Re-Thinking the Northern Identity: Local Government and Politics in Acholi, 1950–1968

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**ABSTRACT:** Ugandan political engagement has continually allowed the politics of ethnicity to take a centre stage. Even in the present day, Uganda remains ethnically divided between the “North” and the “South”. Bantu-speaking ethnic groups in the southern, central, eastern and western areas of Uganda dominate the “South”. These include the Baganda, Basoga, Banyoro, Bagisu, Batoro and the Banyankole. The “North”, which is home to the Nilotic and Central Sudanic-speaking groups, encompasses the Acholi, Lango, Madi, Alur, Iteso and the Karamojong peoples. Historically, the political and ethnic divisions between the peoples of Northern and Southern Uganda have contributed to the country’s contentious post-colonial history. Economic underdevelopment played a large part in fostering political tensions between Northern and Southern Uganda and served as useful tool for Acholi power brokers to negotiate for political and economic capital with the state, by utilising the politics of regional differentiation through the ‘Northern identity.’ This article assesses how Acholi politicians politically manipulated and then challenged the Northern identity from 1950 to 1968. It argues that in the face of political marginalisation from the late 1960s, Acholi ethnonationalism, rather than regional affiliations became the most prominent identity used to challenge state authoritarianism.

**KEYWORDS:** Uganda; Acholi; ethnicity; nationalism; identity; colonialism.
My base has always been in the North

On 17 February 2011, Ugandans went to the ballot box to cast their vote in the country’s second multi-party presidential election since 1980. Of the eight candidates that contested against the incumbent National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, two, Norbert Mao and Olara Otunnu were Acholi. Despite opinion polls consistently placing Museveni ahead, Acholi opposition leaders continued to propagate among their constituents a real possibility that there could be change after twenty-four years of NRM rule. Whilst on the surface both candidates claimed that they were primarily concerned with putting an end to what they considered to be the corrupt government of the NRM, closer analysis immediately brings to light the ethnic and political tensions that have for so long characterised politics in Uganda. Uganda remains ethnographically divided between the “North” and the “South”. Bantu-speaking ethnic groups in the southern, central, eastern and western areas of Uganda dominate the “South”. These include the Baganda, Basoga, Banyoro, Bagisu, Batoro and the Banyankole. The North, which is home to the Nilotic and Central Sudanic-speaking groups, encompasses the Acholi, Lango, Madi, Alur, Iteso and the Karamojong peoples. For the Acholi, and indeed other ethnic groups in Uganda, ethnic identities have historically proven to be a powerful political commodity. Both Milton Obote and General Idi Amin played upon ethnic divisions for political gain, with Obote, of Lango ethnicity, targeting the previously dominant Buganda Kingdom from 1966-7, while Amin’s regime engaged in massacres of the Acholi and Lango peoples. From his return to power in 1980, Obote continued the same trend of his first presidency by ensuring that Northerners from Acholi and Lango dominated the army corps, to contend with military and political threats to his administration.

The clearest example of the strategic use of ethnic cleavages in the 2011 election campaign can be found in an interview with the DP candidate Norbert Mao in January 2011. Listing Mao’s ethnic origins - his father being an Acholi and his mother a Munyankole from the South - the interviewer asked which region was giving Mao the most support. Mao replied, “it may surprise you that my base is not primarily ethnic. My base is generational; my base is a demographic base.” He then added, “the other base is that I have always been in the North. The North identifies with me and they know that no one else cares about peace and reconstruction than me.” It is also important to point out that in every single election campaign, Museveni, a Munyankole from Ntungamo district in the South, had until 2011 had never come close to winning a majority in Acholi districts. The war with
the LRA that has plagued Northern Uganda for well over two decades is one of the reasons why the current President is so unpopular in the region. Numerous accusations of brutality by NRA and UPDF soldiers against Acholi civilians during the conflict have been levied against the government, leading many Acholi to believe that rather than helping to restore peace in the Acholi communities, the NRM’s motives were more concerned with eradicating them all together.¹

**Ethnicity and Politics in Post-Independence Uganda**

The story of post-independence Uganda and the Acholi is not unique within African post-colonial discourse as it contains familiar elements which can be seen throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Nigeria, have been explained along ethnic lines by the international media.⁶ Yet immediately after independence, Uganda appeared to have a promising future with its growing economy and relative political stability. Independence was embraced by Ugandan civil society with the country’s first democratic elections to the National Assembly drawing in three quarters of the population.⁷ Independence was to be the era that would bring an end to the factionalism of tribalism and give Ugandans a new national identity, setting them on the way to modernisation.⁸ Ugandan politicians propagated the rhetoric of democratisation, detribalisation and modernisation to their newly independent constituents urging them to believe that the post-colonial Ugandan nation state would no longer be about the ‘tribe’ but about economic development and the ‘nation’.⁹

However, with the onset of the nationalism project, post-colonial African states instead became embroiled in protracted and violent sectarian conflicts often delineated along ethnic lines.¹⁰ By the late 1980s it became clear that independence had not brought an end to tribal politics, showing that modernisation/development model had comprehensively failed. By focusing on “the strong state” as a mechanism for modernisation and in its various forms, academics, politicians and theorists were left with models that could no longer be viably applied to the African reality.¹¹ Indeed, with the rise of ethnic conflict within the Continent, it was no longer “feasible to look at ethnicity as a cultural hangover.”¹² This opened up era in Africanist literature focusing heavily on the study of ethnicity and its role in within politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than trying to conform African politics into Western political ideals and theoretical trajectories, Africanists and theorists were urged to accept that African politics is very much rooted in the African experience of governance, tradition and culture, in which
the politics of ethnicity remains a viable political tool.\textsuperscript{13}

Uganda’s colonial experience undoubtedly left an institutional and political legacy that is now widely accepted as being paramount in the construction and reification of more centralised, politically based ethnic de

markations.\textsuperscript{14} However, as Martin Doornbos argues more generally, ethnic conflict in Africa is not as result of the political expression of traditional distinctiveness vis-à-vis technologically and culturally homogenising forces’, it is instead the articulation of social, economic and political inequalities unique to each post-colonial African state.\textsuperscript{15} More recently, Daniel Posner argued that political competition within multiparty settings in the context of Kenya and Zambia has been conducive to reinforcing ethnic cleavages related to more unifying blocks, which give credence to distinctions based more on religious, linguistic and regional identities. This is primarily because both political candidates and voters can belong to multiple groups.\textsuperscript{16} Within one-party-rule, ‘the effective arena of political conflict shrinks from the nation as a whole to the level of the local electoral constituency’, thus emphasising more localised political cleavages.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, Berman attributes, in part, the impact on authoritarian rule in Africa, which has resulted in the elimination of the ‘political meaning of citizenship’, by maintaining a decentralised system of authority in the locality sustained by a patron-client network.\textsuperscript{18} Within this context, ‘citizenship’ becomes less about the nation, but about the autochthonous claims of established communities over the territories within the nation.\textsuperscript{19} The clearest point that studies of African ethnic identities over the last two decades have shown is that political African identities have nearly always incorporated some sort of ethnic identification. The pluralism in this stems from the ability of these identities to adapt, or indeed be adapted, in the face of local, regional, national and global changes.

Ethnic conflict in post-independence Uganda has been attributed, in part, to the colonial tribalisation of indigenous pre-colonial cultural groups, cumulating in an ethno-structured system of governance, which remained embedded within the post- colonial state.\textsuperscript{20} Post independence, ethnopolitics quickly became a state sponsored military and administrative exercise, utilised to obtain and/or retain political power, often under the guise of nation building and political centralisation. As state leaders sought to weaken local political authority, they became reliant on political and military support from members of their tribal groups, further militarising national politics along tribal lines. Uganda’s post-colonial economic and political decline began in the mid-1960s amidst the increasingly au-
thoritarian policies of Milton Obote. Obote’s policies inevitably resulted in widespread national disillusionment with his UPC regime. By 1970, this disaffection had permeated the top echelons of the Ugandan army corps, resulting in a military coup by Idi Amin in 1971.21 In his attempt to consolidate power, Amin used fear and intimidation to subdue the population. He continued to manipulate religious and ethnic cleavages in Uganda, and embarked on a systematic campaign to eliminate political and military rivals to ensure his regime’s survival.22 “Within three months of coming into power Amin had suspended all democratic rights and continued his predecessor’s ban on all political parties.”23 Rather than providing a return to some sort of normality in Uganda after the liberation war of 1979 Obote’s re-election under controversial circumstances in 1980 obliterated any hope of political cohesion, sending opposing political figures to the bush to fight against the new regime. Government resources were spent fighting the rebels during the five-year Bush war, at the expense of reconstructing state and local institutions. The country was once again left with an ineffective central government, riddled with ethnic rivalries, governed by military force and crippled economically. By the time Museveni staged his coup d’état in 1986, Uganda had become one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa.24

Uniting the ‘Northerners’: The Acholi and Obote I

Indirect rule and the establishment of Native Administration were crucial in preventing widespread ethnic conflict in colonial Uganda. As the different ethnic regions were governed geographically and politically separately, there was little or no competition for resources such as land and political office.25 Similarly, the lack of British manpower within the Protectorate mandated the inclusion of traditional leaders and politically minded Acholi men within the Native Administration. This was instrumental in containing challenges to colonial rule, by allowing them to work within rather than outside colonial authority.26

However, the last decade of colonial rule was to usher in more pronounced ethnic tensions and anti-colonial nationalist discourses articulated through the divisive politics of ethnonationalism. In Acholi, opposition to the Native Authority and the emergence of anti-colonial sentiments was not a direct attack on European rule. Firstly, the colonial native administrations in the Acholi districts consumed a large amount of Acholi pre-colonial political structures. If anything, as opposed to fostering nationalistic sentiments, the colonial systems of governance emphasised regional and
ethic politics. The paradox of colonial modernity meant that indirect rule was conducted by taking elements of Acholi tradition and socio-political structures and exploiting them to fit British economic and political ambitions. With the onset of decolonisation, the British would in a sense become victims of their own project. By encouraging strong ethnically divided local governments, they paved the way for grass roots ethnonationalism.

Cherry Gertzel argues that political activity at the district level in Acholi from 1945-1962 was largely nationalistic in orientation and that it was focused in the district primarily because there were “institutions at that level within which the colonial administration could be challenged.” These councils became an arena for nationally orientated local leaders, who provided the links through which an African leadership at the centre could challenge the Protectorate. Local governments offered easier opportunities to be elected into office and as such district councils developed faster than legislative councils. Gertzel disagrees with the argument that political parties developed slowly in Uganda because the politics at the district level was satisfactory enough for the actors and as such there was less desire to participate at a national level.

Gertzel’s argument is true in some respects, particularly regarding the local councils as a platform for political activity. The disagreement arises in the assessment that political activity in the district, especially in the 1950s was largely nationalistic in orientation. Undeniably Acholi politicians embraced the new emerging national consciousness and tried to ensure that their political positions in the locality would be guaranteed post-independence. The majority of Acholi politicians who put themselves forward as candidates for political office were younger men who had worked diligently towards acquiring the ‘right education’, strengthening their support base and preparing themselves for the day when they would lead Uganda to independence. However, the ethnically demarcated electoral map of Uganda and the colonial emphasis on strong local government institutions meant Acholi politicians were inevitably restricted in where they could run for political office. Moreover, these politicians needed the support of the locality to be given permission to speak nationally for their constituent base: if they lost the locality, they lost their access to the centre. Consequently, localised grievances took centre stage, and this was in turn channelled to the political centre through the politics of ethnonationalism. In this respect the idea of an all-encompassing Ugandan nationalist movement was superficial from its inception. Anti-colonial rhetoric lacked any unified political coherency as it was channelled through specific local
grievances. Since ethnic groups divided regions, these divisions were translated to the national political stage.

Within the decade leading to independence in 1962 the principal problem faced by Ugandans and the British was the lack of unity that manifested itself into tribal, linguistic, religious, economic, political and social factionalism. With Uganda, split between four major kingdoms and ten districts, each political entity ruthlessly guarded their territory. Questions regarding who was better equipped to rule and which was the most culturally advanced and most politically qualified tribal group, started to appear more frequently in the national media from the early 1950s. The comments section in the *Ugandan Herald* provided the platform for educated parties on all sides to air their views. As the mudslinging ensued, old colonial tribal stereotypes were readily utilised as political weapons reinforcing ethnic and regional identities.

"Between the Bantu and the Nilotics, Bantu people are more advanced of the two and account for three fourths of the population. They have had a longer culture. Nilotics never covered themselves until the white man arrived, and they often mutilated themselves. Of all the peoples of the Protectorate, the Baganda who inhabit the central province have been in the forefront in the shaping of things and all the dramatic happenings in the Protectorate have taken place in Buganda, giving the Protectorate its name, its history, its culture, its education and its religion."  

The question of Baganda superiority and what role of the kingdom would play in the new nation state of Uganda had started long before the 1950s. The British and the Baganda had enjoyed a relatively favorable relationship even before the 1900 agreement, with Baganda Christian agents helping the British to consolidate control of the Protectorate. However, relations between the two parties became strained as early as 1931, when it became apparent that the British were considering creating an East African Federation encompassing, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. The Baganda feared that if such a federation were to be created it would centre most of its powers on the white settler population in Kenya, making their kingdom a mere satellite state. The return of the Kabaka in 1955, following his deposition in 1953 for his continued belligerence to British authority, marked the beginning of overt grass-roots opposition specifically aimed at British colonial rule in Buganda.

In 1952 Uganda’s first national political party the Uganda National Congress (UNC) was formed in Kampala, championing the demands of the farmers, industrial workers, peasants and anyone who felt aggrieved
The significance of the UNC was not simply that it was officially Uganda's first major political party, but that it transcended regional borders, moving all the way from the South to the Northern Provinces. The UNC arrived in Acholi in 1953 after establishing headquarters in Lango. However, the party quickly realised that unlike in Lango, where they enjoyed somewhat of a political monopoly, in Acholi they faced greater opposition. Three years after the first UNC headquarters opened in Gulu; the Democratic Party's (DP) arrival in the district would provide a formidable political adversary creating a competitive ground from which "Uganda would become a two-party state." The UNC's hotly contested battlegrounds were mainly in North-East Acholi in districts such as Lamwo and Chua, which had a strong Catholic missionary presence. In these areas, the Catholic Missionary group the Verona Fathers (VF), did their part to encourage converts to show allegiance to the DP. The UNC continued to draw considerable support in West Acholi, which was a Church Missionary Society (CMS) stronghold.

With the politics of decolonisation, the politicisation of the Acholi Christian identity came to provide an effective tool to mobilise votes along partisan religious politics. The founders of the UNC, Ignatius Musazi and Abu Mayanja, both southerners, visited Gulu in 1953 to appoint a chairman for their Acholi branch. Peter Oola, an Acholi was chosen knowing that he was better served to appeal to his own ethnic homeland. More significantly, the connection between the UNC branch in Gulu and the headquarters in Kampala was not constricted. Despite Oola making several visits to Kampala and abroad as a member of the UNC delegation, political activities in Acholi meant that rather than the UNC headquarters controlling the branch in Gulu, Oola was able to touch base with the centre and but never allowed the centre to control him. This allowed the UNC in Acholi to develop more as an autonomous branch of the UNC nationwide.

Rivalry between the UNC and DP ensured that political cohesion in Acholi remained impossible. However, both political parties quickly capitalised on the growing hostility towards the Baganda and their King, mobilising the Acholi to join the UNC to counter Buganda political dominance. However, being a largely Southern based party proved to be problematic for the DP, as the political and economic dominance of the Buganda Kingdom, made Acholi DP recruits inherently hostile towards their Southern
counterparts. The politics of decolonisation gave opportunistic politicians the perfect tools to mobilise followers along localised grievances using the economic and political marginalisation of the “Northerner” to gain local political support. Politicians continued to encourage debates that juxtaposed the Baganda and the rest of the Kingdoms within the Protectorate and the tribes in the Northern Provinces, further ethnocising national politics.

By 1958 the UNC had won five out of the ten seats available for African representatives in the Legislative Council (LC) elections, while the DP only won one with the other four taken by independents. In Acholi, the elections results were not as clear-cut, as the UNC candidate only clawed his way to victory by 320 votes with 14,483 against the DP's 14,163 total. This was in contrast to the results in Lango where the UNC candidate beat his DP competitor by 32,218 votes. The remarkable victory for the UNC in Lango was made possible under the leadership of the young and dynamic Lango politician, Milton Obote, who not only gave the UNC second highest majority in the country, but also the highest percentage of votes overall.

With his success in the LC elections he was quickly elevated to Deputy Prime Minister of the UNC under the Chairmanship of Joseph Kiwanuka. From 1960, disputes within the UNC resulted in several splits, with Obote eventually leaving the party to form the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) in 1959-60. This was to be the death knell of the UNC as a political force among the Acholi, and in fact the rest of the Protectorate, as the UPC quickly consolidated its power as the main opposition to the DP.

Milton Obote encompassed both the Lango identity regionally and the Northern one nationally. The transference of Acholi political support from the UNC to the UPC can be understood in terms of the North-South divide and the leadership of Obote. Even during the internal conflicts within the UNC, the party branch in Acholi had already shown its allegiance to Obote. When a dispute broke out between Obote and Kiwanuka regarding UNC funds given by China, the branches in Acholi and Lango passed a resolution calling for the resignation of Kiwanuka, despite condemnation from the Party headquarters in Kampala. As Obote started to gain a greater following within the UNC, he utilised his political capital by calling for Sir Frederick Crawford’s resignation, specifying the sluggish pace towards self-governance. Once again the UNC headquarters rebutted him stating that only the Secretary-General of the Party had the authority to make such a statement.

Evidently, even before the official split of the UNC, the Northern branches of the Party were already showing independence from the offi-
cial party mouthpiece in Kampala. In Obote, the Acholi found a political
spokesman with whom they could identify with regionally. This political
utilisation of the Northern identity did not go unnoticed. Following his dis-
missal from the Party as Chairman, Kiwanuka remarked that his suspension
was a manifestation of tribalism, while Obote simply dismissed it as
“operation clean up.”

The physical, cultural and linguistic proximity of Acholi to Lango
was a valuable political tool for Acholi UPC politicians. The fact that Lango
provided the UPC with its strongest support base in the country meant
that Acholi politicians could further capitalise on the political capital of
the Northern identity. Under the leadership of Obote, the UPC in Acholi
could continue to strengthen regional and political allegiances with Lango.
Obote was opportunistic enough to exploit this regional connection.
In 1960 he had written a letter to the supervisor of the elections in Lango
offering an alternative boundary division of the electoral districts in Lango
and in Acholi. The British were suspicious of the proposal, claiming that if
the boundaries were to be amended it would split areas over which the UPC
had a weaker hold, and amalgamate them into larger UPC constituencies,
assuring a victory for the party in Acholi. This was seen as a deliberate ploy
to strengthen Obote’s party support base at the expense of the DP. However,
such was Obote’s popularity in Lango the British conceded that regardless
of whether the boundaries were adjusted or not, a UPC victory in Lango was
almost guaranteed. The election supervisor suggested that Obote’s propo-
sals should be considered with regards to the impact they would have
in Acholi, as it was it was probable that Obote’s proposals were more of an
attempt to tailor the elections results for the benefit of Otema Allimadi and
Peter Oola, the two UPC candidates in Acholi. Both candidates were known
to have strong political and personal ties to Obote and frequently sought
his advice on how to run their own election campaigns. The reorganisation
of the boundaries would then have been of mutual convenience for them.
Obote’s popularity in the North was commented on by the election super-
visor who concluded that, within the DP, no Acholi representative “holds
a place in his party hierarchy comparable to that of Mr Obote, and would
scarcely seem to be in a position to bring the same influence to bear on
matters under discussion as their rivals.”

Aside from his Lango identity, Obote was astute enough to recog-
nise early on that to gain support among voters in the northern region, he
needed to highlight the political and economic grievances of the Northern
Provinces. Prior to joining the UNC, he had sent a letter to the Uganda
Herald arguing that the political underdevelopment of the Northern region by the British had left the Province and its peoples at a distinct political disadvantage.

“We semi-hamites and Norsemen [Nilotes] of Uganda feel that the Congress aiming at ‘Self-governance’ in Uganda is therefore hastening and leaving us behind because of our present inability to aim so high. It must be pointed out to the Congress here and now that with us the question of questions lies in education and rapid developments of African Local Governments.”

As a designated “Northerner” and an aspiring politician, Obote needed to appeal to his regional base by emphasising that it was he alone who truly understood the grievances that plagued that region. Yet as Kenneth Ingham argues, from his early political career, Obote had continually advocated for equal rights for all Uganda’s minority communities. Obote’s emphasis on regional underdevelopment at this point would have undoubtedly worked to place him as a champion of the common man fighting against the elitist establishment of the colonial government and the Buganda Lukiiko. Moreover, Obote’s analysis on the economic situation within the Northern Provinces was also an astute political tactic as it corresponded with the concerns that were already raised by the Acholi Local Government (ALG) in 1951. The Northern Provinces were still vastly underdeveloped compared to the South, particularly in regards to education. In 1952 there were 1912 pupils in secondary schools in the Protectorate but only 151 were from the Northern Provinces. In the junior schools they constituted 501 out of 3605 pupils. Through his letter to the Uganda Herald, Obote was also playing on the fear that as the Baganda had already been privileged with better educational facilities; they inevitably would become the leaders in an independent Uganda. By emphasising regional economic differences, Obote cemented an image of himself not as a Ugandan politician, but a politician from the North.

**Fragmenting the ‘Northern’ Identity**

Ethnic conflict in post-independence Uganda was a consequence of the confrontation between strong ethnically divided local institutions and the post-colonial push for political centralisation, under the guise of nation building. To strengthen one, the other had to be weakened. Self-governance meant that the stakes for political power sharpened at national and local levels ensuring that ethnic antipathies became more pronounced. Politicians who had succeeded within local polities were elevated to rep-
resent their various ethnic groups at the centre. However, these politicised ethnic demarcations were not, and should not, be considered a product of the Ugandan post-colonial state. Rather, they were a continuation of colonial political structures that had emphasised locality, ethnicities and the ‘tribe.’ These were the same power structures that were embedded within Ugandan politics at the eve of independence.  

Tribal allegiances that were politically emphasised and institutionalised by the colonial state ensured that in the fight for control of the centre, ethnic identities became a viable tool to make localised political demands. Consequently, the discrepancy between the political reality (ethnonationalism) and the political rhetoric (detribalisation) meant that by the end of the decade, the nationalist project had comprehensively failed as Ugandans witnessed an army mutiny, the suspension of the constitution, the eradication of traditional leaders within the kingdoms, and the installation of one-party rule.

Despite the political turmoil that was to characterise the decade, the handover of power on the 9 October 1962 was not preceded by the protracted violent clashes that had been witnessed in Kenya or in the Congo. Even amidst the political tensions brought on by the 1960 Bukedi Tax Riots in Buganda, direct elections to the Legislative Council went ahead as planned in March 1961, resulting in a victory for the DP. The DP’s success in the elections lay in the animosity between the Protestant-dominated royal establishment of Buganda’s government hierarchy, and the DP’s largely Catholic leaders. When the Buganda government requested a boycott of the elections the DP ignored the instruction and went on to claim victory. Hence the first Prime Minister of Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, was reviled by the Buganda government for both ignoring the boycott and daring to place himself, a Catholic Muganda commoner, in position superior to the Kabaka.

By this time the UPC had emerged as the main challenger to the DP’s political dominance nationally. The failure of the Buganda Kingdom to segregate, and the fallout from the DP victory prompted a coalition between the UPC and the newly formed Kabaka Yekka (KY) (Kabaka Only) party. It was a calculated decision by both the Kabaka and Obote to ensure victory in the 1962 elections. As Horowitz assess, “both the Kabaka Yekka and the UPC regarded the DP as their rival. Only the UPC and KY had not been competing for votes because neither competed in the territory of the other.”

The UPC and KY coalition secured victory in the 1962 election and Obote was sworn as Prime Minister and Kabaka as the ceremonial President. The new Ugandan constitution reflected the political disunity of the
newly independent state, and was primarily a document of compromise. The Constitution was:

“engineered on the basis of an unusually complex formula: a constitution which provided for the existence of four Kingdoms within an independent state, one of which (Buganda) was to enjoy a federal relationship to the central government, the three others to have quasi-federal powers, while the rest of the country was to be administered through a form of district government which left a fair amount of discretion to the local administration.”

Within two years of the KY/UPC election win relations between the two parties had rapidly deteriorated. Aided by opportunistic defectors from members of other political parties, the UPC had by 1964 formed an overwhelming majority in parliament to the extent that it no longer needed the coalition to remain in power. To further consolidate the UPC’s authority, Obote sought to suppress the political apparatus of the Buganda Kingdom by diminishing the power of the KY. He warned KY party officials that they had no political power outside Buganda as, “Kabaka was not a policy and people could not be expected to live from day to day merely by joining an organisation whose major policy was to uphold the prestige of an individual ruler.”

The relationship between the KY and the UPC was further exacerbated with the ongoing issue of the “lost counties” of the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The two counties of Buyaga and Bugangazi had been allocated to Buganda during the 1900 agreement with the British. Bunyoro had always contested the arrangement and the counties were the subjects of several deputations to London during the colonial period. In 1964 Obote resolved that the matter should be left to the peoples of the lost counties to decide. In the same year the peoples of the two counties were asked to decide whether they wanted to remain part of Buganda or to return to Bunyoro. When they inevitably opted for the latter, the Kabaka was outraged. The fallout from the referendum results caused irreparable damage to the already fragile coalition.

Matters were made worse for Obote when on 22 January 1964 several units of the Ugandan Rifles in Jinja mutinied, demanding higher pay and a new system that allowed for accelerated promotions. After the British negotiator who was sent in to reconcile with the mutineers was held hostage, Obote in the end conceded many of the demands made by the rebellious units. This resulted in the rapid “Ugandanisation” of the army,
as young officers were quickly promoted and British officials reduced to an advisory role. A new intelligence operation was created known as the General Service Unit (GSU), a paramilitary group tasked with monitoring subversive behaviour and potential threats against the government. The 1964 mutinies and the creation of the GSU proved to be the first stage of the militarisation of politics in post-colonial Uganda.

As Obote’s fear of internal opposition increased, he continued to recruit and promote a disproportionately large number of Northerners into the army, following the colonial pattern. Northern, and in particular Acholi, men had been heavily recruited into the army. In 1946 when the British were recruiting for the Ugandan 4 Battalion, it was stipulated that twenty-five per cent should come from the Acholi region, a percentage only equalled by Madi recruits. For the British, recruiting soldiers from the relatively underdeveloped North had served the purpose of providing an avenue for employment in the region. In addition, by recruiting among tribal groups outside of the administrative and economic hub in the South, the British had an army that could be used to crush any resistance arising from southern Uganda.

For Acholi men, the army provided much needed financial security with relatively generous provisions. In post-independence Uganda, Northerners, particularly the Acholi continued to remain an easy demographic to recruit. Employment opportunities in Acholi within the formal economy were few and far between, making the army an attractive avenue for employment.

By 1966 Obote’s top government officials including the Permanent Secretary, Wilson Lutara and Minister of Defence Felix Onama, were both men from the North. In a passing out ceremony in 1966, of the 800 recruits, seventy per cent were Northerners. In trying to break down tribal barriers and forge a centralised national identity, Obote still fell into the trap of utilising tribal ties to consolidate power. By challenging the authority of the Kabaka, Obote evoked anger from pro-Kabaka supporters in parliament who in turn began to plot against the Prime Minister’s inner circle of supporters. This cumulated in the arrest of the plotters and the official cessation of the coalition. A new constitution was enacted placing Obote as paramount leader of the Uganda. When the Kabaka and the Baganda rebelled in reaction, Obote ordered the Kabaka’s palace to be stormed, essentially driving the King into exile.

Ali Mazuri’s assessment of Obote’s leadership style in the 1960s from reconciliatory to confrontational can be viewed by his “shaken faith
in the viability of institutionalised pluralism in his country.” In response, Obote decided to embark on the gradual elimination of divisive elements, mainly the Kings as symbols of regional autonomy. Given the internal threat against his leadership, from 1964 Obote’s selection of political allies stemmed from his ethnic ties to Northern Uganda, calling upon those from whom he could command absolute trust and loyalty. His promotion of the physically imposing Idi Amin to Major General, and later to Commander in Chief of the Uganda army was a direct reaction to the events in 1964. The tribal composition of the army started to became a matter of acute political sensitivity. In 1968 when an American Peace Corps teacher requested information in Kitgum regarding the tribal composition of the Ugandan army, he was immediately placed under surveillance. Fearful of being labelled a “tribalist” Obote continued to defend himself in the national media urging his critics to believe that his government was not in the business of “corrupting tribes to ensure his political position.” But his protestations were to no avail as his political opponents, particularly in Buganda, now saw the military as Obote’s personal Northern militia:

“Southern politicians questioned the army’s recruiting preferences in the National Assembly but Obote’s allies defended the practice on the grounds that northern Nilotic-speakers were natural soldiers. [Defence Minister Felix Onama] claimed that the army had to retain its KAR 5’8” height that made it difficult for shorter Southern recruits to enlist because “we do not want our soldiers to look like totos (small children). In reality the KAR had used a 5’3” height requirement for most of the 1950s.”

The removal of the Kabaka in 1966 by Obote was met with widespread support among the Acholi. This support had its base in the rivalry that had been promoted in late colonial Uganda between the Kingdom and the Acholi. The perception that Buganda was not conforming to the post-independence nationalist agenda was seen by the Acholi as a deliberate attempt to emphasise the Kingdoms political supremacy at the expense of wider economic and political progress in the rest of the country. Even the Acholi who were ardent DP supporters put aside their rivalry with the UPC and expressed approval at the deposition, arguing that it was the only way that Uganda could move forward politically.

Publically, the ALG reacted positively to the declaration of the Ugandan Republic and the removal of the Kabaka, expressing their endorsement in the national media. Shortly after the deposition, the Secretary-General
of the Acholi Local Council, issued a statement expressing his support, asserting that Obote’s actions were not only welcomed in the region, but that the rest of Uganda “should rally behind the Acholi people to support the government.”

Even in parliament and despite their rivalry some prominent Acholi DP politicians were publicly sympathetic to Obote’s actions. DP politician Mr Alexander Latim, speaking on the behalf of eight other opposition leaders, stated that whilst they did not ideologically agree with the actions taken, it was the duty of politicians and Ugandans to unite behind the President in his time of need.

However, this seemingly unified external face of the “Northern” identity masked a far more complex internal relationship between the Acholi and Obote. The UPC’s victory in the 1962 elections had intensified political hostilities between the UPC and the DP in Acholi. As Obote’s political star continued to rise nationally, among some Acholi politicians there was a growing feeling of unease towards the UPC leader. This hostility was derived from the growing perception that the Acholi were being treated less favourably than their Lango counterparts. Even before Obote became Prime Minister, there were public accusations of nepotism and corruption directed against him by Acholi politicians. In his capacity as Legislative Council member he was accused of bypassing the proper protocols by awarding his brother a scholarship to go and study law in the United Kingdom. The Legislative Council members argued that it was wrong of Obote to give his brother another scholarship when other applicants had been refused the chance to study abroad.

District intelligence reports and minutes for the local council meetings reflected a growing enmity between the Acholi and the Lango with on-going hostilities over border disputes. One informant was so concerned about the volatile situation he recommended that officers posted in Acholi should not be of Lango origin. Acholi chiefs whose task it was to collect taxes within their constituencies were generally the main protagonists of these hostilities, as they sought to protect their tax and constituent boundaries. They made official complaints to the local council about Lango farmers and herders repeatedly crossing into Acholi and attacking Acholi sub-county chiefs.

Acholi DP politicians were resourceful in utilising the border disputes with Lango to their own political gains, as they attempted to paint Obote as a dictatorial tribalist. Following the army mutiny in 1964 and the deposition of the Kabaka, Obote’s rule had become increasingly authoritarian which inevitably had a major impact on political activity in Acholi.
This is reflected in the proliferation of intelligence reports in the district archives, gathered by the GUS surveying political meetings. Military personnel and police forces were utilised to ensure that it became increasingly difficult for a political party other than the UPC to operate effectively in Acholi. By 1968 Obote had issued a life ban on all DP, an action that evoked considerable anger from DP supporters nationwide:

"We have a government in which the people have no voice. The people are refused the right to elect their own representative in parliament, district councils and municipal and city councils. We refuse to call UPC a representative of the people and as soon as the ban is lifted a general election should be held."

The DP was instrumental in mobilising supporters to protest against what they deemed to be their unequal treatment in comparison UPC and Protestants in Acholi. In one DP rally in Kitgum protesters held placards lambasting the UPC to "go west now." Although the UPC party hierarchy now considered DP members as persona non grata, the DP continued its campaign against the UPC dominated district councils and the President, albeit clandestinely. However, DP members were not alone in their growing opposition to the President. Even within the UPC there were sharp divisions, particularly within the Acholi District Council. The UPC in Acholi district was divided into two factions led by Alex Ojera and Eric Lakidi. The party already held 44 out of the 50 possible seats in the council and the seats were in turn divided almost equally between the pro-Ojera and pro-Lakidi supporters. Both men represented the power struggle within the UPC in Acholi, with Lakidi not afraid to side with the few DP members in the council if it suited his own political ambitions. Thus even among his own politicians, Obote could not expect unwavering loyalty in Acholi.

Matters between the Acholi and the Lango came to a head in 1968 when the Acholi Local Council passed a resolution criticising Obote’s economic policies in the region. On 16 and 17 February the Ugandan Argus published a report detailing the discussions and resolutions made at a meeting of the Acholi District Council on 13 February 1968. The fallout from the article was to prove detrimental to the already fragile relationship between the Acholi and Obote. The resolutions were primarily concerned with the treatment of the Lango in comparison to the Acholi in the region. Council members made numerous allegations deploping the government for giving the "lion’s share" of industries to Lango when they had previously been promised to the Acholi:
“They were angry that the nearest television station was in Lira (the main town in Lango), even though they had requested that one be built in Gulu. The Acholi the councillors felt that they were being forced to leave their homes in search of employment simply because Obote had not included them in the economic revolution that was going on in the rest of the country.”

Armed with their resolution the council sanctioned a six-man delegation to take the matter directly to the President. Obote’s response to the allegations was to be swift and brutal. Outraged by the accusations of tribalism he penned a 26-page report the following month, counteracting every allegation made by the council members. The President was keen to stress that Acholi districts like all others in Uganda, had been treated fairly and all possible efforts were being to develop the region by the government without the influence of tribal preferences. Furthermore, he stressed that central government budgets had hindered development in all other districts and it was not just the Acholi that were suffering:

“What is disturbing is that although nearly every other District is affected by the cuts of 31 December 1965, the Acholi District Council has taken the cut for the district to mean an action by the Government against the people of the District. The Council’s resolution directed the Secretary-General to give publicity to these allegations in order to indicate the degree of anger of the Acholi people against central government. That, as anyone can see, was an open attempt to use the name of Acholi as a whole in order to promote their personal and group interests.”

A month after the memorandum was published Obote went about completely re-organising the Acholi District Administration, relieving those who had criticised him from their duties. Even UPC members were not spared. He then proceeded to re-appoint his long-time supporter Peter Oola back to his previous position as Secretary-General, replacing Mr Akera. These steps, he argued in the Uganda Argus were necessary because:

“Some people held mistaken views about the role of the district council. They believed that they were separate from central government, an unfortunate consequence of colonial politics that allowed them to ignore the authority of the central government. The Acholi needed to understand that there should be no competition between the local administration
and the Ugandan government and as such steps needed to be taken to remind them of this. The fact that council members felt that they could pass such a resolution under their own authority was an indication of the utter confusion reigning in the minds of the councillors.”

The reworking of the council was presented nationally as an attempt to rejuvenate Acholi, which was lagging behind economically, and needed new life injected into its administration. The President publically accused the council of failing to provide their constituents with roads and other services, while only being concerned with passing useless resolutions. Furthermore, he condemned clan and tribal rivalries that had separated the region between East and West and the constant attempt by council members and politicians to stir up hostilities between the Acholi and the Lango.

Many Acholi did not see it that way however and supporters of the dismissed councilmen responded strongly against the President’s actions. The following month the DP penned an anonymous memorandum to the Acholi people reiterating many of the allegations made by the council and accusing Obote of being a tribalist and acting unconstitutionally. The memorandum urged the peoples of Acholi to welcome those who had been dismissed as heroes, as they were being punished simply for standing up for the rights of their constituents. The condemnation levelled against Obote transcended all political lines drawing in both UPC and DP supporters.

Those who remained in the Obote camp were continually harassed and accused of betrayal. There were open confrontations between Eric Lakidi, who was considered one of the architects of the council rebellion and Peter Oola. In return Oola used his new position as Secretary-General to threaten pro-Lakidi members of the council that they were liable to lose their jobs if they continued to disregard department protocol. On their part, central government continued to target DP meetings and gatherings were often dispersed with force. In Acholi, various complaints were made to the Police Commissioner and in some instances directly to the President himself, about the maltreatment of DP politicians at the hands of police in Acholi and within the local councils. In trying to centralise control of the country through military force, Obote’s increasingly authoritarian rule served to alienate him internally in Acholi. As mem-
bers of the ALG’s political authority was challenged, Obote’s Lango identity became a valuable tool used to diminish his credibility as a leader. In the face of political marginalisation from a Northern President, it was Acholi ethnonationalism, rather than regional affiliations that emerged as the dominant tool to challenge state authority. As a consequence, the Northern identity, presented largely by the Acholi and consumed by external observers as unified and unyielding, had by 1968 politically fragmented.

Conclusion
The juxtaposition between Acholi regional and ethnic identities would continue to reinforce recurrent patterns of political engagement in Acholi from Amin’s military dictatorship, to the current regime. These recurrent patterns have been shaped and reinforced by the symbiotic relationship between the Acholi locality and central government. Even with relatively politically inclusive governments, as can be observed in the 1960s, regional and ethnic identities were still used as a political tool to engage with state structures. This was symptomatic of Uganda’s colonial legacy, which placed emphasis on local rather than national identities. The military coup of Idi Amin would only serve to further localise politics in Acholi. The emigration of prominent Acholi politicians and military personnel following the coup, served to weaken the political connection between the locality and the centre in absence of local political power brokers. Even following the horrors of Amin’s regime, Milton Obote’s second could no longer rely on the ‘Northern Identity’ to harness political support in Acholi. With a state on the verge of economic collapse, the President’s growing weakness opened the door for Acholi politicians to openly challenge his administration. In much the same way that Obote’s first presidency had been smeared by accusations of nepotism and tribalism, the same debates that had contested the idea of a unified ‘Northern identity’ would emerge once again. Fearing a coup, Obote started to target Acholi army officials within his administration whom he believed were a credible threat to his authority. By turning on members of his own administration, Obote set forth a chain of events that would lead to a complete breakdown of Lango-Acholi relations and the eventual overthrow of his regime in 1985 by Tito Okello, an Acholi Army General.

For the peoples of Acholi, nearly thirty-years of the LRA conflict has done little to address the region’s historic economic and social marginalisation. With the current emphasis on Acholi “tradition” and culture as a mechanism to affect justice and reconciliation, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘tribe’ has
once again been placed at the centre of Acholi formal and informal political discourses. Given the current land disputes in Acholi and the failure of the state to adequately invest in post-war reconstruction, it is likely that once again the fight for political power will be channelled, externally at least, through ethnopolitics during the next election campaign.

NOTES

2. Okuku, Ethnicity, State, Power, 16.
3. Olum, Reality Check, 64.
12. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 1308.
24. Mamdani, “Contradictions of the IMF Programme”. 427-67. Also see; Bafleo “Structural Adjustment and Agriculture in Uganda”.
25. Thompson, Governing Uganda, 27.
26. Ibid., 27-9; Larumi, “From the Village to Entebbe”, 73-80.
27. For the most comprehensive accounts on earlier Acholi socio-political formations see: Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity, Girling The Acholi of Uganda and Dwyer, The Acholi of Uganda: Adjustment to Imperialism.
29. Ibid., 22.
32. E.M.K. Mulira was a prominent Muganda politician who established the Buganda based conservative, Progressive Party (PP) in January 1955.
34. Dwyer, The Acholi in Uganda, 192.
36. Low, Buganda in Modern History, 29.
38. Odongo, A Political history of Uganda, 257; Thompson, “Colonialism in Crisis”, 622-3.
42. Ibid.
43. Gertzel, Party and Locality, 18.
44. Ibid., 62.
46. Ibid.
47. Mutilbwa, Uganda Since Independence, 16.
49. Ibid., 14 August 1958.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
55. Ingham, Obote: A political Biography, 45. Also see chapters 2 & 3.
56. Uganda National Archives/Entebbe C:3824 Box 29: Letter sent by the Acholi Local Government as a Petition to James Griffiths, Secretary of State for the attention of the Governor of Uganda, 11 May 1951.
58. Mutilbwa, Uganda Since Independence, 11-12.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 373.
64. Mutilbwa, Uganda Since Independence, 26. Quoted from Doornbos Not All the King’s Men: Inequality as Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda.
71. Gulu District Archive Box 533: Replies to Questionnaires on Tribal Composition 4th Ugandan Battalion kar/ 7 Appendix A, January 1950.
73. Gulu District Archive Box 533: Replies to Questionnaires on Tribal Composition 4th Ugandan Battalion KAR/7 Appendix ‘A’, January 1950.
75. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 374.
76. Ibid., 373.
77. Muzrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda, 15.
82. Interviews conducted in Gulu, Kitgum, Kampala, and Entebbe with Acholi Informants from November 2011-August 2012.
84. Ibid., 2 February 1966.
85. Ibid., 26 September 1960.
87. Ibid.
88. Gulu and Kitgum District Archives: District Intelligence Reports. 1964-1971.
89. Uganda Argus, 20 April 1968.
90. Kitgum District Archive: District Special Branch Officer to Senior District Special Branch Officers, East Acholi, 21 January 1965.
91. Ibid., Report to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mr Akena-Adoko from the Chief General Service Officer Kitgum, 8 August 1969; Kitgum District Archive: Report to the District Police Commander, Gulu from Q.C Police Kitgum, 13 December 1969.
93. Ibid.
94. Gulu District Archive, Box 542: Memorandum by the President, 23 March 1968 (points summarised).
95. Although members of the Acholi council strategically emphasised isolated incidences of nepotism by the Obote administration, there is no indication that during Obote’s first presidential term there was any substantial economic development in Lango in relation to Acholi. In fact, Obote structurally continued the colonial trend of underdevelopment of the region relative to the South. See: Bangugire, ‘Uneven and Unbalanced Development: Development Strategies and Conflict’.
96. Gulu District Archive, Box 542: Memorandum by the President, 23 March 1968 (points summarised).
97. Ibid.
98. Uganda Argus, 4 April 1968, (quotation paraphrased).
99. Ibid.
100. Gulu District Archive, Box 542: Memorandum from the DP office in Gulu to ‘All Acholi People’ April 1968 Received in the office of the DC, 1 May 1968.
101. Ibid.
102. Kitgum District Archive: Intelligence Committee Minutes, 30 March 1968.
103. Ibid., Intelligence Committee Minutes c. July 1968.
104. Ibid., Intelligence Report, 13 December 1969.
105. Ibid., Tiberio Okeny, National Organiser of the NPG to the President of Uganda, 19 February 1969.
106. Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 58; Laruni, From the Village to Entebbe, chapter 4.
107. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, 94.

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