he earlier helped to create.

Baranyanka used oral sources to construct a history that tied kingship of Rwanda and Burundi, which was not new, what is novel is that it dislocated Rwanda as the source of kingship. Baranyanka collected historical narratives not only from Burundi but from Rwanda also. Furthermore, Baranyanka’s extension of the kingship chronology, complemented his rise in the colonial echelons of power and placed the dynasty at the centre of a precolonial past. What has been overlooked is Baranyanka’s effort to produce a history that placed the kingdom as an important power centre that rivalled Rwanda. He did not speak for all members of the royal family or the Batutsi, but rather for a new elite that worked closely with the colonial administration. This paper is not interested in the truthfulness of Baranyanka’s argument but rather in his intent in making that argument, which was rooted in his nationalist ambition.

History writing is taken to be a mode of argumentation that Africans, as homespun historians and entrepreneurs used during the colonial period to gain constituencies, claim legitimate authority, mobilize people around a cause and build a political community. Sir Apolo Kagwa, the ‘chief architect of Ganda-British
collaboration,” projected the present onto the past in constructing historical narratives. When Kagwa was challenged over his autocratic use of power, his response was to present the history of the kingdom through power struggles that resulted in one dominant Kabaka or king: “Kagwa’s monarch-focused history of Buganda politics fitted with the structure of the polity that could be perceived in the mid-twentieth century.” Kagwa, similar to other Africans writers clothed ‘in the power of the past,’ wrote what they believed was most important to define their kingdom in response to colonial narratives. “History writing always contains the potential to serve political purposes because debating political change requires the imagining of a political community, its past and present as well as its future,” writes Emma Hunter.

The colonial arguments for a Hamitic past have been critiqued in the post-independence historiography, while the input of the colonized elite has not been closely studied. Baranyanka, a colonial chief, paints the past alongside missionaries and as a historical actor he also becomes its narrator. Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes that history, as a social process, involves people in three distinct capacities: “1) as agents, or occupants of structural positions; 2) as actors in constant interface with a context; and 3) as subjects, that is, as voices aware of their vocality.” This paper first shows how Baranyanka, of his own accord, becomes the authority and the interpreter between the colonizer and colonized. Secondly, Baranyanka is an actor producing his own historical knowledge within a colonial context. Thirdly, Baranyanka is a colonial subject, working within and challenging the colonial epistemological framework. Baranyanka used his political authority to reimagine the past to reflect his own nationalist ambitions and challenge the colonial domination and interpretation of the past.

The first section shows the connection between a racialized interpretation of the past rooted in the Hamitic hypothesis and the colonial mode of rule. Thereafter, Baranyanka’s role as a source of information is explored as well as how he constructs the past to challenge colonial knowledge of the Burundi polity using oral stories. The last section studies Baranyanka’s version of the past, as an indirect history that prevails at the time of Burundi’s independence.

Indirect-Direct Rule: From a Decentralized to Centralized Kingdom

Indirect writing created historical narratives that shaped colonial rule. Power relations in precolonial Ruanda-Urundi were constructed in racial terms, identifying the population as Tutsi lords against Hutu serfs. This medieval image by European missionaries, explorers and Germans colonizers was already present before 1914, and was put into practice in the twenties and thirties by the Belgians under the impetus of the Catholic Church.

Indirect-Direct Rule: From a Decentralized to Centralized Kingdom

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16 Ibid., 183.
19 John Hanning Speke in his Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile the explorer in 1863 inspired the Hamitic hypothesis, writing about Tutsi as having come from Abyssinia. This was used by the early White Fathers in British Uganda and German east Africa in the late 19th century and built upon to understand other neighbouring communities that shared similarities. Speke discusses his “theory of conquest of inferior by superior races,” pushing forth the Hamitic argument. He connects groups of organized life in Uganda and argues that they came from Asia through “Abyssinians”. Evidence for him at times takes physical form: the “high stamp of Asiatic feature, of which a marked characteristic is a bridged instead of bridgeless nose” in Speke, J. H. Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1864), 147.
20 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silences of the Past: Power and the Production of History.
21 Ibid., 23.
22 The Batwa while viewed as the first inhabitants, were considered to be insignificant in the history-making of the Burundi polity see Gorju, En zigzags. Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa speak the same language Kirundi.
23 Missionaries were convinced that they had found an African middle age, which they wanted to preserve, see Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi” in Au cœur de l’histoire edited by Jean-Loup Amélie Elikia M’Bokolo.
historian Joseph Gahama writes that missionaries like Johannes Van der Burght, Gorju and resident Ryckmans insisted on a false dichotomy, opposing a minority pastoralist Tutsi lord to a majority agriculturalist Hutu serf defined respectively Hamites vs. Bantu or Batutsi vs. Bahutu. The ‘Hamitization’ of the territory under the Belgian mandate consisted of an argument for the foreign origin of the Batutsi as children of Ham, who subdued the Bahutu between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Under Belgian trusteeship beginning in 1919, colonial rule of Ruanda-Urundi – made up of the Rwandan kingdom and the Burundian kingdom – was presented by writers in colonial and post-colonial Burundi as being indirect rule. Instead, it was halfway between direct rule and indirect rule. This was because the law and authority was not ethnicized, unlike the rest of the colonies. Instead of a decentralized despotism (or indirect rule) – with tribalized identities of Hutu and Tutsi having different ethnic homelands with their own native authorities and customary laws – it was rather a racialized centralized despotism, with Hutu and Tutsi living within a single political and legal space. The Batutsi as ‘non-natives’ were racialized, while the Bahutu were identified as indigenous. In Rwanda, the Batutsi as the subject race would receive preferential treatment under the law. In Burundi, it was rather the royalty, now defined as the Batutsi by the colonial administration, and a ‘well-born’ Tutsi elite, that would be privileged by the colonial state, with access to education and bureaucratic post, while the remaining masses of Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa shared the same colonial burden. Colonial education would teach and perpetuate the colonial racial myth of the indigenous native Hutu versus the racialized, non-native Tutsi.

In the colonial historiography, colonial administrators presented themselves as a modernizing tradition, uniting and reorganizing the kingdom and ending injustice and arbitrariness in Ruanda-Urundi with the support of missionaries. The chief, as the “pillar” of indirect rule, was monitored closely and supported by the colonial administration. The smaller the colonial administration was, the more despotic it was. This pattern can be seen by examining the Belgians in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi or the Portuguese in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.

The Belgian colonial administration echoed the missionaries and explorers’ writings in their presentation the political organization of Barundi and Banyarwanda, describing it as a feudal organization with a “solid established native hierarchy” requiring minimal direct intervention. The feudal organization took the form of a pyramid of traditional rule conforming with the pyramidal of colonial territorial administration; the sous-chef and chiefs were under the territorial administration, while the mwami was under the supervision of the resident. Thus the chiefs and sous-chefs were appointed by the mwami, and then sworn in by the governor of Ruanda-Urundi. In the view of the colonial administration...

24 Gahama, Le Burundi, 408
25 Ruanda-Urundi was jointly administered with ‘Congo Belge’ since 1925
26 Using the concept of a centralized despotism or direct rule and decentralized despotism as indirect rule in Mamdani M. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; 34.
27 Comments from Mahmood Mamdani.
28 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 27.
29 Chrétien, “Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi,” 142.
30 Keuppens, Essai d’Histoire.
31 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 27.
33 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 53.
34 Ibid., 59.
35 Van Der Burgt, Dictionnaire Français-Kirundi; Gorju, En zigzags à travers l’Urundi; Julien Gorju et al., Face au Royaume Hamite du Ruanda Le Royaume Frère de l’Urundi; Meyer, Les Barundi.
38 Ibid., 208.
tion, the Belgians had restored unity to the kingdom, which was divided when they arrived, providing more security and justice as rival chiefs reconciled. The authority of kings was “softened” and became less absolute.  

Historians have, however, written about another colonial reality. Between 1926-1933, the Belgian colonial authority reorganized the administration, selecting “good” native collaborators. This meant that colonial administrators selected those they thought were natural leaders, privileging the Baganwa aristocracy and reducing the number of Bahutu to a large extent and the Batutsi chiefs and sous-chiefs to a lesser extent. It is during the colonial period that a Muhutu leader became an exception, while women chiefs and other non-royal chiefs were removed. This political interpretation produced a neo-feudal type of colonial state that privileged the royal Baganwa, to the detriment of the rest of the population.  

Belgian colonial power profoundly transformed society by manipulating customary authorities and removing the Bishikira, the Banyamaban’ga and the Abiru who were power centres that balanced the mwami’s power.

Belgian colonial rule was focused on strengthening and centralizing the monarchy. Indirect-direct rule and indirect writing reduced Burundi’s past and present to racialized and hierarchical power relations. Jan Vansina, in his study of testimonies as oral traditions in Burundi, concluded that its political system explained the limitations in its historical oral sources: the kingdom was decentralized, with a fluid system which did not favour historical memory. Vansina wrote that Rwanda was the opposite. The king was in command and governed through an aristocratic family with a centralized government from which emerged historical narratives, court songs, dynastic poetry, warrior poetry, and even martial poetry involving cattle, the dynastic code, and the royal genealogies. In Burundi, Vansina failed to find official chronologies and instead found popular historical narratives which he believed to be unreliable. News, or amakuru, would be transformed into migani—stories—filled with myths and political truths. These were not official propaganda, but a “popular vision of power.” As Burundi became a centralized territory during the colonial period, a state history emerged: a dynastic history or kingship history based on a racial hierarchy, came to equate kingdom history. The next section explores the role of the colonial chief Pierre Baranyanka, as a source of information during the colonial period.

### The Colonial Chief as Informant

Pierre Baranyanka was a prominent personality in the colonial administration and a royal prince of the Batare line, as well as a descendant of the conqueror king Ntare Rugamba who expanded the borders of the kingdom in the 1800s. Baranyanka was educated in a German school in Kitega where he learned both Swahili and German. He served in the German army and returned from his military service after the First World War to work with the Belgians and is remembered and portrayed in writings of missionaries, historians and researchers as both an interpreter between the colonial authority and the people, and as the "most evolú

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39 Ibid.
40 Gahama, Le Burundi sous administration Belge.
41 Gahama, Le Burundi, 408.
42 Bishikira literally means those able to reach the mwami, have the permission of the king to rule over populations and behaved like other royals who had authority, the Belgians extended the power of the royals at the expense of previous ‘bishikira’ chiefs who were both dependent and independent of the king.
43 These were people of secrets, an influential hereditary politico-ritualist aristocracy. This category exercised spiritual power at the court of leaders and amongst the peasantry. They were holders of the secrets of the state, organized royal ceremonies, initiation cults. See Mworoha, Peuples et Rôts, 135 and Chrétien, J.-P. Burundi L’histoire retrouvée: 25ans de métier d’historien en Afrique. Paris: Editions Karthala, 1995.
44 Guardians of royal tombs.
Pierre Baranyanka’s report eclipsed other chiefs’ reports in the 1929 colonial enquiry. The 1929 territorial Belgian colonial study was used to reduce the number of chiefs, to the benefits of increasing the rule and territories controlled by the Baganwa. In the report, he was described as a judge with a lot of integrity in the “native court,” firm with his subjects, devout to European authority, and voluntarily submissive to higher authorities. Resident governor Pierre Ryckmans gave Baranyanka large territories to rule in the north west region, which were previously controlled—under the Germans—by the rebel leader Kirima. Baranyanka then placed his nephews as Batware. For forty years, every administrator, missionary and anthropologist consulted him. Baranyanka’s influence grew with the support of the colonial administration, and was so strong that there was talk of making him the sole sovereign of Ruanda-Urundi.

The historian Georges Smets interviewed Baranyanka in 1935 at his command post in Irabiro, Ngozi, in north west Burundi where he described social practices and history of the Barundi. In a letter to Smets on 24 June 1935, Baranyanka writes:

To Bwana professor George Smets.

Greetings. Are you and Madam well? I was happy to receive your news. I remember you and I miss you. I would be pleased to know the day you will travel to Rwanda I will come and meet you half way in Ngozi to greet you and wish you well. When you shall return [To Europe] I will not forget you and will write you a letter. Let me respond to the information you requested. Abiru never saw Umwami while still alive, even the Muganwa they never saw him. For other information you asked: The one who did something bad and fled to the [domain of] Abiru would not be caught, but if they had killed someone, a person from their home would pay the Abiru and he would be killed there. Also King Ntare killed some Abiru.

I bid you farewell, may you have peace and may God keep you safe.

It is I, Petro Baranyanka

Amidst the exchange of pleasantries, Baranyanka is responding to Smets’ questions about the Abiru, a group that held the double role as guardians, celebrants of royal funerals and funerary cult ceremonies. The Abiru had their own domains that the king and chiefs could not intervene in. Colonial rule reduced the power of the Abiru with the rise in power of the colonial chiefs such as Baranyanka—who ruled over their territory—because the modern conception of authority would inevitably clash with their own, obliterating their power and signifying the end of their own private domains. The same guardians that Baranyanka wrote about to Smets were becoming relics of the past, displaced during a colonial period where their power was no longer recognized or necessary. The colonial administration sought to present itself as doing redemptive, civilizing work, ruling through chiefs and perfecting
tradition through customary powers. Nevertheless, colonial chiefs were described as “gutwara acuritse” meaning in an arbitrary, illegitimate manner, and the response to colonial modernity was to call for the return of past practices and symbols through revolts.

In the interview with Georges Smets, the focus turned to the recurring theme of origins. Baranyanka located the Batutsi as a group coming with Ndare from Rwanda to Burundi: “On origins: In the past, there were Bahutu and Batwa here. For the Batutsi, he believes that they came with Ndare I. He knows that Ndare I came from Ruanda, and was the son of Kihanga, king of Ruanda. The Banyaruanda do not know where Kihanga came from, they said that he fell from the sky.” Baranyanka lays emphasis is on the Rwandan origin of kingdoms in the region.

Gorju’s Face au Royaume Hamite du Ruanda Le Royaume Frère de l’Urundi: Essai de reconstitution historique published in 1938, was a group effort which combined European missionaries and Baranyanka, to trace the origin of the royal kingdom and its rituals. In the text, Gorju explains the origin of the Burundian dynasty, the

Bagarwa, as coming from Rwanda. Baranyanka is the main informant who affirms that the Urundi royalty comes from Rwanda. The missionary states early in the text that he disagrees with the “banatu” origin of the royal dynasty as told by princes like Nduwumwe, son of the king Mwezi Gisabo in ‘Urundi’. “Our dynasty is Hamite,” is the statement and title of the first section of the text.

Gorju emphasizes the unity of origin of the two dynasties of ‘Ruanda’ and ‘Urundi’ and the Hamitic origin of the Bagarwa because the Barundi royals are brothers of the Rwandan kings “who have never been Bahutu.” The royal Bagarwa dynasty, Gorju argues, has no history, or in his view they refuse to say their true origins. Gorju presents a contested origin of the dynasty; the kings of Burundi are only Bahutu because they are referred to as Bahutu, the “king of Urundi is Muhutu in theory.” Gorju, writes that the king only pretended to be so in order to gain control of the country of the Bahutu and Batwa. Gorju, in this instance, is rejecting oral sources that point to the first king Ndare Rushatsi as being of Hutu origin and being from eastern region of Burundi and neighbouring Tanzania. For him, the origins of the Bagarwa royals were hidden, because the usurping of power by the foreign Hamite Tutsi was not widespread knowledge and it was not in the elite’s interest to reveal it. The royalty could not be Bahutu because they favoured the Batutsi “foreigners,” and because a deposed prince or Muganwa became a rich Mututsi.

History writing during the colonial period was focused on origin, the Hamitic hypothesis, chronology and male authority. Interestingly, Baranyanka describes the Abira’s power in the pre-colonial to Smets, while he neutralized their power when collaborating with the White Fathers and colonial administration during the colonial period. The next section shows how Baranyanka addresses himself to the Barundi and challenges the colonial episteme of the Barundi. The next section studies Baranyanka’s role

60 Ruling upside down.
61 For instance, the large 1922 revolt led by Runyota called upon the end of colonial rule, the rejection of money and European clothing. In 1934, a woman named Inamujandi led a revolt in Ndora – territory controlled by Pierre Baranyanka – calling for the return of traditional order and attempting to install a new wumwe, son of the king Mwezi Gisabo.
62 George Smets Archives, Dossier F, Smets interviewed Baranyanka, on 04/06/1935. Kihanga or Gihanga is creator, a cultural hero who founded first empire brother of Kanyandorwa, Kanyabugesera, Kanyakisaka, Kanyaburundi, Kanyabungo and Kanyarwanda
64 Gorju et al., Face au Royaume Hamite du Ruanda Le Royaume Frère de l’Urundi.
65 Mwezi Gisabo is king about mid-nineteenth century, and dies in 1906.
66 Gorju, En zigzags, 16.
67 This eastern origin of the first king is referred to as the Nkoma cycle, see Chrétien, Burundi L’histoire retrouvée.
as a storyteller, where he moves from contributing to an indirect writing to shaping his own narratives.

**The Colonial Chief as Storyteller**

Pierre Baranyanka in his writings in April 1945, penned a newspaper article titled “‘Ivyibukiro vy’Abarundi ba kera.”68 Baranyanka begins with the story titled “Imana yatira,”69 saying: “When people began to first arrive in Burundi, they use to tell stories that Imana use to be seen,” highlighting migration. Akin to the story of Adam and Eve in the Christian Bible, Imana,70 calls upon the mwami and mwamikazi,71 kwatirwa,72 to receive intelligence at midnight. Rwuba rwa Bigata,73 delays the queen and the king receives intelligence instead. The mwamikazi, who arrives late, is left to drink the cup of sin. Instead of Adam and Eve, Baranyanka presents a past of kings and queens as historical actors. He uses his privileged position as an interpreter-turned-translator of the past to suggest oral stories that would challenge the civilizing mission of the missionaries and colonizers by reflecting on the universal nature of the biblical story to argue that the Burundi already held biblical knowledge. Baranyanka writes that these stories were well-known and changed over the years. “People of long ago knew about Imana [God]. They wanted to tell us a story about original sin, but it has continuously changed. This story, you can ask old men they know it well, even though others alter it a bit,” writes Baranyanka. The people were aware of a monotheist God, Imana. Thus challenging the missionaries’ civilization mission. Yet in Baranyanka’s version, the Burundi’s mwami, contrary to Adam, is unaffected by Eve’s sin. It is only the queen that is affected by sin. In the second story titled “Urfu” or death,74 a woman brings death after being tricked by the devil to swallow the devil and to hide it. She resurrects and is killed. Baranyanka appropriates Christian symbols and themes, and places them in his context to prove that the people of Burundi have always known about original sin.

The displacement of women in the colonial space, stripping them of any powers, parallels with Baranyanka’s writing in this instance. As an author, he produces a new past that is similar to the colonial present. Though a patrilineal society, women occupied important roles and positions of power were not gender-restricted. For example, the title Mwami could be bestowed upon both men and women.75 The biblical story that Baranyanka writes about coincides with the dissolution of women’s power during the colonial period. Baranyanka, in reconstituting bible stories to challenge missionary teachings, relies on gender for its articulation76 to provide a parallel between an origin story of gender relations and women’s loss of power during the colonial period.

In the last story, titled Intsizzi Karyenda,77 Baranyanka writes the story of the search of the royal drum, which symbolises kingship. Baranyanka explained how the king obtains Karyenda, the

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68 Barundi’s Memories of the past in Rusizi Amarembe, sower of peace. April 1945 (reproduced from 1943 edition).
69 God confers.
70 God.
71 King and queen.
72 For initiation.
73 An evil god or the devil.
74 In the second story, the king sets out to revenge against the devil. So the devil
disguised asks a woman to swallow him, saying he shall return the favour. The woman dies and resurrects only to be killed and buried by the husband’s wife. Baranyanka emphasises, that these stories were known. The third story of ‘Bahwe biyake’ is a classic tale of a man who is granted an abundant field with food and a stone that jets out milk, and told not to weed the field by Imana. The man disobey and subsequently loses everything.
75 The Burundi scholarship has ignored the gender neutrality of the role of mwami, as role-based, despite the presence and persistence of historical narratives of women as bami in both precolonial and colonial contexts and postcolonial texts. One way to decentre male authority is through the concept of mwami, symbol of male authority in the historiography, by reflecting on the multiple emergence and presence of bami, both male and female. There are bami that emerge parallel to the king, that decentre the monarchy, with the archives showing mwami as one who both heals and provide, irrespective of gender, from a deeper past to the present. See Haydee Bangerezako, “Indirect Writing and Silences in the History of Burundi: Official History and Woman as Mwami” (PhD thesis, Makerere University, 2018).
76 Similarly, Joan W. Scott writes that the concept of class in the nineteenth century relied on gender for its articulation, see Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 48.
77 Victory of Karyenda, the royal drum. This parallels with the publishing of Alexis Kagame’s book “Inganji Karinga,” victory of Karinga, the royal drum in the same year.
royal drum:
One more thing I will tell you about the Abajiji clan. They came from the regions of Toro-Buganda-Bunyoro-Nkore-Ndorwa-Gisaka-Bugesera, till Bweru in Burundi in Muyinga region, that is how they travelled down to Buyogoma. Those Bajiji are the grandparents of Nyamigogo, Runyota and Ndwano. Those were not like other diviners, who used chicken, cow, sheep, and a lot of other things that diviners use. When Nyamigogo reached the king’s court said: “Those are not the things to use at the royal court.” Nyamigogo spoke like an advisor and did not use what others used. Nyamigogo then told the king: “Send people who know how to build drums, let them dig under the trunk of a tree found in the forest of the north, along the forest of Rwanda towards Bwishaza-Busigi-Buliza-Buberuka [situated in Rwanda]. Let them not cut the tree, but let them dig around it; the drum will be named by a person passing by, and once they will have named the drum, let them be buried the same place where the tree was extracted from the earth. This is how a Mumoso [person from south east Burundi] found them digging and pulling [the drum out] and Mumoso helped them to pull it out. The Mumoso said: “Karyenda of Burundi is difficult to take.” The Mumoso was immediately buried as Nyamigogo had said. They took the stump and left the top part of the tree in Rwanda. This part was then used in Rwanda as a mortar, then the king of Rwanda asked that it be turned into a drum, this is the one called Karinga. This is what the Abiru, elders and kings of Burundi said, I am not sure if that is how they remember it in Rwanda... When the king died they said “Hail Karyenda.” We shall look at Abajiji when we remember the first kings... the drum that rules Burundi is Karyenda... The Batutsi did not have a drum in Burundi. It is I, prince Petro Baranyanka.78

The drum, called “ngomà,” represented the power of leadership in the Great Lakes.79 It was both as a symbol of healing practice and power of leadership, and created a sense of community identity.80 The story involves the mwami and diviners from Toro, in today’s Uganda, a travel to Rwanda and an encounter with the Bamoso.81 Baranyanka, describes Nyamigogo and Runyota famous diviners as members of the Bajiji lineages. These diviners are usually associated with the founding king Ntare Rushatsi and Ntare Rugamba and are described as coming down from Toro to north eastern Burundi. It is the divider Nyamigogo who knows about the drum, he informs the mwami of Burundi on how to locate it in Rwanda and that it will be named by a person from Kumoso, in eastern Burundi. The king of Burundi learns about the royal drum essential to kingship prior to the Rwandan kingdom which first uses it as a mortar. Baranyanka then makes an interesting com-

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79 Schoenbrun, A Green Place, 106.
80 Ibid.
81 Bamoso are people from Moso, people from eastern Burundi, who were not part of the kingdom before the conquest of Ntare Rugamba, around 1860. Burundi was limited to Nile Congo crest and Kilimiro.
mentary: “this is what the Abiru,82 and other leaders83 and kings of Burundi said, I am not sure if that is how they remember it in Rwanda.” The author is hesitant in his statement, as oral sources in Rwanda and Burundi may be contradictory to each other, and more importantly he shows that as narrator of the past, he is not doing it alone but mentions the contribution of elders, Abiru, and stories told before to prove the authenticity of the oral texts.

Knowledge of the royal drum moves north to south from Uganda to Burundi, and the mwami follows the diviners’ advice and sends his people to dig and find Karyenda in Rwanda, and then to bring it back to Burundi. It is after that that Rwanda has access to its royal drum, Karinga, which is made from the same tree bark as Burundi’s Karyenda. There are three points made here that Burundi’s king learns about Karyenda before Rwanda’s king and that Karyenda from Burundi and Karinga from Rwanda come from the same tree, tying both kingdoms’ pasts even more closely to Toro. This is similar to the colonial literature describing the travel of the Batutsi moving from north to south, as argued by the Hamitic hypothesis. The story shows the involvement of other power centres, such as the diviners, and the popular involvement in the representation of a person from Kumoso in naming the drum. Baranyanka displays the centrality of mediumship and mediums in the kingdom, and also mentions the Abiru as his sources. Baranyanka shows that how mediums held political power. His last sentence in the story Intsinzi Karyenda states that “the Batutsi did not have a drum in Burundi,” suggests that he is responding to the colonial argument of constructing the Batutsi as a separate entity in the kingdom. Baranyanka has failed to locate a Tutsi migration to Burundi in oral sources, but as all colonial writers and administrators point out to one through the Hamitic hypothesis, Baranyanka lends credence briefly to such a debate by raising it up and then subtly deconstructing. The colonial chief does this by implying in that statement that the Batutsi were alongside other populations under the rule of the royal drum Karyenda.

Other oral sources in Burundi locate the birth of the drum Karyenda together with Karinga in Burundi. In Ndongozi84 newspaper of 1956, both Karyenda and Karinga emerge from a tree in Gatabo, Muramvya, centre of Burundi. The drum is presented as uniting the country. What is different in this article is that the mwami is the activator and not the diviner, the location of the royal drums for Rwanda and Burundi are in central Burundi and the Bajiji clan becomes Ababaji in this article, which is an unknown family in Burundi.85 Perhaps suggesting the erasure of the diviners with time. Historians later write to argue that Karyenda and Karinga were sculpted from the same tree in northern Mugamba, in northern Burundi.86

Baranyanka sought to locate Burundi’s kingship ties with Rwanda to gain esteem for the Burundian kingdom, as the Rwandan kingdom was more admired by Europeans. Baranyanka shows that the drum as a symbol of kingship is a practice that comes after the presence of a mwami and that it is diviners from the north that are the source of information. The mediums’ important position is obliterated in the colonial literature’s construction of the Burundian kingdom’s past. Thus, Baranyanka brings back mediums at the forefront of the kingdom, while erasing women’s roles. Gender relations in the precolonial era are rewritten to tie the Burundi’s past to the stories in the Bible, reflecting equality

82 The Abira looked after the royal tombs.
83 Most likely Abashingantahe — men of integrity, who settled disputes, advised kings, chiefs, the community and preserved the interest of the people, and kingdom.
85 It is uncertain whether it is a typo as it is repeated throughout the article or it is by intention to separate the Bajiji from Babaji because the former is presented as a Hutu clan in colonial administration and historiography.
86 Following research by historians Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Emile Mworoha in 1976 on inganzo, royal tombs, one of the guardians of Mwezi Gisabo tomb, named Barajenguye, said that Karyenda and Karinga were sculpted from the same tree in northern Mugamba, that is northern Burundi, see Chrétien & Mworoha, “Les Tombeaux,” 78.
between the Barundi’s knowledge and biblical knowledge, while side-lining women’s political roles. Baranyanka is less interested in reproducing the so-called travel of Batutsi and Baganwa to Burundi, but uses the newspaper platform to reflect on the travel of diviners from north to south who share knowledge of the royal drum. The oral stories that Baranyanka writes, were read not only by the Barundi but also missionaries and colonial administrators.

Steven Feierman critiques African history writing as being constructed along European conventions, leaving out the larger historical narrative grounded in Africa. Historians chose stable, linear accounts of masculine authority of kings, over the unstable female authority of spirit mediums. The historical role of mediums was marginalized during the colonial period with spirit mediums becoming invisible and relegated to the sphere of witchcraft. Baranyanka’s oral stories break the monotony of the construction of African history writing along European conventions of male authority, despite the author’s arguments and strong bias towards male authority. The oral texts describe and include the presence of not only a king, but a queen also, the devil and Imana, and spirit mediums. Burundi’s history is reduced to a kingship history with different power struggles. The last section on Baranyanka’s indirect history, shows how using his position of power, Baranyanka imposes a chronology that parallels Burundi and Rwanda.

Indirect History
The title of the last reigning king of Burundi, known as Ntare V Charles Ndizeye and murdered on 29 April 1972, reveals how Baranyanka’s construction of the past, became the official history. The kingship title of Charles Ndizeye “Ntare V” refers to him as beginning a fifth cycle of kingship. On the eve of independence, in 1959, an official history was written down in Essai d’histoire du Burundi by a priest named Joseph Keuppens. This was supported by the colonial administration and numerous customary chiefs. The text’s conclusions were that the dynasty was the product of a Tutsi conquest in the sixteenth century, implying a chronology of four cycles. Essai d’histoire du Burundi became a text used to teach history in schools. In the text, the founding of the kingdom is tied with the coming of the Batutsi, two types of Batutsi: the first to arrive are the Batutsi Banyaruguru in the 16th century, who arrived in Burundi by passing through Rwanda, and the Batutsi Bahima who arrived in the 18th Century who came from the east. The date of 1500 is preferred to 1700, the year estimated by White Father missionary Julien Gorju in Keuppens’ text, because it was deemed ‘impossible’ that the Batutsi pastoralists in two centuries only could have “organized, unified and stabilized the country.” Thus a four-cycle chronology made more sense, and was based on a comparative between Rwanda and Burundi kingdoms. Baranyanka attested in Gorju’s 1938 text and in an interview with historian George Smets in 1935 that the Ganwa dynasty had eight kings with two cycles: Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga and Mwambutsa. Baranyanka would later argue that Burundi had four cycles of kings (sixteen kings) instead of two cycles (eight kings), after discussions

88 Ntare V Charles Ndizeye was murdered upon his return from Uganda, following a request by the government of Michel Micombero after they had overthrown Ndizeye in 1966 when Burundi became a republic.
89 Keuppens, Essai d’histoire; Chrétien, “Les traditionnistes,” 408.
90 Gorju’s Face au Royaume Hamite, Both have a common origin in the kingdoms in the north, in Uganda, writes Keuppens, but differentiated themselves in Burundi due to unidentified social factors. Batutsi Banyaruguru arrived in 16th century from Rwanda and Batutsi Bahima arrived in 18th century from the east. This allows Burundi kingship to match chronologically with Rwanda’s.
91 Keuppens, Essai d’histoire, 11.
92 This was based on the ‘memorialists’ of Rwanda who noted four Ntare in the Burundi kingdom, which substantiates the four-cycle chronology; Ntare I Rushatsi, Ntare I Rubagura, Ntare Iri Kivimira, Ntare Iri Rugamba writes Keuppens, Essai d’histoire, 12.
with Rwanda's priest and scholar Alexis Kagame in 1954. This was a chronological reconstruction to align Burundi's history with Rwanda's, showing the chief's agency to define the past.

African intellectuals who were navigating the colonial environment produced their own linear chronologies, which are now the subjects of critical analysis: “The birth of the colonial state gave birth to the Great Lakes kingdoms in historical texts by fixing their chronologies.” The chronology debate became important in Burundi's history writing; the shorter two-cycle kingship by Gorju and Baranyanka established the Baganwa dynasty as a recent development of the eighteenth century, whereas the dynasty emerging in the sixteenth century, was later developed by Baranyanka in conjunction with Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame to four cycles. The political and historical project of tying Burundi and Rwanda to a joint past operated within the Hamitic hypothesis, which presumed that kingship came from a foreign race from the north.

The official history equated the kingdom past with a Tutsi migration and domination, without oral stories of how this domination and migration occurred. The Hamitic myth was accepted not because it reflected reality but because it was an ideology of the powerful. It was based on a false premise: that those with power corroborate knowledge and are the ones to define the past. Colonial history writing became about locating oral sources that could support the colonial interpretation of the past. Informants like Baranyanka used their new platform as colonial chief to produce a history that would conform to the colonial mapping of the past, but which showed varied actors of the past and resonated with the present. A longer chronology legitimized the rule of Baganwa, now strengthened by the colonial administration.

**Conclusion**

Pierre Baranyanka shapes the past and present of Burundi by juxtaposing colonial arguments to support an indirect history, entrenching his own position of power in the past and the present. He builds a national history built on male authority, kingship and chronology. Baranyanka, using the Hamitic hypothesis, is able to leave a mark in history of Burundi by focusing on dynastic narratives by extending the chronology of kings, and by evoking other actors such as mediums in Burundi’s past. This challenged the colonial civilizing mission. Baranyanka, unexpectedly critiques missionaries' civilizing mission, remarking ultimately that the Burundi already knew of a monotheistic God. Baranyanka displaces women's roles in the construction of the political. His depiction of women parallels how women were rendered invisible by colonial policy. The colonized writer occupies a complex position; sometimes he resists indirect history, exploits a situation and produces counter-narratives or extends indirect state history. The colonial chief not only seeks to support colonial narratives, but also constructs a political community by producing a history of a kingdom enmeshed with other kingdoms. On the surface it looks like the colonial imagination of the Burundi proves the Hamitic hypothesis, because the official history ties Rwanda and Burundi's past together. Yet it is not Rwanda only that Burundi has ties with, but other neighbouring kingdoms, such as the coming of mediums from Toro. Baranyanka is not interested in reproducing historical narratives in the newspaper about the coming of the Batutsi, or Baganwa. Instead, the colonial chief writes about the regional participation in kingship. Baranyanka emphasizes in oral narratives in Rusizira Amarembe, that a leader, a mwami, was autochthonous

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96 Schoenbrun "A Past Whose Time Has Come,” 36.


98 Ibid, 52.
to the region and how spirit mediums also influenced the king and held political power. Baranyanka furthermore argues that he is speaking on behalf of elders, Abiru, as a claim to legitimacy and authenticity in relation to the historical narratives he produces. The oral texts in the newspaper, do not reinforce the hamitic hypothesis but stress popular participation, while strengthening male authority as inherent to Burundi and the region. Thus, a colonial chief like Baranyanka shows us the multiple facets of oral narratives, and the different ways they were interpreted in the colonial period.

This paper shows that history writing in the colonial period was shaped by multiple forces made up of missionaries, colonial administrators, historians, customary chiefs, elders and also neighbouring figures like Kagame. Oral sources were used to support or refute colonial arguments or produce a different argument altogether. The official history reveals how power allows the formation of certain historical narratives, while at the same time it silences others. This further shows how different claims of authority during the colonial period competed using history writing as a gesture of alliance and innovation. The past became a competing space of authority, which Baranyanka dominates with his historical imagination and nationalist ambitions.

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Colonial Developmentalism and Politics: From Occupation as Rupture to Colonial Legacy

Yonas Ashine Demisse

Abstract

The concept of ‘occupation’ has been deployed in Ethiopia to represent Italian colonial rule. Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia has been also seen as a failed colonial attempt and has been represented in Ethiopian historiography as war and crisis. This assumption ruled out the question of how Italy ruled Ethiopia even for those five years. This paper rethinks the occupation discourse in light of Italian policy of colonial developmentalism and its effort to mobilize an alternative social base from non-Christian and non-Amharic speaking subjects. Thus, it analyzes the legacy of Italian occupation as integral to the genealogy of state developmentalism and political policy in Ethiopia since the 1940s. This paper engages literature written about Italian colonialism in comparative to theory and history of colonial rule in wider continental Africa. Moreover, to make sense of colonial governance and its aftermath, I read newspapers as ethnographic sites. As a result of this, Hayläl-Sellassé’s post-liberation policy of developmentalism and de-tribalization is depicted as an attempt to decolonize.

Keywords

Mode of Rule, Colonial legacy, developmentalism, and political subjectivity

History of the Present: From Colonial Rupture to Legacy

One morning, I was taking my son to school passing one of the roundabouts in Addis Ababa where the statue of Emperor Ménilék II is erected. The statue depicts Emperor Ménilék galloping furiously toward the north, perhaps to the battle of Adwa where Ethiopia defeated the Italian colonial force in 1896. One day, my son asked me where Ménilék was going, pointing at the statue. I told him he was going to chase out the white men who came to steal from our country. Another day, my son pointed towards white men in a café and asked me “What are those white men doing here and how come Ménilék left them behind?”

It was a very difficult question to answer for a four-year-old boy. The answer warrants stretching the question beyond the presence of the ordinary white man in Africa and comparing theories in colonial studies in Africa. Legacy as a mode of historical inquiry and theory is the first choice to address the question. Legacy, critically engages colonial period countering the theory of rupture. A rupture as a mode of inquiry considers the colonial period as an episode, exception, a page, and parenthesis signifying a brief insignificant break in the long history of Africa. Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia has also been seen as “a page of Ethiopian history,” as an insignificant moment in the long history of the country. This assumption is similar to historiographical representation of the colonial era by African nationalist historians such as Ade Ajayi and Cheikh Anta Diop. This paper opens the occupation period once again for debate by framing the Italian colonial rule in Ethiopia and its silenced political impact using the notion of legacy.

1 This paper is one of the five chapters of my PhD dissertation submitted to Makerere Institute of Social Research, 2017.


It writes Italian colonial intervention “as a living history that informs and shapes the present rather than as a finished past.”

**Colonial Newspapers as Ethnographic Sites**

When Italian colonial forces entered Addis Ababa, newspaper-publishing infrastructure with writing and readings native subjects were ready. Newspaper publication was in place for about three decades before the colonial interlude and it was central in the making of pre-colonial Ethiopia’s public. Newspapers, among other things, were used as sites for debating civilization and progress in pre-colonial Ethiopia. Newspapers publication itself was used as sign of Ethiopia’s progress and modernity. In other words newspapers were already used as pulpits from which to preach the Ethiopian state’s mission of civilization and progress before Italian intervention.

Similarly newspapers and the reconstitution of the public sphere according to the interest of the colonizer was an indispensable part of the colonial art of governance. The Italian colonial administration inherited the infrastructure and reused the style and content of the already-existing Ethiopian newspapers. Colonial newspapers such as Yä-qéṣar Mäŋgest Mäl’ktáñña (The Messenger of Caesar’s State), Yä–Roma Berhan (The Light of Rome) and Thadäst Ityopia (The Renaissance of Ethiopia), in their style of writing and their content, were strikingly similar to the pre-colonial newspaper called Berhanena–Selam (Light and Peace). These colonial newspapers began to chronicle the progress of colonial development, representing the Italian colonial mission as civilizational, humanitarian and salvational intervention in Ethiopia.

In this vein, naming of colonial newspapers, setting their motto and the deployment of concepts signify the savior mission of the colonizer while representing the natives as an object of colonial intervention. Yä–Roma Berhan as main colonial newspaper regularly used to demonstrate Italy as modern bearer and disseminator of Roman civilization to Africa. However, the name and its content was derivative of an Ethiopian state Amharic newspaper called Berhanena–Selam. The name Berhanena–Selam served as a metaphor for progress and civilization which was the central theme of the newspaper. The newspaper represented emperor Haylä-Sellasé as a midwife of Ethiopian progress and civilization. Yä–qéṣar Mäŋgest Mäl’ktáñña and Thadäst Ityopia, both established in 1936, played a similar role of preaching Italy’s colonial civilizational mission to the native. Yä–qéṣar Mäŋgest Mäl’ktáñña newspaper’s motto for example was Tähadäst Ityoppia meaning renaissance of Ethiopia and signifying the deployment of the discourse of civilization and progress as a mode of colonial rule.

Invoking the “renaissance of Ethiopia” as its ethos, Italian colonial rule was represented in these newspapers as one example of “laboratories of modernity” through which technology, reason and progress were introduced to the natives. Renaissance presumes the presence of a civilization, and the origin of this civilization was externalized through colonial historiography. In this discourse, similar to the representation of ancient civilization as materialized through external intervention, Ethiopia’s modernity in the twentieth century also needed an external and colonial midwifery. For this, Italy presented itself as a candidate and newspapers as a part of the public sphere played a pivotal role in this self-representation.

It is also striking that no conceptual rupture occurred between Berhanena–Selam, a pre-colonial newspaper, and the colonial Amharic newspapers. The colonial newspapers redeployed Amharic concepts, such as siltané to mean civilization to articulate the idea of progress. The concept of siltané was the key concept in pre-colonial newspapers such as Berhanena–Selam, which depicted the emperor as a civilizational leader. In colonial newspapers also Caesar’s government in Ethiopia was narrated as the introducer of

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Colonial newspapers deployed siltané or civilizational discourse to articulate mission of colonial developmentalism accompanied by pictorial portrayals of infrastructures such as schools, roads, and hospitals made for the natives.

Colonial developmentalism—similar to any other modern discourse on development—deployed infrastructural landmarks as temples of civilization to depict the presence of development and its agents. Italian colonial development discourse used the already-existing tradition to epitomize its civilization mission using infrastructures as temples of civilization. Hence, newspapers were central in Italian colonial governance mainly to influence the natives in cities and towns. They were the major sites on which colonizer wrote about itself and its colonial mission. Newspapers were deployed to create an “imagined community” unified through objectification to colonial savior intervention. The public sphere of newspapers was a site of political mobilization and production of consent and legitimacy, even though colonial governance was inherently authoritarian. In this colonial governance, newspapers connected the colonized and colonizer to make up the political community of the colony or the colonial state. Colonial newspapers however were not sites of public debate about civilization exhibiting a complete shift from pre-colonial newspapers such as Berhanena-Selam, which is known for being a site for public. Limiting the public debate the colonizers reduced the public only to readers rather than political participants. When emperor Haylä-Sellassé restored his power from colonial rule, a new public sphere of newspapers was reconstructed, declaring the era as Addis Zämän or “new era.” In this post-colonial public sphere, Addis Zämän also became the name of the main newspaper, which remains in circulation today. This paper's ethnographic reading is inclusive of Addis Zämän in addition to the colonial and pre-colonial newspapers.

Hence, this paper reads the newspaper in two ways: as an archive and as an ethnographic site. The methodology appeals to both ethnographic and archival ways of reading newspapers in order to question the Italian occupation period in Ethiopia. Italian colonial newspapers published for the native in the native language are seen as an archive, and are read “not as sites of knowledge retrieval, but of knowledge production, as monuments of states as well as sites of state ethnography.” I benefited greatly from Ann Stoler’s reading of colonial archives and newspapers, and was influenced by Nancy Rosa Hunt’s reading of fiction as a site of archive, ethnography and remembrance to disrupt temporality. The next section presents the colonial discourse of development as a mode of rule combining different features of modern colonialism.

Colonial Discourse: Humanitarian Civilization and Late Colonial Developmentalism

From the 1920s onwards, Italy was preparing to expand its colonial empire in Africa by colonizing Ethiopia after its humiliating defeat at the battle of Adwa in 1896. For some, it is the “the Adwa complex” that explains the political psychology of the fascist party’s obsession in colonizing Ethiopia. The fascist party took the assignment of erasing this scar. Italy’s old ambition of colonizing Ethiopia for economic and settlement purposes also motivated the new conquest in the twentieth century. It also deployed different strategies to materialize this aspiration.

Diplomacy was Italy’s primary strategy to realize its colonial ambition in Ethiopia. In this diplomatic strategy, Italy attempted to use dissatisfied “feudal lords” as a Trojan horse for its colonial

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7 Yä qésar Mängest Melaktegan Vol. 27 No.28, 1940
9 Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance"
11 Del Boca Angelo. The Ethiopian War 1935-1941 translated by P.D. Cummins London: the University of Chicago press 1965 first chapter ‘the “Adowa complex”’ 3-16
12 Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, 12
mission. The fascist Italian regime was documenting “the defection of chiefs to show Europe that Italy was not occupying Ethiopia but liberating it from feudalism and eliminating slavery.” The defecting lords were seen as a gateway to Italy’s protectorate over Ethiopia. Moreover, to appease the imperial government of Ethiopia, Italy competed with France and Britain by sponsoring Ethiopia’s admission to the League of Nations.

Italy’s attempt to colonize Ethiopia by mobilizing provincial nobilities and appeasing the Haylā-Sellasse’s regime was followed by violence. “Violence and negotiation, dismantling and reconfiguration” was the rule of modern colonializing processes. The concept of “de bellatio: military conquest” justified Italy’s claim of rule over Ethiopia. The Italian colonial rule was similar to other colonies in Africa, where the “foreigner coming from another country imposed his rule by means of guns and machines.” Colonial rule however goes beyond the deployment of force to rule the colonized. Italy’s mode of colonial rule in Ethiopia had also multiple strategies beyond force and violence.

The narration of the use of force as central mode of Italy’s colonial rule influenced the historiography to the extent that the history of the five years Italian colonial period written only as a history of rupture defined by colonial war and anticolonial resistance. Literature on Italian colonial rule in Ethiopia “deal with the military, political and diplomatic events leading to the occupation of Ethiopia, instead of analysing Italian colonial rule and its impact on Ethiopian society.” The Ethiopian historiography reproduced the period as insignificant rupture using the concept of occupation.

The span of Italian colonial administration is known in Ethiopia as Italy’s occupation period, in Amharic popularly described as yā-Talian gizē (Italian era) mirroring the rupture discourse in colonial history in the continent. Despite the rupture framing, the period has been a significant theme that attracted literary works and novels and play writings. The legacy of colonialism appears worthy of historical inquiry only for those scholars who consider colonialism having specific impact on the colonized. Those who frame the colonial era as rupture ruled out the necessary of studying the colonial period and its legacy. By extension they exclude the decolonization option in post colonial discourse of emancipation. The framing of Italian period in Ethiopia as occupation created a historical blind spot that preclude the possibility of studying Italian colonial rule and its legacy and the possibility of decolonization to address post colonial problems in Ethiopia. Hence Ethiopian exceptionalism in African has been written among others by deploying concepts such as occupation which successfully represented Ethiopia in African historiography as anomaly kept aloof from colonized Africa.

Occasion is a European legal concept that emerged from the Congress of Vienna in 1815, though the practice is much older. Nehal Bhuta briefly mapped the conceptual history of belligerent occupation in European legal history. Bhuta depicts how the right to conquest and acquiring effective control of the territory of another state had a legal basis in classical European “international” law. He argues that the concept of belligerent occupation or occupatio bellica “develop[ed] as a legal status defined in con-
Therefore, occupation is defined by its relative “temporary state of fact”—provisional military control and administration with “no legal entitlement to exercise the rights of the absent sovereign.” Occupation, on the other hand, appears as an “intermediate status between invasion and conquest, during which the continuity of the juridical and material constitution is maintained.”

In the words of Arnold J. Toynbee, the members of the League, mainly Britain and France complemented the “Mussolinian sin of omission.” The temporal, legal and sovereignty discourse that conceptualized the notion of occupation misses a story of political implication such intervention may cause. An illegal, short-term intervention with or without complete defeat of targeted society and its organization would be considered colonial rule. Irrespective of the short time it was in power in Ethiopia, Italy destroyed the state institution, introduced a new colonial law, and worked until the end to dismember of the state of Ethiopia.

In the aftermath of the Italy’s defeat and withdrawal from Ethiopia, Italy’s colonial period was retrospectively conceptualized as temporal military control and administration over another state where the sovereign was exiled and the so-called international allies under the League of Nation appeased the invading force. In the words of Arnold J. Toynbee, the members of the League, mainly Britain and France complemented the “Mussolinian sin of Commission” by their “sin of omission.” How Italy ruled Ethiopia became a marginal subject matter though the mode of Italian colonial rule appeared similar with any modern colonial rule.

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26 Bhuta, “The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation”, 726
29 See Mamdani, Define and Rule, how the discourse of civilization was the feature both direct and indirect colonialism, pp. 44-45
30 See Paulos, 2003:332 and Haile, The Building of an Empire, 28
31 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini: 24; and Pigli Italian Civilization in Ethiopia.
32 Pigli Italian Civilization in Ethiopia, 60
33 Paulos, Mussolini’s “civilizing mission,” 332
34 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party . Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1848.
35 Tekeste Negash. Italian colonialism: 77, quoting colonial text book in Eritrea
rule of law.”

The theme of newspapers was preaching the above discourse to the natives. The public sphere mainly that of newspapers depict, colonial developmentalism was a central aspect of Italian colonial rule in Ethiopia. While this discourse defined the native as uncivilized compared to the colonizer, language highlighting pluralism and difference represent colonial rule as being inclusive of all natives. As part of the colonial discourse of civilization, the colonial government narrated the discourse of religious equality and sponsored the building of churches and the construction of mosques.

Similar to any other colonial rule, management of difference and pluralism was combined with the discourse of civilization. Similar discourse around religion was used to appease the political elite of the Arabic world, describing Italy as a champion for Islam and Ethiopia as a barbaric state which “oppressed Islam” and “oppressed Arabism.” Such measures dominated newspaper reporting, connecting different native religious groups to the colonizer, who represented a champion of all religions.

Conceptually, sultané and selam (civilization and peace) were the two categories persistently deployed from the eve of the capture of Addis Ababa in 1936 when the colonial force dropped pamphlets promising both to the residents. In Yä–Roma Berhan, civilization and peace were constantly used to justify colonial rule. Peace, for the colonizer, was a condition of defeating and eliminating anti-colonial resistance forces that were described as shifta (bandit) and anti-civilization. The major task of the three native newspapers was disseminating this discourse of civilization and progress made through the colonial intervention.

37 Mamdani, Define and Rule, 2013: 45
38 Mamdani, Define and Rule, see the language of exclusion and inclusion pp., 44-45
39 Erlich, Ethiopia and the Middle East, 114
40 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini
41 Yä–Roma Berhan

As the Fig. 1 picture depicts, newspapers were used as sites to show the temples of civilization such as technical schools, clinics, hospitals, highways and bridges as embodying the colonial
developmental mission. Roads and bridges as temples of civilization took considerable space of newspapers. This appears to be a continuation of the practice of state developmentalism, which deployed temples of civilization as symbols and justification of progress towards an imagined secular utopia.

The Fig. 2 picture depicts news of the health sector and focuses on the colonial government’s efforts toward fighting disease; this, too, was regular content of civilization discourse. The campaign against communicable diseases such as malaria was represented as a war declared by Italian medical doctors to save the natives. The colonial government defined itself as yā tēna tebāka mengit—“guardian of the natives’ health.” Figure 2 depicts how colonial medical practice fighting malaria was part of the discourse of colonial developmental mission. However, this representation of the colonizer as guardian of the natives’ health only depicts how medicinal practices were also aspects of the colonial governmentality. Because of the nature of this study and the limitation of historical sources used in this paper, it is impossible to depict broader aspect of colonial medicine and the “meaning-making” from the natives’ side. This section depicted how the Italian colonial government was mobilized many discourses such as civilization, progress and health as a mode of rule. This discourse was the dominant theme of the public sphere as an ethnographic reading of colonial newspapers reveals. Newspapers were part of a controlled public sphere where the colonizer speaks and write while the urban colonized is defined as merely a reader and object of the colonial mission.

Italian Indirect Rule and the Local State of the Natives

Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia is considered part of modern historical events alongside the Nazi occupation of Paris or Israeli occupation of Palestine, all of which occurred in a post-Congress of Vienna world order. However, the five-year stay of Italians in Ethiopia was an intensified colonial rule with a strong political legacy, rather than simply another occupation. In Europe, the legacy of Nazi’s occupation is studied by considering pre-occupation French institutions compared against those imposed by the occupier. The complete destruction of the institutions and laws of the occupied state and annihilation of its sovereignty would qualify the act as beyond invasion and occupation.

Pertaining to the nature of Italian colonial rule in Ethiopia, Alberto Sabacchi argued, “the fascist colonial administration was based on direct rule because they mistrusted the Ethiopians.” He justified this argument by citing the elimination of the Ethiopian elites from their positions of power. This liquidation of political elites happened, Sabacchi says, because “Italy hoped to bring modern ways of life to Ethiopia;” by this logic, Italian colonial rule was direct in its nature.

However, I argue that Italian colonial rule was indirect, even though the destruction of an already-existing state structure made it seem like direct rule. As Haile Larebo argued, “in order to conquer Ethiopia, the total dismemberment of the existing administrative structure of the empire became necessary. Everything was hurriedly reorganized ex-novo cutting across religious and ethnic divisions.” The destruction of the existing state structure tells us about the making of a new structure, which, I argue, was one for the making of indirect rule, which the concept of occupation cannot make intelligible.

42 Yä-Roma Berhan Vol. 1 No. 5 1931
43 Yä-Roma Berhan Vol. 1 No. 5 1931
46 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini: xxii
47 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini, 87
48 Haile, The Building of an Empire, 51
Particular institutional and discursive apparatuses characterized the indirect Italian colonial rule. Italy’s process of colonial governance inconsistently deployed a seemingly contradictory discourse of humanitarian civilization and colonial developmentalism combined with settler colonialism, tribalism and racial military administration and rule. Therefore civilizing discourse and influencing the native subjectivity were central in colonial mode of governance. Managing political subjectivity of the native beyond assimilation does not contradict with the civilizing discourse that was the feature of ancient colonialism. According to Mahmood Mamdani, “direct and indirect rule were not two consecutive phases in the development of colonial governance…. [Rather they] continued in tandem: the civilizing mission (assimilation) existed along the management of difference (pluralism).”

The above colonial discursive and institutional apparatuses used to produce new subjectivities. Similar to other colonial indirect rule, Italian colonial governance organized “to remake the subjectivities of the entire population” and shape “the present, past and future of the colonized” through the triad of setting new political identities, rewriting the historiography and through law and administration. It mobilized race to differentiate the colonizer from the colonized, and mobilized religion and tribe to enforce difference among the natives. Race, tribe and religion were deployed in authoring the subjectivity of the native.

However what sets Italian colonialism apart from other colonialisms in Africa was its successful utilization of religion—mainly of Islam—to create political subjectivity. Since the late nineteenth century, race and tribe, according to Mamdani, were the “two politicized identities” in colonial Africa, while caste, religion and tribe were used in colonial India. Italy’s colonial rule in Ethiopia combined these colonizing tools. Race, tribe and religion were deployed as political identities in order to shape the subjectivity of the natives.

Like in any other modern colonialism, racism was the salient feature of fascist Italian colonial discourse. Fascist racial discourse was a derivative of German anti-Semitism and “Nordic Racism.” It primarily began producing the “other” at home as was done, for example, to the Jewish minority in Italy. The 1938 fascist “Manifesto of Racial Scientists” publicized the narrative of an “irremediable divide between Jews and Italians.” The Italians were considered a pure Aryan race, while Jews were considered an inassimilable population composed of non-European racial elements. Social Darwinism and eugenics defined the content of this manifesto.

In relation to Africans, the manifesto prompted racial superiority of Italians over Africans by mixing race with geography and constructing the collective identity of the Mediterranean people against Orientals and Africans. According to Samson Bezabeh, this manifesto guided the Italian policy in Ethiopia through which Ethiopians and other subjects—such as Yemeni Arabs—were considered racially inferior to Italians. Similarly, Paulos Milkias argued that the fascist party was a stubborn adherent to this manifesto as it built a colonial state in Africa.

However, Darwin’s theory of social evolution as a justification in Ethiopia does not hold up; Ethiopian archeological sites bear witness to an ancient civilization. Because of the ruins of ancient civilization and presence of state as well as the victory of Adwa, colonial historiography could not simply impose social evolution theory onto the colonized space, Ethiopia. What is called the

55 Paulos, ‘Musoloni’s “civilizing mission, “
57 Samson Subjects of Empires Citizens of States, 156
58 Paulos, ‘Musoloni’s “civilizing mission, “
“meta-history [which] is written in bold within the frame of race... to represent historical progress, culminating in the development of the state,” could not be rewritten without the addition of another theoretical tool. As Martin Bernal argued “Where the racial stereotype of natural European superiority failed, artificial intervention was necessary to preserve it.” Hence, in Ethiopia, parallel to other similar colonized spaces, the manifesto was complemented by additional historiographical theory called the Hamitic hypothesis.

The Hamitic hypothesis as historiographical theory or assumption was deployed to externalize the mythical origin of some Ethiopians who contribute to ancient civilization while alienating the masses of the native from the history of this civilization. Hamitic hypothesis was one of the ways in which what Teshale Tibbebu calls “paint[ing] Ethiopians White” or constructing the myth of “Black Caucasians.” Historiography, as Mamdani theorized, is deployed to shape the past and influence the future. The major assumption of the Hamitic hypothesis is that “externalizing civilizing influence” while at the same time representing black Africa as a site of stagnation and receiver of external civilization. The historical changes and civilization of the past were retrospectively associated with the new migrant people such as the Sabians, for example, or the Amhara into Africa. The Amhara and Tigrean people were considered similar to Tutis, Berbers and Fulani—as Hamites—while the rest—mainly people settled in the southern part of Ethiopia—were represented as natives, similar to the Hutu and Hausa elsewhere. The above historiography also slipped into national historiography and ideology of the ruling Ethiopian elites similar to historiography of Nigeria, Rwanda and Sudan.

Italian construction of Hamitic hypothesis appears similar with the application the hypothesis elsewhere. Racist discourse also combined a humanitarian-oriented “white man’s burden” in Africa. The colonized subject was reduced to less-than-human category until Italy’s civilizational mission came to induct the native into modern humanity. The Italian colonial mission in Ethiopia was discursively represented with the task of both liberating the ethnically oppressed natives from Hamitic people. The Amhara, as one supposedly Hamitic group, and their subjugation of the rest of the Ethiopian society was dominant in the anti-Ethiopia literature of the time. Not only civilization but also liberation of the native from Amhara justified the Italian colonial intervention in Ethiopia. Colonizing the native with the intention of liberation hence appears one of the contradictory discourses of Italian colonialism.

The major paradox of Italy’s colonial discourse was, its vision of settler colonialism in Ethiopia was accompanied by discourse of humanitarian and civilizational mission guided by racial principles. This paradox is visible in fascist colonial policies’ representation of Addis Ababa as an object of its civilization mission and space for settler colonialism. Addis Ababa was represented as “the true Negro city,” signifying not only the color of the inhabitants but the “disorganized” and “undisciplined” behavior that justified colonial civilizational mission. However instead of selecting other site for building new colonial city, Addis’ historical significance forced them to choose it. As Fuller Mia argued Addis Ababa’s “permittivity was one justification for conquering it; but on the other hand, Italian architects had to build there rather than de novo because of its [Addis Ababa’s] specific historic meaning.”
Though it was presented as a primitive and disorganized city—characteristics which made segregationist restructuring difficult—Addis Ababa was chosen by Mussolini to be the capital of the Italian empire in East Africa, mainly because of prestige.\(^{70}\)

The paradox of settler colonialism and civilizing of the “primitive” natives’ city was to be resolved in the discourse and architecture of separate developments for natives and settlers. In 1936 it was reported that a plan to “complete reconstruction of the city on an imposing scale. The European and native quarters are to be separate and provisions were made for the natives themselves to be divided into various sections according to race [tribe] and religion.”\(^{71}\)

The first Italian plan for Addis Ababa was comprised of three neighborhoods: the native quarter (quartiere indigeno), the commercial quarter (quartiere commerciale), and the Italian quarter (quartiere italiano). It additionally included a political center (centro politico), and green spaces (zone verdi).\(^{72}\) This was also true for other cities such as Dire Dawa where the binary of native space or ville indigène/magala and settlers or the ville Europeenne/Gazira existed.\(^{73}\)

Beside the 1936 plan for Addis Ababa, three other plans were formulated for the city between 1936 and 1939. Also based on racial principles, separate development between the native and the settler remained key to planning. “Segregation extend[ed] to terminology;” for example, the concept of “quarter” was applied to natives’ neighborhoods, while “center” or “city” was used for the settlers.\(^{74}\) Segregationist designs also involved natural barriers such as rivers, hills and green zones between the natives and settlers, which falsely naturalized racial difference.\(^{75}\) Therefore in addition to analysis of colonial historiography, law and institution, Italian segregationist policy can be understood by looking at the architectural planning of cities such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.\(^{76}\)

Civilization itself was equated with architecture.\(^{77}\) However, architecture, like law, signifies more than colonial governance and management of difference. Through separate development project and segregationist salvation architecture was deployed to shape the natives’ present and future.\(^{78}\) The management of urban spaces through architecture reflects the binary political identities of settler and native, white and colored, civilized and primitive, and colonizer and colonized. While deliberating on the plan for Addis Ababa, colonial experts reportedly found that “the core and the most urgent task in constructing the city [Addis Ababa] was building the native quarter.”\(^{79}\) Sanitation, greening, order and equitable distribution of land to the native justified the construction of the natives’ quarter.\(^{80}\) By 1937, “more than ten thousand blacks, almost a ninth of the colored [native] population” were evicted and settled in a new native quarter called Addis Kätäma or “new town.”\(^{81}\)

Politicized racial identities were enforced, above all, through law, which preceded the management of space and geography through architecture. Architecture as a marker of civilization needs the support of the law if it is to govern the colonized subject. The architecture of separate development was a derivative discourse from the management of difference through law and historiography. Law, following historiography, defined the subject, and

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\(^{71}\) British Foreign Office confidential “Italian annexation of Ethiopia: development schemes.” Refers to Rome dispatch No. 725. Telegram from Mr. Ingram to Mr. Aden, Rome 17/6/35/1935/21 September 1936. I am grateful to Dr. Samson Bezabeh and his generosity for sharing this particular archival source.

\(^{72}\) Fuller Mia, Modern Abroad, 198

\(^{73}\) Samson, Subjects of Empires Citizens of States, 55

\(^{74}\) Fuller Mia, Modern Abroad, 206


\(^{76}\) See Samson, Subjects of Empires Citizens of States, 55


\(^{78}\) Mamdani, Define and Rule

\(^{79}\) Ya Qeser Mälakteñña Volume 1 and 2:32

\(^{80}\) Ya Qeser Mälakteñña Volume 1 and 2:32

\(^{81}\) Pankhurst, 1987:33
architecture redefined space to fit with the new definition of the subject. Hence, architecture and separate development discourse were part of the colonial mode of rule and governance. Such definition of the colonial subject precedes the institution of rule, as Mahmood Mamdani argued in his book *Define and Rule*.  

Controlling about one-third of Ethiopia, Italy declared its colonial empire *Africa Orientale Italiana* (AOI) by deploying historiography, law, geography and architecture. In 1936, it declared the *legge organica* (organic law), which gave legal support to the military and its colonial conquest. Later, a charter called *Ordinamento Politico Amministrativo* strengthened this. Italian settlers were "citizens of optime jure, and the Ethiopians who were treated as a subject people and enjoyed no rights whatsoever, although, divided into categories according to their tribal origins, some of them were favored with certain 'privileges.'" The native authority was invented through custom, religion and language difference. Italians were considered united citizens of the colonial empire while Ethiopians were the native subjects disunited by their "tribal" and religious lines. The major objective of the "native policy or politica indigena was to subordinate the indigenous population's interest to metropolitan politics." Education of the natives was one of the instruments deployed for such subornation of the native population.

Under AOI, Ethiopia mixed with the other countries of the Horn of Africa, and colonial administration more generally were divided based on ethnic or linguistic and religious differences into four governorships or governorates. These are Amhara, Harar, Oromo–Sidama and Shoa while the Tigreña-speaking community was combined as Eritrea and the Somali-speaking community joined the Italian Somalia making the number of governorships of the colony six. In other words these administrative regions are homelands crafted based on ethnic identity. Each governorate was also divided into commissioners, residencies, and vice residencies. The number of residences and vice residencies was estimated to be 300. Each resident also combined districts headed by Meslâné and villages headed by a *cheqa shum* or village chief. These last two tiers of the state made up the local (native) authority of the colony.

To realize this colonial governance, the colonial regime eliminated most of the upper and middle nobilities and provincial leaders and replaced them with Italian residents. This left the lowest office—*cheka-shum*—intact. The local state therefore appeared to be a native authority involving both administrative and legal apparatus. The language of the local state and the media of instruction reflected the native authority. The following table depicts the colonial state dual structure for the settlers and natives in Amhara governorates. It depicts the bifurcated state structure from the governorate, which is the highest regional state with the colonial apparatus to the *cheqa shum*, which was the lowest tier of the colonial state.

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82 Mamdani, *Define and Rule*
83 Sabacchi, *Ethiopia under Mussolini*, 44
84 Del Boca, *The Ethiopian War*, 229
85 Del Boca, *The Ethiopian War*, 229
86 Haile, *The Building of an Empire*, 57
87 Paulos, "Musoloni’s "civilizing mission, "
88 Sabacchi, *Ethiopia under Mussolini* 86–91
89 Sabacchi, *Ethiopia under Mussolini*: 87
Both ethnic identity and religious difference were used to constrict the native authority of the local state. The secular local governor for Muslims was Nāgadrās, while it was Kāntība for Christian in Gojjam and Bahir-Dar commissariats under the Amhara governorate. When the two overlapped, religion was given priority. For example, in areas where Amharic-speaking Christian community dominated, education was given in Amharic, whereas if Muslim Amharic speakers dominated an area, as the language used in schools was Arabic. Arabic for an Amharic-speaking community was an ecclesiastical language, and therefore the decision seems to have been justified by religion than ethnic identity. But Amharic was not a religious ecclesiastical language for Christians; rather, it was a language of the court and of the imperial palace, probably since the Middle Ages.

It was called lisane negus (the language of the emperor) before its expansion. It was aspiring to “appeal to Muslim opinion” not only in Ethiopia but also globally from Libya to Arabian lands.

The colonial ruler paradoxically deployed different languages as the official language of the state at the local level. This strategy counterbalanced Amharic by making Arabic an official language of the Muslim-dominated areas irrespective of their vernacular language: Oromo, Amharic or Tigreñña.

Italy’s Arabization project was also linked to the global geopolitics of the time. The politicization of Islam by the colonial regime through Arabization and institutionalization of Shari’a law and the spread of Islam was part of the plan to make the Italian empire in the Horn of Africa “part of their oriental Mediterranean dream.” The Italian governor determined the establishment of Shari’a courts, the appointment of its qadis (judges), and determined the court’s jurisdiction. This Italian colonial policy was successful in producing loyalty and trust from the elite of Muslim community. Italy “tried to divide and rule the country portraying Muslims as the oppressed and orthodox Christians as the oppressors;” it was aspiring to “appeal to Muslim opinion” not only in Ethiopia but also globally from Libya to Arabian lands.

Governorships, districts and residences were mainly organized to ensure the ethnic and religious unity of Muslims. Islamic court was institutionalized under the qadis (Shari’a judges). During the Italian period alone, fifty new mosques were built. According to the governor of the Shoa governorship, S. E. Nasi, the Italian pro-Muslim policy was determined by three major explanatory

93 Pankhurst, “Language and Education in Ethiopia”, 2
94 Erlich, Haggai Ethiopia and the Middle East London, Lynne Reinner Publisher, Inc: 1994: 122
95 See Amharic abridged colonial law prepared for Shoa governorship in yā Roma Berhan newspaper Vol. 1 No. 3 1933 e.c.
96 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini
97 Samson, Citizens of State and Subjects of Empire, 118
98 Foreign office “Italian efforts to obtain allegiance of British Arabs in Ethiopia” Telegram from Mr. Roberts, Addis Ababa 17/26/1935/1 August 1936. The telegram describes demonstration of loyalty by local Arabs organized by Italians
99 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini, 162-164

Table: Colonial State Structure in Amhara Governorate 1936–1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure / Function</th>
<th>For Italians [State Structure for Settlers]</th>
<th>For Ethiopians [Natives]</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governorate General</td>
<td>Governors General (Viceroy)</td>
<td>Abīqaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governors General</td>
<td>Abīqaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissariats</td>
<td>Commissioners</td>
<td>Medlānē [district governor]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residences</td>
<td>Residents</td>
<td>Dug [zone chief]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Residences</td>
<td>Vice-residences</td>
<td>Atebya dañña</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from Saltene Seyoum A History of Resistance in Gojjam (Ethiopia) 1936–1941

Ge’ez, the “Latin of Ethiopia,” that was been considered an ecclesiastical language that could have paralleled Arabic if religion had been the unanimous principle for creating a political subject. The colonial ruler paradoxically deployed different languages as the official language of the state at the local level. This strategy counterbalanced Amharic by making Arabic an official language of the Muslim-dominated areas irrespective of their vernacular language: Oromo, Amharic or Tigreñña.

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99 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini, 162-164
factors. The first was that one-fourth of Italian subjects living in the colonial empire—including Albania—were Muslims. Second, Italy’s commercial ties and business were related to Muslim-dominated areas such as Libya, Yemen, Egypt and Turkey. Third, Muslims were considered to be the most loyal of Italy’s colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, it was politically strategic for Italy to portray itself as a champion of the Muslim cause. Such self-representation, alongside the mobilization of religious and ethnic identity, was visible in the colonial newspaper.

Custom was a significant organizing principle in the making of the colonial state. Custom refers to a social element within a particular community in the premodern. In colonial modernity, custom became part of the political and instrument of law to define the native.\textsuperscript{101} Colonial philosophy itself promotes the establishment of native authority based on custom. Both ethnic and religious identities were considered part of the native custom, including the Arabic language.

As part of this separate racial and tribal development rule, “employing Amhara in government offices and using the Amharic language in non-Amhara territories was prohibited.”\textsuperscript{102} “No power sharing with the ras”\textsuperscript{103} was the motto of the Italian colonial officer assuming all rases (heads or generals) were Amhara. The Italian colonial policy restructuring the empire into ethnic homelands or governorships was represented as a way to eliminate “the hegemony of the Amhara over other ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{104} Marshal Graziani ordered the “extermination of all Amhara chiefs, great and small.”\textsuperscript{105} Though unsuccessful, resettlement of the Amharic-speaking communities was encouraged.\textsuperscript{106}

This was primarily an attempt to attach nativity to homeland; as Mahmood Mamdani puts it, both land rights and participation in local public affairs were “the exclusive preserve of natives said to belong to the homeland.”\textsuperscript{107} In the colonial governance the narrative of “Oromo oppression under Amhara domination became a central theme of Italian propaganda and of de-Amharization campaigns.”\textsuperscript{108} As part of this campaigns “Amharic was displaced as the legal language; Arabic, Oromonya and Kaffinya were taught

\textsuperscript{100} Yä–Roma Berhan Vol. 1 No 3 1931 Ethiopian Calender.

\textsuperscript{101} Mamdani Mahmood \textit{Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism, with a new preface}. South Africa and Uganda: Wits University Press and Makerere Institute of Social Research, 2007; xvii.

\textsuperscript{102} Haile, \textit{The Building of an Empire}, 56.

\textsuperscript{103} Haile, \textit{The Building of an Empire}, 56.

\textsuperscript{104} Sabacchi, \textit{Ethiopia under Mussolini} 159.

\textsuperscript{105} Del Boca, \textit{The Ethiopian War}, 220.

\textsuperscript{106} Sabacchi, \textit{Ethiopia under Mussolini} 159.

\textsuperscript{107} Mamdani, \textit{Define and Rule}, 3.

\textsuperscript{108} Sabacchi, \textit{Ethiopia under Mussolini} 16-161.
in schools.”

The demobilization of Amharic language and the Amharic-speaking subject from the colonial state is a reflection of the colonial historiography in which Ethiopian history was represented as ethnic strife with the Amhara dominating all other groups. Hence, Italian colonial officers believed that by mobilizing a protectorate image of the colonial state and anti-Amhara sentiment, they could easily produce consent from non-Amharic speakers. The primordial view of ethnic identity and a policy to associate tribe with the tribal homeland were made mainly to “the total disappearance of Ethiopia as a geographical unit.”

It was true that the court and palace language of the empire was Amharic mainly from the nineteenth century onward. However, the army and higher officers of the empire were recruited from the wider empire through different means such as voluntary submission, slavery and captivity. The colonial state was designed to displace and dismember the Ethiopian empire by creating native authorities along religious and ethnic lines. Therefore, tribalism was a political and administrative strategic tool in the making of Italian colonial empire in East Africa. It was a strategy to set the clock backwards or to keep as it stands still by mobilizing, inventing and enforcing difference by colonial law and governance.

The complex colonial mode of governance which produced and mobilized the difference of the colonized also produced their unity. This unity was a product of the colonizer representation of the colonized as object of the colonial mission. The collective unity of the colonized subjects was a product of their relation with the colonizer which presented itself as midwife of the progress of the colonized. Italian colonial developmentalism as a mode of rule used temples of civilizations: infrastructure built in Ethiopia to define the colonized space with natives as object. In just five years, “25 hospitals, 14 hotels, dozens of post offices, telephone exchanges, aqueducts, schools and shops were built.”

Moreover, about 5000 kilometers of new roads were constructed. These developments were cast as part of a civilizing mission and deployed to produce legitimacy for Italian colonial state.

The discourse of liberation from Amhara domination and civilizing the native through colonial intervention however failed to produce loyalty from the colonized natives. Italy failed to gain the trust and loyalty from the Oromo [and other “liberated” natives] that it expected. The anti colonial forces in Ethiopia were made up of all linguistic and religious groups. It is perhaps self-evident that the colonizer’s (unfounded) assumptions were that all patriots and nationalists fell along ethnic lines as Amharic speakers, and that the Ethiopian state was ethnic property.

Despite this collective struggle against the colonizer, the politics of difference mobilized as colonial mode of rule left its own legacy in the politics of Ethiopia. However the impact the colonial mode of rule in the post Italian period politics has not seriously studied. Little attention has been given to issues such as how Italy ruled Ethiopia and what legacy it left on Ethiopian politics?

Because of this, decolonization was not considered as possible redemptive and transformative discourse in Ethiopia. The next section discusses the restoration of Haylä-Sellasé’s regime and an attempt to preserve the political through state developmentalism and nation building through re-Amharicization as an anti-colonial, and reactive mode of rule. It directly linked the post Italian policy of the Ethiopian state with the colonial mode of rule.

Discourse of siltané in the New Era
Reactive Discourse 1941–1974

Addis Zämän (New Era for new Ethiopia) was declared after the end of Italy’s occupation, following Italy’s defeat by the collaborative work of patriots and exiles—including Emperor Haylä-Sellasé—with the help of the British. In his victory speech, Emperor

109 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini 16-161
110 Haile, The Building of an Empire, 52
111 Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, 233
112 Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, 232
113 Sabacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini 16-161
114 The relevance of this question to post-colonial African states see Mamdani: Citizen and Subject
Haylä-Sellasé affirmed that Myazya 27 (May 5), the victory day, "[would herald] a new era for the new Ethiopia."\(^\text{115}\) It was the day on which Ethiopia restored its sovereignty from Italian colonial force and was represented as a day for rebirth and renaissance of Ethiopia with the crucial role of the emperor.\(^\text{116}\) The day also signified "the beginning of a new task for new Ethiopia following the exemplary role of the emperor in the spirit of evangelical love, collaboration and unity."\(^\text{117}\) The new era was declared to be the era of siltané, taking a cue from the subjugation imposed under the fascist government.\(^\text{118}\) The post colonial public sphere reconstituted erasing the naming and the publication of the colonial newspaper. A new newspaper was published titled Addis Zämän, heralding the beginning of the new era.

The era was also declared to be a period of nätsänät (liberation) and national freedom from Italian colonial occupation. This was articulated as freedom from national and collective slavery.\(^\text{119}\) The colonial period was represented in the state discourse as national subjugation and slavery similar to the story of the subjugation of the Israelites in Egypt under pharaoh. After Ethiopians had been subjugated for five years under Caesar, the exiled Haile-Sellasé was represented as the Ethiopian Moses who liberated the nation from slavery under the hands of the modern Caesar.\(^\text{120}\) The five-year colonial period was also represented as a trial and tribulation time designed to give a lesson to Ethiopians. It was represented as a historical lesson to Ethiopians about the value of freedom, obedience, hard work and religiosity.\(^\text{121}\) The new era, therefore, was the era of liberation, national freedom, and the new siltané.

Siltané re-emerged as a concept however considering national freedom as a precondition for it. Sustainable national freedom and sovereignty in the 1920s and 30s were a byproduct of and justification for the national commitment to progress. In the 1940s, national freedom was considered a necessary condition for siltané. Such urgency to ensure national sovereignty and freedom was not only a result of Italian colonization of Ethiopia, but also the British forces’ delay in withdrawing from Ethiopian territory. This policy of National freedom and political kingdom first appeared similar with anti-colonial resistance articulation against the late colonial developmentalism in the rest of Africa. As Fredrick Cooper argues, "...the development concept once intended to solidify the colonial empires ideologically and economically – was deflected by nationalists movement into assertions that true development required self-government."\(^\text{113}\)

As a universal hegemonic discourse, civilization represents Africans as on object to be transformed and an outsider other to be introduced or familiarized with the ideas of civilization and progress. The colonial intervention of the West justified through this discourse. However, the intrinsic nature of such discourse—which has been totalizing but not total, hegemonic but fragmented\(^\text{123}\) or dominant but not hegemonic—"opened the possibilities [in Africa] that alternative formulations [in Africa] could get themselves heard on a global scale."\(^\text{125}\) Copper affirms the late colonial developmentalism; though it was a totalizing colonial discourse, the African nationalist also used it as anti-colonial instrument by presenting self-government and independence as a precondition to the economic kingdom. For example, Ghanaian national priority in the 1950s was political as captured by Kwame Nkrumah’s mantra, “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you.”\(^\text{126}\)

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115 Haylä-Sellassie’s victory speech AZ No. 1 1933 e.C
116 AZ No. 1 1933 e.C
117 AZ No. 1 1933 e.C
118 ‘saw bagarar bezu nawi Kebru’ AZ NO 2 1933 eC
119 ‘saw bagarar bezu nawi Kebru’ AZ NO 2 1933 eC and Ewnätäña Tsnu haymanot yämotä Ynäsal’ AZ NO 19 1934 eC
120 AZ NO. 10 1933 e.C
121 AZ No. 1 1933 e.C
123 Lacalu and Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2001
124 Ranjit Guha’s subaltern “autonomy” as a result of colonial dominancy lacking hegemony quoted in Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 9
125 Cooper, Frederick Decolonization and African society, 472
126 Biney Anna The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, 79
Haylä-Sellasé’s imperial regime’s national and foreign policy was influenced much by a similar quest to preserve the political kingdom, first from Italian colonial project, and then from the British, who referred to Ethiopia as an Occupied Enemy Territorial Administration (OETA) until 1944. The discourse of abolition of slavery was one of the justifications for British interventionist policy in Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa was also a victim of colonial tribal mobilization; therefore, fear of social conflict was also presented as justification for British colonial trusteeship administration in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian state also considered development, abolition of slavery and, de-tribalization as defining elements of it imperial policy from 1941. What was at stake after Italy was defeated in the war was restoring the dismembered Ethiopia using counter-logic to Italian tribalization. This de-tribalization strategy was implemented by imposing Amharic as the national language of Ethiopia. The tribalization mode of colonial rule therefore, was followed by de-tribalization while the developmentalism from above persisted as part of the ethos of the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia’s initiative to forge relations with the United States was motivated by this quest for development and national sovereignty that grew from British ambition to keep Ethiopia as a colony.

In the aftermath of the Second World War and the end of Italian colonial period in Ethiopia, the discourse of siltané, therefore, was not only a negotiated discourse between global universal discourse and local sensibility, but was also reactive to Italian colonial policy and praxis and British influence until 1944. The 1940s and 50s both had some element of the anti-colonial, de-tribalization and decolonization moment, albeit each with its own particularity. Despite this colonially derivative policy of the Ethiopian state, Italy’s stay in Ethiopia narrated through the concept of occupation.

The Ethiopians’ persistent fight for five years was the explanation for using the concept of occupation, which depicts that Italy’s rule as not fitting into the doctrine of effective control as a defining element of colonial control and rule. Because of this, a writer in the Addis Zämän newspaper argued that “it is impossible to say Italy ruled Ethiopia.” The category of occupation instead of colonization was a result of belittling impact, short span of life, and failure of Italian force to crush the Ethiopia patriots’ movement costing the lives of about 11,000 Italian soldiers in addition to causing widespread property destruction. Despite this historical representation of the five-year span of Italian colonial military regime in Ethiopia as insignificant, in the 1940s and 1950s the Ethiopian state’s ethos and discourses focused on healing the colonial legacy and its politics. This was a central aspect of the new public sphere, represented by both the name and content of Addis Zämän.

Colonial Legacy and Detribalization: Amharicization and Depoliticization of Religion

Haylä-Sellasé’s regime, from 1941 onward, attempted to address the legacy of Italian policy of divide and rule and tribalism, which exploited and politicized the linguistic and religious difference in Ethiopia while at the same time keeping developmentalism, which defined the ruled as an object of intervention. The Italian colonial policy position was retrospectively reflected in the first year publication of Addis Zämän. The newspaper, quoting Italian general Marshal Graziani’s speech addressed to the native, depicted how a major target of the divide and rule policy was Oromo-Amhara

129 Säw bägäru bezu naw Kebru’ italya itypypyn gäzäch lämalet aychalem AZ NO 2 1933 RC
relations.\textsuperscript{131} The newspaper deployed colonial memory to justify the new policy.

Asräs Yänésew, one of the homespun scholars of twentieth century Ethiopia, also argued that "even if the Italian army withdrew from Ethiopia, its politics didn’t. [He] can present Italians’ books written for wicked intention for anyone who doubts this."\textsuperscript{132} The wickedness of this colonial historiography, according to Asräs, is that it was written to divide and sow the seed of social antagonism in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{133} The intellectual and the state policies confirm the legacy of how Italy ruled Ethiopia was critical public concern at the time. Hence Asräs affirmed that Italy was only defeated in war, and that its politics and knowledge production that de-centered Ethiopia persisted. He calls for decolonization through re-centering Ethiopia through local languages, mainly Ge’ez. Ge’ez and ancient Ge’ez literature were represented as solution for re-writing history and transforming the political economy.\textsuperscript{134}

The regime perused Amharicization of the national official language to detribalize as a reaction to colonial Arabization and de-Amharicization policy. It tried to transcend religious difference by deploying a discourse of national freedom, unity and developmentalism as well as by relegating religion to the private realm. The newspaper described how both Muslims and Christians have the honor and joy of being able to celebrate their respective religious festivities in the context of national freedom.\textsuperscript{135}

The association of the regime’s policy with the colonial mode of rule was plausible in light of the history of pre-Italian period being defined by an absence of coherent language policy and clear lack of religious equality. This was true despite the public’s and intellectuals’ articulating the necessity of religious equality.\textsuperscript{136} The language issue was hotly debated in the pre-Italian period, and the discussion involved both intellectuals and the public.\textsuperscript{137} For example, there was no consciously planned national language policy to be used as the main medium of instruction. Ge’ez continued as an ecclesiastical language, but its role in the palace was reduced. Chroniclers began to write emperors’ chronicles in Amharic since the time of Emperor Tewodros (1855-1868). Amharic persisted as the language of the court.

There was no consistent praxis both in using local and foreign languages in official communication and or in gradual expansion of education. The issue was never settled before Italy’s intervention. For example, in the beginning of the 20th century, the first experiment of modern education by Emperor Menelik II taught Ge’ez as the only language alongside lessons in Ethiopian history, writing and ethics.\textsuperscript{138} The first government-owned modern school, Ecole Impériale Menelik II, opened in 1908. Egyptians were the first teachers and the language of instruction was French, though students were also taught English, Italian and Amharic. Swedish Evangelical mission schools in Addis Ababa used to combine both the Amharic and Oromo languages alongside French and English. It was also reported that emperor Menilk wrote, “everywhere my soldiers are sitting on the ground spelling and or reading” after he distributed Amharic and Oromo Bibles to his military.\textsuperscript{139} As can be captured from Richard Pankhurst’s panoramic survey of education in the pre-Italian period, Ethiopia had no national curriculum or education policy. The public debate on language in the early 20th century shows that the national language of education was not decided. Amharic was used as a media of instruction for primary school at the national level starting only in 1955, and until then “the imperial government had no coherent strategy. The curriculum was ad-hoc and left to teachers who came from different

\textsuperscript{131} AZ 1934 Number 22 year one quoting Graziani speech
\textsuperscript{132} Asräs, Tekami Mekir ("የኢትዮጵያ ጦር ትወጣ ለቲኩ አልወጣም። ወዴት አለ ብሎ የሚጠይቀኝ ካለስለተንኮል የጻፉዋቸውን መጽሐፍት አቀርብለታለሁ።")
\textsuperscript{133} See Asräs Yenesew Tebé Axum
\textsuperscript{134} Asras Yä-nesaw Tebē Axum Mänu Anta and Tekami Mäkir
\textsuperscript{135} AZ ‘yä Ramadan bale akäbabär’ Year one no. 24 1934 E.C.
\textsuperscript{136} See Gabrahwoit’s books Atsé Minlik and Ethipothia and Mängestna yä-hizeb Astädader and Täkelä-Hawaryat’s speech in Mahatma Selläsé Zebra Najar 723 726
\textsuperscript{137} See Aemro and Berhanena Selam Newspaper
\textsuperscript{138} Pankhurst, “Language and Education in Ethiopia”, 20
countries with different background.”

In the 1940s and 50s, the regime enacted a policy to make Amharic the official national language of Ethiopia. In the formal school, military trainings and other institutions, Amharic and English were taught. At a graduation ceremony of military officers at Holeta Military Academy, Emperor Haylă-Sellasé said in his speech that “to claim Ethiopian-ness and not to be able to speak Amharic, is as disgraceful stance as a claim to have no country and to fail to know one’s mother and father. If possible it is worth knowing Ge’ez too.”

Along with the changing language policy, Haylă-Sellasé’s religious policy had shifted to consider Muslims as legitimate political actors in the country. He began to consider building mosques as part of the tradition of rebuilding of churches, sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca, and championed the pilgrimage to Jerusalem as a reaction to Italian mobilization of Muslim Ethiopians against the theocratic Christian state.

The ritualistic meeting of heads of Muslim community with the emperor was also a post-Italian period event. In these meetings, the emperor used to trace how Christians and Muslims lived together freely. He also recalled how fascist Italy tried to exploit differences, presenting itself as favoring one religion against the other. He stated, “it has been clear for all of us the fact that Italy policy was to oppress like slaves all the races except Italians and Germans.”

In 1945, Haylă-Sellasé now-famously stated that “religion is personal; the state is for all.” By declaring the state as a collective and religious identity as a private matter, Haylă-Sellasé countered the colonial mode of politicization of religion in Ethiopia. A policy document of the regime affirmed that “Ethiopia has continued to abide by her policy that religion should be kept apart from politics.” Haylă-Sellasé elaborated on the private aspect of religion with another famous dictum: “The matter of religion pertains to the kingdom of God.” In other words, the political kingdom is secular and collective, while the relation between God and believers is private affair. However, he maintained the discourse of the “elect of God” as king of kings in the “secular” kingdom. According to the official ideology therefore, it was only through him the kingdom of God and the profane kingdom linked, while religion was kept out from shaping the political subjectivity of the commoners.

Towards the policy of depoliticizing religion, one of the intellectuals of early twentieth century, Gabrahiwot Baykedagn wrote that “religion belongs to conscience and the supernatural king will rule over it, the earthly king doesn’t inspect it.” In elaborating on this, he used the famous quote “to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, to God what belongs to God.” Scholars such as Bahru Zewde considered this prescriptive writing the foundation of Haylă-Sellasé’s post-Italian occupation policy of depoliticizing religion.

The emperor gave attention to such intellectual prescription as a reaction to Italian colonial policy of politicizing religion.

Besides declaring the state as a collective, the regime also provided a secular utopia as national imagination through the discourse of development. In his speech on the Ramadan festival Haylă–Sellase requested the Muslim community of Ethiopia to work for “limaat of their country, stability of their state and to the unity of the people without being self centered.” Development therefore continued to be the theology that cemented the unity of the people transcending religious or nationality differences. A meetings between Muslim elites and the emperor became an of-

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141 See Fré-känafer za Qidamwi Haylă Selassé vol. 3 1957 Addis Ababa Berhanena Selam Printing 31.83 cm × 21.5 cm 4 vol. የወቅ የዓበላ በርሔና የወቅ የግር ያለኝ የወቅ ያህል አሳፋሪ ነገር ነው፤፤ ቢቻል ግዕዝንም ጨምሮ ማወቅ ጠቃሚ ነው፤፤
142 Az ‘yi Ramirez bale akähaber’ Year one no. 24 1934 e.C.
144 Ministry of Information Religious Freedom in Ethiopia, 14
145 Ministry of Information Religious Freedom in Ethiopia, 17
146 Gäbrä-Heyywät, Ates Menilik ena Iyopia: 22
147 Bahru, “The Challenge of Millennium and its Historical and Cultural Meanings.” 43
148 Az 1934 Number 21 year one
ficial ritual during Muslim holy days, Ramadan and Arafa. In one such occasion, the emperor reaffirmed that the Muslim–Christian binary is divisive. And he told Muslim representatives “…we work to stop this division…. All Ethiopians are belonging to one family.” On each occasion of paying homage, Muslim representatives expressed their loyalty to the emperor and the emperor reaffirmed the unity of Muslims and Christians alike in sharing the political kingdom.  

In the post-Italian period, national unity and independence for siltané generally dominated the state ethos in the 1940s and 1950s. National unity, peace, brotherhood and security were determined to comprise the ethos and discourse of siltané in 1950s and 1960s. In other words, even revising the hitherto national ethos of siltané, Haylä-Sellasé’s policy to erase the colonial legacy that risked the dismemberment of Ethiopia and to preserve the monarchical political kingdom at any cost was the result of a rupture created during colonial intervention. Italian colonialism was considered an intervention and disruption of Ethiopia’s march towards progress and siltané.

By being reactive to the colonial discourse of civilization without freedom, the imperial regime deployed freedom and unity as a precondition for siltané. This aligned with the priority of self-government and the call for the political kingdom was first in decolonization moments elsewhere in Africa. The prioritization of the security and sustainability of the political kingdom by Haylä-Sellasé’s regime, like any other African nationalist regime of the period, made use of development discourse to articulate national and popular sovereignty as it related to the global powers.

One of the colonial political and economic legacies in Ethiopia is manifested either as a reactive policy of the imperial regime to the colonial intervention or in the ways it kept this legacy. For example, intensified Amharicization of the nation was a direct reaction to the divide and rule policy of Italy. This means that Haylä-Sellasé’s regime paralleled Mahmood Mamdani’s description of African post-colonial radical regimes which operated against decentralized despotism. The imperial regime, similar to radical regimes elsewhere in Africa, engaged on the project of detribalization as decolonization, transforming the regime in a similar way to the centralized despotism of post-colonial African states. Amharicization was presented as a solution to linguistic and nationality differences within the state, just as economic planning and science were presented as solutions to the predicament of Ethiopia’s development. The regime used de-politicization of religion to transcend religious boundaries within the community. Amharicization and modernization through development planning were the two pillars of the post-1940s Ethiopian state ethos.

In comparison to the pre-war period, Haylä-Sellasé’s regime became more repressive and less tolerant to different political questions and deliberations. Despite the 1955 revision of the constitution to introduce universal suffrage for adult citizens and the Bill of Rights, the political space was narrowed and securitized. In that period, the vibrant discursive community that wrote and read Berhanena Selam in the 1920s and early 1930s was no longer in existence. The new newspaper, Addis Zämän, inherited the Italian colonial newspapers, which were the propaganda sites of political cadres serving the regime.

The regime had faced persistent protest and critique from the intellectuals and the masses. These dissident voices manifested in literary works and later during the revolution, were seen only as reflections of political degeneration of Haylä-Sellasé’s regime. According to Bahru Zewde, the progressive Haylä-Sellasé of the 1920s and 30s had become the reactionary of the 1950s and 60s.

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149 Fré-känafer zä Qädamwi Haylä Selassié vol. 2 Addis Ababa Berhanena Selam Printing 1953: 860
150 See Fré-känafer zä Qädamwi Haylä Selassié vol. 4 1959 Addis Ababa Berhanena Selam Printing 1959: 1922
151 Emperor Haylä-Sellasé’s speech on his birthday A2 No. 12 1934
152 Biney Ama The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah
153 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 25
154 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject 25-26
155 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 149 of 1955, Negarit Gazeta, 15th Year, No. 2 revised constitution 1955
Young Haylä-Sellasé was progressive in earlier days according to Bahru because civilization or “progress was a concomitant of his quest for power” and he became reactionary in the later days. This is because of the emperor’s “clinging to power blocked all paths to progress.” Haylä-Sellasé’s opportunist and megalomaniac behaviors were considered the main authors of the history of the national discourse, and politics of exclusion shifting from progressive pre Italian period relative democratization to reactionary vent in post Italian period. The preoccupation with political independence, national unity, security and peace at the center of Ethiopian state’s ethos in 1940s to 60s, according to Bahru, was a result of Haylä-Sellasé’s personal power obsession. Bahru—cutting the colonial intervention out of his historical analysis—writes, “the roots and origins of the post-41 order are to be seen in the pre-35 period.”

What lacked from this idiosyncratic center analysis, however, is the Italian colonial rule, which was seen as a historical parenthesis and a footnote between this biographic historical time of the young and the old, progressive and reactionary Haylä-Sellasé. Without considering how Italy ruled Ethiopia during colonial occupation, such a shift cannot be explained with mere behavioral analysis of Haylä-Sellasé. Similar to the colonial intervention in the rest of Africa, the question of how Italy ruled Ethiopia during the five years and how it affected the politics since 1941 is yet to be studied. This will require Italian language fluency as well as an in-depth colonial archival work, to start.

157 See Bahru A History of Modern Ethiopia 201-202
158 Bahru, A History of Modern Ethiopia

Conclusion

This paper has interrogated the “occupation thesis,” which presents Ethiopia’s five-year colonial experience as a less colonial and a less significant historical episode than it was in reality. The reading of newspapers as ethnography reveals that the public sphere of newspapers as a central aspect of modern governance was one form of continuity from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial in Ethiopia. Regimes, both colonial and non-colonial, deployed newspapers in order to reconstitute the public sphere as an integral part of rule and governance.

By considering the colonial policy of tribalization and the politicization of religion at the core of its analysis, the paper briefly depicted a decolonization policy of Haylä–Selassié in the post-Italian period. The politicization of the Amharic language—which was imposed as a national language—as well as the depoliticization of religion—which was declared to be a private matter—defined this decolonization policy of Haylä-Sellasé. The two Ethiopian regimes following the Italian colonial administration pursued centralization, politicization of the Amharic language and depoliticization of religion until 1991. As an antidote to this, the post-1991 regime re-installed re-politicization of ethnicity while keeping the de-politicization of religion. The re-politicization of ethnicity has re-produced the different homelands which were in place in Italian colonial period. It also reproduced the political identity of native and non-native in each homeland. The quest for new homeland status from linguistic group and the political conflict over defining the native and non native have been challenging the political stability of the country. This seems like indirect rule and its legacies in what is known as Ethiopian “ethnic federalism,” as Mamdani presents in his most recent preface for Citizen and Subject.

Hence what is at stake in the contemporary Ethiopian politics is not only democratization but also decolonization mainly tran-
scending the binary political identity of native and non-native. One can argue that the colonial mode of rule remerged as an answer to the revolutionary democratic question in post-colonial Ethiopia following failed decolonization policies. The major challenge is how to transcend the divided political citizens as native and non-native while at same time promoting and embracing diversity based different political identities. This politics of difference conditioned the contemporary discourse of state developmentalism in Ethiopia today. Arguably, the contemporary Ethiopian regime used the historic discourse of state developmentalism as an answer to one of the national questions, while also mirroring colonial indirect rule to answer the democratic question.

This paper should also be read as a history of the present. In this paper, I have documented the evolution of colonial developmentalism as an integral part of history in Ethiopian state developmentalism. I have also discussed how the two developmentalisms evolved in the context of policy of tribalization and de-tribalization, respectively. This particular history of developmentalisms in Ethiopia appear strikingly similar to the evolution of developmentalism in the rest of the continent, be it colonial or post-colonial. Development appeared both as a mode of colonial rule and mode of emancipatory and anti-colonial discourse. In the colonial condition, development was deployed as a mode of colonial rule however countered by similar discourse mainly as a language anti colonial resistance. Development for the colonized was nothing butof the quest for self-government or the search for the political kingdom. In the post-colonial period it becomes a second independence and search for the economic kingdom. However, in the post-colonial period development emerged as a new mode of rule that combined the post-colonial nationalist leaders and global development apparatus. This explains the nature of Hayläl-Selassie’s regime in post Italian period. This new mode of rule had a tendency to totalize and de-politicize, but failed to do so because it also became a mode of resistance and survival from the popular and intellectual voice in Ethiopia. Similar to the post colonial popular movements elsewhere, the resistance movements against Hayläl-Selassie’s regime deployed development as a language emancipator politics.

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What Do Binaries Do? Tracing the Effect of Social Science Categories on Knowledge Production in the Great Lakes

Lisa Damon

**Abstract**

Much social science work on the Great Lakes region of Central Africa over the past hundred years has relied heavily on two binary categories to make sense of its subject(s): the native/foreigner dichotomy and the modern/traditional one. This article aims to understand what kind of work these binaries do. What do they confuse and what do they illuminate? How have they guided and circumscribed epistemological production on and of the Great Lakes? To do so, I probe the literature concerned with migration, which tends to territorialize people both geographically and historically as native and migrant or firstcomer and newcomer. This is evident in scholarly debates on Bantu/Hamitic migrations, colonial labor migration and postcolonial refugees. In order to trace the modern/traditional binary, I examine the literature concerned with land, what people make of it and how relations of power traverse it. Categorization of phenomena as either modern or traditional is evident in three sets of debates: the modes of production debates, the politics of land tenure over time, and the relationship of women to the land. The distinction between native and migrant appears here too, with the one considered a harbinger of modernity while the other figures as guardian of tradition or vice versa. During the course of this excursion through the literature on the region, I suggest ways of framing questions that may allow us to move beyond critiquing these analytical categories and toward imagining new ones.

**Keywords**

migrant/native, traditional/modern, land, colonial labor, postcolonial refugee

Introduction

There is likely not a single scholar of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa today who has not grappled with the problem of finding analytical categories that speak to the social reality she seeks to study, be it contemporary, colonial or pre-colonial. Making sense of particular histories in general terms is what the Western academic tradition defines as the work of a social scientist. The question boils down to this: do these general terms or analytical categories actually do the work of translating one idiomatic world into another? Or do they misrepresent the social reality at hand by attempting to articulate it in terms that cannot quite carry over its meanings? Looking back on the literature produced on the region, from the early European explorers to contemporary scholarship, there is no doubt that part of the problem is not classification per se. Rather, the problem is that categories tend to be deployed as binaries, leading the observer to define what he sees as either this or that, with a conscious or unconscious positive valence attributed to the one and a negative connotation attributed to the other. Some critics have discussed this as presence and absence, or the articulation of one reality being dependent on the opposing articulation of the other. Here, I would like to deal with two binary categories that have been instrumental in knowledge production on the region and which continue to be instrumentalized in popular and political discourse in and on the Great Lakes. The first is the native/foreigner dichotomy; the second is the modern/traditional dichotomy.

My aim is to understand what kind of work these binaries do - what do they confuse and what do they illuminate? How have they guided and circumscribed the epistemological production on and of the Great Lakes? Dealing with the social and political repercussions in the region of this mode of categorizing the real is beyond the scope of this paper. Scholars such as Jan Vansina (1998), David Newbury (2001), David Schoenbrun (1993), Mamdou Diouf (2000) and Jean-Pierre Chrétien (2003), to name but a few, have done this quite brilliantly. What emerges from this piece is
a specific map of the literature that follows the contours set forth by these two interlocking binaries. Hovering on those lines, it asks what might exist beyond them. There are two sets of literature I focus on specifically, as they seem to rely most heavily on the native/foreigner and traditional/modern dichotomies. The first is work concerned with migration, which tends to territorialize people both geographically and historically—a native and migrant but also first comer and newcomer—in debates over the Bantu/Hamitic migrations, colonial labor migration and postcolonial refugees. The second is work concerned with land—what people make of it and how relations of power traverse it. In this set of works, ranging from the pre- to the post-colonial, the dividing line between the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ informs the way scholars approach the land-power-people triangle. Where the two sets of literatures—and, indeed, the two binaries—intersect is in the definition of who peoples the land, who has rights over the land, and who has the power to attribute those rights; in effect, differentiating native from migrant, citizen from refugee, firstcomer from newcomer in a narrative that distinguishes modern from traditional practices, sometimes making the migrant the harbinger of modernity and the native the guardian of tradition, and sometimes the reverse.

**Native/Migrant**

We might say that the moment migration became a preoccupation of scholars on the Great Lakes is the moment the Enlightenment portrait of timeless, ahistorical Africa began to crack. While this portrait certainly needed cracking, the one that replaced it—a history based on the “ceaseless flux among populations”1—is just as problematic. Perhaps this is true because the values attached to notions of civilization that provided the canvas for the first portrait are, to a large extent, still the stuff of the second. In other words, both timeless immobility and constant flux are bad for human ‘progress.’ One of the questions moving much of the litera-


erature on migration is, then, who are the agents of change? Are they the locals or the foreigners? Thus, much of the scholarship is shot through with a dichotomy between native and migrant, or firstcomer and newcomer (in Kopytoff’s terms), masking, in a sense, the existential fact that most everyone can trace their genealogy to somewhere else while simultaneously considering where they are as home. The epistemological and political work of the native/migrant dichotomy is to territorialize people both spatially and temporally, minimizing existing ambiguities of kinship and belonging.

**The Great Historical Migrations: Precolonial Bantu and Hamitic/Nilotic Migrations**

Migration and mobility have been central themes in scientific discourses on Africa since the continent became an object of study for the expanding modern sciences and humanities in the nineteenth century, in the course of European expansion and early colonial encounters. Initially, hypothetical historical waves of migration were drawn upon to explain the “racial” composition of African peoples and the distribution of language families across Africa. These “great migrations”—in particular the “Bantu expansion” and the (putative) north-south migration of “Hamites”—were very much imagined along the model of the Volkerwanderung, the migration of Germanic tribes into the Roman Empire. They were also closely linked to contemporary diffusionist theories about cultural change as well as general ideas about race shaped by the scientific racism of the late nineteenth century. If there is a European, if not biblical, genesis to the notion of tribe,2 there is also one for the idea of the great historical migrations.

Before turning to the debates around the Bantu and Hamitic migrations, it is worth noting that the story of migration does not start with them. Recent scholars of the distant past such as Igor Kopytoff (1987), David Schoenbrun (1998) and Christopher Ehret (1998) build on the works of Greenberg (1970), Fagan and

2 Kopytoff, p.4
Oliver (1975) and Murdock (1959). Their work suggests that from the beginning of the North African Neolithic (around 5000 BC) until about 2500 BC or so, most of the population ancestral to the present population of Sub-Saharan Africa was concentrated in the northern half of the continent, specifically in the now barren but then fertile Saharan-Sahelian belt. Kopytoff calls this “the incubation place of ancestral pan-African culture” or the “ancestral hearth or ecumene.” So the story begins with a place of origin to which everyone is native. Everyone, that is, except the small bands of Cushites, Pygmoids and Bushmanoids (as Schoenbrun refers to them) who were already in the Great Lakes region when the first waves of Neolithic Bantu came. Even the firstcomers found inhabitants with greater claims to indigeneity than themselves.

The story of the Bantu migration proper begins around 2500 BC with the desertification of the Saharan-Sahelian belt which prompted, in Ehret’s words, “a population tide that crept slowly southward” and a second “spurt” that began during the first millennium BC, spreading Bantu language speakers through the central forests down to the southern third of the continent. Ehret’s contradictory choice of words is indicative of one of the aspects of this migration theory which is up for debate. Did they creep? Or did they arrive as a tide washes over land? There is a conquest theory entertained by Christopher Wrigley and Merrick Posnansky that has the Bantu-speakers arriving en masse with either iron technology or American crops to dominate local populations. Against this, Vansina and Lwanga-Lunyiigo argue for a trickle process by which people moved in small numbers over short distances over a period of a thousand or more years. Where the two differ is over the peopling of the Great Lakes. Jan Vansina, using historical linguistics, argues that the second wave of Bantu speakers from West Africa moving through central Africa are the ones who populated the Great Lakes region. Lwanga-Lunyiigo argues that there is no archeological data to support this, and so Bantu language speakers must have been in the region long before. The second theory drops the quest for single origin so prized by scholars seeking to explain pan-African cultural similarities for one that could be employed to buttress Bantu language speakers’ claims to indigeneity, alongside earlier “Khoisan and Sudanic stocks” that they displaced or incorporated. Yet they were still migrants.

We can trace the single origin theory back to the colonial literature from whence the term ‘Bantu,’ in its current sense, emerged. First coined by Wilhelm Bleek in 1862 to account for the similarities between the vast number of languages spoken across Sub-Saharan Africa, it is part of the nineteenth century European philological project to explain civilization by way of mapping the global movements of race, culture and language, seen as the trinity that distinguishes one people from another. In this account, Bantu languages were classified as less organic and incapable of poetic and philosophical thought; thus, they were only good for unstable and primitive peoples. And yet, the Bantu had managed to conquer (or assimilate with) earlier inhabitants. The question was twofold. First, how did they do it? And who later conquered them, bringing with them the civilization the Bantu, with their so-called primitive language, could never have borne themselves?

Thus, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century literature on the Great Lakes, the Bantu shifted status from migrant to native, inhabiting the paradox of autochthony that Peter Geschiere examines elsewhere on the continent. On the one hand, the Bantu were seen as primitive and unfit to rule; on the other, they were granted the “right to the soil,” allowing them to drive away strangers. Of course, their status as native in the second sense was conferred only in relation to another group of newcomers known

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as the Hamites or Nilotes. The morphological and linguistic unity of the Bantu as well as their nativeness and primitiveness was all established in opposition to the civilization-bearing foreigner from the North. The point of the Hamitic migration theory was to explain state-formation in the Great Lakes. Monarchies, at various stages of centralization, could not have been built by the Bantu, whose main political culture Hans Meyer and other early ethnologists believed to be segmentary clanship.

Versions of the Hamitic conquest theory appear in the works of John Hanning Speke, John Roscoe, H.H. Johnston, and C. Seligman as the anglophone, mainly protestant writers on the region; versions also appear in the works of Julien Gorju, Bernard de Zuure, and F. Rodegem as the francophone, mainly Catholic writers on the Great Lakes. Where these northern conquerors with fine traits and regal poses originated ranges from ancient Egypt to Abyssinia, to more far-fetched places of origins such as ancient Palestine. What is distinctive, however, is that these northerners were nomadic pastoralists, whereas the Bantu were seen as sedentary agriculturalists, having long ago abandoned their migratory ways. Thus the Hamites were invented as the ancestors of those whom the Europeans saw as rulers in the late nineteenth century kingdoms: the Batutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, the Bahuma in Bunyoro, and the Bahima in Nkore. Even the Baganda in Buganda were thus characterized, which proved hard to justify as there was neither cattle nor rulers with Hamitic traits in the kingdom.

Although the Hamitic migration theory itself was relegated to the dustbins of colonial historiography – based as it was on racial and civilizational prejudice – the questions it attempted to answer around state-formation and its origins continued to be debated, especially in times when differentiating native from foreigner was hot on the political agenda. Narratives of origin establish firstcomer status which, as Kopytoff reminds us, is not necessarily based on chronology but also on civilization. In other words, who is most often credited among the architects of present political configurations? Nationalists such as Apollo Kagwa and later S. Kiwanuka in Buganda, Tito Winyi and Samwiri Karuguiire in Bunyoro, and Alexis Kagame for Rwanda all wittingly or unwittingly confirm a certain number of mythico-historical tropes first found in the colonial archive. Displacing the single-origin problem from outside the region – for example, the myth that Bunyoro-Kitara is the original Great Lakes Kingdom from whence the Hamitic nomads spread to found the other kingdoms of the region – continues to be a debated issue. Scholars of Buganda such as Christopher Wrigley continue to adhere to a version of the conquest theory, while others such as Archie Mafeje argue for “spontaneous and simultaneous development.”

Via the practice of mutual referencing, then, theories regarding precolonial migration are generated by questions of mythical or historical origin and social formation that assume a distinction between native and foreigner, from which it seems nearly impossible to escape. There is no doubt that both for contemporary political reasons (around who belongs and who does not in the nation-states of the region) and for historiographical reasons (thinking of migration less in mythico-historical grand narrative terms and more in concrete, quotidian terms), the trickle-theory of migration and the encounter theory of state-formation are more attractive. But something of the dichotomy remains in both, if only in the kinds of questions that prompt the theories. If questions were less focused on origins and more on residency at any given time, would the distinction between native and migrant still hold theoretical purchase?

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8 A segmentary society refers to non-centralized political entities made up of relatively small autonomous groups (or ‘segments’) who regulate their own affairs while also working as a single collective society, also referred to as ‘egalitarian.’

Colonial Labor Migration

Colonization and the twin colonial projects of state building and development led to the emergence of new forms of migration that were firmly rooted in the political economy of the colonial state. Among these was labor migration to the centers of the colonial economy: emerging towns, mining and industrial sites, as well as commercial plantations. This can be interpreted as an outcome of “peripheral capitalism,” characteristic of the global periphery at large (Amin 1995), though the colonial context was unique in its deliberate policies and massive use of force used to ensure a sufficient supply of cheap labor. Yet colonial attitudes toward migration were ambiguous, as they also saw migration—especially spontaneous migration—as a danger to the colonial order and as disruptive and detrimental to the wider colonial development objective. In other words, resulting absenteeism from homelands would endanger the collection of hut taxes, increase the desire for monetary income and undermine the declared policy to expand crop cultivation. But also, the potential disruptive effects of migration on the “traditional” order was a central concern of colonial authorities. That concern was fundamentally driven by the need to territorialize peoples, demarcate them into “tribes” with specific homelands and, of course, distinguish natives from foreigners.

If anything, the precolonial history of “great migrations,” exceedingly fluid boundaries, “tribal admixture,” and the assumed ease with which peasants could traditionally vote with their feet if dissatisfied with a particular chief, all fueled the desire to establish social order on the basis of native/migrant dichotomies. Audrey Richards, in the introduction to a collective study on immigrant labor in Buganda, sets the problem thus: “In certain districts of Buganda, the foreigners, in fact, outnumber the inhabitants by a proportion of three to two.” The migrants in question do not include Asians or Europeans, but are either from other regions of the

Uganda Protectorate (West Nile and Alur) or from Ruanda-Urundi. The study thus purports to classify the immigrants according to kind, cause and incorporation methods, as well as to establish the singularity of Buganda as a magnet for labor migration. The authors are structural-functionalism ethnographers, for the most part, hence the focus on culture and society rather than political economy. Questions central to understanding migration—such as precolonial modes of production the introduction of the colonial market economy and class differentiation—that engage authors such as Mafeje, Mamdani and Lwanga-Lunyiigo, are largely peripheral to the concerns in Economic Development and Tribal Change.

There are two ways in which the native/foreigner dichotomy becomes central in discussions of colonial migration. The first is from the point of view of the people—in this case, the Baganda, and their capacity to incorporate immigrants into their society. The second is from the point of view of the colonial state and the legal distinction between native and foreigner. The first is marred by considerable ambiguity, the second by outright confusion.

Having elaborated on four modes of structural incorporation of immigrants in Buganda—economic, village, kinship and political—Richards, Southall, Fortt and Powesland see the Baganda relationship to foreigners as broadly dual, operating a distinction between discourse and practice as well as between foreigners taken either as a group or as individuals. According to Richards, the Baganda differentiate between kindred and alien foreigners based on cultural difference. There are those tribes known as “Inter-Lacustrian Bantu” in Uganda, the Ganda, Soga, Toro, Nyoro, Nkole, the Ruanda and Rundi (not Tutsi and Hutu) and those from the Lake Province of Tanganyika like the Haya, Zinza, Ziba, and Ha that all have similar languages, similar kinship and clan organization, as well as common clans and legends of origin. These kindred tribes are sharply distinguished from the West Nile tribes, whether Nilotic or Nilo-Hamitic whose languages are Sudanic and who belong to a society mainly based on a system of clans


11 Richards, p.1

12 Richards, p.164
with no central government or kingship – the so-called segmentary or egalitarian societies of East Africa. If this were true, cultural affinities would constitute a basis for kinship – and therefore a sense of nativeness – that did not rely on territorialized political identity conferred by the state. Richards concludes, however, that in practice, the Baganda discriminated less on the basis of cultural difference and more on class, the poorest being the most despised at any given time. Aidan Southall maintains that the West Nile tribes, no matter how rich or poor, are the bottom rung on the immigrant scale for the Baganda. Can the line between native and foreigner really be reduced to wealth?

Elsewhere, Phares Mutibwa argues that the Bahima immigrant cattle herders were the worst treated, while Lwanga-Lunyigo maintains that assimilation of the Ruanda-Urundi migrant workers was commonplace until problems arose at independence. Archie Mafeje, on the contrary, sees them as constituting a separate class, one that for the first time can be called serfs contrary to the Baganda bakopi. From the few works that talk about the issue of colonial migration to Buganda from the Burundian side, historian Jean-Pierre Chrétien, demographer Christian Thibon and agrarian-historian Hubert Cochet tend to agree that social segregation was the norm. Chrétien goes so far as to claim that Barundi migrants were lumped together with other migrants in an inferior social class constituting a kind of rural proletariat, though their work is based on interviews with those who returned to Burundi, not with those who settled in Buganda. The Barundi who stayed may have a different experience of incorporation or lack thereof.

If sorting out the Baganda view on immigrants posed a challenge to these authors, then sorting out the colonial government’s view was even trickier, despite its inscription in law. Part of the problem was the dual legal system that had foreigners governed under Protectorate-wide civil law while ‘natives’ were governed under distinct territorial customary authorities. Yet with racial segregation operating in civil law, African foreigners had to somehow be fit in the ‘native’ category provided by customary law, despite their lack of local ‘tribal’ affiliation. Thus, Richards and A. B. Mukwaya offer contradictory interpretations of the law in order to argue their different points about immigrant incorporation. Referring to a 1945 ordinance that defined a native as ”any person who is a member of, or anyone whose parent is or was a member of an indigenous African tribe or community (no. 17),” Richards attempts to read the change in what is meant by “non-native” from the Buganda Land Law of 1908 to its 1951 amendment, as a restriction of the term ‘native’ to mean “only from Buganda.”

Previously, ‘native’ could have referred either to the whole protectorate or simply to ‘Africans.’ For Mukwaya, whose work is on the criminality of immigrants, an immigrant is subject to the local chiefs and the Buganda Courts as soon as he arrives in the country. This is because every ‘native’ is subject to the local authorities and the term ‘native’ as defined by the Protectorate Ordinance includes any person whose tribe is a tribe of the Sudan, the Belgian Congo or Ruanda-Urundi, the Protectorate or the Colony of Kenya, the Tanganyika Territory, Nyasaland, and includes the Swahili.

Mahmood Mamdani sees this ‘native’ problematic in the wider context of the politics of indigeneity subscribed to by the British Protectorate. In When Victims Become Killers he claims that “the central trend in Buganda of the 1940s was to join all tenants, indigenous or immigrant, into a common anti-landlord movement

15 Mafeje, p.97
17 Richards, p.172-3
called the Bataka Movement” (164). In this first phase, all are natives, so to speak, especially in light of the colonial response to the revolt which aimed to divide immigrants from natives. He writes:

The point of colonial reform was to reinforce a landlord initiative set up as an ‘indigenous’ electoral coalition in the name of the king, Kabaka Yekka, to participate in the coming elections. It was a political initiative designed to draw a sharp political distinction between all those defined as indigenous, and those not.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus, the literature on colonial labor migration is engaged not only in differentiating native from foreigner in order to discuss practices of incorporating or ostracizing migrants, but also in the laborious process of disentangling native/migrant distinctions in colonial law and how those distinctions influenced historical practices and political responses. Within this history of widely varying definitions of nativeness over a fairly short period of time, we might find room to problematize the dichotomy between native and foreigner by highlighting its utter inconsistency. If the lines are so easily shifted, what kinds of meanings actually materialize? Is the point at which the distinction is most fervently politicized also the point at which it ceases to bear any deep historical and cultural significance? It is no doubt the point at which a rich history of negotiating difference is collapsed into a present of political violence, whose object and terms keep changing.

**Postcolonial Political Refugees**

After independence, it becomes clear that the very notion of international migration is intricately tied to the modern nation-state. Only in a world neatly divided into nation-states is the definition of who is a native and who is not based singularly on territorial borders, at least on paper. A general concern for identifying and controlling population flows was certainly inherited from colonial governance. However, some terms changed, as did the central aim of policy-making. From a multiplication of native policies, we have a multiplication of migrant ones. From keeping insiders in, the obsession that follows is to keep outsiders out. The same dichotomy is at play with a shift in semantic weight from the first term to the latter. Migrants have morphed into refugees and natives into citizens. And instead of terms such as incorporation used to understand how the native/foreigner distinction is bridged, terms such as assimilation and integration are employed.

The backdrop to debates around migrants/refugees is different interpretations of factionalism and sectarianism structuring the failure of the nation-state (and its citizens) to see itself as one. Presumably, adding the refugee question to this state of affairs could either be seen as adding fractures to fractures or going relatively under-noticed in the general lack of national cohesion and conflict. As Gingyera-Pinyewa points out, Uganda has as much experience producing refugees and causing internal displacement amongst its own citizens as playing host to foreigners.\textsuperscript{20} Debates about refugees turn around the question of naming and identifying who is and who isn’t a refugee, beyond the official registration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This often involves identifying kinship structures and networks; in other words, one identifies where on the spectrum of integration the foreigner lies. A second set of debates follows around what to do with these groups of foreigners; action depends on weighing both politics at home and politics in countries of origin. In other words, policy depends on how disruptive this influx of foreigners appears to be to the social structures in place. A third set of debates, linked to the second, focuses on numbers: how many refugees (or migrants) are actually present and how many more or less can be hosted?

It seems that political refugees in large numbers were even more feared by the postcolonial state than labor migrants were by the colonial state, probably due in part to the devaluation of refugee labor. Who is considered and catered to as a refugee in Ugan-

\textsuperscript{19} Mamdani, p.164

da is linked to the definition of “aliens.” Abraham Kiapi reminds us that the Control of Alien Refugees Act (Chap 64 of the Laws of Uganda, 1964) was passed in great haste after independence to deal with large numbers of refugees coming in from Sudan, Rwanda and Congo. In it, the appropriate minister is given all powers to grant or refuse refugee status, which depends first on being considered an alien. The term ‘alien’ designates a person who is not a citizen of Uganda, but also is not a citizen of the Commonwealth countries or the Republic of Ireland. The refugee must then be issued a residency permit and accept to reside in cordoned-off settlements. By law, the refugee is not allowed freedom of movement or equal access to employment or education, contrary to international regulations. Most significantly, according to Nabuguzi, they are excluded from applying for naturalization under the Uganda Citizenship Act (Part 2, 3-i) while other aliens can do so after five consecutive years of residence and demonstrated language aptitude.21 Living as a refugee on Ugandan soil does not constitute residence in Uganda (Art 18 (2)). Peter Nabuguzi and Abraham Kiapi have wildly differing opinions about the state response to refugees. Kiapi sees it as rather benevolent in practice, contrary to the stringent regulation and containment regimes prescribed by law. He claims most refugees have integrated Ugandan society, relying on kinship networks, and that no one has ever been arrested - as the law stipulates - for “harboring a refugee.” Nabuguzi, however, believes the state has followed through with its prison like reception regulations, seeing as it constructs the refugee as a political problem, an economic burden and a temporary phenomenon.23 He argues that refugee settlements are total institutions and that on this point, UNHCR policy buttresses government policy. Run like nations within the nation-state, they are certainly reminiscent of colonial native authority policies, serving to materialize the divide between citizen and refugee. There is also a sense that the “ad-hocism” Nabuguzi diagnoses in Uganda’s refugee policies is a mirror image of the colonial government’s ever contracting and expanding definitions of natives.

The case of the Banyarwanda exemplifies the problematic of naming in order to segregate or expel like few others do notably because, as a group, it straddles the political divide between citizen and refugee. Mahmood Mamdani and Elijah Dickens Mushemeza divide the Banyarwanda into three broad categories: the nationals – those who were already residents when colonial boundaries were fixed; the migrants – those who came as laborers during the colonial period; and the refugees – those who came as a result of political crisis in the postcolonial period. The first category and sections of the second became de facto citizens at independence while the third category was labeled refugees. Those amongst the migrant group who did not go through the administrative procedures to acquire citizenship at independence were in a grey area – neither citizens nor refugees.

There is much confusion if not outright debate around what best characterizes the Banyarwanda as a group. Are they a nationality? An ethnicity? A culture? A minority? Mamdani refers to them both as “the sixth largest ethnic group within Uganda” and a cultural group based on common language.25 Phares Mutibwa draws pockets of Barundi and Banyarwanda as separate “small ethnic groups” of Uganda on his ethnic regions map.26 By referring to them as ethnic groups, the author undermines (or interestingly problematizes) the perceived distinction between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Burundian and Rwandan societies. Can ethnic groups exist within ethnic groups? Had the Banyarwanda been considered

23 Nabuguzi, p.49
24 Banyarwanda refers to people from Rwanda, but in the context of Uganda, it tends to be used indiscriminately for people coming from Rwanda or Burundi (or, during the colonial period, Ruanda-Urundi).
26 Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes.
a minority or a nationality, then they would be subject to different legal determinations than tribes or ethnic groups in Uganda, which are largely territorialized. E.D. Mushemeza also refers to them as the “Banyarwanda ethnic group.”

In any case, because they straddle the citizen/refugee divide, the Banyarwanda have been the but of political manipulation across the various post-colonial regimes. Obote persecuted them in both his regimes, assuming they constituted a Catholic and monarchical constituency that supported the opposition. He thus passed a number of directives to first segregate, then actively expel them. The lines between citizen and refugee were intentionally blurred. Amin subsequently sought allyship with them, though his political machine was based on varying phases and subjects of repression, so the alliance was at best a tenuous reprieve from political targeting. Museveni recruited a good number of Banyarwanda as National Resistance Army (NRA) fighters during the bush war, allowing them – and all other foreigners – to participate in political decision-making via Resistance Committees set up in the liberated areas. However, within a year in power he had reneged on the promise of naturalization, prompting many refugees and some migrants to join the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in their long march on Kigali. Instituting citizenship based on residence rather than descent was once again deferred. What is clear in all these cases is the similar role played by designations of tribes and refugee in state control over people and territory. Because the term migrant is not a legal assignation, it seems the divide between citizen and refugee is that much greater than that between citizen and migrant.

The study of migration in the Great Lakes certainly marks a shift from seeing Africa as a continent with no history to configuring it as a stage of constant drama. This shift has not helped to recover a more complex understanding of history as one of people moving back and forth between places according to their life circum-

28 Mamdani, p.170
tracing the effect of social science categories on knowledge production in the great lakes

What do Binaries do?

In the 1960s and 1970s, with Marxist historians and sociologists attempting to supplement or expand Marxist terminology, Coquery-Vidrovitch and Claude Meillassoux sought out an African mode of production, while Samir Amin conflated the feudal and Asiatic modes of production into one general tributary mode of production. Archie Mafeje argues that neither feudalism nor Amin’s tributary mode work for the case of the Great Lakes as “those who were responsible for the extraction of tribute were not identifiable in terms of their relation either to property or to labour.” In other words, tribute-recipients could not be said to constitute an exploiting class. If Kabwegyere, Lwanga-Luyiigo and Mamdani agree that property relations could not be classified as feudal, Mamdani argues that labor relations in the southern kingdoms could, while the first two authors are more circumspect due to the fact that producers (peasants) controlled their own production plans and processes.

Debates about precolonial modes of production are informed by the role authors attribute to colonialism in altering earlier land and labor relations. While feudalism was considered ‘modern’ and communualism ‘traditional’ in precolonial debates, the lines are blurred around colonial modes of production. What is ‘modern’ is the introduction of capitalist labor relations and private property in land, yet there is debate over to what extent these superceded or overlapped with ‘traditional’ forms, which were still seen as communal, feudal or transitioning from one to the other. Two questions are debated in tandem. One question is about class-formation, while the other is about the extent to which a market economy was introduced. While Mamdani and Mafeje argue that the 1900 Agreement created a “landed aristocracy” out of the batongole chiefs who were granted mailo land, Jorgensen and to a certain extent, Kabwegyere see this as the beginning of a bourgeois capitalist revolution that created a class of proto-capitalist rentier landlords. Wrigley claims that until the early 1920s, the landlord chiefs showed signs of capitalist development in cotton-production but then settled into being rentier-farmers, content to extract busulu and envujjo from their tenants. Debate continues between Mamdani and Mafeje over the emergence of a petty bourgeoisie and whether it constituted a single class or three separate classes involved respectively in trade, petty commodity production and the colonial bureaucracy. The same goes for the peasantry: how much class differentiation was there amongst the free peasantry in terms of their access to land, labor and tools?

Against the dependency theorists who understood ‘traditional’ economies to be subsistence-based before external intervention (either Arab, Indian or European), Mamdani and Mafeje argue that trade and commodity production were traits of the precolonial economy. Colonial capitalism then proceeded in phases directly related to the colonial administration’s ambiguous relationship to the expansion of market relations in their colonies. Populations artificially kept in traditional (communal/feudal) relations to land were easier to control than those dispossessed and fully ensconced in (modern) market relations. And since the colonial economy was based on a secure provision of cheap labor, allowing a subsistence-economy to endure supplemented wages that could not alone cover the needs of social reproduction. Kabwegyere dis-

30 *busulu* is ground rent; *envujjo* is tribute.
31 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 147
agrees, claiming the postcolonial state inherited a fully capitalistic economy that it continued to develop by legalizing various modes of dispossessioning peasants. Lwanga-Lunyiigo also seems to see the transition from colonial to postcolonial as a continuous process of expropriation creating a “landless mass of people” unable to be absorbed by the market. Mafeje concludes that the struggle at independence was between the landlords, who held land - the most important economic asset in an agrarian society - and an educated elite, which was otherwise weaker economically. The latter lived largely on revenue and were not the owners of the means of production. Ever since the new educated elite came out on top of the nationalist struggle, the Ugandan state has been used as an instrument for individual accumulation. Thus, no real capitalist class has emerged in the post-colonial period either.32

Both Mafeje and Mamdani move away from modes of production as a grid through which to understand the history of Great Lakes economies. Mafeje does so because he claims that modes of production can only become apparent in a longue durée perspective that we don’t have access to; Mamdani does so because he sees how dependent this epistemological tool is on an opposition between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional.’ What is clear is that the contents of these categories shift depending on the time period being analyzed and the ideological inclinations of the author. The analytical value of modes of production seems to depend on how strongly specific features are tied to an understanding of economic history as a linear progression through various stages of pre-capitalist and capitalist social formations. It also depends on whether we see the market as guaranteed by society or guaranteed by the state - as a tool for the good of society or as a mechanism for state control over society.

Power and land
The question of rights or access to land is linked to the modes of production debates by way of the question of power. Theorists dealing with this question want to understand how people and power interact over land. Who has the power to allocate land and what kind of rights to the land does that allocation entail? The traditional/modern binary operates in a more stable fashion through these debates, seeing usufruct rights and group ownership managed by clan heads as traditional or customary. In the meantime, private individual ownership vested in the central state - be it the monarchy, the colonial government or the postcolonial nation-state - is seen as modern. It is the stability of the binary that poses an obstacle to understanding what land means to people under changing historical circumstances.

The exceptionality of Buganda in relation to the other Great Lakes kingdoms is often predicated on the fact that power and wealth was vested in land rather than in the accumulation of cattle.33 Who actually had the power to allocate land in Buganda before colonial intervention, however, causes some debate. Some say the Kabaka34 only had symbolic power over all land, with actual distribution practices vested in clan heads. Others say that power over land was actually exercised by the Kabaka from the mid-nineteenth century on, when there was a move from the king being “first among equal heads of lineages (bataka)” to the king usurping clan power and becoming the head of all clan heads (saabataka).35 This, for some, means that, in practice, he arrogated the right to distribute all land. Lwanga-Lunyiigo argues that this was not the case until the 1888 take-over by the batongole during the religious wars.36 Others, like Kabwegyere, cite the year 1900 as the real turning point. Before 1900, trusteeship was under the Kabaka but clan heads took care of land distribution amongst the peasants, while the batongole held land only during their tenure

32 Mafeje, p.109
33 Mafeje 1991; Hanson 2003; Reid 2002; Wrigley 1996; Mair 1974
34 leader of the Buganda kingdom.
35 Mafeje, p. 47
36 Lwanga-Lunyiigo, p.18-19
in office, which was entirely dependent on the Kabaka’s goodwill. The reason the timeframe is so contested is because of the historical importance given to establishing the event that prompted a change so significant that it might constitute a leap across the binary and into the modern. If the event was endogenous it says a particular thing about the place of the Baganda as a people on the civilizational timeline; if it was exogenous it says something quite different.

Yet in the event, the distinctions and discrepancies between law and practice are materialized. Thus, it is also the place where the traditional/modern divide founders. In this case, because most scholars agree that land was only important to the Baganda to the extent that it was peopled by producers,37 then a change in land law is not necessarily coterminous with a change in the practice of power over people. The traditional is carried over into the modern, so to speak. Power was thus not so much understood in terms of land itself but in terms of the people on the land. As Holly Hanson suggests, it was the object through which relationships of reciprocal obligation were built. Establishing a social and political relation rather than an economic one between state and society, whether land was held by clans or by the monarchy, no longer holds as a marker of the traditional versus the modern.

What scholars understand the 1900 Mailoland Agreement to have changed in practice is central to debates on the relationship of people to land in the colonial period. Did a centralization of power over land take place in the mid-nineteenth century, prompting the religious wars38 that consequently wrested land away from both the monarchy and the clans? If so, the Buganda Agreement just weighed in to secure the batongole chiefs as the new trustees of half the land while the rest was held by the British Crown. Although the British understood this as private land ownership, Hanson argues that the real shift in the meaning given to land did not take place until the implementation of the hut tax, poll tax and forced labor. Kabwegyere rather sees the introduction of cotton as a cash crop as the key event. The main point, both Lucy Mair and Audrey Richards suggest, is that land became understood directly as a source of wealth, severing the traditional link between political authority and land holding. Yet, as Hanson shows, this did not necessarily change patron/client relations between landholders and their bakopi, especially in light of later colonial interventions to preserve the native social order and maintain the use-value of land in the face of growing exchange value.39

In the postcolonial period, debate continues to revolve around the value of customary land tenure versus private land tenure, often seeing the former as good for the people - the bearers of tradition - and the latter as good for national development - the harbinger of modernity. How authors approach this dichotomy is based on where they stand in relation to the neoliberal argument that titling and private property ensure increased development. While Kabwegyere and Lwanga-Lunyiigo categorically reject that argument, seeing titling as ensuring mass evictions of peasants in the name of development, Mamdani questions the terms in which the argument is couched. Because the 1998 Land Act claimed to recognize customary ownership of land in view of future titling (though this is made explicitly voluntary not forced), interpretation of it fell right into the tradition/modern binary made to overlap quite precisely with the society/state binary and all together forgetting the market.40 Thus many land activist NGOs got caught in this binary reading, making it very difficult to understand the law as neither a great bulwark against global capitalism and peasant dispossession, nor a great agent of development via land privatization, but in continuity with colonial and earlier postcolonial initiatives to simultaneously invite and control market forces.

The 1998 Land Act also recognizes Mailo land-tenure, which is neither quite freehold nor quite customary but legalizes the rights to land of both landowners and occupants. It thus complete-

37 Mukwaya 1953; Kabwegyere 1975; Hanson 2003; Mafeje 1991; Luwaga-Lunyiigo 2011
38 Lwanga-Lunyiigo 2011; Mafeje 1991; Kabwegyere 1975
39 Holly Hanson, Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda
40 Mamdani, The Land Question, p. 161
ly undermines any neat division between traditional and modern. As such, it seems to be fetishized in the more recent literature, by James Okuku and Aili Tripp, for example, as reifying the worst of both worlds and thus causing the most inequality between rich and poor, landowner and tenant. Baganda and immigrant, women and men.

**Women and Land**

By the end of the nineteenth century, the way a society treated women was considered a hallmark of either barbarism or civilization in the European zeitgeist. Thus, early explorers, missionaries and colonial administrators in the region sought to fit observable gender roles into a spectrum of progress that ran from traditional/barbarian to modern/civilized. However, as colonial rule advanced and ambiguity over the extent to which the colonized should be allowed to enter the market economy began to emerge, the valuation of traditional versus modern roles began to change. Being tied to the land under customary tenure became seen as an insurance against free floating labor and the loose morals and lack of protection that were imagined to accompany it.

Most scholars of the precolonial period agree that women worked the land for subsistence production, except where the Bahima/Bairu or Batutsi/Bahutu division of labor existed. Meanwhile, because patriarchal clan relations prevailed in all the kingdoms, women accessed land through their fathers or husbands, depending on their status as married or unmarried. This was not quite the case for the royal family of Buganda since they instituted matrilineal descent for kings, in order to avoid the creation of entrenched dynasties.\(^ {41}\) This meant that mothers and sisters of the king had direct access to land in the form of estates which they had the power to oversee the management of.\(^ {42}\) Yet Musisi argues that because princesses were not allowed to bear heirs, they could not be said to ‘own’ land in perpetuity. Land was attached to their

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41  Hanson, p. 120
43  Hanson, p. 18
46  Hattersley, p. 21
47  Hanson, p. 181

...political function - just as for the batongole - not their person.

While the early colonial writers such as Roscoe and Hattersley saw cultivation by women as barbarous exploitation by lazy menfolk, later scholars such as Wrigley, Reid and Hanson note that this was not considered demeaning work since it was the source of livelihood for all, from royalty to peasants. Hanson even argues that one of the chief legacies of colonialism in Buganda was the loss of female power, which began with the erosion of reciprocal relations during the slave trade and continued with the privatization of land and taxation under Protectorate rule.\(^ {43}\) Musisi extends the timeline of this gradual erosion of the role of women in state formation to the arrival of Kimera in the early fifteenth century.

The colonial perspective was a self-interested one, as the early years were about securing an abundant pool of cheap labor. And if women were growing enough cotton to earn the hut tax\(^ {44}\) and even doing road work and other compulsory labor,\(^ {45}\) then what were the men doing? The traditional/modern binary appears with Hattersley attributing the shift in gender labor division to the civilizational impetus of Christianity\(^ {46}\) while Hanson remarks that it was most likely due to the intensification of labor demands in colonial Buganda\(^ {47}\). Because men either migrated to avoid forced labor and taxes or in order to engage in wage labor to pay those taxes, women were often left as household heads. While some missionaries continued to promote women’s rights to purchase and inherit land, lineage networks and conservative forces within the Protectorate government strongly contested the trend. There is a sense that the colonial administration approached the problem of women and the problem of migrants in a similar vein. The entry of both groups into the colonial capitalist economy were essential...
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The relationship between women and land remains at the heart of debates about national development in the postcolonial period. The question is now framed in terms of rights to the land rather than division of labor; yet different ideological perspectives on what constitutes progress still determine how the customary/modern binary operates. Again, it is often made to dovetail with a society/state opposition, with the market seen as a force benefiting either the one or the other. In Aili Tripp’s rendition, there is a state land story that changes with every change in political regime, and a people’s land story that largely stays the same. This inevitably pits development – as conceived by the state – against the common good. Yet in Tripp’s later work, Museveni’s Uganda, she claims that women’s support for Museveni and the NRM seriously waned when spousal co-ownership of property was replaced by a “consent clause” in the 1998 Land Act. Thus the “common good,” by women’s estimation, was presumably to be allowed to deal directly with the land market, earlier considered to be a force co-opted by the state.

Lynn Khadiagala claims that the status of women’s property rights in judicial doctrine from the early 60s to the present depends on whether the courts perceive female authority over land as a guarantor of or a threat to social order. Like migrants or refugees then, women are viewed by the state as either disruptive or productive participants in the status quo. Their rights to land are determined by this valuation, making them sometimes defenders of the customary, sometimes exemplars of the modern, depending on the politics of the time. Mamdani argues that the market needs to be considered a force in its own right, problematizing both the customary/modern and state/society binaries. If neither one can be de facto understood as the guarantor of women’s rights to land, then regardless of the intent of the 1998 Land Law to move toward a unitary private property regime, its recognition of multiple land regimes can also be used to protect popular access to land.

While Mamdani recognizes that the market has transformed and continues to transform both the customary and the statutory, Tripp argues that women’s movements have responded to these changes by navigating a course to secure their rights through both regimes (or, rather, all four, as the 1998 Land Law provides for). Thus, just as there are regional differences between how customary regimes operate, there are chronological ones, too. The same goes for the statutory across different political regimes and their legal implementations since independence. And insomuch as customary land arrangements are based on social and gender stratification, reliance on markets poses similar dilemmas because markets are also embedded in social relations that are fraught with inequalities and power dynamics.

Conclusion

Making the triangular relationship between people, power and land fit on a line sharply divided into two parts – traditional and modern – requires both a flattening and a trimming off the edges that exceed the line. What this means in academic practice is restricting the kinds of questions one asks to those that will accommodate the deployment of the binary. In the two cases examined here, native/foreigner and modern/traditional, neither holds up when the study of singular events gives way to that of historical processes. David Schoenbrun suggests that one way to approach the problem is to seek our terms of analysis or analytical categories in the deep past, “shifting the burden of analysis from a focus on capitalism, colonialism and religions to the historical study of

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48 Orde-Brown (1946) quoted in Richards, p. 7
50 Tripp, p.106
kinship, royalty, spirits and fertility.” More generally, reaching back into the past of a people and place for analytical categories to project forward rather than projecting contemporary ones - such as native/foreigner and modern/traditional - back to make sense of the past. In doing so, we make use of contemporary social science methods while using those methods to seek categories and tropes that better speak to different social realities. With a historical practice that does not rely on the temporal ruptures between precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial - to which the traditional/modern binary belongs - we may see different spatial units emerge - ones that prompt different understandings of belonging rather than being so readily bound to distinguishing native from foreigner.

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What do Binaries do? Tracing the Effect of Social Science Categories on Knowledge Production in the Great Lakes
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Tracing the Effect of Social Science Categories on Knowledge Production in the Great Lakes


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"Ffe tuli ku kituufu, abalala bali ku byaabwew": The Intra-Salaf Debate and Violent State Intervention in Uganda’s Muslim Community

Joseph Kasule

ABSTRACT This paper uses the recent murders of Muslim clerics and important personalities between 2012 and 2016 as an entry point to understanding the internal debate within the Salaf Muslim faction in Uganda. It situates the murders within the context of intra-Muslim violence born of the internal debate regarding Muslims’ responses to their minority status in Uganda. It argues that the violent turn of the intra-Salaf debate bred intra-Muslim extremism, which deeply divided the Islamic reformist movement. The reformist movement bred different schisms seeking different agendas; as some sought political reform of the state and formed the ADF rebel movement to effect an Islamic revolution, others sought autonomy from the state to concentrate on Dawah; a third group chose state cooption to secure social-political-economic benefits for itself. The attempts of these diverse Muslim publics to effect their various agendas translated into an intra-Muslim violence that ultimately threatened the very survival of the Muslim community they intended to reform. Led by urban Muslim youths, these internal schisms also threatened the survival of the NRM regime especially its political gains in Buganda. In effect, violence became its own victim.

KEYWORDS Islam, Salafism, secularism, violence, statecraft, Muslim diversity.

1 "We have the sole claim to the truth, the rest are deceptive”. Salaf Amir, Kampala, November 2016; Jamil Mukulu Recordings, 2012.

Introduction

Over the last twenty years, the Muslim leadership in Uganda has been divided among two dominant camps: Kibuli and Old-Kampala. These two camps receive fidelities from leaderships of other Muslim sub-groups, especially in the urban areas in Uganda. The divide between the two took a violent turn that culminated in the death of Muslim clerics and other personalities between 2012 and 2016. On April 21, 2012 Sheikh Abdul Karim Ssentamu, a prominent Muslim cleric in Uganda, was killed a few meters from Masjid Noor, William Street, Kampala, shortly after his evening "Question and Answer" session. In June 2012, Hajj Abubaker Abbas Kiweewa Kigejjejo, a prominent Muslim leader and businessman, was also killed in Kyanja, Kampala. More deaths followed: Sheikhs Maganda and Yunus Abubakari Mudungu both of Bugiri, Eastern Uganda, killed in August 2012; Abdu Jawali Sentunga, Imam of Namayemba Salaf Masjid, in Bugiri, Eastern Uganda, killed in September 2012; Sheikh Abdu Rashid Wafula, of Mbale, Eastern Uganda, killed in May 2015; Sheikh Dr. Abdul Kadir Muwuya, the leader of the Shia Sect, killed in Mayuge, Eastern Uganda on December 24, 2014; Sheikh Mustafa Bahiga, the Kampala District Amir of Jamaat Dawah Salafiyyah, killed at Bwebajja near Kampala on December 28, 2014; Sheikh Ibrahim Hassan Kirya, the Spokesperson of the Kibuli-based faction, killed in

in Bweyogerere, Kampala on June 30, 2015. Major Sheikh Suleiman Kiggundu, a member of the Salaf faction and a serving UPDF officer—killed in Masanafu, Kampala on November 26, 2016—was the last high profile cleric to be assassinated.4

All of these murders occurred by shooting. Rumors have circulated within the Muslim community of other prominent clerics who have died under “mysterious” circumstances. Such deaths include: Sheikh Abdul Hakim Ssekimpi, the Deputy Supreme Mufti of the Kibuli-based faction, who died at Kibuli Muslim hospital on July 21, 2012. In April 2015, Sheikh Zubair Kayongo, the Supreme Mufti of the Kibuli-based Muslim faction, passed away in Aga Khan Hospital, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where he had traveled for a conference. Other sheikhs received death threats through both multi-media recordings and telephone calls, as well as by being shot at. These include: Haruna Ljema Katungulu, the leader of a breakaway Salaf faction who survived gunshots at his home and Najib Ssonko, another member of the breakaway Salaf faction who also survived gunshots. Other Sheikhs, within the same faction, who have received verbal death threats and marked on lists include Mahmood Kibaate and Umar Swidiq Ndawula. On September 12, 2016, Prince Kassim Nakibinge, the head of the Kibuli-based faction, intimated that he had also received death threats and he had been added to a list for elimination.

Grouping the aforementioned murders as if they are all the same could be misleading. Speaking to respondents and victim's families in eastern Uganda revealed that Sheikh Abdu Rashid Wafula may have been murdered due to some land disputes involving his family and that the timing of his death may have coincided with the wave of Muslim clerics’ murders. With area Muslims gripped by fear, popular accounts attached his murder to the sweeping narrative.5 Also, the murder of Dr. Sheikh Abdu Kadir Muwaya—the leader of the Shia Sect in Uganda—is allegedly not connected to the death of the Muslim clerics, since the other

deads have mainly been of Sunni Muslim clerics of the Salaf sect.6 What linked the deaths of Dr. Muwaya and Sheikh Wafula to the wave of Muslim clerics’ killings was the method: all were committed by assailants riding on boda motorcycles. Further, the majority of the murdered clerics were allied to the Kibuli Muslim faction. As the murders continued unabated, concerned Muslim leaders pressured state authorities to explain the cause of the murders.

In response, the state’s narrative was that members of a now defunct Muslim rebel group, the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) were responsible for the murders.7 When the killings continued even after the arrest of the ADF leader, Jamil Mukulu, and the end of the ADF rebellion, the Muslim public found the state’s narrative insufficient. Debate over the murders continued to generate questions and possible explanations. During Muslim discursions in darasa (teaching and learning sessions) and khutba (Friday sermons), sheikhs allied with various camps wondered which clerics would continue to be killed and why. Pointing to America’s global war on terror, another narrative emerged from members of the Salafist group allied with the Old-Kampala Muslim faction, arguing that the murder of Muslim clerics in Uganda was not isolated from the wave of murders targeting Muslim clerics globally, including in Kenya.8 These competing narratives between the state and the Muslim public need to be problematized.

President Museveni and his Inspector General of Police, Kale Kayihura, have supported the state’s narrative that the ADF was behind the killings.9 Although the state’s counter-insurgency operations managed to end the rebellion by infiltrating it and turning its soldiers into state agents spying on fellow Muslims, the govern-

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4 See ‘Muslim clerics who have been killed’. Daily Monitor, 26th November 2016
5 Focused Group Discussion, Mbale 1st December 2016
6 Ibid
ment only managed to arrest Jamil Mukulu when he was deported from Tanzania after being arrested in May 2015. The clerics’ murders continued even after his arrest. Did Mukulu have the material resources and organizational capacity to continue killing clerics even after his incarceration? Was he responsible for the 2012-2015 murders that occurred prior to his arrest? In a set of recordings obtained from former ADF rebels, Mukulu is heard giving Darasa sessions in their rebel camps in Eastern DRC. In a session recorded in 2012, days after the killing of Sheikh Abdul Karim Ssentamu, Mukulu denied that he had planned to murder Ssentamu, regardless of how he detested his ways: “even when they abused us, and tried to kill us, we did not kill them. And we had the guns and the capacity to do it. Why has Ssentamu passed away when the state admired his work of preaching against Jihad?”

The ADF narrative was limited in understanding the clerics’ murders because it did not explain the similar murders of Muslim clerics in Kenya.11 When the murders revealed a foreign phenomenon, another narrative emerged. It emanated from within the Muslim community (specifically, the Kamoga-led Tabliq faction) and argued that the Zionist state of Israel was responsible for the systematic global murder of Muslims.12 Various sheikhs in the Kamoga camp popularized the Zionist conspiracy that was responsible for the death of Muslim clerics in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere.13 One Sheikh Murtadha Bukenya purveyed this Zionist conspiracy in response to the statements made at Kibuli the previous day (December 29, 2014, at the preparations to bury Sheikh Mustapha Bahiga). Bukenya said, “Muslims in Uganda cannot kill each other…this is the work of the enemy.”14 Other voices joined this Zionist conspiracy.15 But they could not respond to a fundamental question of why the Zionists had chosen to eliminate only clerics allied to the opposite camp. The link to the Zionist conspiracy comes from an Al-Jazeera investigation that revealed how the Kenyan security agencies were using a rule book supposedly borrowed from Israel and Britain, nations which were believed to have trained the Kenyan anti-terrorist squads that confessed to murdering Muslims.16 While the Zionist conspiracy gives cogence to the on-going wave of global murders of Muslim clerics linked by America’s global war on terror,17 it de-contextualizes local experiences and de-historicizes local responsibility and accountability for particular acts. Closer scrutiny of the Kenyan experience highlights that the Zionist conspiracy ignored the local social-political-economic components in each case.

In Kenya, prominent Muslim clerics have been violently...

10 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
12 This narrative was the topic of discussion called at Masjid Nuur, William Street Kampala, to rebut claims that Kamoga was implicit in the murder of Sheikh Mustapha Bahiga, 30th December 2014
13 Sheikh Murtadha Bukenya, Masjid Nuur, William street, Kampala, 30th December 2014
14 Sheikh Mahad Mbazira, Masjid Nuur, William Street Kampala, 30th December 2014
15 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UJ5OdjDhr8k (last accessed 19th May 2016).
murdered since 2012. These clerics\(^8\) were assassinated on charges of terrorism tied to their Jihadist discourse delivered in Darasa and Khutba. Many resided in Mombasa County and used Islamic teachings to critique the existing political and economic order\(^9\) in a context of historical marginalization and to express desire for cessation in order to achieve political emancipation.\(^10\) The immediate cause of the murders has, however, been identified with a wave of erosion of "Islamic values" within the context of increasing youth unemployment in a high tourist destination such as Mombasa.\(^11\) As the so-called radical sheikhs were murdered, the state proceeded to identify moderates that could stick to non-Jihad discourse and concentrate on other aspects of Islam. Therefore, although the Zionist conspiracy points to a foreign element, it is important to inquire into the internal component of the Ugandan Muslim experience.

This paper discusses the nature and character of the Islamic reform movement in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime. It contends that the violent attitude of the reform movement bred a language of Islamic extremism internal to the general Muslim public. It considers that the intra-Muslim debate within the reform movement informed multiple social-political imaginations when various splits in elite Muslim leaderships perceived and sought to cultivate a role of reformist Islam within the Ugandan state. One side argued that youthful Muslims were an important fulcrum in founding a Dawla Islami-yah (Islamic state), while another argued that Muslims were safe within the majority non-Muslim state. The paralysis within this debate bred a wave of intra-Muslim violence that culminated into conflict around masjids as sites of Muslim power. These instances of Muslim violence and the consequent ADF rebellion invited intervention from the state to counter the strand of intra-Muslim violence using its military and political machinery.

The paper demonstrates that Islamic reform was a product of three important moments that reinforced each other. One, Idi Amin's role in attempting to construct a unified, Islamic center under state patronage met with momentary success when Amin's patronage brought Muslims together under a single force. The nascent reformist debate therefore spoke to ways of transcending historical marginalization by consolidating the gains of Muslim unity. As reformers took a nostalgic view of the Salaf, they imagined a new role for Islam within a majority non-Muslim society. The reformist debate was dominated by questions of how to overcome this Muslim minority.

Second, returning Muslim students of Islamic studies who had gone abroad to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Egypt became agents of local reform in connection with the various structures and spheres where they studied. Returning students took after their alma mater; for example, those from Madina designated themselves 'Ba nna Madina. Although the group

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\(^8\) Including Sheikhs: Samir Khan (killed in 2012 body discovered in Tsavo National Park), Aboud Rogo (murdered in his car August 2012), Ibrahim Ismail (murdered on 3rd October 2013), Gaddaf Mohammed aka Shehe, Omar Aburumiea, Issa Abdallah, Salim Aboud (all murdered on 6th December 2013), Imam Hassan Suleiman Mwayuyu (short in a minibus), Sheikh Shaaban (shot in Majengo). In April 2014, Sheikh Abubaker Shariff aka Makaburi was murdered as he left the Shanzu law courts. On 10th June 2014, Sheikh Mohammed Idris was murdered outside his house.


\(^10\) Ibid, p.9.

\(^11\) According to NK, a Kenyan scholar investigating the murder of Muslim clerics in Kenya, the grammar of terror was the alibi of the Kenyan state to designate the clerics as enemies of the state. Their elimination would give succor to Kenya's intervention in Somalia in late 2011 and provide accountability for the large funds meant for fighting terror. On the other the elimination of the clerics was considered a necessary project to eliminate the 'radical' resistance to the state-capitalist's desires to roll out a drug-trade project in Mombasa so as to satiate tourists' appetite for cocaine and marijuana. The Sheikhs (Aboud Rogo, for instance), were the obstacle to this project since their daily Khutbas were not only challenging the intervention in Somalia as an invasion of a Muslim land whose duty it was for every Muslim to protect. Other Khutbas warned the youthful coastal Muslims to desist from engaging in the drug trade regardless of their unemployment. The state applied the language of terror to eliminate the opposition to its various ventures. But the wave of murders and disappearances went beyond Muslims. This was another excuse to create a 'general feeling of insecurity' in the country to explain away the systemic murder of those opposed to particular state-led interests. Discussion held in Nairobi, late December 2016.
Salafiyyah was its core ideology. Used to connote the ways and manners of As-Salaf Salih (pious predecessors), Salafism emerged as a centralizing ideology to replace the theological schisms reflected in the Juma-Zukuuli conflicts of the previous decades. Moving from the multiple ideologies of Muslim leadership towards Salafism engendered conflict among elites. The urban concentration of reform centers meant that Muslim representation was still bedeviled by its historical burdens of the colonial and Obote eras. As these urban-based preachers went to rural spaces to purify what was perceived as traditional practices by enforcing a correct form of Islam, religious propagation (dawah) moved from advice (nasiha) to critique (naqd) thereby breeding resistance from the very public it targeted. Three major consequences resulted from this. First, the Tabliq movement split into various factions that sought to assert discursive coherence over other groups. These splits bred the ADF rebellion. Second, the fragmentation of reformist debate also resulted in the emergence of multiple Muslim publics, which reflected the contradictions embedded in the quest for Muslim unity. When the agents of Islamic reform attached themselves to the Kibuli-Old Kampala centers of Muslim leadership in Uganda, other Muslims began to articulate Islam differently by organizing their practices around other centers such as universities, business clubs, and other political associations to express their disappointment with the "traditional" centers of Muslim leadership and those centers' monopoly over Islamic organization. So, questions such as "who are the Muslims" and "where are they located" cannot be answered by simply pointing to the popular sites of Muslim identity, but rather should be addressed through acknowledging the diverse, multiple and contradictory ways in which all those who claim to belong to Islam articulate themselves.

Third, the intra-Muslim debates bred a wave of violence that cultivated a special role for the state within the Muslim organizations. This occurred on two fronts. First, the hostile character of the Dawah movement bred a Muslim backlash that bred a new language of Muslim extremism. A category of Tabliq were marked as radical and uncompromising characters. This means that radicalism among Muslims was also born within the moment of reform. Second, the emergence of Muslim groups that sought to use violence to reform the state also invited the state to intervene in Muslim politics using violent counterstrategies, which had consequences for the various Muslim individuals and the Muslim public generally.

This paper is divided into three sections that focus on the various issues that emerged within various moments of Tabliq reform. The first discusses the need, nature, and character of reformist Islam within Uganda. It argues that the violence of the intra-Muslim reform agenda bred a language of Muslim 'extremism' which also created the first excuse for state infiltration within the Muslim social-political spaces. The second section discusses the internal debate regarding the reform agenda among the Muslim groups. It argues that the internal debate bred splits within the reform movement, which also had three consequences. The first consequence was that the debate enabled a reformist movement that was friendly to NRM political power. Second, it bred diverse Muslim publics tired of Muslim elite hegemony and ones that desired to cultivate more autonomous individual expressions of Islam that included joining national political platforms, either independently or in conjunction with others, Muslim or non-Muslim. Such groups are composed of Muslim politicians, university graduates, business people and social-cultural icons. The third consequence was that it constructed another reformist faction hostile and opposed to NRM political power. The third section of this paper discusses the end of the ADF rebellion and its implications for Muslim relations within the state in Uganda. As these sections demonstrate, various expressions of Islam and the response of the state to those articulations have formed the core of the Muslim question under the NRM regime.
Internal differentiation within Islam

Scholarship on Islam and Muslims in Uganda has imagined a monolithic Muslim response to its minority status. It was informed by historical assumptions that viewed Islamic practices as having similar traits across time and space. Talal Asad has critiqued earlier anthropology for failing to adequately conceptualize the considerable “diversity in the beliefs and practices of Muslims.” He argued that Muslim scholarship needed to take Islam as a “discursive tradition” which could be discerned by identifying the historical variations in political structure and the different forms of Islam linked to it. Asad considered that the starting point in any inquiry about Islam had to be the domain of orthodoxy, which he identified with the primary texts (the Quran and Hadiths). To Asad, this would be the “correct model.” This Asadian position of locating the Islamic discursive tradition from primary sources is problematic when we ask the parameters by which orthodoxy becomes constructed.

In a recent critique, Shahab Ahmed argues that Asad’s call to establish orthodoxy as the basis of all “Islamic” practices attempts to “stake an exclusive claim of authority” on what Islam is. This occurs because the domain of orthodoxy is a site of prescriptive power. In effect, orthodoxy becomes a prescription of those who possess the social authority to prescribe rules that legitimate practices at the cost of excluding contradictory claims; orthodoxy emerges as the “prescription and restriction” of truth. Part of Shahab Ahmed’s critique is that orthodoxy is misleading because it introduces aspects of time where we locate Muslim-ness in the degree to which the practices of a community either conform to or depart from original/authentic practices of earlier generations, which are taken to be the true reflections of Islam. To escape the limits that orthodoxy as a concept engenders, Shahab Ahmed emphasizes that the value of the primary sources as an analytical category depends on how they are related to the changing dynamics of Muslims’ generations across time and space. Specifically how generations of Muslims construct new vocabularies of what Muslim-ness means. This enables scholarship to conceptualize unity in both its diversity and contradictions and to capture the totality of all practices that claim an affinity with Islam.

The import of Shahab Ahmed’s critique of Asad is that primary sources cannot be the total embodiment of Muslim-ness across time and space because orthodoxy is not an innocent act. It is an outcome of a complex process by which prescriptive power authored its idea of truth in a double movement that excluded its conception of untruth. The intention of prescriptive power is a critical ingredient in the interpretation of a primary source to establish an orthodox position. The very fusion of power with its claims to truth therefore forms the core of the discursive tradition in Islam. In the contemporary moment, these processual dynamics of Islam and Muslim life are situated at the historical juncture of Islamic traditions and social-political constructions such as secularism, which also attempt to influence and direct Muslim authority.
The Tabligh and Islamic reform in Uganda

The debate on reformist Islam in Uganda has coalesced around a set of questions: How (and under what conditions) did the Islamic reform movement emerge and what interpretation of Islam did it articulate? What was the role of the reform movement within Uganda’s Muslim society and how was that role articulated? In what ways was it connected to the historical global Islamic reformist movements? Who were its agents? What was the character of its Dawah? Which Muslim public did it target and how did they receive the reformist message? What was its connection to both existing Muslim leadership and non-Muslim power? I will respond to these questions in this section.

Etymologically, Tabliq means calling people to the right way or delivering the true message. In Muslim history, the first usage of Tabliq comes from the Prophet Muhammad’s last sermon in 632 C.E. when he asked his audience: “have I delivered the message? Oh Allah be my witness.” As a movement for Dawah (Islamic propagation), the Tabligh began as an offshoot of the Tabligh Jamaat from India and Pakistan, whose ideas were exported to Uganda in the 1960s. Terje Ostebo has argued that approaches which frame the ‘arrival’ of Salafism in a dichotomous relationship between the ‘original’ and new ‘locality’ are insufficient. This is true mainly because they fail to identify, contextualize and historicize the conditions of the interactions across local boundaries, which introduced the new currents. To transcend such approaches requires that we investigate the factors that facilitated the reformist movement beyond its original locality, as well as analyze those actors who were involved.

The conditions that necessitated the reform agenda among Muslims in Uganda were multiple and had to do with the history of Islam in the country. Although the Muslim spirit had rejuvenated during the colonial era, there was “poor practice” of Islamic principles. The forefathers had not perfected understanding the Unity of God (tawhid) and it was considered normal for a Muslim to proceed to prayer (salat) while wearing amulets believed to protect one against evil spirits (nsiriba and yirizi). Many Muslim families dabbled in polytheism (Shirk) while publicly displaying commitment to tawhid. Many Bazeyi (old guard) could perform Islamic practices like fasting (sawm) alongside other practices considered non-Islamic. They considered the consumption of alcohol, the eating of pork and other prohibited meat to be the only haram (forbidden) Islamic practices.

The agents of reformist Islam in Uganda were initially individuals. Sheikhs Kailan, Hakawaat and Abdul Razzaq Matovu were the prominent agents of the first attempt at reform. Due to the daunting task of individual-based propagation of Islam, an organization was imagined as opposed to individual sheikhs, since such a strategy would lighten the burden of reaching distant areas. A group of Sheikhs met at Bilal Islamic Institute in Wakiso district and discussed how best to revive Islamic beliefs and practices among Muslims. Many of the sheikhs in this group were former students of Sheikh Abdul Rahman Hakawaat, a Syrian who preached the teachings of the Saudi reformer Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. Abdul Rahman Hakawaat taught at the Bwaise Masjid near Kampala and used his sessions to denounce acts of bida (innovation) among Muslims, especially mawlid (celebrations of Prophet Muhammad’s birth), lumbe (last funeral rites), congregational dua (supplication), and talqin (supplication during the

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32 The Last Sermon of Prophet Muhammad.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
burial ceremony). Other acts of *bida* included all cultural practices that were considered anathema to Islamic principles such as not eating *halal* (lawful) animals due to their cultural category as totems. Ganda culture also forbade men from marrying women of the same clan. Practices regarding dietary restrictions to women such as forbidding chicken, fish and mutton were also declared un-Islamic. Such practices were akin to forbidding what Allah had allowed.

The major teachings of the Tabliq included the following practices: growing a beard, trimming the trousers to somewhere above the ankle, strict observance of Muslim code of dress for both men and women, and *salat* in accordance to the teachings of Ibn Hanbal (as opposed to the Shafii School of legal thought). Using a *miswak* (wooden toothbrush) was encouraged while shoes could be kept on during *salat* for burial (*janazat*). Practices like *talqiin*, *lumbe*, shaking hands with unrelated members of opposite sex, photography, and *mawlids* were considered haram. Practices regarding dietary restrictions to women such as forbidding chicken, fish and mutton were also declared un-Islamic. Such practices were akin to forbidding what Allah had allowed.

To the extent that the above Ugandan teachings resonated with the global Salafist movement engages the need to study structural changes across spaces that enabled the “emergence of new groups of actors and increased inter-local interactions.” This means that various reform phases outside Uganda had enabled processes of change that allowed multiple, transposable and diverse intersection among structures, thereby revealing their fluid and heterogeneous nature. The consequence of this was that actors are now understood both collectively and individually (as when group feeling informed the continuity of particular individual acceptance of some practices), as possessing both “transformative and reflective capacities to maneuver within complex structures whilst accommodating currents of change.” This demonstrates that Salafism as a reform ideology was susceptible to internal debates which thereby revealed how the agents of Salafism in Uganda “prepared, elaborated, maintained and resisted it.” The complex process of Islamic reform did not therefore play out in the “dialectic between two equally homogenous groups of reformers (Tabliq youth) and traditionalists (Bazeyi), but it entailed “compound negotiations in which a diversified body of actors with preferred views were deeply involved in the accommodation, appropriation and localization” of Salafism. This nevertheless means that the complex moment of Islamic reform must consider the political context of the state structure within which the reform agenda is expressed as opposed to focusing on the Islamic reform movement in its local-global linkages, especially localities of interaction that “move beyond the Islamic universe.”

**Internal Splits in the Tabliq**

Nakasero masjid was the critical space from which the message of Islamic reform was articulated in Kampala. The masjid had once belonged to an Asian Muslim group, but was handed over to

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44 Ostebo Terje, Ibid, p.631

45 Ostebo Terje, Ibid, p.631

46 Ostebo Terje, Ibid, p.631

the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) when President Idi Amin expelled the Asian community. When—during the Obote II government—the leader of the Muslim youth (Muhammad Yunus Kamoga) was given an office at the UMSC headquarters, he used it to influence a new wave of khutbas from young sheikhs, recent graduates from the Islamic institutions in Pakistan, Sudan and Egypt and the Muslim Arab world. The main topics regarded the practices of the Bazeyi that were equated to bida. The Bazeyi also participated in these khutbas with counter-critiques. Although the youth had been accommodated at the UMSC as a means to consolidate Sheikh Obeid Kamulegeya’s control of the Muslim institutions in the country, their confrontational khutbas were perceived as a threat to the leadership of the Bazeyi and the youth were relocated to Nakasero masjid. Those who disseminated reformist rhetoric relocated to Nakasero, including Muhammad Kizito Zziwa. According to Rashid Rida, the renewal of Muslim practices need not segregate between the young and old generations. He argues that, as a process, renewing is a law of “social association” integral to nature but “counterweighted by the preservation” of the old practices. Within this process, there is no place for opposition between the new and the old ways provided that each understood its place without “neglect or excess.” To Rashid Rida, the Islamic reform entailed “renewing its guidance,” clarifying the certitude of its truth whilst refuting bida and the “extremism” of its followers. Consequently, both the new and the old would have their place and it would be a matter of “ignorance to prefer one over the other in absolute terms.”

The act by which Sheikh Muhammad Zziwa Kizito took over the leadership of Nakasero and established the Tabligh in Nakasero masjid has been derided and it would later reveal the nature of the schism that came to exist among the Tabliq members. The character of this dawah equated to extremism. According to Yusuf Qaradawi, religious extremism takes four basic forms. First, big-otry and intolerance, which make a person obstinately devoted to his own opinions and prejudices, as well as rigidity, which deprives one of clear vision regarding the interests of others, the purposes of Sharia, or the context of place and time. Second, the perpetual commitment to excessiveness in religious practices. Third, the “out-of-time and out-of-place religious excessiveness and overburdening of others” for instance when “applying Islamic principles to people in non-Muslim countries or to people who have only recently converted to Islam, as well as to newly committed Muslims.” Finally, the “harshness, crudeness, roughness” in treating and approaching people during dawah.

Zziwa was a Muganda graduate from Pakistan. Together with colleagues, he had founded darasa in Masjids and other spaces to preach against bida. He had founded the Society for Preaching Islam, Denouncement of Innovation, Qadianism and Atheism (SPIDIQA) to realize his objective of eradicating bida among Muslims, beginning in Buganda. Abul A’la Maududi Qadian expositions influenced Zziwa. Although many believed in the necessity for reform, its character concerned them. Zziwa and his group had a confrontational attitude. During one Salat session led by one Mzeei sheikh within Nakasero Masjid, Zziwa went outside the Masjid windows and shouted to the Muslims Jamaat (congregation) inside to stop the Salat because the Mzeei Imam was leading wrongly. The Jamaat left the Salat and Zziwa established himself as the Amir of the Tabligh Community. His leadership witnessed controversial fatwas (Islamic religious rulings) such as pronouncing takfir (Islamic apostasy for Muslims he felt did not display Tabligh practices. In one communication, he promised the jamaat an important fatwa on the morrow. Zziwa’s fatwa pronounced takfir upon one prominent Muslim leader whom he said was so beyond the bounds of Islam that he was a moving corpse.

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid
51 Rashid Rida in Charles Kurzman, ibid.
53 Maududi Abul A’la (nd), The Qadian Problem, PVT: Lahore.
Attending a Lumbe was analogous to falling in a pit latrine. Zziwa’s confrontational khutba incensed the wider Muslim public when he made statements that equated eating lumbe food to pork or vomit. Although he was alleged to have misappropriated Tabliq funds, he was much accused of transgressing the limits of moderation in Islamic conduct and called an extremist. When he began to ridicule and abuse the learned scholars of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) many under the Tabligh felt that Zziwa’s abuses had gone too far. He was dismissed and replaced with Muhammad Yunus Kamoga as Amir (leader) of the Tabliq deputized by Jamil Mukulu. Other prominent Sheikhs included: Idris Lwaazi, Muhammad Kiggundu, Sulaiman Kakeeto, Abdallah Kalanzi, Hassan Kirya, Murtadha Bukenya, and Abdul Karim Ssentamu. This marked the first split within the Tabligh.

Under Muhammad Kamoga as Amir, the Tabligh reorganized and streamlined structures of leadership by founding a national network. Leadership became hierarchical with the office of the Amir reproduced at the district, county and village levels. The Tabligh membership consisted of both unemployed Muslim youth and those in part-time employment who could spare time after their jobs to listen to various Khutbas. Many young Sheikhs, especially returning graduates of the foreign universities, were allowed a platform at Nakasero to speak about social-political-economic injustices committed against Muslims especially in Uganda’s recent history, including such events as the 1979 Muslim massacres in Southern Buganda and Ankole. They wondered what the umisc leadership could do in response to what Abasi Kiyimba’s fresh investigations in Ankole had concluded was the responsibility of the then-minister of Defense, Yoweri Museveni. When the khutbas spoke about perceived injustices by Christians against Muslims in Uganda, the Tabligh audience was filled with resentment and hatred directed against two centers of power. The immediate was the umisc whose leadership had ‘failed even to conceive of a willed plan to improve the Muslim condition, many of its leadership defined as ‘stooges’ of the state. Yoweri Museveni’s government was identified as the other center of power that was ‘determined to keep Muslims in their historical place as third-rate’ citizens. Both challenges were inextricably linked and how the Tabligh leadership attempted to overcome both determined its trajectory.

During Kamoga’s restructuring, many organs formed within the Tabligh, beginning at Nakasero and radiating to other areas. Women’s groups were established; Amirats—female Muslim leaders—operated parallel to the Amirs. An internal morality organ was established to enjoin good and forbid evil. Its dual directive was to enforce law and order internally within the group, and to defend it against enemies from without. Internally, the morality organ enforced such rules as dress code, punctuality for Salat and Darasa and general hygiene. Thus, physical attributes marked out the Tabligh members as different from other Muslims. Muslims Tabliq men had to maintain a bearded face and also shorten their clothes to a length above the ankles. Shaving the beard would attract designations like “orange face” or “Hajati” and likened to “baby dolls.” Similarly, a Tabliq male who failed to shorten his trousers would be likened to a ‘Hajati’ since Tabliq women were allowed to wear longer attire reaching to the feet. When men with longer trousers approached the Salat in jamaa, sometimes the trousers would be forcefully cut off and reduced to the Tabliq standard size. If it were the Imam leading the Salat with longer trousers, the followers would boycott it.

For Muslim Tabligh men, it was compulsory to attend the fajr (dawn) Salat in jamaa because Darasa would usually follow. Failure  

54 Focused Group Discussion, Nakasero, 2nd July 2016.
56 Although the word ‘Hajati’ designates a Muslim woman who has completed the rights of Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, it is loosely used in Luganda to refer to any woman who regularly wears the full-body garb.
57 Focused Group Discussion, July 3rd, Nakasero, Kampaala.
58 One respondent Sheikh reminded how he went to give a Darasa at the Islamic institute in Bugembe, Jinja, and his would-be students said ‘tufunye ssenyiga musomero’ (a big influenza has attacked our institution), referring to the ‘dilution’ of Tabligh doctrine reflected in the longer trousers that the Sheikh wore.
to attend both would sometimes lead to flogging. If some Muslims consistently failed to attend important meetings, their immediate leaders described them as lazy Muslims and not worthy of belonging to the group. It was considered important for the Tabliq community to participate in religious activities—even those that involved longer travel, like burial rites. The Tabliq interpretation of the burial rites in Islam differed from those of the Bazeyi. What is called talqin is the recitation of particular mixed phrases to ‘initiate’ the deceased into their new life. While the Bazeyi perceived it as a supplication to Allah to show mercy to the deceased, the Tabliq asked for daril (evidence) from authentic Islamic sources to legitimate its practice without which they would be silent at the burial. On one occasion to inter a prominent Muslim in Mbarara, the Tabliq arrived at the mourning site only to realize there was a military convoy that the deceased’s family had prepared to challenge their intentions of a keeping silent at the burial (all mourners at the graveyard were expected to fall in with their practices). When the commander of the military officers told the head of the Tabliq delegation to desist from their usual mourning practices, he was told to consider his commands carefully for the Tabliq “desired death more than the military commander and his entourage desired life.”

External morality organ discharged its other directive of protecting the Tabliq from outside enemies by preparing its members for any physically violent confrontation if any outside authority were to become an obstacle to their practices of dawah. Training in taekwondo and wrestling became general practices for particular Tabligh units in various secret locations. They had also benefitted from the military training that the state operated through the Mchaka-mchaka programme. These militant units were thus conceived as integral to the reformation and were deployed to protect Tabligh interests. The militant rhetoric revealed itself in the violent clashes among opposing groups in the attempt to control various Masjids. In Kampala, Masjid Noor became a battleground when the Tabliq chased out the Bazeyi and established another stronghold in Kampala after Nakasero. Other clashes occurred in Kyazanga, Mbale and Mbarara in the early 1990s. Ultimately, the violent-turn of the Tabliq dawah culminated in the 1991 invasion of the UMSC headquarters to oust the Bazeyi, which also operated as the excuse for state infiltration of the Tabliq. But unlike the character of the first split, which focused on intra-Muslim politics, the second split was conditioned by the debate surrounding the nature of Tabliq relations with state power.

The second split within the Tabliq occurred in 1996 although its prelude is credited to the events of 1987-89 and February 1991 (the section on ADF and political Islam provides a lengthy discussion of this split). At the beginning of 1991, there was a court ruling to decide the rightful office bearers of the UMSC. The judgment had declared that Saad Luwemba was the Mufti of the Muslims in Uganda as opposed to Rajab Kakooza. The offices of the UMSC were housed in the property that had belonged to the Aga Khan, the head of the Ismaili Muslim community, which had been transferred to the UMSC during President Idi Amin’s decree relinquishing the property of departing Asians to their respective religious groupings. The economic restructuring policies of the NRM government gave an open door return policy to the Uganda Asian community dispersed in different parts of the globe. If the state returned the property to its owner, the UMSC had to vacate. The challenge was that the sitting tenant was unwilling to leave. In this stalemate, the state desired a compromising Sheikh as Mufti to ease its task. Saad Luwemba was propped up in opposition to Rajab Kakooza. A few days before the court ruling, President Yoweri Museveni visited Iran accompanied by Saad Luwemba. The Tabliq interpreted this as state support for Luwemba, Mufti-in-waiting. Having set up camp in Masjid Noor, Tabliq leaders laid siege to the

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59 Focused Group Discussion, Wandegeya, 4th July 2016.
60 Focused Group Discussion, 3rd July, Nakasero, 2016
61 Mchaka-Mchaka began in the 1990s as a state project to instill basic military skills among the youth population.
It took the intervention of the state—which resulted in the death of four police officers and the arrest of over four hundred Tabliq—to cease hostilities. The internal leadership of the group was disrupted. During the siege the Tabliq leadership was torn between continuing the physical confrontation and retreating. The Amir, Muhammad Yunus Kamoga, favored a negotiated retreat to consider the whole situation and plan anew. The deputy Amir Jamil Mukulu—with a large constituency—favored a continuation of the hostilities until victory. As the state police and military gained the upper hand, the Amir escaped and was exiled to Kenya only to return in 2009. His deputy insisted that the Amir had committed a heinous crime of escaping from battle. All along, Jamil Mukulu had considered the siege a jihad (Muslim holy war) and since its rules forbade retreat from war, Muhammad Kamoga was designated a traitor. When Mukulu was imprisoned with a large group of Tabliq youth, he continued to call for jihad against the kaafir (infidel) regime of President Yoweri Museveni.

The state responded to Tabliq trouble with a gradual infiltration of the group although this occurred because the new Amir had a moderate character. The events surrounding the siege on the uMSC headquarters occurred when Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto was finishing his studies abroad. As the arrests of Mukulu and the exile of Kamoga created a leadership vacuum, other Tabliq sheikhs escaped arrest and were unwilling to occupy this vacuum. Further, the state desired that a friendly leadership take over the Masjid due to its location on Entebbe road—the main route into the capital city. Thus, the Mufti, Saad Luwemba, took over the Masjid and handed it to the leadership of Kakeeto. To demonstrate success over the Tabliq, the Bazeyi returned to Nakasero and celebrated by performing burda (an evening activity to send supplications to the Prophet Muhammad), which was a practice anathema to Tabliq belief. Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto’s willingness to accommodate both the youth and the old sheikhs convinced Mufti Luwemba of his moderate character. His diplomatic approach endeared him to the Luvemba leadership and he was chosen to become the Tabliq Amir, deputized by Sheikh Kalanzi. The new Tabliq leadership at Nakasero mutated into a non-confrontational group, denouncing violence while compromising with the Bazeyi at the uMSC. They embarked on Muslim projects and built masjids and other waqf (Muslim endowments) at various locations in the country.

The focus on dawah activities around the country attracted new members into the Tabliq, especially considering its changing character. Trouble re-erupted upon the release of the former Tabligh sheikhs. Some of the released clerics accepted the new situation they found at Nakasero while others in Jamil Mukulu’s constituency rejected it. The Kakeeto leadership refused to accommodate Mukulu’s jihadist beliefs. In turn, Mukulu organized his group and began accusing (or abusing) prominent sheikhs like Lwaazi, Abdul Karim Ssentamu (both deceased) Murtadha Bukunya (imprisoned) and many others of betraying the Islamic call to arms. As Mukulu exited Nakasero, Kakeeto’s leadership suffered from the infiltration of the state. Weekly convoys of the Tabligh to attend darasas in various parts of the country were a sight that signified their organizational capacity and binding beliefs system. When President Museveni witnessed this, he wondered who led this large group and how he managed these different individuals. The President cautioned Kakeeto that a “leader has to travel with protection” (guns) and also “travel well” (by private car). Once Kakeeto accepted these state enticements, many interpreted that he had been “bought.” When a wave of arrests targeting Tabliq leadership and youths began, finger pointing focused on Kakeeto. Later information revealed that Kakeeto’s consorting with the state was responsible for the mass incarceration of Tabliq members whom the state deemed a “danger to national security.”

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63 Available documents reveal that Sheikh Muhammad Kamoga joined with Sheikh Muhammad Kiggundu in 1992 to found a rebel movement (Uganda National Freedom Movement/Army—UNFM/A) that operated in the West Nile region of Uganda and reached into Sudan (now parts of South Sudan).
Another split became inevitable. Sheikhs Idris Lwaazi (who later died under state torture in Katojo prison in Western Uganda), Abdul Karim Ssentamu (assassinated), Hassan Kirya (assassinated), and Abdul Hakim Sekimpi Tamusuza (died in Kibuli hospital) among others, left Nakasero Masjid and established a new base at Market Street in Kampala. But before moving to the new location, some thought the best alternative was to evict Kakeeto and his group. The opposing faction went to Makerere University Masjid and hid a training unit in the women’s wing inside the Masjid, where they clandestinely instructed themselves in Taekwondo and other forms of offensive physical confrontations. Mur-tadha Bukenya led the training. The objective was to proceed to attack Nakasero and evict Kakeeto. The ensuing clash spilt blood and state police were called to quell the attack. Further police investigations revealed that the invading force had marched from Makerere University Masjid. Further intelligence discovered they had trained inside the masjid. The masjid Imam was arrested to explain how a Tabliq faction came to hide inside his office. As he pleaded his innocence and ignorance of Tabliq activities, he was remanded for two weeks. Following this incident, the state intervened to protect Kakeeto from the attempts of the splinter group to evict him from Nakasero masjid. The new splinter faction in effect established its base at Market Street.

Accordingly, the 1996 split among the Tabliq has to be situated within the political context of the Presidential elections of that year. It would be difficult to imagine a “group of prominent Sheikhs breaking away from the main faction unless there was a serious challenge to their understanding of the dawah. If they said Kakeeto mismanaged Tabliq finances surely they could find solutions for financial accountability. But there was a bigger issue that caused their exit. It has to do with nRM politics.” 1996 marked the first Presidential election since 1986. A group of Muslims founded a political party—Jeema—and fronted Muhammad Kibirige as its Presidential candidate. The objective of Jeema was not to win the national Presidency on a Muslim ticket. According to some of the founders, Jeema was conceived to restore Muslims’ belief in their political potential as nationals of Uganda. Since the 1979 war had tarnished Muslims’ image, it was believed that a political platform would support this revitalization. To succeed, the project needed the support of all Muslims in important positions of leadership. Hussein Kyanjo, Imam Kasozi and other prominent Muslims canvassed for the support of Jeema. At Nakasero, Kakeeto’s nRM leanings challenged Jeema. He was designated a kafir (non-Muslim) since he betrayed the Muslim cause. He was a considered a murtad (apostate), “unworthy of the Muslim name Sulaiman and he was renamed “Solomon” for his support of the “infidel” nRM government.

The Tabliq splinter group at Market Street denounced its relationship with Kakeeto and proceeded to found its own organization, Jamaat Dawah Salafiyyah (hereafter Salafiyyah) headed by Abdul Karim Sekimpi. This group continued to spread dawah imbued with political nuances when it stressed Muslim marginalization and accused the state of meddling with Muslim disputes by propping up the corrupt administration of Saad Luwemba at the uMSC. When in 1997 as series of bombs exploded in various localities in Kampala, most especially in Nakulabye, the government took advantage of the prevailing animosity between Kakeeto and the Salafiyyah to accuse the latter of causing ‘insecurity’ in Kampala. Another wave of state arrests directed at the Salafiyyah ensued. Like the 1995/96 split, fingers pointed to Kakeeto’s group for betraying Muslims and selling their secrets to the state. The state of fear within the Tabliq and Salafiyyah groups subsided in 2000 when the clerics and the state reached an agreement for the denunciation of violence. This amnesty also included members of the aDF and Uganda National Freedom Movement/Army (unF-
especially Sheikh Major Muhammad Kiggundu (assassinated on 26th November 2016) and Sheikh Muhammad Yunus Kamoga (imprisoned since February 2015 and charged with the murder of fellow clerics). The Amnesty that concluded in Nairobi in 2000 was conditional to the state fulfillment of particular promises including: provision of security to returnees (especially the officers), provision of welfare and election of the Mufti of Uganda.

How did the Muslim public respond to acts of manifest violence? Muhammad Abduh had emphasized that the attempt to reform the social fabric of Muslim groups had to consider their traditions and customs so as to design sanctions befitting their situation. If the leaders failed to design sanctions comprehensible and discernible to its subjects, those sanctions would harm the people. Thus, the sanctions that governed a “vile” and “base” society differed from those that governed a “compliant” and “noble” one. While the former were harsh and severe in punishment, the latter were equitable and light in punishment. The attempt to exhort Muslims to abide by tawhid took a confrontational character and alienated the very society it intended to reform.

When Muslims were violently accosted for not cutting trousers or debased for shaving beards, ridiculed and flogged for not attending important communal activities, they came to hate their leaders and stayed away from the masjids. A backlash occurred within the Muslim public and debates ensued in small circles of Muslim families and Bazeyi Masjids about Ekizibu kya aba Tabliq (the Tabliq problem). These debates bred recalcitrant responses that critiqued the approach of the Tabliq in matters of Islam. Many Muslim families stopped sending their children to study Islam from problematic Sheikhs rumored to belong to Tabliq. Muslims consciously spread rumors to inform each other of which Sheikhs could be safe to deal with in Islamic issues. Ultimately, the language of Nnalukalala (uncompromising, extremist) emerged to designate Tabliq behavior. Many families could not marry their daughters to Tabliq (actual, rumored or potential). Tabliqs then married internally, and the boundary of Muslim social binaries widened further. This backlash reflected hatred and deep resentment against Tabliq teachings. Many asked about the hastiness of the dawah. Did not the Prophet “teach kindly even to his worst enemies? Give us time to understand the message to which you call us and if we consider it, then maybe we shall change.”

The situation worsened when confrontational dawah met with known Muslim “pork eaters” who were designated apostates. Such Muslims regarded Tabliq designations as true and correct declarations of Islam and would also retort oba Obusiramu bubwo, mbuvuddemu (If Islam belongs to you, I have exited it). Due to the character of the reform Islam became the enemy. Thus in the reform of faith, Tabliq had alienated its social base and violated the basic principle of Islamic dawah: moderation. In the defence of Islam, Tabliq had attempted to police the nafsi (soul) of individual Muslims and misunderstood the bounds of their duty. The outrage of Muslim masses against Tabliq dawah enabled new Muslim publics to emerge. Multiple centers of Muslim organization were founded beyond the traditional power centers at Kibuli and Old Kampala and the other urban spaces. Many Muslim professional doctors, graduates, public servants, politicians, women parliamentarians, councilors and businessmen have cultivated other spaces to express their Muslim identity in ways that do not claim to identify with Muslim leadership in the country. These multiple Muslim identities perceived the national Muslim leadership’s politics as a disgrace to the basic message of Islam, which was to understand dawah through exemplary morals.

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72 Agreement of the Nairobi Peace Talks between the Uganda Government and the UNFM/A, May 2000
74 Muhammad Abduh, Ibid.
75 Focused Group Discussion, August 2015
76 Focused Group Discussion, Kisenyi, 6th July 2016
77 This designation referred to individuals who claimed to be Muslims but Tabliq leaders considered non Muslim for consuming pork.
78 Interview with Muslim professionals, Mbale, November 2016
lim politics freed up individual Muslim autonomy whilst enabling multiple centers of Muslim power to emerge, the ADF rebellion would intensify it.

**The ADF and ‘Political Islam’: The Other Face of the Tabliq**

The violent turn of the reform movement has global antecedents. The modern Saudi Arabian state is founded on the fusion of Salafist ideology with ethnic power. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has historically been identified with Salafism as an ideology to mobilize masses to reform society and politics. By claiming to return to A-Salaf Salih as the standard of Islamic practice, Salafist ideology summoned Islamic doctrine in its entirety as opposed to its circumscribed form, including its political aspect. Classical Islam was “both a religion and the state.” By claiming to return to A-Salaf Salih as the standard of Islamic practice, Salafist ideology summoned Islamic doctrine in its entirety as opposed to its circumscribed form, including its political aspect. Classical Islam was “both a religion and the state.” [Prophet] Muhammad (pBH) did not only preach morality; he also established an enormous Islamic empire for the nation of believers such that whoever aspired to the return of these norms had to work for the proper political system.” However, Erlich posits that politics is also a diversified term: “one can work patiently and moderately and for an open, pluralist, and tolerant system or “one can work violently for the destruction of all opponents” but “once one defines oneself as a Salafi, one’s identity is political.”

Under what conditions did the reformist debate among the Tabliq divide between dawah and reform as rush to the bush? How did the attempts to localize Salafism breed multiple debates and varied results? Why and how did the ADF become the faction of choice to lead the anti-NRM Muslim rebellion? Did this demonstrate the actors’ personal desire for power such that Salafist ideology was a vehicle for group mobilization? What did Islam and Muslims in Uganda have to do with the rebellion? What environment supported its initial formation and what conditions militated against its success as a movement to capture state power?

The conditions that cast the Tabliq reform debate between dawah and political jihad have to do with two developments. First, the need for intra-Muslim reform of religious practices—understood as purifying Islam from the shackles of tradition—had been identified as an important step in reforming national Muslim leadership (to dethrone the Bazeyi and inaugurate the youth). Second, some groups critically considered the reform of the state as a structure that subjected Muslims to social-political-economic marginalization. The multiple and diverse responses to these two developments created a paralysis that would later divide the Tabliq. On one side stood those who believed that as long as the state allowed Muslims religious space to articulate Islam and extend dawah to reform the practices of Muslim masses, Islamic reform of the state (Muslim revolution) was not only irrelevant but also unattainable. On the other side stood some who believed that the reform of Muslim leadership and Muslim masses had to proceed alongside the reform of the political structure so as to establish Dawla Islamiyah (a Muslim state) governed by Sharia. Although a major division and the related splits emerged within a particular moment after the events of 1991 (the invasion of Supreme Council), the division had a brief history in the events of 1987-89.

According to Jamil Mukulu the Tabliq leadership received a message from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1987. It concerned a planned meeting in Mombasa, Kenya, which the Tabliq leadership Amir Yunus Kamoga (in jail since 2015), Deputy Amir, Jamil Mukulu (in jail since 2015) and Abdul Karim Ssentamu (assassinated in 2012) who was considered a top cleric in the Tabliq leadership—were to attend. The events that followed this meeting...
demonstrate the context within which the Tabliq leadership united and later divided. The fallout from these events also revealed the widening schism that intensified violence and invited state intervention. As the trio proceeded to Mombasa and met with their host, Jamil Mukulu was chosen to speak for the Tabliq leadership (Kampala camp) while the host insisted that he represented political interests from Jeddah. The message from Jeddah was that the Tabliq “should mobilize the Muslim youth and acquire guns to dislodge the Kaafir Museveni government from power.”  

As the spokesperson for the Kampala camp, Mukulu responded that they were ready to realize this call to arms on condition that they would institute Islamic Sharia after ousting Museveni from power. His two colleagues nodded with approval over this suggestion. Mukulu notes that “we were convinced that since the messenger represented interests from Jeddah where oil money is located, the war would not fail.” The Jeddah representative however felt that the post-war institution of Sharia should not be considered a condition for starting the war, insisting that a shared Muslim identity was a good basis to begin the war. The representative returned to Jeddah and promised to communicate the way forward.

When the Jeddah camp contacted the Kampala camp after some time, its representative communicated that the war should begin on the basis of a shared Muslim identity and not on the condition of instituting Sharia. As Mukulu emphasizes, the Jeddah camp had “no interest in instituting Sharia in Uganda but desired to have a Muslim government.”  

Whether the Jeddah camp imagined an Amin-like arrangement where the state protected Muslims under its patronage is difficult to surmise. Regardless, Jamil Mukulu refused. As the representative of the Kampala group, he retorted that he and his colleagues were not ready to begin war without the Sharia in mind, saying that “Allah has commanded us not to judge except by using the Quran and Sunnah.” The trio dismissed the idea of allowing anyone to lead just because he had an Arabic name. If the Jeddah camp would not fund the war, Mukulu and his colleagues looked inward to find the necessary resources to begin.

The year 1989 marked the third anniversary of the NRM revolution in Uganda. In many ways, stable political structures had not materialized; the northern corridor had not been pacified and in many places the NRM regime was still fighting opponents while integrating others. Mukulu and his colleagues took advantage of the fragile political structure and began collecting guns. The objective was to “cause an Islamic revolution in Uganda so as to make Islam the higher power. Islam could not judge expect if the gun propelled it to state power.” He was tasked with collecting guns from Gulu, northern Uganda. The proximity of Gulu town to on-going conflicts in Uganda and the region made it a proliferation ground for used guns. These were transported to Kampala under “difficult circumstances since roadblocks and vehicle searches were a common practice.” In Kampala, Jamil Mukulu’s group “would divide the guns into bunches and give each to some core leaders to store in different locations and also made contact with a former Fedemu92 soldier who trained our group to assemble guns and ammunition, and to use bombs.” The operation had ceased being a secret of the top Tabliq leadership and grown into a sophisticated enterprise that needed recruits. Where and how to train those recruits would prove a challenge. Mukulu and Ssentamu identified Muhammad Kiggundu (assassinated in November 2016)

84 Ibid
85 Ibid
86 Ibid
87 Ibid
88 Ibid
90 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
91 By 1989, Gulu town linked Kampala to North Eastern Zaire and Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A conflict with Sudan was still raging while remnants of the rebel forces were in West Nile. Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012.
92 The Federal Democratic Movement was one of the groups that emerged during the Anti-Amin struggle to attempt acquire state power. Together with others, it was later incorporated under the NRM leadership.
93 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
who suggested that he was the heir to a piece of land in Namagoma, where they could undertake military training.94

A salient feature of the Tabliq movement has been its mobilization of the Muslim youth. For all the resources that the Tabliq leadership desired but could not get (such as bigger guns and missiles), there was one critical resource that was in plentiful supply: the Muslim youth. No wonder that the Jeddah camp had confirmed its importance. The Tabliq leadership did not manufacture the category of Muslim youth. It merely took advantage of and channeled histories of Muslim frustration with existing Christian power. The regions of Buganda, Busoga and Eastern Uganda provided a recruiting ground for a potential Tabliq army. Many of the Muslim youth in these regions were unemployed; others had been forced to acquire secular education so as to fit into the category of “employable people in the various institutions; some had become too aged to fit into the grafting school system that required one to study both Islamic and secular subjects.”95 When they finished primary education, Muslim youth dropped out of school and partook in “simple” employment: those from urban areas pushed wheel barrows, fetched water, worked for Asian businesses in town. They also taught Islamic doctrine at nursery and primary schools a few days a week.96 The Muslim youth in the rural areas worked in small plots to cultivate food and to offer their labor in exchange for food or some more space to cultivate their own food crops.97 Both the urban and rural Muslim youth had plenty of time after their routine chores, which they used to attend *darasa* in the evenings to listen to different speakers. The conditions of their everyday life seemed natural until the Tabliq leadership convinced them otherwise. Like Obote’s making of NAAM, this group had nothing to lose and everything to gain from a successful revolution.

To reach its recruiting base, the Tabliq leadership used audio recordings of *khutbas* that were taped and circulated throughout Buganda, Busoga, and deeper areas of Eastern Uganda. Jamil Mukulu made the recordings and his words were “sharp” and “confrontational,” intended to wake up the Muslim “sleeping giant.”98 He shaped and directed his discourse at Muslim youth within the context of historical Christian marginalization of Muslims. His early recordings reveal that the *Kaafir* were responsible for the Muslim predicament, but his later message blamed the *Kaafir* Muslim as well. Mukulu used the challenges of the everyday Muslim routine to pack and deliver his message. Rural areas expressed a deep aversion to Islam. The year 1990 witnessed a continuing Islamophobia in many parts of Uganda; in Busoga, *masjids* were attacked and burned, and Muslims were murdered. Mukulu used these atrocities as the examples to showcase what he believed to be Christians’ aversion to Islam.99 This message fell on an expectant audience and the revolution was underway.

The control of Muslim leadership in Uganda was under the Bazeyi (old guard), which the Tabliq had identified as an important obstacle to Muslim development in the country. To acquire national legitimacy, they identified the Supreme Council as the initial target of their revolution. But to reach their prize they demonstrated their organizational and mobilizing strength on a smaller site. In 1991, the Tabliq youth were mobilized to lay siege at a *masjid* in Makindye, Kampala, to dislodge one Mzeei sheikh who “dabbled in Bida.”100 Muhammad Kiggundu commanded this siege, which took a few days. This incident was immensely symbolic because it confirmed the mobilization skills of the Tabliq, whose importance later events would demonstrate. This incident also witnessed the use of a Muslim flag with imprinted words of the Islamic creed,101 which was secretly carried and hoisted whenever the group moved

94 Ibid
95 Interview with former ADF rebel, Kisenyi, 12th July, 2016
96 Ibid
97 Focused Group discussions in Busoga, November 2016
98 Focused Group discussion in Busoga, November 2016
99 Ibid. Many respondents spoken to in Busoga in November 2016 disagreed with Mukulu’s later decision to wage ‘Jihad’ but all agreed with him that the conditions of the time allowed the Muslim youth in Busoga to receive and accept his message; Mukulu promised them a ‘better’ life beyond their ‘normal.
100 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF rebels, Kampala, 13th July 2016.
101 This act imitated the historical Islamic battles when classical Muslims raised banners in war to signify that they were fighting to defend the Islamic creed
to its target space. This flag signified the desire for a Muslim revolution.102 After the successful Makindye siege, the next objective was to dislodge Saad Luwemba from Muslim leadership.

According to the veterans of the Tabliq invasion of the Supreme Council (who later became foot soldiers in the ADF) the Tabliq could not just take over without any support from the Supreme Council. They needed the support of an already existing Muslim leader to front their project. They chose Rajab Kakooza who was locked in a court battle with Saad Luwemba, over the legitimate Mufti. The Tabligh supported Kakooza because they believed Luwemba was a Shia (therefore a Kaafir). They also believed Luwemba was supported by the state. Since the decision of the court in the matter was expected on a Tuesday, the Tabligh moved from Nakasero on a Monday to anticipate the court’s decision and established a base at Old Kampala.103 When the February 1991 court decision declared Luwemba as Mufti, the Tabligh dissented and laid siege on the Supreme Council, hoisting their flag and announcing that Nakasero and Masjid Noor masjids would be locked for the jumuah. This meant that every Tabliq member had to proceed to Old Kampala and participate in the siege. This announcement mobilized Muslims from various parts of Uganda to oust state “stooges” from the Masjid.104

The state mobilized a counter-force headed by the military police. This operation proceeded alongside a national wide security search for the Tabliq in all Muslim spaces nationwide as the Tabliq problem revealed the apparent weakness of the state structure and its susceptibility to another political revolution. In Old Kampala, the Tabliq surrounded the Supreme Council during jumuah and the police fired tear gas in the middle of the khutba to disperse the siege. Muslims pulled out pangas, stones, metal bars, clubs and other weapons to counteract police violence. In the scuffle, four police officers were murdered. When a UPDF officer Kazini (now deceased) arrived at the scene and asked who had murdered the police officers, one sheikh replied, “Our commandoes did it.”105 Kazini called in the military police that surrounded the premises and emptied the city of its petty merchants by caning them. When the police entered the Old Kampala masjid near the sunset prayer, Jamil Mukulu is said to have asked, “Are we not the ones on the truth?”106 This question implied that the Tabligh should continue fighting until they either won or were killed. Sheikh Yahya Mwanje, who was about to lead the salat, responded, “let us allow them to take us anywhere they want.”107 This statement signified surrender to the state authorities. Buses entered to take the Tabligh convicts to the Central Police Station in Kampala where they arrived under tight security to witness the first round of police torture. Jailed to Luzira prison on the morrow, Tabligh were released after about three months or more while Jamil Mukulu was released after over a year.108

More than any other event, the arrest and imprisonment of its leadership divided the Tabligh on the issue concerning how to proceed with their attempt at revolution. While in prison Jamil Mukulu continued with his plans for a full-scale military rebellion. A different environment however informed the relationship of the Tabliq leadership with the state. What happened between the moment of Mukulu’s arrest and imprisonment that changed the perspective of his former colleagues? When Mukulu was in prison, Ssentamu and Kamoga denounced the proposed military rebellion. Upon release, Mukulu retorted, wetwaakoma we tutandikira (we begin from where we stopped), and he resuscitated his recruitment plans. But Mukulu’s colleagues maintained that the situation had since changed in a way, which ruled out war. Although the looming 1996 national election was a major factor in this second split, an internal debate within the core Tabliq leadership had

102 Focused Group Discussion with five former ADF Rebels, Makindye (Kampala), 11th July, 2016
103 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
104 Ibid.
105 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF Rebels, Makindye (Kampala), 11th July, 2016
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF rebels, Wandegeya, 14th July 2016
informed one group (Ssentamu) that war was not only unnecessary but also impractical. By then, president Museveni’s support had consolidated Luwemba as Mufti at the Supreme Council and Luwemba had, in turn, chosen Kakeeto as Tabliq Amir at Nakasero. These events marked state infiltration of the major Tabliq faction. Jamil Mukulu has stated that when Kamoga and Ssentamu denounced political jihad they reneged on their promises and became traitors: “when released from prison, I returned thinking that Ssentamu was progressing with our plan. But the state had co-opted him and changed his views on Jihad. Even Kamoga refused to join me. He ran to Kenya.”

Released from prison, Mukulu was denied space to preach his Jihadist language, and he was forced—like the Tabliq splinter groups that later emerged—to establish his own masjid at Mengo near Lubiri ring road, Kampala. Why he was chased at Nakasero is a contested issue. Some have explained it in reference to Kakeeto’s leadership and its distaste for Mukulu’s “radical” thought, some have intimated that Mukulu inquired into the Nakasero masjid “accountabilities that the new leadership failed to produce.”

At Mengo, Mukulu courted trouble when his “moving darasa” was seen as revolution in the making. Many youth had continued to listen to his audio recordings and his new base became more popular than Nakasero and other Tabliq spaces. Did this popularity have to do with the message of his weekly khutbas? By this time (1993-95), Islamophobia remained high in many rural areas. Mukulu built his message on general Islamophobia such as vulgarizing Islamic names, dumping pork in masjids, etcetera, and called the state to intervene. In one of his messages from that time, he stated:

“If these atrocities do not stop, we shall speak a different language [violence], we are peaceful where there is peace…we shall pick up guns…this is not a threat, its reality. And if one side picks up the guns, even the Talaf [Mukulu’s opponents] shall pick up guns, we are capable of making an army. This Tumwine [updf officer] was an artist who went to bush and he returned a major general. When we go to police we are not helped, the state wants to make us into opportunists; stop politicizing us, do not make us a fertile ground for recruitment.”

The above message called on the state to remember that Muslims were part of Uganda society and that the state had a duty to guard against atrocities. But it also reminded the state that Muslims were capable of defending their rights through armed force. Mukulu’s second message was directed at Muslim youth. He reminded them:

“We shall pick up the gun and fight these Kaafir; the AK47 is just a gun and whoever can pick it up can cause results. Omukafiri [Kaafir] fears death more than life; they want money and life; they want life more than we do. We can fight them, we have nothing to lose: if we are killed, we shall go to Jannah, if we win, they shall lose. Do not fear them. Museveni’s intention is to erase Islam from this country; we are the youth and we understand all the language unlike the Bazeyi.”

Muslim youth received this message and looked to Mukulu as a leader who would deliver them from historical marginalization. As hordes of Tabligh youth rushed to listen to Mukulu’s messages, Nakasero and other Tabliq spaces were concerned. Unlike the first split, this second split was not about losing followers to a new leadership. Rather it concerned a widely held belief that the language of political jihad was “toxic” and it would lead Muslim youth astray. This was compounded by the fact that Mukulu’s message...

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109 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
110 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF rebels, Kampala, July 13th 2016
111 Interview with Jamil Mukulu’s former assistant, Kampala, 18th July 2016
112 These were teaching sessions delivered in Muslims’ private residences at various Masjids in rotating weekly patterns.
113 ‘Embeera y’obusalafi’, (the state of Salafism), Jamil Mukulu, Recordings, Kampala, 1994
114 Ibid
115 Focused Group Discussion with Sheikhs and elders, Iganga, 3rd November 2016
continued to attract followers. While many people shared the belief that the social-political-economic situation favored other religions more than it did Muslims, political *jihad* was dismissed as an alternative to the Muslim predicament.

How could Mukulu be persuaded to tone down his message? Mukulu mentions that Ssentamu met him to persuade him to “forget *jihad*” and to “follow Islam as he [Ssentamu] interpreted.” Mukulu further maintains that other Sheikhs tried to convince him to denounce *jihad*. Mukulu reminded Ssentamu that his own message was more important at the time because Christian powers had invaded the sites of Islamic practice (Old Kampala and Nakasero). On this, he said, “the invasion of Old Kampala failed because our objective of dislodging the Kaafir Luwemba from Supreme Council failed and even spread to Nakasero where Luwemba gave the Nakasero keys to Kakeeto, another Kaafir.”

As Mukulu declined to tone down his radical language, his opponents chose a different course. Multiple Tabliq leaders joined to preach against Mukulu’s message of *jihad*. As Ssentamu and Kiggundu returned Mukulu’s “guns and ammunitions, and bombs, they also spoke against his activities, revealed the secrets they had with Mukulu and designated him a *khawarij* [heretic].” As Madina graduates were chided for cultivating the space in which Mukulu’s radical message thrived, they too redirected the anger at Mukulu; his ignorance of Islamic teachings had propelled his apostasy.

These new designation marked Mukulu and his Tabliq faction for exorcism from the Tabligh when Kakeeto and others began beating up Mukulu’s Tabliq so as to prevent them from hearing the *jihad* message. With his image tarnished, his members were beaten and humiliated. In Masaka, one sheikh made it his duty to prevent Mukulu-allied Tabliq from sprouting, to no avail. Failing to separate Mukulu from his followers, authorities denied him a peaceful atmosphere to construct his Mengo masjid.

When pressed on whether Mukulu continued to think about *jihad* at that time in his Mengo space, the former Tabliq members in his camp say that his message spoke about Jihad but he was not ready. They argue that the violent attacks against Mukulu disorganized his plans to build the Mengo masjid; Mukulu was pushed into a wall and he decided to begin war not against Nakasero and Old Kampala, but their benefactors, the state. How do we reconcile the statement that Mukulu was not ready with his own admissions that *jihad* was conceived during the early 1987-98 era only to be disturbed by the imprisonment? Mukulu has said that political *jihad* was the objective; the formative moment was ongoing until it was interrupted. As his recordings from the camps (Zaire) highlight, he was committed to *jihad* but had not decided the opportune moment to begin attacks. Pushed to the wall and denied operating space, Mukulu recruited the first 265 ADF fighters, who marched to Buseruka, Hoima (Western Uganda) and began full-scale rebel activities.

The state’s response to the ADF problem was tailored to different circumstances. In the pre-rebellion moment, the state had sought to appease Mukulu and his faction. A string of masjids were constructed in various parts of the country to appease Mukulu’s Tabliq faction and to convince them not to go to war. These masjids are spread in many places in Busoga, Buganda, Eastern Uganda; they are identified as “Museveni’s gifts to Mukulu’s Tabliq.” The other response of the state to the ADF rebellion was gradual intelligence infiltration, open military engagement and assassination of its top commanders, and political promises directed at some of their commanding officers. This military response was predicated upon the military nature of the threat. The ADF rebellion begun in Buganda, led by Baganda Muslims who recruited

116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Jamil Mukulu recordings, 2012
120 Ibid.
121 Focused Group Discussion with former Tabliq members in Mukulu’s Mengo Masjid, Kampala, 19th July 2016
122 Ibid.
123 Jamil Mukulu Recordings, 2012
125 Discussions in Busoga, Mbale, Masaka, Eastern Uganda revealed these sites.
fighters from the nearby provinces such as in Busoga and Eastern Uganda. Since the NRM regime had declared that Buganda (Kampala) was the center of any regime’s legitimacy from which power radiated to the regions, Buganda had to be pacified at all costs. With the emergence of the rebellion, the ADF Tablíq became the political underbelly of the NRM regime in Buganda.

The ADF rebellion began with 265 Muslims (fifteen were women) in Buseruka, Hoima district, Western Uganda. The idea was to attack police stations and to acquire more guns. The rebellion began with sixteen guns, which had been initially kept in the private houses and in Nakasero Masjid. Government forces attacked the ADF camp in Buseruka, arrested some, killed the others, while forty-five remnants ran to Ntoroko landing site and boarded boats to escape to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Jamil Mukulu was not part of this camp and those arrested were returned to Mengo and initially imprisoned in Lubiri palace but later transferred to Luzira. They were released after six years in 2000.

Meanwhile, as the ADF Tablíq faction engaged the state in a rebellion geared towards capturing state power, another debate had sprung up within Nakasero. According to the former ADF rebels, Jamil Mukulu’s ADF project was received with mixed feelings in the Nakasero camp. While some felt that the Tablíq leadership at Nakasero should denounce Mukulu, others wondered: “if Mukulu actually succeeds in his rebellion against Museveni, we are his enemies.” This fear influenced Muhammad Kiggundu (now deceased) to found the UNFM/A as a counter force to the ADF struggle against Museveni and they chose to go to Arua near Zaire in North Western Uganda as the base of their operations. Unfortunately, these met a deadly ambush when John Garang’s (SPLM leader) mistook them for rebels and killed many of them. The remnants did not marshal a significant threat to the NRM until some were given amnesty and others were integrated into the UPDF. UNFM/A was not as popular as the ADF.

The amnesty agreement between the state and all rebel movements was signed at Nairobi in 2000 and allowed for the release of all ADF fighters captured at Buseruka. But it also presented the ADF with a recruiting group of battle hardened youth who, when they heard that the war was still raging ran back to Hoima, Bundibugyo, Kasese and Eastern Zaire to join their colleagues. When the ADF attacked Kasese, Western Uganda, (first in November 1996 and later in August 1998), it mobilized more recruits. Those released under amnesty in 2000 also returned to support their colleagues because they felt their rebellion was winning some battles.

New waves of recruitment continued around the same message: political jihad and Islamic Sharia were the solution to Muslim challenges in Uganda. The objective was to engage the UPDF in battles that would ultimately move to capture state power in Kampala. The group feeling influenced individual choices that as long as the war waged, one could not abandon the group lest one apostatized.

What was the possibility of success? How realistic was the initial decision to wage war in the first place? Does the uncertainty of success explain why Ssentamu and other Sheikhs spoke against it? The responses of the former rebels reveal that within the moment of the 1990s, they had hope for success. According to the circumstances of the time, the rebels “Were convinced and we also believed that we were fighting a good cause. When we actually began the war and encountered government forces in Buseruka, those 45 who escaped through Ntoroko to Zaire symbolized

126 Interviews with former ADF rebels, Kampala, 19th July 2016. Some respondents disagreed on the exact amount of guns.
127 This was before the government handed over these premises to the Kabakaship, years after the restitution of the Buganda traditional institution in 1993.
128 Ibid.
129 Interview with former UNFM/A rebel, Kampala, 19th July 2016
130 Ibid
131 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF Rebels, Makindye (Kampala), 11th July, 2016
132 Ibid
that we would continue the war and become victorious. When we also attacked government forces in Kasese we got morale and thought that success would eventually come.”

The recordings of Jamil Mukulu in the camp highlight some responses to the feasibility of success. In a series of recordings made in 2012, Mukulu used a special session he calls *Ffe tuli ku kituufu* (we have the sole claim to the truth) to attack the Kampala Tabliq, the state and its agents, and all his opponents. He used the darasa session to explain how his is the only faction following the correct interpretation of Islamic truth in contrast to those Tabliq leaders and groups that he left in Kampala. With this claim, he challenges anyone else to bring forth evidence to challenge their (ADF) monopoly of “Islamic truth.”

In the same session, Mukulu proceeds to provide the details of his government and how he had succeeded to establish *Dawla Islamiyah* (rebel camps) in the mountains, away from the Kaafir state in Uganda. In one of his recordings, he says, “we are enjoying true Islam here. We do not have CMI [Uganda intelligence organ] Nagis (dirt), we have no churches to abuse Allah that he has a son, we are not living in a Kaafir state.”

As he advanced his cause vis-à-vis his opponents, Mukulu reminded his admirers that since Sharia governed his Mujahidin (holy fighters), those intending to join him should first purify themselves from *shirk* (polytheism) and *kufr* (disbelief) and then wear “garbs of tawhid (Islamic monotheism) and the Sunnah [and] prepare to practice them truly.”

He further warned that the camp as *Madina-t-Tawhid* (city of Islamic monotheism) was not a place to work for the earthly life but for the hereafter. Those Muslims who stayed in Uganda the “Dawla Kufriya (Kaafir state), Nifaqiya (state of hypocrites), Shrikiya (state of polytheism) should remember that they lived in Nagis and if they were comfortable under Kaafir laws they were also Kaafir.” The implication was that any Muslim who refused to migrate to Mukulu’s camp had apostatized, including all Muslim leaders like parliamentarians who made laws in Uganda.

Mukulu’s radical language can be interpreted as a sign of frustration and desperation. Frustrated by the increasing desertion of his forces following government counter-insurgency in the Kasese region, Mukulu painted a picture of a successful Islamic revolution in his camp to entice new members to his idea of *Dawla Islamiyah*. This frustration also bred desperation for new recruits since his fighters had reduced immensely. A closer scrutiny of the internal situation in Mukulu’s camps reveals that the state had infiltrated his group more than he could admit.

First, Mukulu was at pains to paint a picture of pure Islamic governance devoid of Kaafir influence yet in his very midst state spies operated to inform on his whereabouts. These same spies passed state information on ADF top commanders such as “Benze and Issa Twatera, who later accepted state advances and abandoned the ADF rebellion.” Mukulu called the Uganda experience one of Dawla Nifaqiya but hypocrisy operated in his very midst. When his commanders escaped from camp and accepted state lures, they informed on the military operations in the camp and ADF operations became compromised. When Mukulu’s strategy became lost in tactics like urban bomb attacks, the state approached the very ADF bomb experts to inform on their colleagues and use them to eliminate the ADF bomb threat in Kampala.

Second, Mukulu’s message in the darasa sessions spoke of desperation for new recruits. Many of his soldiers were captured in various places and taken to government offices in Kyanjoka, Kasene, Western Uganda, for amnesty screening. Former rebels were pardoned if they accepted amnesty. But if they participated in the rebellion again, they would face the death penalty or life imprison-
When granted amnesty, the state representative sent the former rebels to Kaweewa barracks, Western Uganda, for full military training, after which another screening would proceed at CMI headquarters, Kampala to sieve the intelligence officers from the foot soldier. At CMI, bomb experts and intelligence gatherers were identified as the new UPDF recruits to inform on their new enemy, the ADF.

But not all accepted integration in the UPDF. The reason for refusal was that if the rebellion began as a way to fight the NRM Kaafir army, accepting integration into UPDF and CMI under state payment meant that the rebellion had failed and the state won. In other words, the state had succeeded in weakening the Muslim and turned him into its asset. For such a Muslim, this meant continuing serving a Kaafir army and coercing Muslims with state power just for a monthly salary of just a few shillings. This state of affairs frustrated Mukulu because it confirmed that his project had failed to cultivate a strong Muslim self in the people he claimed to govern. The state integrated the former ADF rebels into its security apparatus and released it into the Muslim community to inform on the goings on thereby turning the Tabliq against each other; it transformed a Muslim insurgence into an intra-Muslim civil war. The intrigue and in-fighting that gripped the Tabliq following the murder of the Muslim clerics was intensified by the circulation of information between the state and its informants. As the following section shows, the outcome of the nature of the state’s response to the ADF rebellion led to further splits within the Salafiyyah as those granted amnesty felt protected by the state and used their temporary power positions to reorganize themselves at the detriment of others.

The 2011 Split in the Tabliq

In 2011, a group of Sheikhs within the Salafiyyah appointed Muhammad Yunus Kamoga to become their Amir. Their choice was dictated by the reconciliatory wave sweeping through the Muslim groups and to his organizational abilities. And because he had received state amnesty, his new position would accord him a degree of protection. But internal Salafiyyah politics disrupted the reunion until Kamoga was dismissed for “dictatorship and fanning hatred and division among Muslims.” Kamoga resisted his dismissal and an internal purge targeting all Sheikhs opposed to him began. Yet the prelude to these spats had much to do with both internal management politics within the Salafiyyah and the state’s attempt to divide and rule the Tabliq whilst appointing state agents to become the custodians of Tabliq groups. The trouble began with the death of prominent Muslim clerics in 2012 that were allied to the Kibuli faction. Accusations and counter-accusations emerged within the Tabliq groups over complicity in the clerics’ murders. When more clerics were murdered in 2013 and 2014, information reached various sheikhs that some leaders in the Salafiyyah were colluding with the state to inform on other Sheikhs within the Tabliq groups. As seen in the previous section, this was the very effect of the integration of the former ADF into the government security structure.

Further, Kamoga’s mobilization skills had culminated in the conception of a fundraising drive to build a project—Ummah House. Before long, questions emerged regarding the signatories to the project’s bank accounts. Where was it to be built? Who would own it? Did it belong to only the Tabligh-cum-Salafiyyah only or to all Muslims in Uganda? Who would manage it? Would all Sheikhs from Kibuli and Old Kampala also have offices in it? As Kamoga’s cohorts ran to media houses to improve public relations regarding “Ummah House” a section of prominent Sheikhs within the Salafiyyah denounced the project. Prominent Sheikhs: Haruna Jjemba Katungulu, Najib Ssonko, Hassan Kirya, Mu-

142 Ibid.
143 Ibid
144 Focused Group Discussion with former ADF rebels, 19th July 2016
145 Ibid
146 See also ‘Muslim Tabliqs dismiss leader’ Daily Monitor, 28th November 2014.
hammad Kiggundu, Umar Swidiq Ndawula, Mahmoud Kibaate, Mustapha Bahiga, among others, were abruptly stopped from conducting darasa sessions. The explanation was that they had gone to the media and spoken against Ummah House.

But the problem was larger than Ummah House. Internal leadership politics regarding the management of different Muslim organs such as zakat (income tax given to the poor), hijja (pilgrimage) and waqf (endowments) were considered lucrative opportunities for many Tabliq youth in league with leadership to attain some higher economic status and ekitiibwa (honor), which brought internal competition among Sheikhs to attract the Amir's approval. As Amir, Kamoga had begun demeaning and ridiculing prominent Sheikhs whom he stopped preaching inside a darasa session, on various occasions. Kamoga's group was also suspected of "torturing enemies" and for rampant displays of "dictatorship."\(^{147}\) State support for Kamoga was confirmed when General Salim Saleh (a state official) attended one of the annual Tabligh darasa at Busega in which Kamoga requested that Saleh assist them with a ground to build Ummah House—together with Moses Kigongo. Salim Saleh had been identified as the state officials to provide custodianship over the Kamoga-led faction.

The Jjemba-led faction became convinced that Kamoga was the enemy within and at a farewell khutba in Masjid Noor, Ndawula, with emotion, revealed a tell-all about the wrongs within the Tabligh-Salafiyyah, swore by the Quran and marked a formal split from Kamoga.\(^{148}\) Unlike open confrontation of the previous years, the new split undertook a discourse of recorded darasa and khutba whereby each faction critiqued the other. Yet there was an undercurrent of despair, disillusionment, hatred, betrayal and malicious lies directed against some sheikhs within these recordings. In summary, the busagwa (poisonous discourse) of earlier years resurfaced only that video and audio recordings carried it to its targeted audience. When Haruna Jjemba became the Amir of the new Salafiyyah faction, a wave of abusive recordings emerged from their counterparts. Trading insults and abuses reached the level where death threats surfaced. In one recording, the author threatens Ndawula and his group that unless they all face death, Islam in Uganda would never progress.\(^{149}\)

On January 3, 2016 at the Wandegeya Masjid in Kampala, the Jjemba-led Salafiyyah faction convened a large darasa, which it dubbed katubibagambe (let us tell you the secrets). The objective of this session was to explain to the Muslims the cause of the clerics' murders and the agent of death. What emerged from the darasa session was that one professing Muslim could become the enemy of Islam and Muslims. Sheikh Abdallah Wanji delivered a session that reported a Hadith of the Prophet. He said:

"The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said: 'after me, there will be two things: disagreements in understanding knowledge and factions. Composed of youthful people, with beards, shortened clothes, and shaven heads, their understanding will be thoughtless; their prayers would be frequent as is their fasting. Although reading the Hadiths of the Prophet would be their daily routine, their practice would be worse. They would be strong in reading Quran but it would not proceed beyond their throats to their hearts to inform practice. Their tongues would convince others to become Muslims but they would not practice what they preach. They would be the primary people to murder Muslims but the non-Muslims would look at them as their brethren since they would pronounce disbelief saying that so and so is Kafiir and unworthy of Islam."\(^{150}\)

When Wanji delivered this hadith, he was all the while in-

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\(^{147}\) Kirya's faction gives evidence for Kamoga's torture of Muslims' Bukedde, 1st January 2015.

\(^{148}\) Umar Swidiq Ndawula, Khutba at Masjid Noor, William Street, Kampala, August 2015.

\(^{149}\) Audio recording from one Sheikh, relayed in a Darasa session, Lubiri ring road Masjid, 'Yahya Yaani', (who is Yahya), 20th December 2015

\(^{150}\) Wanji Abdallah (2016), 'Who is Killing the Muslims', Wandegeya, 3rd January; This Hadith was reported as a combination of meanings from various narrators of the Prophetic tradition. Its full statement did not originate from All Abi Talib. I have translated it from Luganda.
terjecting with reminders that the Tabligh had to watch out for members who looked like them (beards, shortened trousers, et cetera) but were the worst enemies of Islam and Muslims. The narration of this hadith was important for the very reason that among the information circulating in the Sheikhs was their brethren were complicit in the murder of clerics in various ways. But as this paper has argued, the Tabligh was responsible for laying the language of extremism that invited the state’s violent intervention. When it successfully defeated the ADF rebels and turned some of them into agents of state security, the NRM government turned the Tabligh problem into an intra-Muslim civil war. Further violence ensued when the Tabligh allied themselves to the centers of Muslim power in Uganda (Kibuli and Old Kampala) and the state consequently became concerned about the intentions of alliances. How the state attempted to contain Muslims culminated in the defeat of former rebels and their supporters to excise signs of rebellion (both real and potential) from the NRM political gains in Buganda.

Conclusion

The foregoing work has highlighted the predicament of the Islamic reform movement in Uganda. In the attempt to reform Islamic practices, Tabligh leaders assumed a monolithic understanding of the reform agenda. The prevailing social-political conditions within Uganda revealed however that Muslims’ understanding of Islamic reform were diverse and multiple. This explains why multiple splits emerged depending on a group’s understanding of the role of Islam under non-Muslim majority power. These debates in how Tabligh leadership conceptualized the reform of society bred violent consequences. Yet the violent character of the Islamic reform movement provides two important implications. First, the interpretation of Islamic theology must consider the meaning of religious text and the context of the society.

Second, the need to interpret religious edicts into principles of political praxis. The major challenge of the Islamic reform movement in Uganda was the failure to identify a detailed plan of political action that would encompass the whole country. Seeking political reform of state structure beyond the minority status of a single community would have given larger social legitimacy to Muslims’ political demands. By circumscribing the message of reform as a sole concern of establishing Sharia, the Tabligh leadership limited the scope of the reform agenda and with it the opportunity to acquire a wider national audience. More than any other factor, this failure highlights the challenge of building political coalitions of social-political reform in such religiously and culturally diverse political arrangements.

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**JOURNAL ARTICLES**


The Public Politics of Nudity

Lyn Ossome

**Abstract** This working paper argues that nudity’s appeal to a liberal public via the law negates its claim of being a last resort mechanism of justice. It seeks in part to respond to a recent paper delivered by Professor Sylvia Tamale in her inaugural lecture, *Nudity, Protest and Law in Uganda,* and argues that modes of political expression like nude protests ought to be understood as already interpellated into the very structures of power to which they appeal. This is because liberal politics of recognition cannot acknowledge a subject that is invisible to the structures of power toward which claims of oppression are directed. This last point may be expanded by arguing further that the banalization of those elements of our existence from which we are capable of distancing ourselves (such as the fear of appearing naked in public) begins long before the act that produces the spectacle. The symbolic order that begets nudity is, in this regard, part of the structure that lends it legibility as an act of protest by guaranteeing its morality being under public scrutiny, and thus its survival as a political act. At the core of the debate—which has been long sustained within critical feminist thought—lies the idea that, in practice, the public conceals and corrupts the materiality of the private. The problem with the liberal subject of rights held up to the state/public for redress is that the rights they are accorded remain abstract and do not fully reflect the social context and actual lived realities which necessitated the rights claims in the

**Keywords** politics, nudity, power, feminist

**Introduction**

Were a public protest to claim any form of "publicness," it would need to properly name its subject. That is, such a protest would need to make clear the objective claims which both constitute the possibility of its production as public and ensure its legibility to the structures of power to which it appeals for resolution. Outside of a clear political question, nude protest is easily interpellated into an identitarianism that holds up its subject (female, in this case) as self-evidence of oppression, and in doing so obscures the social, cultural, and political contexts that would properly situate the claims within a realm of transformative politics. Against much feminist critique, the association of the public with the political implies that the political is necessarily that which we cede to public scrutiny and necessarily, therefore, that which is qualified as amenable to critique, disgust, shaming, ridicule, awe and so forth. In this regard, the political is paradoxically also that which is already beyond injury, to the extent that political identity and the politicization of identity may be seen as antecedents of protest.

This last point may be expanded by arguing further that the banalization of those elements of our existence from which we are capable of distancing ourselves (such as the fear of appearing naked in public) begins long before the act that produces the spectacle. The symbolic order that begets nudity is, in this regard, part of the structure that lends it legibility as an act of protest by guaranteeing its morality being under public scrutiny, and thus its survival as a political act. At the core of the debate—which has been long sustained within critical feminist thought—lies the idea that, in practice, the public conceals and corrupts the materiality of the private. The problem with the liberal subject of rights held up to the state/public for redress is that the rights they are accorded remain abstract and do not fully reflect the social context and actual lived realities which necessitated the rights claims in the

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1 This is not so much to endorse the ostensible objectivity of public claims as it is to place them within broader philosophical debates that ascribe subjectivity to the private domain, and thus tacitly, objectivity as the condition for transgressing the private domain.
first place. This contention was also central to Marx’s thesis On the Jewish Question, in which he showed the fallacy of political emancipation based on (religious) identity. To Marx, political recognition was a ruse; it merely admitted individuals into a civic/public space that left intact the material relations against which identities became politicized. Extrapolated to my argument here, recognition of women as rights-bearing citizens does not in itself deal with the historically contingent or objective factors that compel women to publicly present themselves as female. To Marx, full human emancipation had to deal with the material realities that produce and stabilize identities as a form of politics.

To perform politics based on this abstract subject is nothing more than a romanticization that can no more approximate an emancipatory possibility than it can address the questions that necessitate the appearance of the (abstracted) subject in the first place. It is in this vein that I set out to critique the politics of nude protest, asking in the process the extent to which nude protest might become productive of emancipatory feminist praxis, and the conditions that such a possibility necessitate. In this, I restrict myself to an analysis of one institutional context—April 2016 at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR)—in which the deployment of nudity was enacted as a political act of protest. In my reading of Sylvia Tamale’s recent piece on the MISR context, I draw attention to the question of immanence—-the idea that feminist emancipatory politics can produce within them the dialectical possibility of social and political change. I view immanence as impossible within the realm of a particular form of identitarian politics that asserts ‘powerlessness’ as the mode of staking broader political claims.

Feminist Identitarianism and the Morality of Nudity as ‘Truth’

To deal with the act of nudity as the presentation of a political claim is to ignore broader questions that such an act foregrounds: that is, why does feminism lend itself to cultural appropriation in the ways that it does? Why do women’s bodies remain as self-evident terrains of oppression guided purely by morality or the self-evidence of the truth of this oppression? Tamale asserts just such a moral dichotomy in distinguishing between “macro unequal power relations engendered by patriarchy and neoliberal capitalism” (which she terms “negative power”) and “localized empowerment exercised at the micro-political level by women who seek to disrupt dominant power and to transform society” (terming this “positive power”).1 If nudity is a moral discourse that denies its links to power, nudity as protest then equates its moral statement to powerlessness, its appearance suggesting its complete disarticulation from any power. Wendy Brown writes of “feminism’s complex relationship to Truth;” her argument, following Nietzsche’s idea of repressentiment, is instructive:

...for the morally superior position issuing from resentment to work, reason must drape itself in powerlessness or dispossession: it attacks by differentiating itself from the politico-ontological nature of what it criticizes, by adopting the stance of reason against power, or, in Marx’s case, by adopting scientific objectivity against power’s inherent cloaking in ideology.4

The nude body in this regard demands to be understood through its embodiment: the undeniable of the physiological differences between man and woman replaces reason and knowledge prior to or after the objective physical display of oppression. To Brown,

...this desire for accounts of knowledge that position us

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outside of power would appear to be rooted in the need to make power answer to reason/morality and to prohibit it demands for accountability in the opposite direction. The supreme strategy of morality...is denial that it has an involvement with power, that it contains a will to power, or seeks to (pre)dominate it.5

Brown is critical of what she views as a contemporary feminist strategy for legitimizing “our truth” through its relation to worldly powerlessness, and discrediting “theirs” through its connection to power. Powerlessness is in this regard implicitly invested in Truth, while power inherently distorts. Truth is always on the side of the damned or the excluded; hence Truth is always clean of power, but therefore is also always positioned to reproach power (1995: 46).6

Critical of the modernist feminist preference for moral reasoning over open political contest, Brown’s critique turns our gaze instead to what would be required to live and work politically without such myths, without claiming that our knowledge is uncorrupted by a will to power, without insisting that our truths are less partial and more moral than “theirs.” The moral bullying that characterizes nudity as protest in this way functions to conceal rather than reveal the social context of its claims to oppression.

There is nothing we can particularly understand about ‘rape culture’ or misogyny or violence outside of a concrete understanding of the lived circumstances that produce the subject of the violence as subjugated—that is, subject to a set of negative conditions. Subjugation cannot of itself gain legibility when abstracted from a broader social context that constructs particular claims as violations of the liberal codification of a regime of rights. In other words, in what ways do we establish that the objective factor(s) driving sexual violence is gender and not something else? When we appear in and to the world, how do we go about determining which one of our various subjective positions acquires objective presence and a political semiotic?7 Is this choice not itself inherently political? Responding to the feminist infatuation with the Lacanian symbolic order—“the structuralist reduction of discourse to symbolic system”—Fraser argues that making sense of the gender dimensions of social identity exceeds biological determinism that would ascribe inevitability to women’s oppression. Rather, she sees possibility in understanding the historical specificity of social practices that produce and circulate cultural descriptions of gender.8 The performance of nudity cannot of itself reveal the social conditions under which it is taking place.

**Nudity as Politics**

A core concern for Tamale is to explore the extent to which Nyanzi’s nude protest was also political. The “naked protesting body” is an abstracted notion in the paper which never clarifies its source of power. As such, the lecture invites the question: do bodies ‘do politics’ on their own? While the assertion of politics implies agency—the idea, as argued above, that power already resides in public as well as private domains to which struggle is articulated—the view of nudity as a prima facie expression of politics does not interrogate its politicization. In this regard, a number of questions may be posed in relation to Tamale’s other concern with the relationship between nudity and the law. Firstly, what happens when acts of nude protest heavily infused with a cultural dialectic, essentialist even, appeal to liberal, legal regimes of rights for redress? Second, is the public appearance staged in relation to a cultural group, or is its appeal directed at a liberal public? Both of these positions take on a particular distinction when understood in relation to the ways in which groups undermine individual expressions of rights, thus undermining the effect of a liberal public qua non. Third, when does nudity function as politics and what deter-

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, p. 46
7 Ibid, pp. 46-47.
8 To Arendt, for instance, “there is no subject that is not also an object and appears as such to somebody else, who guarantees its ‘objective’ reality. What we usually call ‘consciousness,’ the fact that I am aware of myself and therefore in a sense can appear to myself, would never suffice to guarantee reality” (1978: 19-20).
The Public Politics of Nudity

10 Tamale, Nudity, p. 16
11 Ibid.

mines its effect and legibility as protest?

Let us work with the example of the reproductive labour performed by women on a daily basis. Ample anthropological evidence suggests that sex/gender divisions of labour do not necessarily produce gender inequality. Rather, women’s oppression emerges in relation to specific forms of social organization. We may further consider the meaning of a shift of domestic labour from an analytical category centered on class to a descriptive term empty of analytical meaning. In this sense, if a working class woman does certain tasks in her own home for her family, she is doing unpaid non-market domestic labour that contributes to the production and reproduction of labour power on a daily and generational basis. If she does the same tasks in someone else’s home for pay, she is a paid employee or a wage labourer. The distinction between the two lies in the social relations of the work, not in the tasks themselves or the physical and emotional exertions of the worker.

The point I seek to make here is that the nakedness of bodies—whether female, male or transgender—in and of themselves carry no inherent political semiotic. Outside of a particular social context, nudity or nakedness is as mundane as, say, seeing a madman walking naked on the street; it provokes no particular aversion, no symbolic power to or from the naked being (apart perhaps, from fear, which might be evoked by actions separate from the nudity).

As such, while Tamale historically locates nakedness as protest, by neglecting the particular conjunctures and contexts that produced the various stripping incidences as injury, and beginning the story from the stripping itself (focusing on the act), she ironically strips these forms of nude protest of the politics that thrust them into the public. The superficial distinction that Tamale draws between ‘nakedness’ and ‘nudity’ aside, how can we understand what the naked body was appealing to outside of the social context that led to the stripping? What tools, apart from the objective fact of nudity, do we have for actually understanding why it happened and, more importantly, the effect of the act as protest (that is, who or what structures of power it might actually have succeeded in apprehending)? While we know the subject of Tamale’s critique, the negation of its object, I believe, renders Nyanzi an impossible (or abstracted) subject that exists only for its own sake, one that demands to be taken seriously by the mere fact of its appearance—it's embodied femininity. That is romanticism, not politics.

Drawing further from Tamale’s work, we could also interrogate the fact that breastfeeding women in the West draws a particularly adverse public reaction, while as Tamale observes, “a publicly breastfeeding woman in Uganda..., does not raise eyebrows.” Rather than insist that the endurance of such practices in Africa “illustrate contradictions and paradoxes that are associated with the body as a site of cultural and political contestation,” could this persistence not conversely be shown as functioning within the realm of materiality ascribed on particular social relations? The care ethic, long associated with lower classes of women as unpaid, underpaid, or unrecognized reproductive labour, easily transcends gendered boundaries to encompass class contradictions, rather than sexuality, gender or race. Even if intersections among all four were acknowledged, the ways in which white and privileged women experience motherhood anywhere in the world has historically been mediated through labours of the enslaved, colonized, and at the current conjuncture of late capitalism, through the informalised and casualised labour of women of colour. To insist on a confluence of the mothering/nurturing experience across these historical boundaries is to precisely hold up to the law for redress, a subject of rights completely abstracted from social contexts that animate the liberal construction of law in the first place. Part of the law’s ambivalence toward defining nudity and addressing cases such as this likely relates to the overly subjective nature of these acts. The idea of justice without visible perpetrators, only visible victims, is thoroughly modernist in its claim; it is a romanticism long debated within the legal establishment itself.
The Public Politics of Nudity

What, therefore, thrusts nude protests into the public and the realm of the political? On this, a long-standing debate within feminist thought has maintained (in its critique of the public/private dichotomy) that what appears as a set of subjective conditions and interpretations of the condition of women actually conceals the objective conditions and circumstances that reproduce subjectivity as gendered. In short, the personal is political. The Marxian materialist conception of history showed that the social relations of production—the pattern of class relations and class structure that gives society its central character—arose out of the different modes through which societies produced and reproduced themselves. Therefore, our understanding of the ways in which people interact and relate to achieve their individual and collective goals could not be abstracted from the imperatives that drove different societies to define themselves culturally, socially, politically and economically in distinct ways. The cultural norms and traditions that animate societies internally and, in this way, differentiate one from the other, conceal long histories of contestation based on class, gender, age, etc. These histories already have an objective, and therefore public, dimension to them and as such, disrupt the public/private distinction.

I highlight this point in critique of a comparison that Tamale makes between two communities in Uganda. She cites Buganda culture as one in which women inadvertently cover their bodies in conformity with a truth regime and in keeping with social acceptability. This is presented against Karamojong culture, where “women routinely move about half-naked.” This comparison suggests that Baganda women perform docility at home and only through transgressive, non-conformist acts like public nudity can there be potential for social change. Noting the deference of public nakedness/nudity (based on Tamale’s typology), what then politicizes the act of public nudity among Karamojong women, who by this suggestion have already transcended the private/public barrier? Upon what basis should we read the bodies of women for whom public nakedness normatively constitutes society’s perception of female-ness? Is it not a plausible argument to say that this particular case disrupts an idea which centers the female body as a locus of oppression, and therefore of struggle, rather than attending to an understanding of the mechanisms through which power is distributed in that society?

This distinction implies an interpellation of femininity beyond the boundary markers of nudity/nakedness. In the capitalist-patriarchy analytical framework, what is it that tips the gaze in excess of a morality based on socially acceptable norms? It is, in my view, impossible to establish this causality based simply on (public) appearance or presentation. Indeed, difference in the modes of understanding nakedness between these two Ugandan communities suggests difference in the forms of social organization akin to each; the primary difference lies in the political economies of social reproduction, to which female labour is articulated. In The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx articulated this materiality, writing that “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstance, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” The modes of resistance that women have enacted against oppression and the power they have marshaled to this end cannot constitute politics without an illustration of conditions of its possibility as political in a particular context. The materiality of those struggles cannot make sense outside of concrete interpretation within particular historical trajectories through which different women in different societies become constituted as worthy subjects of rights and justice. Turning to the MISR context, the various narratives offered that obscure the circumstances, contexts and conditions preceding the protest do no more than justify a moral claim that confounds public nudity as politics.

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12 Ibid, p. 18
Limits of Moral Communities

My argument in this text has sought to discount the possibility of marshaling a transformative feminist politics expressed through the moral discourse of nudity as an expression of women’s ultimate powerlessness. Stripped of context and circumscribed from its inherent identification with power, nudity engages a morality that, in fact, eschews politics. Wendy Brown again informs this point: Feminists have learned well to identify and articulate our “subject positions”—we have become experts of politicizing the “I” that is produced through multiple sites of power and subordination. But the very practice so crucial to making these elements of power visible and subjectivity political may be partly at odds with the requisites for developing political conversation among a complex and diverse “we.” We may need to learn public speaking and the pleasures of public argument, not to overcome our situatedness, but in order to assume responsibility for our situations and to mobilize a collective discourse that will expand them. For the political making of a feminist future that does not reproach the history on which it is borne, we may need to loosen our attachments to subjectivity, identity, and morality and to redress our underdeveloped taste for political argument.13

Our collective feminist struggles become legible precisely because we need to both master the power to understand the forces that are assembled against us, and the power to apprehend those forces (Brown 1995).14 To stop at an identitarian point that holds up the oppressed as the evidence of oppression is to obscure the structures, conditions, histories and institutions that produce and normalize those identities. Nudity’s moralist identification with gender oppression suggests transcendence, and, ultimately (in bad faith), impossibility of freedom for those so identified. We must question the basis of a brand of feminism that increasingly hails.

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13 Brown, States of Injury, p. 51.
14 Ibid.
Reflections on Sylvia Tamale’s Inaugural Professorial Lecture

Samson A. Bezabeh

In her Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Professor Sylvia Tamale focused on the relationship between nudity and social protest. Engaging in a comparative analysis, Tamale focused on the case of Uganda. To make her case, she discussed the April 18, 2016 event that unfolded at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR). On that day, Stella Nyanzi, a research fellow at MISR, undressed in front of the director’s office. This occurred after the director, Professor Mahmood Mamdani, decided to close Nyanzi’s office following her repeated refusals to teach in the MISR PhD program. In the lecture, Tamale claimed that she was initially horrified, embarrassed and ashamed by Nyanzi’s action and rushed to MISR in order to remove Nyanzi from the scene. Upon reflection, however, her understanding was transformed and she began to consider Nyanzi’s action a form of protest.

Using this event as an entry point, Tamale explains the relationship between nudity, law and protest in the Ugandan context. In order to do this, Tamale uses a post-structuralist approach. Right from the beginning, she cites post-structuralist scholars, notably Michel Foucault, who she again celebrates in the main section of her lecture.

By placing this lecture within the broader field of social sciences, this essay will show its theoretical and methodological gaps. By taking Tamale’s claim of having been inspired by post-structuralist scholarship seriously, the author will also point out inconsistencies. Even though Tamale claims to be inspired by post-structuralism and locates her lecture within the post-structuralist school, she fails to make proper use of the post-structuralist theoretical framework. Her lecture is marred by theoretical stances that actually contradict post-structuralism, particularly the work of Foucault.

Such contradictions emerge from the beginning, when the lecture engages in a historical analysis to explain the relationship between body, law and protest. To do this, Tamale draws on world history, colonial history and African history. The kind of historical analysis that she makes, however, assumes the presence not only of a past, but also of an original past from which the true condition of a society can be discovered.

Claiming the possibility of going to origins is problematic when it occurs in an essay that locates itself in post-structuralist thought. It shows either reclusive eclecticism or complete disregard of post-structuralist thought, such as the work of Foucault, which is critical of historical analysis that claims to return to origins. In the very first pages of The Archaeology of Knowledge, in which Foucault makes his genealogical method explicit, he is critical of such an engagement. What we learn in the first few pages of that book is that discourse analysis, in which Tamale claims to be engaging, does not relate to a form of historical analysis that focuses on origins.

In fact, Foucault urges his readers to shy away from exercising a form of history that focuses on continuity. Instead of tracing traditions, as Tamale does when she seeks to establish “African” practices, Foucault focuses on ruptures and discontinuities. Criticizing the concept of tradition as a notion that lacks “rigorous conceptual structure,” Foucault advises his reader that in discourse analysis we should not look for an origin:

One last precaution should be taken to disconnect the unquestioned continuities by which we organize, in advance, the discourse that we are to analyse: we must renounce two linked, but opposite themes. The first involves a wish that it should never be possible to assign,

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1 See Foucault (2007: 23)
in the order of discourse, the irruption of a real event; that beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin—secret and so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in itself. Thus one is lead inevitably, through the naiveté of chronologies, towards an ever receding point that is never itself present in any history; this point is merely its own void: and from that point all beginnings can never be more than recommencement or occultation ...

By claiming that her chronologically oriented historical overview gives a historical reading of the African body as well as by making a claim that the way African bodies have been handled has been transformed by colonialist and international capital (and hence alluding to the presence of an authentic traditional African past), Tamale engages in the naive exercise of searching for a chronology and a true origin. This search comes despite her intention to engage in discourse analysis à la mode de Foucault.

The contradiction that marks the inaugural lecture is not limited to the use of history. Beyond searching for an origin, Tamale’s lecture also engages in macro–micro analysis. Both in her historical analysis and in the part of the lecture where she focuses on the contemporary period, Tamale’s lecture is filled with analysis that operates on different scales. In addition to this difference in scale, we see a simplistic, unidirectional analysis. Sylvia speaks of colonisers affecting the colonised, of state affecting society, of capital affecting Africans and so on. Such analysis lacks a grey zone where one can see the possibility of a two-way interaction. Recent scholarship on history and the postcolonial states of Africa—such as the work of Frederick Cooper and Anne Stoller, Benjamin Lawrence, Emily Lynn Osborn and Richard L. Roberts—shows an interaction through which Africans are not only affected by colonial power or capital but are also engaged in the very process of colonization and the power dynamics of the post colonial state. Tamale does not adopt such a perspective, but she also does not indicate an awareness of current scholarly debates or give reasons for leaving them out of this particular analysis.

Tamale’s engagement with macro-micro analysis is also in contravention with the post-structuralist stance in which she claims to locate her lecture. Again, Foucault is critical of such analysis. In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault explicitly explains that this form of analysis is not conducive to an analysis that focuses on the relation between body and power:

In general terms: rather than refereeing all the infinitesimal violence that are exerted on sex, all the anxious gazes that are directed at it, and all the hiding places whose discovery is made into an impossible task, to the unique form of a great Power, we must immerse the expanding production of discourses on sex in the field of multiple and mobile power relations... No “local centre,” “no pattern of transformation” could function if through a series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an overall strategy. And inversely, no strategy could achieve a comprehensive effect if it did not gain support from precise and tenuous relations serving, not as its point of application or final outcome, but as its prop and anchor point. There is no discontinuity between them, as if one was dealing with two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic)... Foucault (1998:97-100).

In her lecture, although not quoting the above passage, Tamale indicates the diffused nature of Foucault’s analysis when it comes to power. Despite this awareness, her lecture contradicts this stance in a number of places. In Tamale’s lecture, the colonialist bourgeoisie and international capital appear as unique form[s] of Power. Tamale does not ask how colonialist and colonizer—the African post-colonial subject and the post-colonial state, among others—engage in creating discursive practises through mutual strategies that cannot be placed in hierarchal terms.

Tamale’s conception of society and culture is also problematic. Within the disciplines of sociology and anthropology where these concepts are developed, their usage has been a subject of de-
bate since the 1960s. Anthropologists such as Raymond Firth criticised a reified conception of society. Fredrik Barth, in Conceptualizing Society, was critical of the creation of a congruence between a given territory, society and the culture that is said to belong to that society, as society itself is marked by different forms of interaction and borrowing. To Barth, finding a bounded society with its own culture is an unfounded myth. In the 1980s this critique further expanded within the field of anthropology with the publication of works like Writing Culture and Writing Against Culture. At present, the so-called ontological turn in anthropology as well as what came to be labelled as perspectivism further present a critique of the concept of society and culture.\(^2\) Within sociology, this critique has taken a more prominent place with the work of the French scholar Bruno Latour. In Reassembling the Social, Latour not only indicated how a bounded conception of a society is problematic, but also showed how the notion of society was itself a conception of the bourgeoisie that was created at the turn of the nineteenth century for the purpose of social control.

Despite the presence of such advanced scholarly debates, The Inaugural Professorial Lecture was bathed in reified conceptions of society. In view of the current scholarly debates, to accept Tamale’s analysis becomes problematic. Can we speak of a Ugandan culture, of an African culture, and so on? Professor Tamale does not relate to the current debates, nor does she show an awareness of them. Rather, we are asked to accept concepts as facts.

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History, Nudity and Protest

Mahmood Mamdani

ABSTRACT This essay on female nakedness as a form of public protest calls for a historicization. If we are to evaluate its justification, we need to focus on the demands of the protest, and not only its form.

KEYWORDS female nakedness, anti-colonial tradition, culture, custom, colonial anthropology

Sylvia Tamale’s Inaugural Professorial Lecture begins with a mea culpa—a regret that she responded to Stella Nyanzi’s public nakedness with shame rather than solidarity: “I was shocked and horrified, embarrassed and ashamed... I now realize that my emotive response to Nyanzi’s protest was in keeping with societal attitudes that associate nakedness—especially the nakedness of a grown woman—with shame, perversity and taboo” (2). Ashamed by her own response to public nakedness of the female body, Tamale resolved to make a second—and this time public—response: “Nyanzi’s protest might have appeared to be personal; what I want to explore today is whether, and the extent to which, it was also political” (3).

Tamale begins the Inaugural with a historicized account of nakedness and clothing in a place called “sub-Saharan Africa,” focusing in particular on the context of anti-colonial nationalism. By the end of this account, Tamale’s attitude towards Nyanzi’s protest—and the general act of public nakedness as a form of protest—has moved from shame and silence to celebration and euphoria. The Inaugural ends with a policy recommendation, that Uganda follow New Zealand and inscribe naked protest as a constitutional right.

Naked and Clothed Bodies

Tamale proclaims her methodological aspiration at the very beginning of the lecture: “The analysis that follows is guided by post-structural feminist understanding of the human body as a site for both power and control” (vi). Yet, a few pages into the lecture, we find her evoking a line of argument first made popular by Rousseau, and commonly used in colonial anthropology: “the noble savage.”

According to Tamale, the naked body is the original human condition in sub-Saharan Africa: “Historically, the largely consistent warm weather in sub-Saharan Africa did not require a lot of clothing” (4). Yet in Sudanic societies ranging from ancient Ghana to Mali, Songhay, Dar Fur, Senmar, to Abyssinia across the trans-Saharan belt, and even the city states of the East African coast, human bodies were clothed abundantly in cotton apparel. While Tamale argues a form of environmental determinism, differences in dress were explained more by social distinctions and cultural emphasis than by warm weather. Furthermore, there is no single “sub-Saharan African” history of naked and clothed bodies, as the region is made up of particular societies, each with a particular history.

From nakedness, Tamale moves on to a history of the clothed human body, again making sweeping sub-Saharan generalizations. This time, her account is laced with another assumption common to colonial epistemology: when it comes to Africa, all change (whether defined positively as progress or negatively as corruption of an original natural order, as in Rousseau) is introduced from without. According to Tamale’s account, as quoted earlier, this original naked condition was “completely changed” as a result of external influence. Tamale cites the influence of missionaries of different persuasions, particularly those in Uganda: “The missionaries designed an ankle-length Victorian dress (gomesi or busuti) for women and a similarly long tunic for men,” she writes (5). This, she continues, was followed by “the political Islam of the veiled woman we know today” (6).
Throughout the essay, the clash between Tamale’s intentions and the analysis she presents is striking. If Tamale’s ambition is post-structural, her account of social and political development is often positivist and progressivist. This becomes clear in the next step of her historical narrative, which is concerned with nationalism. Take, for example, Tamale’s reading of Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*: “the concept of nationalism invents or imagines nations where they do not exist” (26). The implication is that Anderson distinguishes between two kinds of places: where nations actually exist and where they do not, but are instead invented or imagined by nationalism. Anderson’s point is the opposite: that all nations are a product of the imagination of nationalist intellectuals. Anderson adds that these intellectuals exist within a historical context where print capitalism provides the technological infrastructure to spread this imagining to other social groups. Whereas Anderson challenges a positivist theory of nationalism—that some nations exist and others do not—Tamale turns to him for intellectual support to put forth a positivist claim that divides Uganda into two parts: where precolonial nations existed (as kingdoms in the South and West) and where they did not (the East and the North). Instead of diversity and plurality, we are presented with a hierarchy of historical development. Though presented as a sub-Saharan African point of view, this evolutionist perspective is more characteristic of European colonial thought.

This, then, is the setting in which Tamale chooses to understand nakedness as a language of protest: “Today, in the ‘civilized’ world of clothed bodies, stripping naked in public is guaranteed to draw immediate attention” (7). To make sense of Nyanzi’s stunt—“stunt” is Tamale’s word (7)—Tamale gives us several examples of public stripping by women as a specifically African form of protest (7-10) during the colonial and the post-colonial periods. This is both the most informative part of the Inaugural Lecture and puts forward its most controversial and troubling claim.

**The Uses and Misuses of “Culture”**

Tamale seeks to place the object of her query—public nakedness of grown women—in a context. That context—as I have already suggested—is sometimes a place “sub-Saharan Africa”—and at other times a way of life—“culture.” Both contexts appear as unproblematic categories, with no internal tensions or historical discontinuities considered worth even mentioning, much less worth discussing. There is no sense of difference, either temporal or spatial. Throughout the lecture, Tamale generalizes from Uganda to sub-Saharan Africa without appearing to think twice. When it comes to a discussion of law, Tamale has no qualms equating “customary law” with “culture”: “Uganda operates [under] ... codified statutory law and uncodified customary law mainly rooted in culture” (22). Yet, there is an entire literature, starting with Martin Chanock, on the top-down translation of “custom” from a set of precolonial, plural social conventions to a colonial, state-enforced and authoritative “customary law.” If “customary law” is rooted in “culture,” that is the culture of a patriarchal elite. Rather than a ground marked by consensus, customary law during the colonial period was the site of ongoing debates about what was “genuine” custom and what had been “invented” by the colonial power and local elites. The shaping of custom and identity is key to understanding the making of post-colonial subjectivity.

One result of this discussion is a growing consensus that there is no such thing as a singular and authoritative custom as claimed by either colonial or postcolonial power. Custom is ever-changing, and that change is shaped by relations and struggles, internal and external. This point is particularly important since Tamale’s objective in the lecture is to sanctify Nyanzi’s action by locating it in a hallowed and unchanging tradition: that of anti-colonial protest by women outside the power structure. In the process, Tamale dislocates the history she is writing, shifting the justification of protest from the object (anti-colonialism) to the mode of protest (the naked body) regardless of the content and purpose of the protest. The consequence of this is to subvert the anti-colonial tradition by
The Uses and Abuses of Historical and Genealogical Analysis

To summarize the argument in the previous section: To defend a right to using the naked body as a mode of protest is not the same as claiming that nakedness legitimizes the demands of a protest. One can defend armed struggle as a legitimate form of resistance, but to do so does not legitimize the use of arms in every instance. Anyone claiming that the use of arms is justified will need to explain the circumstances and specify the grievances and demands of those resorting to arms.

Whether discussing the right to bear arms or, indeed, any right at all, the legitimacy of the exercise of that right is contextual. This means turning to the specifics of the case. What is striking about Tamale’s Inaugural is how carefully she avoids the specifics of the Stella Nyanzi case. Perhaps this is because the subject of the Inaugural was, in the first instance, motivated by Tamale’s sense of guilt over her own immediate response: public female nudity. At no point does Tamale consider the rightness (or wrongness) of Nyanzi’s demand.

With this distinction between the form of protest and its demands, let us return to Tamale’s account of nude protest in colonial and post-colonial Africa (7-10). In each instance she refers to—the Oyo empire in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Igbo in 1929, Cameroun in 1958, Soweto in 1990, Nairobi’s Uhuru Park in 1992, the Niger Delta in 2002, Kampala in 2012, and Amuru District in 2015—Tamale is careful to sum up the specifics of the case and the demands of protesters as justification for each instance of protest. This is true also of the only other individual protest she cites, that of Noerina Mubiru in 1996. The only exception is the case that inspired the Inaugural Lecture—that of Stella Nyanzi.

Tamale is silent when it comes to the object of Nyanzi’s protest. Precisely when we expect Tamale to ask questions, she resorts to silence: What was Stella Nyanzi’s demand? Did this demand amount to an assertion of rights (in that it could be generalized to all in a similar position) or was it a demand for privilege (in that it was non-generalizable, thus constituted a claim to privileged treatment)?

displacing it with one that carries a contrary meaning. The protest in question is justified not because of the justness of its demands but because its carrier is the naked (female) body.

The breach between the justness of demands and the mode of transmission of those demands reaches its zenith in the conclusion, where Tamale suggests that Uganda follow New Zealand in acknowledging that the “nakedness of protesters (or naturalists) does not amount to indecent behavior” (28). Without any reference to the justness of demands, Tamale proclaims: “Deploying ... any criminal code against naked demonstrators under the patronizing guise of protecting the ‘public interest’ cannot be demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society” (33).

Let us for a moment shift this discussion on the form of protest from nakedness to violence. We may defend resorting to violence as a form of protest, but that cannot be the same as claiming that a protest is justified because it is violent (or non-violent) in form. What justifies a protest is not its form (nakedness, violence) but its demands. The most we can say with regard to public nakedness is that its use can by itself neither legitimize nor delegitimize a protest. To make that judgement, requires focus on the demands of the protesters. While it is true that Tamale at no point says that the mode of protest justifies a protest regardless of its aims, it is also true that Tamale at no point addresses the aims of Nyanzi’s protest, and yet implies that it was justified.

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denial of a right but a demand for privileged treatment. Indeed, resort to public nudity in defense of privilege in this particular instance suggests a discontinuity rather than a continuity in the tradition of protest. To place Nyanzi’s “stunt” as the latest in a single line of protest by defenseless women across the past century is not only to seek to glorify Nyanzi’s action, but is also to demean the actions of women who protest to defend themselves, their families and their communities.

**Looking to a Contemporary Tarzan for an Answer**

Professor Tamale closes her Inaugural with a policy recommendation that naked protesting be declared “a constitutional right and freedom.” She suggests that “Ugandan courts follow the New Zealand judiciary” (29), specifically the 2012 public nakedness case of Pointon v. New Zealand Police, and protect naked protest as a constitutional right. The first surprise for the reader is the realization that the case in question has nothing to do with public nakedness of the female body as a form of protest—which is what Tamale spends most of the Inaugural Lecture defending. Instead, Tamale tells us, this case is about a man: “Pointon was a naturalist who did not believe in covering the natural human body with clothing” (27).

The second surprise is that, even having spent most of her energy and time establishing the historical legitimacy of the naked female body as a form of public protest in sub-Saharan African culture and history, Tamale chooses to leave the terrain, history and culture of sub-Saharan Africa and instead leap across the ocean in search of an abstract prescription from a context that has little to do with African culture or African history. If anything, this Tarzan-type preoccupation with naturalism seems likely to evoke a settler-colonial history.

The third surprise is that Tamale offers a legal solution to a social problem. Tamale assures us right at the beginning of the lecture that “there is absolutely no written law in Uganda that prohibits public nudity” (2). The real problem, she says, is social: “The written law may not prohibit public nakedness but the living law of most Ugandans—including law enforcement agencies—renders it not only ‘illegal’ but also immoral and unethical to exhibit our bodies in this manner” (3). So powerful is this social stigma that even Tamale finds herself sharing it. So if the problem is more social than legal, why prescribe an exclusively legal ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution imported from New Zealand? Having spent a good part of the lecture on “the mobilizing potential of women’s naked bodies and their ability to rally against oppression” (26)—in addition to providing illustrations from different African contexts—why would Tamale turn to the court case of Pointon the male naturalist, who “did not believe in covering the natural human body with clothing,” (27-28) to provide a legal solution?

The primary takeaway from Tamale's Inaugural lecture is that not only is the problem cultural and historical, but so is the solution. In this case, the New Zealand example is not only irrelevant but is also misleading. The Stella Nyanzi case shows that female public nudity can be used for opposite purposes: not just to defend rights but also to claim privileges. While the use of female public nakedness as a means of protest should be defended, its use should not blind us from distinguishing and critiquing the nature of its demands. To fail to do so is to do a disservice to not only the feminist movement but also the larger progressive movement.
Guidelines for Contributors

The MISR Review welcomes two types of contributions: first, submissions from doctoral students from within the African continent, based on primary research and an original theoretical engagement; second, think pieces from scholars around the world, inviting and initiating a critical discussion on the literature focused on a particular theme.

Submissions should be original contributions and not under consideration by any other publication.

Contributions should be limited to 10,000 words, but should in no case exceed 15,000.

Manuscripts should be submitted to the editors by email attachment in Word format. All manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to The Editors, The MISR Review, at misrreview@gmail.com.