


African Social Research 1

Africa in Movement

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Africa In Movement

Hisham Aidi, Marc Lynch, and Zachariah Mampilly

In their recent volume, *Understanding Global Migration*, James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley observe that the concept of a “migration state” is an ideal type, reflecting a range of ways in which states grapple with migration. In its original formulation, it referred to the liberal democratic state with policies oriented towards markets and rights. Yet as they note, the “migration state” can take different forms, whether it is the “post-imperial” liberal states of Europe and Turkey, the “postcolonial” migration states of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, or the “developmental” migration state in East and Southeast Asia.¹ Migration has created economic and political interdependence between states and societies, with contradictory effects. Economic remittances are supporting livelihoods and aiding development in far-flung corners of the world, but migration from Africa and the Middle East has triggered a xenophobic surge in the West. The much more hospitable reception by European countries of white Ukrainians than of Syrian war refugees or African labor migrants did not go unnoticed.

Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas have recently argued that the field of migration studies has neglected the emergence of “state migration management regimes” outside the Global North and the West. The bias towards the policy priorities of liberal democratic states has split this field between “migration” and “refugee” studies, with the latter more focused on the Global South.² Thus, “migration studies” research tends to be centered on issues of economic migration, citizenship and integration in northern democracies, while “refugee studies” scholarship is focused on humanitarian crises and security challenges emanating from southern “non-democracies.” Moreover, the scholarship on migration flows in the Global South has tended to treat the topic as an issue of global governance and less of domestic policymaking. As they write, “states in the Global South are often missing or lack agency in this literature, relegated

to the backdrop on which refugee crises unfold, the passive recipients of international aid, or victims of the policies of more powerful Northern states.”

If the scholarship on migration in the Global South is wanting, the discourse on migration in/out of Africa is particularly distorted and exceptionalist. As the *African Migration Report: Challenging the Narrative* (2020)³ published by the African Union and the International Organization for Migration maintains, the current narrative about African migration tends to conceive of African migrants as being largely irregular, crossing oceans to Europe, and constituting the majority of global migrants. In reality, most African migrants are migrating within Africa, crossing land borders within the continent and largely within their respective regions. What is more, 94% of African migration across oceans is regular, with Africa accounting for 14% of the global migrant population, compared with 41% of Asia and 24% from Europe. In contrast to the media’s framing of migration as posing an unprecedented security crisis, African migration in Europe has been a constant for over a decade and the number of arrivals across the Mediterranean has declined since 2015. The African Union/IOM report calls for “a new narrative on contemporary African migration that focuses largely on intra-African migration.”⁴

The essays included in this *African Social Research* collection heed this call. The papers were originally presented at the “Africa in Movement” workshop organized by the Program on African Social Research (PASIRI) in January 2022. We originally organized the workshop with Mehdi Alioua of the International University of Rabat, whose journal *Afrique(s) en Mouvement* inspired the title of our collection. Unfortunately, shortly before the workshop was to be convened in Rabat, it (ironically) had to be moved to a virtual format after the Omicron wave of the COVID-19 pandemic led Morocco to close its borders.

By focusing primarily on intra-African migration, the papers attempt to go beyond the common depictions of African migration, showing how African states are not simply exporters of refugees and migrants or passive executors of European Union policies. Rather, these scholars explore how African states are developing their own approaches to migration management, and how migration has increased the interdependence of African states (wherein unrest in South Africa can have economic repercussions in the Horn of Africa). As elsewhere, intra-African migration can spur xenophobic violence and anti-globalization sentiment. But the contributions also show that migration within the continent is generating humanitarianism, cosmopolitan identities, and conviviality. The papers also contribute to critical policy debates over how European states are externalizing their borders, such as in the recent agreement between Rwanda and the United Kingdom, whereby asylum-seekers arriving via the British Channel will be shipped to the Central African country for processing and resettlement.⁵

Several of the papers in the collection focus on how African states have internalized and modulated European Union approaches to regulating labor migration. Balkissa Diallo highlights the *localization* of European migration norms in Niger. Diallo shows how following the Valetta Migration conference held in Malta in 2015 and the establishment of the European Union Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the government of Niger passed Law 2015-36 aiming to criminalize the trafficking of migrants. The law would have unexpected repercussion domestically, including incentivizing ex-smugglers to form associations (such as L'Association des Anciens Passeurs). The diffusion of what Diallo calls the European Union's "migration management norms," would also lead to Niamey introduce the 2020-2035 National Migration Law and a five-year Action Plan.

Salahadin Ali makes a similar argument tracing how the European Union's Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (also known as the Khartoum process) has adversely affected the lives of "forced migrants" in Sudan. The Khartoum process is an inter-regional forum, including five

European member states and five African member states (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan). Ali shows how the Khartoum process led to the Asylum Regulation Act of 2014 and the new Passports and Immigration Act of 2015, both of which were used to justify a crackdown on Eritrean migrants in Sudan.

Itah Patience, in turn, demonstrates that while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union are trying to promote intra-African migration (through a possible AU passport, for instance), pressure from external actors like the European Union and the United Nations is actually shoring up authoritarianism and hardening borders. Thus, Uganda, which Patience suggests has surpassed the Maghreb as a "feeder-state," and currently hosts a large refugee population, is under pressure from international organizations to be more accountable and to provide more social services, all of which raises domestic political tensions.

Janina Stürner-Siovitz and Lionel Nzamba Nzamba examine how local city actors—at the forefront of migration crises, but long shut out of international decision-making processes—have created city networks such as the UCLG Africa, the Global Mayoral Forum and the Mayors' Mechanism. Reflecting the "local turn" in migration studies, where researchers have come to treat municipalities, not simply as spaces of migration, but also as actors involved in local and federal governance, the authors interview a variety of local actors from a range of cities including Freetown, Kampala, Oujda, Sfax, and Sousse.

Not all of the essays limit themselves to intra-African migration, with several contributors describing the lethal consequences of European state policies. In a particularly haunting essay, Nabil Ferdaoussi reflects on the deaths that have occurred on the Moroccan and Senegalese coasts as a result of European "border regimes," and examines how these fatalities have been depicted in the work of Senegalese filmmaker Mati Diop. Those "ghosts" haunt the technocratic discourse on the management of migration and the brutal costs of European border regimes.

The essays in this collection also address the links between migration, identity formation and what Namhla Matshanda terms “long-distance nationalism.” Sarah Koshin’s piece on “diaspora practices” within the Somali community in Zambia looks at how technology (WhatsApp, to be precise) has driven “kinship mobilization,” and humanitarian support for the region of Puntland, and how socio-demographic changes produced by migration are shifting gender roles within Somali migrant communities. Koshin observes that Somalis in Zambia may insist that they are not a diaspora (“We are not diaspora, we are Africans in Africa, we belong here”), yet scholars still refer to these transnational communities as diasporas, and the Somali government has set up a Department of Diaspora Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reach the two million-strong Somali population living abroad.

Her results resonate with the essay by Richard Houessou of Arab Barometer, which provides empirical evidence showing how the internet and existing social networks have shaped the contours of African migration. In a novel empirical study of data from 34 African countries, he shows that internet usage strongly shapes decisions to migrate independently of economic conditions or other measures of life satisfaction. His findings speak to the complexities involved in decisions to migrate or to remain at home, and show how the internet and social media could have long-term ramifications for increasing intra-African migration. He suggests that social media and communication technology can not only trigger and facilitate migration, but increase diaspora civic engagement.

Abdullahi Hassan tries to understand the precarious status of small Somali business owners in Cape Town, South Africa using Edna Bonacich’s classic theory of the “middleman minority.” He argues that this approach may be more compelling than Mahmood Mamdani’s influential framework for understanding the Indian community in Uganda,

as the colonial state’s political intermediary and “buffer community.” Hassan observes that, despite not having a political role within the South African state or governing coalition, Somali migrants are still targeted by South African politicians for political purposes. (In 2016, the secretary-general of the African National Congress Gwede Mantashe said the solution to the migration question was refugee camps.⁶)

Matshanda draws attention to migrant flows into South Africa from beyond the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which includes South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and South Africa. She spotlights the “Ethiopia-South Africa migration corridor” detailing how Ethiopian identity is being reconstructed transnationally, through migration, and in light of the splintering of Ethiopia’s system of ethnic federalism.

In the study of intra-African migration, there are a number of “flashpoint borders” and “corridors.” Carina Kanbi instead draws attention to the *cultural* corridor connecting Lagos and Accra, what she calls Anglophone Africa’s “cities of cool,” and shows how creatives in these cultural hubs are forging a new cosmopolitanism and cultures of conviviality that are shaping cultural flows at the global level.

Collectively, the essays reframe the debate around African migration by decentering Europe and the Global North and putting African countries at the center. By providing snapshots of specific migrant communities and patterns of inter-African migration, what emerges is a dynamic picture of a continent in movement. Pulled by opportunity and pushed by crisis, African migrants continue to remake villages, towns and cities in their own image. While some conflict is perhaps inevitable, the essays also reveal the new forms of sociality and cooperation that emerge as Africans make new homes while retaining their links to the old ones, transforming both in their wake. ■

Endnotes

- 1 James F. Hollifield and Neil Foley, *Understanding Global Migration* (Stanford University Press 2022) <https://www.sup.org/books/title?id=32777>
- 2 Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, “The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management,” *International Migration Review* (October 2019) <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0197918319879057>
- 3 <https://publications.iom.int/books/africa-migration-report-challenging-narrative>
- 4 Recent research is showing that African migration is not exceptional, or fundamentally different from other regions: most Africans emigrate to work, study, or join family. In 2011, UNHCR, refugees and ‘people in refugee-like situations’ represented 2.4 million or 14 per cent of international migrants in Africa meaning that about 86 per cent of international migration within Africa was not related to conflict. See Marie-Laurence Flahaux & Hein De Haas, “African migration: trends, patterns, drivers,” *Comparative Migration Studies* (January 2016) <https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6#ref-CR53>
- 5 Ferruccio Pastore and Emanuela Roman “Migration policies and threat-based extraversion. Analyzing the impact of European externalization policies on African polities. *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, (January 2020) <https://journals.openedition.org/remi/14591>
- 6 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/south-africa>

Localization of EU Migration Governance in Niger: The Role of Local Actors

Balkissa Diallo

Non-state and state actors each play critical roles in the governance of African informal migration to Europe from Niger. Since the Valletta conference in 2015 following the European migration “crisis”, and the launch of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), EU migration management policy is being adapted at the local level, with Niger becoming a strategic country for its implementation. This has been referred to as the EU’s project to externalize its borders to sending regions such as Niger (Pastore and Roman, 2020; Boyer et al., 2020). Externalization involves agreements with Europe’s partner countries to allow deported persons in their territory and to apply similar policies to border control (Akkerman, 2018). In Niger, such migration management has gained momentum. How are local actors in Niger adapting to these new policy norms?

This essay offers a sending region perspective on the phenomenon of externalization by reconceptualizing African “*irregular*” migration to Europe as African *informal* migration, and reconceptualizing *externalization* as *localization*. It relies on preliminary field work, documents and observation, to explore norm localization theory (Acharya, 2004). It argues that local actors are adapting to these new EU migration management policy norms through a localization process. There is a selection, refinement, and reframing of the current migration governance approach to be in accordance with existing practices and beliefs. Local agents in this context are not mere recipients of these new migration management norms. They exercise their agency in the application of these new norms to make them acceptable within the existing normative context. The first part of this essay conceptualizes the phenomenon as African *informal* migration to Europe instead of “irregular” migration to position this research within a sending region perspective (West Africa). The second part uses data collected from my preliminary field work

in Niger to examine local actors’ adaptation to the EU’s migration management norms.

With this new influence of the EU’s informed policies in Niger, and production of discourses on this phenomenon from receiving regions being dominant, African informal migration is being subject to strategies that aim to counter “irregular” migration to Europe. These efforts are being enforced in a site where migration is an integral part of history (Mounkaila, 2007) and this is deepened with the 1979 ECOWAS’s protocol on the free movement of goods and persons. Defining these dynamics as “irregular” migration when trying to make sense of this phenomenon in West Africa limit our understanding of these movements; and hence how these international migration regulations are received at the local level. Investigating African informal migration from Niger to Europe, my research shows norm localization taking place. Using preliminary research findings conducted in April and May 2021 in Niger based on discussions with experts, state actors, the consultation of documents and my observation, this analysis uses norm localization theory to explain how the European “irregular” migration policy norm is being integrated at the local level in Niger.

African Informal “Irregular” Migration to Europe from West Africa

An “irregular” migrant is defined as someone who violates the immigration policy of a country. Scholars define an irregular migrant as someone who crosses a border without appropriate documentation, breaches the conditions for entering another country, or remains in a country in violation of the immigration policy. This definition includes those who have been smuggled, trafficked, or who abuse the asylum system (Koser, 2005; Kuschminder, De Bresser, and Siegel, 2015;

Ayuba, Muhammad Ribadu, 2018). Accordingly, what makes a migrant “irregular” is the action of entering another country or remaining within it without legal documentations, or without meeting the criteria for admission. Although this understanding is positioned within the immigration jurisdiction in most countries, it has created a divide in the literature, especially on the question of what governance prerogatives make an individual “irregular”.

Cvajner and Sciortino (2010) argue that “irregular” migration is rooted in the structural inconsistency between social and political conditions for migration. In a similar vein, Rajaram and Grandy-Warr (2004) suggest that the “irregular” migration definition is contingent on political will to establish a migration regime where at the bottom lies a category of individuals defined by the denial of membership. As such, rules about what makes an individual “irregular” can vary depending on each country’s legal framing of irregular migration (such as shown in Duvel, 2011 study in the EU). In West Africa, “irregular” migration is the Trans-Saharan movement of people to North Africa and Europe. Studies on these movements are mainly dominated by a receiving country’s perspective (De Haas et al., 2020). As Roseman (1974) previously identified, there are four approaches in migration research. The first focuses on the movement across political and statistical unit boundaries. The second looks at the consequence of migration and its impact on migration destination areas. The third deals with migration and its temporal dimension (i.e., when, and how often people move). Finally, the fourth examines migration as a behavioral process including decision making and information gathering process.

An “irregular” migrant is therefore someone who resides in a country or crosses a country’s borders without proper documentation, and usually understood through the perspective of their impacts in receiving countries (i.e., Europe). Here, African migration is seen as undesirable since the perceived consequences of these passages are the production of more irregular migrants at the shores of Europe. Adopting this perspective to study West African migration conceals the migration dynamics within

the region as well as regional policies regulating these movements. Migration within West Africa is higher than intercontinental migration to Europe (IOM, 2020).

The 1979 ECOWAS protocol on the free movements of persons and goods in the region authorizes West African nationals to move freely in the region (Manchuelle, 1997; Adepaju, 2007), making their movements *informal* rather than *irregular*. The use of “informal” migration instead of “irregular” migration centers a sending region perspective (i.e., West Africa) and makes sense of these movements by looking at them as movement across political boundaries, as a temporal dimension, and as a behavioral process that includes decision making and information gathering. I use informal migration to describe voluntary African migration from and within the ECOWAS region via unofficial and official means. The paper then examines how governance norms about “irregular” migration are being integrated locally in Niger, which serves as a “transit” passage for migrants aiming to go to Europe. Using the norm localization theory developed by Acharya (2004), the section below looks at how local actors are reacting to new migration norms.

Local Actors and EU African Migration Governance in Niger: Resistance, Reframing, Adaptation and Amplification

Norms can be defined as intersubjective standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Avant and Finnemore, 2010). In looking at local actors’ reactions to transnational norms, Acharya (2004) developed a theoretical framework for understanding how new norms are diffused by emphasizing the agency and role of norm-takers through a dynamic congruence-building process referred to as localization. Beyond local actors’ acceptance or rejection of outside norms, he describes localization as a process and outcome whereby norm takers build congruence between transnational norms, and local belief and practices. This process allows foreign norms to be incorporated into local norms. Hence, the success of diffusing a norm relies on the extent to which it provides an opportunity for localization. Acharya

(2004) goes further to argue that this process may begin with a reinterpretation and re-representation of the outside norm but may also take the form of more complex processes of reconstitution to make an outside norm congruent with a preexisting local normative order. In this mechanism, the role of local actors is crucial.

This form of norm localization can be seen in informal migration from Niger to Europe. Niger has long attracted West African migrants who transit in the region to go to North Africa, where some go on to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. Such migration has been a way of life even before independence. As a state official in Niger explains it, the harvest season in the region means more migration. It is a time when most migrants have been able to save from their earnings to travel. He further notes that there is a tendency to focus on migrants whose intent is to go to Europe, but often those migrating were either on their way to Algeria or Libya. When asked about instances when actors usually meet to discuss migration, he stated that, “It is during the harvest season that we meet to discuss migration subjects given the number of migrants in that time being sent back from those countries.”¹

While migration from Niger to the Mediterranean has been taking place for decades, controlling migration was not a priority in Niger. Such movements were considered “normal”; especially since they are often temporary and seasonal (Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, and Perrin, 2011; Mounkaila, 2021). The death of the Kantche women in the Desert changed this (Boyer et al., 2020). It happened in 2013 when ninety-two migrants, mostly women and children from Kantche in the region of Zinder, died in the Sahara Desert on their way to North Africa. The tragedy prompted three national days of mourning. As noted in a news report, a government official expressed that, “this tragedy is as a result of criminal activities piloted by traffickers networks of all sorts.” Following this, policy actions were taken to close migrants’ camps in Agadez and to prosecute all actors involved in the ‘traffic’ of migrants (Franceinfo, 2013).

The mediatization of these movements in Europe generating fear of migrants contributed to misinterpreting all trans-Saharan migration as trans-Mediterranean migration (Brachet, 2011). As one expert observed in an interview, the fact that these movements took place in the open made them less dangerous, while the new laws restricting these passages and enforcing the criminalization of these trans-Saharan movements have made them more dangerous. He also added that, “the danger was there. But at least the smugglers were documented and were part of a convoy. They were registered.”² While migrants continue to use those pathways, they are more vulnerable as they are hiding to travel, which makes them easy targets for some smugglers. These consequences on migrants (i.e., tragic death, trafficking, and being abandoned in the desert) became a problem for the Niger authorities.

A new policy that aims to control these movements was introduced in 2015 (the Law 2015-36) following the Valletta conference. This new policy criminalizes illicit trafficking of people while portraying migrants as victims of such trafficking. As the law stipulates in *article 10*, “Every person who intentionally or to derive a certain indirect or direct financial benefit or other material benefits, ensures the illegal entry or exit of a non-national or a permanent resident in Niger” is considered a criminal. In this regard, after the Valetta Summit (Boyer, Ayoubou and Mounkaila 2020), Niger became a key partner for the EU with the establishment of the EU trust Fund (EUTF) in 2015. This established an externalization of EU migration policies and the production of a national narrative on migration. These are reframed at the local scale and part of an opportunistic strategy bargained from new migration controls (Boyer, Ayoubou Tinni, and Mounkaila, 2020). This shows that local actors especially in the region of Agadez are not passive norm takers of this new policy; rather there is a reinterpretation of this new policy norm at the local level. In Acharya (2004) definition of localization, he states that it is an active construction of foreign ideas (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) by local actors to build congruence with

local beliefs and practices. In this process local actors' agency is essential. This trajectory can be observed in the case of Niger where local actors are reinterpreting these "external" policy norms to fit their identities. In this context, as the theory suggests, localization is facilitated when these actors perceive these new norms as tools to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their existing institutions and practices without essentially altering their social identity.

The first step towards localization is resistance and contestation. This is mainly because local actors may perceive these new norms as a threat to their existing beliefs and practices and thus their legitimacy. The contestation of EU "irregular" migration governance can be seen through the production of the 'transit' and 'anti-transit' as observed during a discussion with an expert. As he told me, "the management of the anti-transit is delegated to international actors which creates a contestation from local actors in Agadez". This makes the 'anti-transit', which is constituted of the physical presence of international organizations visible while the 'transit' became invisible given the criminalization of such activity. These are smugglers who depend on the revenues they make from passing migrants through the Sahara Desert. This resistance leads to localization when these local actors perceive these new norms as ways to contribute to their legitimacy.

The second step towards localization involves local actors borrowing and framing these recent norms to establish their values to the local audience. As observed in the case of Niger and Agadez particularly, the smugglers have organized into an association (*L'Association des Anciens Passeurs*) which convenes ex-smugglers. These associations include ex-smugglers and their wives as well as local state actors who are positioning themselves in this new norm and its benefits (Boyer, Tinni, and Mounkaila, 2020).

The third step is adaptation. Here, these external norms are reframed to fit local beliefs and practices. This is done when local actors redefine the external norm by associating it with specific existing local norms and practices and refining the former

by selecting those elements which fit the local normative structure and rejecting some. From observation, this tendency can be seen with how these movements are being framed in Niger. For instance, currently, there are two types of migrants whose intent is to go to Europe: the transit migrant and the refugee/asylum seeker. Refugees/asylum seekers are migrants who have been repatriated to Niger either from Algeria or Libya, and those from Sudan and Eritrea who are awaiting the processing of their asylum application. Transit migrants are those coming from countries in West Africa and who are using Niger as a transit passage – and use services from smugglers - to cross the Sahara Desert in hopes of going to Europe. While EU global migration governance frame these migrants as "irregular", we see at the local level these migrants being reframed as either transit migrants or refugees/asylum seekers. Irregularity in this context, comprises the process through which migrants move (i.e., their helpers, their transporters, and smugglers) who can face criminal charges with the enforcement of the law 2015-36. Finally, amplification takes place whereby new instruments and practices are put into place from different sets of values and practices in which local influences prevail.

We can see this happening with the passing of Niger's 2020-2035 national migration law. The regulation seemingly comes as a response to criticisms of the law 2015-36 which led to the criminalization of migrants (Moser, 2020; Harouna, 2021). This new law calls into action the engagement of both state and non-state actors to address the question of African migration in Niger. Through this holistic approach, the law seeks to promote a participatory, inclusive, multisectoral migration policy approach that considers the local context. As such, the goal of the policy is also to empower local authorities to manage migration through decentralization. These include the provision of funding and capacity building to integrate migration management in their policies. We see here that there is a greater acceptance of a migration management policy that will address the human insecurity consequences of migration, such as programs to protect the rights of migrants and promote integration, and that criminalizes those

who facilitate clandestine movement. Moreover, the capacity building for managing migration being established at the level of local authorities includes the recognition of non-state actors such as associations for ex-smugglers (“ex-passeurs”).

Following localization theory, the diffusion of EU migration management norms in Niger is facilitated by the fact that these new norms are enhancing the legitimacy and authority of local actors and their existing institutions and practices. In this regard, though migration management norms in the region are influenced by the EU, local actors in the region are not passive recipients of this new approach to migration. There is an active reinterpretation of these norms to fit the existing normative structure. In the same vein, the use of “irregular” migration in this context to describe the movements of African migrants via unauthorized channels to Europe undermines this localization process and the norms that regulate these dynamics in this sending region.

Conclusion

State and non-state actors’ dynamics in the governance of African informal migration to Europe is dominated by the introduction of the EU’s global migration governance that followed the Valetta conference in 2015. Contextualizing these interactions within a sending region’s normative structure shows local actors’ agency who are more than passive ‘recipients’ of these international norms. Through a localization process, they play an active role in the diffusion of these new norms. This is taking place through the framing of the national migration management as a holistic approach to not only derive the benefits of migration, but also to offer protection to migrants transiting through Niger. Criminalization here is applied to those who help migrants on the journey to the desert while providing an opportunity for ex-smugglers to participate in this governance. This process is facilitated by the fact that the diffusion of this new migration management norm enhances local actors’ authority and legitimacy. Whereby different local authorities in Niger can access resources to manage migration in their respective cities, and ex-smugglers can maintain a sense of legitimacy by actively contributing to this process while

receiving incentives to transition to a different activity. In this sense, this paper argues that while EU externalization of its migration governance to Niger have influenced the approach to migration in the region, local actors are not mere recipients of these new norms. They contribute to its diffusion through a reinterpretation, selection, reframing, and refining of the original policy to align it with pre-existing norms. ■

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- 1 Conversation with a State Actor in Niamey (Niger), 2021
- 2 Conversation with an expert (Non-State Actor) in Niamey, Niger (2021)

European Union and the Securitization of Migration in the Horn of Africa

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The Horn of Africa is one of the major refugee producing and refugee-hosting regions in the world. Anxious about an ever-increasing onward movement of these forced migrants to Europe, the European Union has for long been working with the states in the region to stem the flow. In 2014, that effort culminated in the creation of the European Union – Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, otherwise known as the Khartoum Process. The stated objectives of the initiative include ensuring “effective protection to refugees, asylum seekers, as well as to internally displaced persons” and addressing “the root causes of irregular migration.”¹ However, the concrete outcome of the process, so far, has been an elaborate arrangement in which host/transit states in the region are getting financial and material incentives to seal their borders and curtail the onward movement of migrants.²

Through a closer examination of the living conditions of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, this paper shows how, under the auspicious of European financing, the Khartoum Process worsened the life of migrants in and from the Horn. These outcomes mirror the negative effects of EU-supported policy changes on informal migrants in West Africa described in Balkissa Diallo’s contribution to this collection. This paper is an introductory note to a proposed larger ethnographic study on the modes of refugee political subjectivities in the region as they respond to broader structures of international law and international relations.

The Khartoum Process: Text and Context

The European Union’s Global Approach on Migration and Mobility (GAMM) represents its current policy framework on migration. The main objectives of GAMM are said to be: “better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility, preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking

in human being, maximising the development impact of migration and mobility [and] promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.”³

The GAMM is often criticized for prioritizing border control over protection of migrants.⁴ Yet, despite such criticism, entangling security and migration remains the main feature of the framework, as it has been in the other EU-Africa initiatives which operate under the GAMM’s overarching framework (see Diallo, this collection). The security approach that pervades European Union’s response to irregular migration in general also constitutes the hallmark of the Khartoum Process, with devastating effects on the lives of migrants in and from the Horn of Africa. Before examining this aspect further, however, a brief discussion of the regional context that led to the advent of the initiative is in order.

Since WWII, the Horn of Africa region has been an extremely troubled region. The experience of colonization and decolonization⁵ dragged the region into inter- and intra-state wars earlier than the rest of the continent. Those conflicts, compounded with arid and semi-arid climatic zone which results in recurrent droughts and famines, have been the cause of migration and displacement for seven decades.⁶ Thus, in 2014 and 2015 alone, 60,000 migrants from the Horn entered Europe. They also represented 10% among the deaths in the Mediterranean.⁷

One of the main source countries of refugees in the region is Eritrea, which is currently experiencing unprecedented migration of its people.⁸ Many writers explain the mass flight as being driven by the massive militarization and grave human rights abuses committed by the state.⁹ To avoid excessive presentism, however, it is important to look at the long history of conflict, poverty and militarization

across the region which drives the large number of migrants to irregularly enter Europe and/or die trying.

On 28 November 2014, alarmed by the escalating and large number of migrants from the region, the European Union, following the Rabat model initiated the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, otherwise known as the Khartoum Process.¹⁰ The composition of initial signatories to the Rome Declaration (a foundational legal instrument of the Khartoum Process) reflect the wider scope of the initiative and includes countries from North and East Africa.¹¹ More recently, in June 2021, IGAD Council of Ministers adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance. Funded by the EU Trust Fund, the Protocol's underlying objective is to facilitate free movement of people and it is hoped that the Protocol will improve labour mobility in the region. Member countries have yet to nationally rectify the Protocol and its full implementation may take some time.

Several earlier efforts had been made to regulate these migration flows. In 1998, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) adopted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services. Since its adoption, however, only handful of countries have signed it and it remains unimplemented. In 2006, the Rabat Process was established as a platform of migration policy dialogue between EU and the North and West African countries. The official website of the Rabat Process claims that the aim of the initiative is to “foster solidarity, partnership and shared responsibility in the joint management of migration issues in full respect of human rights.” To its critics, however, the concrete achievement of the Process remains “the setting up of a common EU coast guard that was tasked to patrol the waters between the African mainland and the Canary Islands”.¹²

Despite the Rome Declaration's preamble's language that underlines “the need to ensure effective protection to refugees, asylum seekers, as well as to internally displaced persons” and stresses addressing “the root causes of irregular migration,” the Khartoum Process reflects the overarching

securitized European approach to migration. It describes the initiative as an agreement “to undertake concrete actions to prevent and tackle the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe, in a spirit of partnership, shared responsibility and cooperation.”¹³ The ordering and substance of the ten concrete area of cooperation listed in the Rome Declaration reflect the priority given to migration control.¹⁴ Cooperation to ensure sustainable development is only mentioned towards the end of the list, with refugee rights and protection deemphasized and demoted to a secondary place.¹⁵

The whole initiative finally boiled down to one core statement of intent: *controlling irregular migrants by combating smuggling and trafficking of persons*. The statement is problematic on many levels. Firstly, it should be noted that a phrase like ‘combating smuggling/trafficking’ is best understood as a “rhetorical tool for justifying control measures.”¹⁶ Furthermore, drawing direct connections between irregular migration and the crimes of trafficking and smuggling has serious implications to the rights of the irregular migrants. This can be seen from different angles. First, it fails to acknowledge that human smuggling and human trafficking are consequences not causes of migration. Tackling the crimes does not resolve the underlying problem — the refugees' need for protection.¹⁷

Second, the formulation presumes an inseparable connection between smuggling and trafficking. Though both might be criminal offences, smuggling is not a straightforwardly illegitimate activity. For example, in the Eritrean case “smuggling is a socially embedded collective practice that strives to facilitate safe exit and transitions of Eritrean refugees.”¹⁸ Smugglers are variously viewed as ‘humanitarians,’ ‘protectors,’ ‘traffickers’ or simple as people engaged in somehow legitimate business.¹⁹ For the majority of refugees from Eritrea, recruiting a smuggler is the only available option to illegally leave their country and continue their onward march until they reach Europe and seek protection.²⁰ A clampdown on smugglers alone, without providing alternative legal channels, would not dissuade people from moving.

Eritrean refugees in Sudan in the Era of the Khartoum Process

The European Union sees countries in the Horn as both sources and transit countries with European countries as final destination. While Eritrea is exclusively considered as a source country, Sudan is identified as the main transit country of the migrants (though it also produces its own refugees) 'from the Horn to Europe through Libya or Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea.'²¹

This assumption is, however, inaccurate. The collective designation of Eritrean refugees as 'transit migrants' obscures the fact that majority of those who left their country irregularly remain in and around the region. And "for those who do decide to move out of the region, the route to Europe is only one of several routes that can be used. The majority of those who leave the Horn go east, through Yemen to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, while others travel south, through Kenya, to South Africa."²²

Nonetheless, based on that assumption and in the name of clamping down on smuggling networks, Eritrean refugees – especially those living in the cities – are exposed to frequent roundups and arbitrary arrests. The intensification of roundups and detention are part of the new drive to 'combat smuggling and trafficking of persons' in the wake of the Khartoum Process. One news item from last year, for example, entitled "Further arrests as Sudanese Police Crackdown on Irregular Migration," states:

Sudanese security forces intercepted four smugglers and 57 irregular migrantsIt is part of their continued efforts to curb irregular migration and human trafficking. The police stormed a house in the East Nile locality, where the smugglers were hiding the migrants, according to Sudan Media Centre (SMC), a local media outlet stationed in Khartoum. The SMC report also revealed that legal action against the traffickers is being taken and that another three traffickers who escaped arrest are being hunted.²³

Yet another news item says:

900 Eritreans were rounded up in Khartoum on Monday and that a further 400 arrested en route to Libya have been deported to Eritrea, [this] come amid recent revelations in the British and German media that the EU is planning to deepen its cooperation with a number of African countries, including Sudan and Eritrea, to stem migration towards Europe.²⁴

The implication of such measures in the life of refugees is enormous. One Eritrean refugee told an interviewer "I had first planned to go to Sudan and stay, but I had so many of the same problems there as I had in Eritrea. The police started to round us up there too – although it's not as severe as in Eritrea. So, I had to change my mind and keep going on my journey."²⁵

The detentions were conducted by segments of Sudanese security forces who are beneficiaries of "training, technical assistance and provision of relevant equipment" of European Union under the guise of "capacity-building support." In fact, the majority of the €40 million budget allocated to the process goes "towards capacity building, and the EU Commission indicates that this is all to be spent on state institutions dealing with law enforcement, the justice sector and border security."²⁶ From the perspective of refugee rights this is problematic because the criminal justice system in Sudan is said to be 'grossly deficient.'²⁷ Many Eritrean ex-detainee refugees in Sudan have allegedly experienced or witnessed torture and rape.²⁸ In extreme cases, some elements of the security forces (now empowered by the EU finance) in Sudan are found to have a long-standing links with human trafficking rings and have been handing over refugee detainees to their partners in crime. In 2011 and 2012, for example, Human Rights Watch interviewed a dozen of Eritrean refugees who had been trafficked with the active assistance of the police.²⁹

In the wake of the Khartoum process, and largely supported by that initiative, Sudan adopted several legislative measures related to nationality, migration and trafficking. The Asylum Regulation Act of

2014 came as a major reform to the existing law but it greatly “restricts freedom of movement and does not provide for adequate judicial guarantees to challenge deportation orders and revocation of refugee status.”³⁰

Following the independence of South Sudan and partly in response to Khartoum Process, Sudan ratified a new Passports and Immigration Act (2015). This act “provides for wide powers of deportation for illegal entry, without judicial review.”³¹ Amidst multiple legal reforms and the inefficiency of the relevant institutions to cope with the reforms, hundreds of Eritrean migrants were charged with illegal entry under the 2015 Act and deported back to Eritrea without reference to the rights conferred to them in the Asylum Regulation Act (2014).³²

One UNHCR press release in 2016 lamented the trend of “collective expulsions from Sudan of Eritreans to Eritrea.” The press release notes “at least 313 Eritreans were arrested on 6 May in the northern Sudanese town of Dongola. They were tried and convicted of “illegal entry” into Sudan under national immigration laws and were forcibly returned to Eritrea on 22 May. The Office has also learned of a previous collective expulsion of 129 Eritreans back to their country of origin a few days before the 22 May incident.”³³

This brief case study of Eritrean refugees in Sudan in relation to the ‘Khartoum Process’ is meant to give a glimpse of how the EU’s securitization of migration issue (and the different initiatives and partnerships informed by such an approach) are adversely affecting the status and rights of irregular migrants in regions far from Europe. As many writers suggested the Khartoum Process is being implemented in unusually high level of secrecy.³⁴ For example, the EU support and financing of the Rapid Support Force (RSF) (the successor of the paramilitary force of the notorious *Janjaweed* militia which is now playing a key role in cracking down irregular migration) has, for long been, denied by the EU but recently admitted by the head of the RSF.³⁵

Conclusion

Writing after the massive displacements and statelessness of millions of people in Europe between and after the two world wars, Hannah Arendt rejected the metaphysical conception that human rights emanates from our universal common humanity. For her, the notion of inalienability of human rights abstracts the category ‘human’ out of its historical, social and political context and “...the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an “abstract” human being who seemed to exist nowhere.”³⁶

The paradox that Arendt refers to exposes the fundamental contradiction in the notion of universal human rights. On the one hand, it speaks to our common humanity by holding that rights are inalienable and all ‘men are born and remain free.’ And all have the right to liberty, property and security. On the other hand, the origins and existence of human rights are very much tied to the existence of a nation state.³⁷ The latter renders the appeal for our common humanity redundant and, for individuals, having rights is solely dependent on belonging to a political community in the form of a nation-state. For Arendt, therefore, in the global political order characterized by territorial nation states, the category ‘human’, which is the subject of the ‘human rights’ is not a generic one but is only a euphemism for the category ‘citizen’.³⁸

Despite the proliferation of international human rights instruments meant to protect refugees and stateless people, the ‘rightlessness’ of the stateless to which Arendt alluded in the inter-war and post-war period remains with us. As we have seen in the case of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, European ‘migration management’ initiatives are heavily contributing to securitization of migration and are placing refugees outside the realm of rights granted under the international refugee laws.

The dominance of the security approach goes beyond the suspension of refugee rights conferred by relevant international instruments. Even worse, the European Union’s intervention has substantially

eroded a socially embedded political culture which had been largely welcoming to refugees. Most of the Eritrean refugees who migrated to the Sudan in 1960 and 1970s, for example, had since been integrated into the local communities and many of them acquired Sudanese citizenship. This positive experience is very much part of the popular memories of Eritreans across the border. Recently this has dramatically changed and little remains of such local practices. ■

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Migration, New Identities and Uganda's Refugee Hosting Crisis

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Migration has marked Uganda as a country of destination and transit as well as of origin. Responding to political violence, economic problems, and humanitarian crises both within its borders and neighbouring countries, migrants and refugees have travelled to, through, and out of Uganda in large numbers over the years.¹ Uganda has the highest refugee hosting status in Africa, with about 1,421,133 refugees.² This adds to the economic pressure accelerated by a looming unemployment problem. Uganda's population of nearly 48 million³ creates a demographic challenge to Uganda's government which is exacerbated by the large number of refugees. While Covid-19 brought the migration numbers down, between 2020 and 2021 over 5000 refugees still crossed into Uganda⁴ while over 8,666 Ugandans left the country in search of employment.⁵ This doesn't include those fleeing ethno-tribal and political conflicts and economic hopelessness by crossing the border into Kenya, Congo, Tanzania and Rwanda.

During the last two decades in particular, South-North migration has intensified in Uganda as a response to globalization processes and the lack of economic opportunities.⁶ Taking these factors into account, this essay argues that Uganda's cyclic migration is a result of its refugee hosting crisis⁷ and its political and socio-economic inequalities. It investigates the consequences of migration on regional relations and challenges the claim that Uganda has replaced the Maghreb in the migration narrative.

Cyclic Migration and the Refugee Crisis in Uganda

Uganda's migration patterns can be explained in relation to its refugee obligations and migration policies. Uganda's migration is historically characterised by intensive inflows of migrants

prompted by demographic, economic, and political factors, as well as by the fact that it is bordered by warring nations. These have acted in combination to produce various forms of migration such as nomads, labour migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons. In all these cases, there is clandestine movement across long, porous frontiers, with undocumented migrations perhaps the most common configuration.⁸ This has created massive in-flows, to the degree that Uganda has become the new in-flight link to the rest of the world, taking over from the Maghreb region.⁹

As several papers in this collection demonstrate, the *legalities* of migration in Africa demand a close analysis: how migrants leave a country of origin is not in itself proof of their legal status in another. Migration itineraries shift over time, in response notably to tightened controls and changing policies in transit countries.¹⁰ Uganda has flexible flight policies, lax visa processes¹¹ and open visa requirements which mean that citizens of more than one half of African countries can easily get a visa upon arrival. This makes it easy to use Uganda as a destination transit point. With regional integration and a number of trade and economic treaty agreements¹² and the mandate to respond to humanitarian needs,¹³ Uganda remains vulnerable to mass entries as well as massive exits into other countries.

I argue that while the out-flight in the Maghreb is risky, and borders on the suicidal due to processes of human labor trafficking and smuggling (see Nabil Ferdaoussi's essay in this collection)¹⁴ other forms of migratory irregularities shouldn't be ignored. While Maghreb migrants are lost at sea, Ugandan migrants to the Middle East and even to the Americas tend to be lost within the countries to which they migrate. There, they become victims of domestic violence, human trafficking and a

booming trade in human organs.¹⁵ Africans not only die in transit but even in their destinations. Do the statistics match the bodies of mutilated victims that leave to work only to end up dead and harvested? While the sea harvests the Northern Africans, traders in the Middle East harvest Ugandans.

Uganda, as one of the biggest feeders of migrant labor to the Middle East, is therefore a significant area to study how migratory processes impact migrants lives. Studies continue to argue that migration should not be seen as only a South-to-North phenomenon but also a South-to-South process where it occurs within and between several countries.¹⁶ In Uganda's case, there is equal measure of South-to-North and South-to-South migration, accelerated by political and socio-economic inequalities that make Ugandans migrate to its neighbouring countries in search of better social services and work opportunities. For example, Atukunda (names anonymized), a teacher from Uganda, says she was forced to migrate to Kigali where the pay is better.¹⁷ She is only one of hundreds of teachers that moved to Rwanda between 2009-2013, responding to a sector unemployment crisis in the country.¹⁸ The same applies to doctors, nurses and scientists who move to other countries in search of better opportunities.

There are two phenomena to explain this. Firstly, the open and porous nature of Uganda's borderlines and its migration policies make it easy to move across to other countries and continents. Porous borders are not unique to Uganda¹⁹, but the borderline security enforcement in Uganda's case is weakened by corruption, inconsistency and a laxity in the enforcement and legal due processes. This affects the way immigration in Uganda handles in-flow and outflow of human traffic. Furthermore, the government lacks a streamlined structured administrative process responsible for immigration in the country. As one scholar notes, countries like Uganda which have diverse Ministries and Agencies responsible for different aspects of migration make coordination and collaboration a challenge, arguing that a unified and integrated department is better placed to ensure national security.²⁰ Uganda's border management compromises its cross regional

and international migration, perhaps making its own inadequate policies to blame for its migration problem.

This translates into border conflicts, and diplomatic tensions, especially if there are no clearly defined terms of relations, trade and exchanges, as with Rwanda-Uganda relations since 2019.²¹ One particularly important case is the South Sudan military conflict, which left many trading Ugandans stranded and in need of evacuating, and then facing struggles to survive back in Uganda.²² Esther, a trader who was rescued when the upheaval in South Sudan occurred,²³ is one of many examples of frustrated Ugandans. She was a restaurateur for the construction personnel in South Sudan. With her return to Uganda, she was unable to find a job and even market for her merchandise. Because she didn't want to spend her savings, she trusted a pyramid scheme to make a quick interest and profit, but in less than a year she had lost it all when the scheme crashed. She plans to move to South Africa, to escape the frustration of a failed life in Sudan.²⁴ This shows how migration creates crises that extend to other countries.

I want to argue that this in some way explains the xenophobia and Afrophobia in South Africa, showing just how much migration affects relationships in Africa, where countries already exhausted from fighting for limited resources are then threatened by migrant labourers against whom they must compete.²⁵ The victims of such violence often cannot return home, having fled political prosecution, and so they move on with migration to other parts of Africa or even Europe, America, and the Middle East. This is a cyclic trend in which thousands of Africans rotate in and of their countries. Consequently, Uganda has been a victim to the cyclic migratory patterns rife in many African countries, especially hosting refugees, asylum seekers and labourers from the Horn of Africa, South Sudan, Congo and central Africa Republic. Consequently, settlement formations become necessary within which migrants try to negotiate survival. Questions however are raised as to what happens to Ugandans who flee to other countries, migrating both out of necessity and compulsion and attempting to navigate new

challenges born out of socio-cultural and political economic issues in the country.

Forging New Identities and Carving Second Futures

There is a story to every migrant that you find in the diaspora. For many, their dreams for better opportunities becomes nightmares – especially those in the Arab world. For others, their tenures end in the midst of their work, such as students who flunk out of university in Europe. A student I interviewed once told me of the shame of failing. A woman who I met in North America narrated a story of a broken heart and losing her K-2 visa when her marriage did not last: “upon my arrival, I couldn’t understand him anymore.” Another friend from college, depressed and lonely, committed suicide. These are stories that are told by educated, dream chasing migrants who realise too late that the promises don’t come and if they do, there is a long journey to walk to get them. If they survive, just how much do they need to adjust to adapt to their new homes? There is a validity to the questions of ‘What to do?’ ‘How to act?’ and ‘Who to be?’ as responses arising out of occurrences affecting everyone in modern societies, prompting an identity crisis in each of us.²⁶ Identity dilemmas are pervasive in the migrants’ daily lives because of their conflicting but often overlapping and intertwined identities.²⁷

The need to fit into the new home and yet retain a defining identity to their origins reigns high in both the short term and permanent migrant. An Uber driver from the Congo explained it to me: “I came on a student visa, then found I could do some work part time, at first I fought to speak like an American, then realized that I didn’t have to be an American to live and work in America, so I reverted to my accent and found it better and easier.”²⁸ Pushed a little more, he confessed that he had migrated to Uganda as a refugee and then applied through the system after doing his A-levels in a Ugandan school. He joins the many refugees that choose to begin normalcy in Uganda before they emigrate to other parts of the world as ordinary people. This is because the identity of refugee is a tag they are choosing to leave behind, because of its

connotations. There is a need for a new identity. In the forging of a new person, there is a new question that arises: who am I? Neither here nor there, the cultural dilemma and corresponding attempt to forge a hybridity of identities for the migrant becomes not a question of time but of acceptance.

There is a continuous assessment of the impact of the identity crisis on the migrant, the lack of confidence and esteem due to cultural differences and ethno-racial separation seen as a result of acculturation²⁹ while noting the suggestion that the process of acculturation is akin to the psychological models of moving towards, moving against and moving away from a stimulus. Investigations must be undertaken to show if this change will correspond to adaptation or simulation, rejection and deculturation. The process of acculturation requires two cultures to come into contact and both cultures may experience some change.³⁰ What if this doesn’t happen?

Whether it is a refugee or a non-refugee emigrant, the biggest concern for the migrant is the adjustment to the cultural shock that comes with moving from a country of origin to a new country. Whether through acculturation, deculturation or assimilation, there is always a new identity created, and this is often beyond hybridity; it is a reculturation. In migration situations where the emigrants form part of a minority group, the need to cluster into national communities is high. Take Waltham in Boston, estimated to have the highest number of Ugandans in the state of Massachusetts; it has a Uganda church, a Uganda market, Uganda games and even a Uganda day. The need to revert back home, without going home is an important example in seeing how emotional migration becomes in the debate on how they want to be identified. It is not about who do I want to be, but who I am, a Ugandan. Knowing that tribal and ethnic realities have been deconstructed, the only reality remains in origin identity: I travel to America with more food, traditional clothes and national flags, than I do with anything else. The need to have a future without out forgetting the past is important. Children are being born and there is need to hold on to identities of origin. While children take on

new identities, parents, grandparents and other relatives remain tied to the old; the philosophical rendition of Okot P. Bitek's idea that the pumpkin should not be uprooted from the old homestead.³¹

Conclusion

Migration has been attributed to three factors meso, macro and micro³² translated into employment, short term and seasonal and education migration. But now, refugees account for almost 17% of all migration³³ implying that it is a persisting global problem which is a reality in Uganda. Uganda will have to honour her hosting obligations, but how can Uganda ensure that alongside this hosting obligation, its citizens are catered for so that they too thrive with the support of the government? The European Union, African Union and the United Nations push for more accountability measures especially in areas of education, health,

and structural adaptations that create discrepancies in income and employment opportunity between citizens and migrants.

Furthermore, the migrant, the migration and the destination as tripods created out of different crises and formulated within frameworks of change must be re-defined. The very idea of reculturalisation;³⁴ the metaphorical innuendos in translating the untranslatable becomes a burden for the future, in identify creations of the migrant. The choice to live beyond the hypotheses of coloniality and the pitfalls of post-coloniality bring into the present the reality of decoloniality. Even when there is an attempt to separate migration from these historical events intra-continental migration is a reminder that colonialism brought partitioning, which separated tribes and ethnicities across borders, creating a natural fluidity of identity seekers. ■

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What Role for African Cities in Urban Migration Governance?

Janina Stürner-Siovitz and Lionel Nzamba Nzamba

At the 2015 African Union-European Union Summit, the city network United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG Africa) called upon national governments to include local authorities in regional migration dialogues. Three years later, African city leaders discussed local contributions to the UN Global Compacts for Migration and Refugees at the Africities Summit 2018 and adopted the “Charter of local and subnational governments of Africa on migration.” At first sight, such engagement appears surprising, given that the great majority of African local authorities lack legal mandates, resources and capacities to address questions of urban migration and displacement. As migration policy represents a traditional domain of national competency, African local authorities are rarely considered (relevant) partners or recipients of funding by national and international actors. Nevertheless, a rising number of migrants and refugees settle in African cities and towns, and local authorities need to address social and economic consequences of climate-related migration, conflict migration, and rural-urban movements (Teye 2018; Angenendt 2021). Being closer to the realities on the ground than their national counterparts, some local authorities emphasize that exclusionary policies and attempts to halt inter-African mixed movements do not result in sustainable solutions and may even spark social unrest and urban conflicts. Instead of conditioning access to social and economic life on a person’s legal status, representatives from cities like Arua (Uganda), Freetown (Sierra Leone), or Sfax (Tunisia) are promoting a more pragmatic approach. Highlighting potential benefits of inclusive strategies addressing the needs of migrants, refugees, and host communities alike, city representatives call upon national and international actors to invest in cities as cooperation partners and to join forces in addressing urban migration and displacement (UNOG 2019; interview Freetown, 2020; interview Sfax, 2021). Drawing on migration

studies’ “local turn”, we pose the question of how (some) African local authorities came to claim agency and act in urban migration governance. The first part of this essay sets out a city migration governance paradox to illustrate the research puzzle further, and highlights a city focus in migration studies’ “local turn.” Drawing on a qualitative research design, part two analyzes how (some) African local authorities came to claim agency and act in migration governance processes at the local and transnational levels. As reasons for human mobility are diverse, we adopt an inclusivist perspective on “migration as a global phenomenon and policy field that also includes refugees” (Carling n.d.). The essay concludes with leads for future research on cities as actors in urban migration governance.

Presenting the city migration governance paradox

A growing number of African cities experience a *city migration governance paradox*. As cities gain in importance as spaces of origin, transit, destination, and return, local authorities are increasingly impacted by the consequences of mixed migration movements as well as by national and international policy-making on these issues (e.g., Landau et al. 2016; Angenendt et al. 2021). While urban residents and national governments expect local authorities to cope with these situations and ensure that the city continues functioning for its residents, many local authorities have limited capacities and resources. Local authorities also often lack political mandates to address mixed migration in cities, even in situations where there is political will to engage. Furthermore, local authorities are missing channels to feed their local experience back to the national and international levels, where decisions on migration and asylum policies are made that directly affect cities on the ground (Stürner-Siovitz 2022a).

Developing municipal strategies to address national and international migration movements poses a great challenge to African local authorities, in particular when confronted with incomplete decentralization reforms, outdated population data and limited access to fiscal transfers or international humanitarian funding (Stürner and Nzamba Nzamba 2021). In this context, many local authorities do not consider migration and displacement as priority areas of municipal engagement (e.g., Wanjiku-Kihato and Landau 2017). Nevertheless, a small but growing number of African cities have started coming together in city networks like UCLG Africa and the Global Mayoral Forum to share ideas among peers to overcome these limitations (UCLG Africa 2020; Mayors Mechanism 2020).

Overall, it is important to highlight that we do not argue that local authorities are necessarily more open to questions of migration than national authorities. Much depends on local contexts and individual positions within local governments and administrations, as well as on civil society's interest and capacity to advocate for rights of migrants and refugees, and human rights more generally. Local authorities are often more directly confronted with the negative consequences of restrictive migration policies than their national counterparts and may therefore be more interested in developing approaches that recognize (1) that migration cannot simply be stopped and (2) that there is therefore a need to find inclusive solutions for the benefit of migrants, refugees, and local populations (interview Freetown, 2020; interview Kampala, 2020; interview Sfax, 2021; interview Sousse, 2021; UCLG Africa 2020; Mayors Mechanism 2020). Driven by pragmatic interests in expanding funding, resources, and mandates, a small number of African local authorities are thus seeking to engage directly at the local and transnational levels with local, national and international actors working on mixed migration in cities.

In recognition of this growing urbanization of mixed migration – not just in the African context but worldwide – migration studies have taken a “local turn” as off the late 2000s. This “local

turn” allowed shifting the scholarly focus from municipalities as *spaces* of migration towards municipalities as *actors* of local and multilevel migration governance (e.g., Caponio and Borkert 2010). In particular, cities receive increasing attention among “local turn” scholars and in debates analyzing horizontal and vertical interaction between local and national authorities, city networks, NGOs, foundations, and international organizations (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017; Caponio et al. 2018; Scholten et al. 2018). Drawing on migration studies’ “local turn” as well as on urban studies, we theorize cities, understood as local governments and authorities, as actors capable of agency and action (e.g., Caponio and Borkert 2010; Acuto and Rayner 2016; Pinson 2019). But *how* do African local authorities claim agency and how do they launch action in the field of urban migration governance?

To explore these questions we combined a qualitative structuring content analysis (Kuckartz 2016) of official declarations and statements issued by African cities and city networks between 2015 and 2020 with an analysis of 25 expert interviews conducted with representatives of African cities, city networks, research institutions, and international organizations between 2019 and 2021. Among the interviewed actors were representatives from the cities of Freetown, Kampala, Oujda, Sfax, Sousse, as well as the city networks UCLG Africa, UCLG, the Mayors Migration Council, and the Mayors Mechanism. A most-important-case design was applied to select cases, with a particular focus on cities and city networks engaging in local and transnational migration governance. As an approach of theoretical sampling, this case design prevents research results from being generalized, but has proved useful for exploring city action in urban migration governance as an emerging phenomenon (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).

Local authorities as actors in urban migration governance?

Drawing on the interview and document analysis, we found that representatives from African cities and city networks engaging on questions of

migration often bring forth two lines of argument: (1) that local authorities are particularly well placed to address global challenges through local action; and (2) that national and international actors can only deliver on their mandates if they take local expertise into account (Lukwago et al. 2018; Thaller and Silver 2019; Aki-Sawyer and Plante 2019). They are thus adding a *global* dimension to local authorities' *local* role, thereby transforming the *local* into a *glocal* role.¹

What does this look like in practice? At the Africities Summit 2018, participating local authorities highlighted that cities had become local frontline actors in addressing international migration and displacement. While recognizing national competencies, local authorities argued that global questions of migration could no longer be treated as solely the remit of national and international actors. Rather they highlighted the need for multi-stakeholder approaches integrating local authorities into global strategies, given that (inter)national policy-making on global challenges should be based on and respond to local potentials and needs (UCLG Africa 2018b, 2019). City representatives have presented similar positions at the African Union consultations of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in the summer of 2021 and in the Rabat Process, a migration policy dialogue bringing together European and African states, in autumn 2021 (Mayors Mechanism 2020; Rabat Process 2021).

The idea that cities as *glocal* actors may be able to connect global challenges and local action draws increasing interest from international organizations, research institutes, and philanthropic actors (IOM 2019; Cities Alliance 2020; Spindelegger et al. 2020; Rosengaertner 2020). Many of these actors could potentially play the role of door openers or gatekeepers when it comes to city agency in urban migration governance. At this point, we therefore move on to the second research question: How do local authorities try to enact this *glocal* role? Our inductive analysis revealed two main forms of action: (1) promoting transnational city diplomacy and (2) engaging in multi-stakeholder collaboration at the local level.

Promoting transnational migration city diplomacy

City diplomacy may be understood as “processes by which cities, or local governments in general, engage in relations with actors on an international stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interest to one another” (Van der Pluijm 2007: 6). While the engagement of African local authorities in regional and global migration governance is a rather recent phenomenon, diplomatic action is steadily increasing (Angenendt et al. 2021; Stürner-Siovitz 2022b; 2022c). In order to strengthen municipal positions in regional and international policy deliberations, African cities have participated in city side-events dovetailing intergovernmental summits, have adopted joint local commitments as well as statements addressed to the heads of governments and states, and have made migration an important topic for regional and international city organizations.

As such, some African local authorities are among the founding members of the GFMD Mayors Mechanism and the international Mayors Migration Council (MMC).² Both organizations strive to strengthen the participation of local authorities in intergovernmental processes of regional and global migration governance (Thouez 2020; 2022). In the words of the Mayor of Freetown, who is among the founding members of the MMC: “At a time when more than 55 percent of the world’s population live in cities, governments and international frameworks cannot afford to make choices without consulting city leaders” (Aki-Sawyer 2018).

Regarding migration governance between Africa and Europe, African local authorities have called upon African and European governments at the 2015 AU-EU Summit to integrate “associations representing the local authorities as rightful stakeholders in the Europe/Africa political dialogue on the issue of migration and in the definition and implementation of the strategic actions aiming to addressing the issue of migration” (UCLG Africa 2015: 3).




Figure 1 Charter of local and subnational governments of Africa on Migration (Source: UCLG Africa)

At the pan-African level, the African city network United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG Africa) made migration a priority topic as of 2014 and has dedicated an important part of the triennial Africities Summits in 2015, 2018 and 2022 to questions of migration and displacement. Central topics include free circulation of Africans within the continent, universal access to basic services, immigrant detention, and the controversy of establishing migration hotspots in African countries (UCLG Africa 2018b; 2019; 2020). This engagement led to the adoption of the “Charter of local and subnational governments of Africa on migration” in 2018, signed in early 2022 by over 30 African local and regional authorities (UCLG Africa 2018a).

Developing multi-stakeholder collaboration at the local level

Promoting city-to-city exchanges and obtaining a voice in political dialogues is not considered a goal

in itself, but rather a means towards mobilizing funding and gaining allies for collective local action. For instance, the participation of the city of Sfax in the Mediterranean City-to-City Migration project, co-led by UCLG, UN-Habitat, and the ICMPD, enabled the municipality to receive support for strengthening a local multi-stakeholder coordination structure bringing together NGOs, migrant associations, international organizations, national and local authorities (IMCPD 2021; interview Sfax, 2021). Cities participating in the Africa-Europe Mayors’ Dialogue on Growth and Solidarity, championed by the Mayors of Freetown and Milan and supported by the MMC, the Overseas Development Institute, the Open Society Foundations and the Robert Bosch Stiftung, strive to make use of peer-learning and cooperation with a wide range of actors to develop partnerships for sustainable initiatives that benefit migrants, refugees, and local populations (Rosengaertner 2020).³ The interest in establishing *real* partnerships for inclusive strategies is also clearly articulated

by a representative from Kampala, speaking about the Kampala Coordination Forum for Displacement, Migration and Urban Refugees. Launched in 2018, the Forum brings together local authorities, government agencies, development and humanitarian actors, NGOs as well as community-level actors:

“Essentially, the reason for the platform is that there are so many actors that organize a lot of interventions concerning refugees, but it is mostly very ‘siloed’. [...] So, the platform aims to bridge some of these gaps by saying ‘How can we work in a more coordinated way?’ But also by saying, ‘Fine, there are refugees and migrants who are persons of concern for a lot of these organizations involved in the refugee response, but they live side by side with very poor Ugandans.’ And so, the aim is to integrate the host communities, as they call them, into some of these initiatives. So, the idea is to adopt a broader program, broader in terms of scale geographically, but also in terms of target groups. So, to look more at area-based approaches” (interview Kampala, 2020).

Given that (humanitarian) actors working on urban migration and displacement are increasingly (re) discovering area-based approaches, originating in concepts of city planning, cooperation with local authorities may prove an invaluable asset (Saliba and Silver 2020).

Conclusion

This essay has shown that some African local authorities confronted with the consequences of urbanizing migration are connecting global challenges with local action, thus positioning local authorities as *glocal* actors in urban migration contexts. Drawing on this perspective, some local authorities aim to broaden their scope of action by (1) promoting transnational city diplomacy and (2) engaging in local multi-stakeholder collaboration.

Despite the recent growth in municipal engagement, it is important to highlight that both migration city diplomacy as well as local action for multi-stakeholder cooperation remain

fluid and emerging phenomena. As such, their sustainability is often threatened by a lack of local resources, capacities and institutional learning – on the side of local authorities as well as on the side of potential national and international partners (Stürner-Siovitc 2022c). Moreover, local authorities striving to engage on questions of urban migration at the local and/or transnational levels currently face two major challenges – on the one hand the COVID-19 pandemic with its direct and indirect effects on migration movements, urban inequality and municipal budgets, and, on the other hand, the reluctance of national governments to recognize local actorhood on migration. Both of these challenges should be addressed in future research zooming in on limits, challenges and potentials of local authorities as actors in urban migration governance. ■

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Endnotes

- 1 Within this essay we follow Oomen’s understanding of glocalization as “the way in which globalisation involves the creation and incorporation of locality” (Oomen 2016: 10).
- 2 The Mayors Mechanism formalizes the relationship between the Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development and the intergovernmental Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), with the idea of ensuring that global policy discussions are grounded in and respond to local realities and to provide local authorities with direct access to the state-led GFMD (GFMD 2022).
- 3 In 2022 the Africa-Europe Mayors’ Dialogue includes the cities of Milan, Freetown, Accra, Agadez, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Bologna, Bristol, Dakar, Durban, Entebbe, Grenoble, Helsinki, Kampala, Kanifing, Kigali, Lisbon, Mannheim, Maputo, Montpellier, Monrovia, Paris, Tunis and Zürich (ODI 2022).

Border Hauntology: Ghosts, Border Regimes, and the Prison-House of Necropolitics in Mati Diop's *Atlantics*

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Maritime routes to Europe have morphed into unfathomable graveyards of African migrants. Since 2014, IOM's Missing Migrants Project has recorded more than 40,000 deaths and disappearances in migratory routes worldwide (Sanchez et al., 2021). In 2021, more than 1,100 are reported to have died or gone missing in the West African Route in their way to the Canary Islands (UNCHR, 2022). However, the accuracy of such reports is called into question because so many dead and missing migrants remain off-record. Explanations for this inaccuracy in border death data vary considerably, reflecting a systemic avoidance to systematizing and quantifying border death data by the EU and Member States (Last, 2018).

Coupled with this issue of border death data inaccuracy is the absence of policy mechanisms and deflection of responsibility by state agencies for managing dead bodies of migrants at the EU's externalized borders. This entrenched policy of 'blame avoidance' (Kovras and Robins, 2016a) regulating the management of dead and missing migrants at the EU's externalized borders is the direct result of a 'policy vacuum,' defined as a "lack of cooperation among different state agencies and the absence of standard operating procedures" to trace, search, identify, bury and repatriate dead bodies of migrants and notify their families (Kovras and Robins, 2016b: 4). As a complex and challenging humanitarian conundrum, border death management has been allocated only a modicum of resources, compared to the massive logistical, legal and financial resources mobilized to contain and deter living migrants (Kovras and Robins, 2016a). This logic of securitization perceives living migrants as a threat to national security (Karyotis, 2012), subjecting their mobility to more surveillance and EU policy debates—unlike dead migrants whose loss is considered as mere accident, rather than a byproduct of stringent

migration policies. A copious body of literature explores how border death has prompted new policy objectives to put paid to the loss of life, variously phrased in policy reports as 'saving lives', 'reducing', or 'preventing deaths'. This repertoire of humanitarian objectives is used to rationalize border control and crime prevention through dismantling organized networks of criminals and smugglers (Last, 2018).

Information campaigns sensitizing potential migrants to the danger of sea-crossing through images and fiction films have been inscribed into these policy objectives as a way to prevent border death. Charles Heller drew a comparison between the use of a '*media dispositif*' of suffering and death by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in its information campaigns and colonial educational cinema (Heller, 2014). Such visual regimes of (im)mobility frame a spectacle of border enforcement by linking illegalized sea-crossings with eventual distress and drowning (De Genova, 2013). Critical cinematic productions reframing this spectacle of border death and violence are not short in supply notwithstanding (Hanna and Sheehan, 2018).

This paper explores the subversive potentialities of border cinema in reframing the spectacle of border death beyond and above the hackneyed policy debates and humanitarian borderwork. By analyzing Mati Diop's debut feature film *Atlantics* (2019) using the spectral metaphor, I explore the conceptual viability of spectrality, or the spectral turn, and its untapped subversive potential for the study of border death. A key question which the conceptual framework I advance — *border hauntology* — seeks to answer is how can a deconstruction of ontological borders—between death and life, visibility and invisibility, time and space—methodologically inform a deconstruction

of the EU's deadly borders? In so doing, I first map out the various epistemological turns that informed the field of critical border studies, then show the conceptual viability of the spectral turn for the field. Second, by moving beyond the myopic conceptual frameworks that foreclose possibility of resistance and agency in their investigation of border death, I advance the concept of *border hauntology* as an alternative framework in my analysis of Mati Diop's film *Atlantics*. Third, drawing on the spectral metaphor, I explore the authority of dead, revealing the way the dead and unburied bodies are figures of agency and may exert political influence.

Border Hauntology: Bringing Ghosts into Critical Border Studies

As search, rescue and disembarkation efforts are intentionally curtailed, families of dead migrants and NGO members go to great pains to recover and identify bodies of lost migrants (Stierl, 2016). Family members and borderland activists alike are *haunted* by this *ghostly violence* of lethal border regimes striating Euro-African borders. Yayi Bayam Diouf, a Senegalese woman interviewed by Aida Alami, is haunted by the loss of her 26-year-old son, Alioune, who set sail off Mauritania in 2006 along with 80 nationals from the impoverished suburbs of Dakar towards the Canary Islands. In the Wolof local language, this maritime route – or better, maritime frontier – is called 'Barsa wala Barsakh', meaning 'Barcelona or die'. Traumatized by the loss of her son, Ms. Diouf quit her office job to adopt a nautical lifestyle that would allow her to reminisce about her lost son. "I wish I had at least seen his body," Ms. Diouf said. "Sometimes I wonder if he really died. One day, I was out in the sea fishing and *I really thought I saw him pass by*. It hurts a lot. It's very hard to talk about him" (emphasis added).¹

In another piece published by *The New York Times*, Boubacar Wann Diallo, a Guinean migrant activist working with Alarm Phone in Morocco, revealed that he "could not sleep at night without leaving a light on", as "he was *haunted* by the phone calls he received all too often from desperate women and children screaming as they were swallowed by the sea during storms and shipwrecks" (emphasis

added).² What emerges from these border death stories is not a mere personal trauma or a voodoo-like supernaturalism, much less a belief in the actual return of the dead. Rather, it furnishes us with a conceptual reflection on haunting as a deconstructive instrument capable of unveiling the ghostly underbelly of the EU's migration policies. This deconstructive force transpires in the capacity of haunting to blur the divisive lines between life and death, presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, reality and fiction. Collapsing such ontological borders, these stories about haunting reassert what Jacques Derrida's called hauntology, a conceptual neologism he coined to supersede ontology (Derrida, 1994).

The conceptual framework sketched out in this paper builds on and contributes to a series of epistemological turns that punctuate critical border studies. For African border scholars, spatiality has been politically salient for decolonizing African borders and vilifying the imperial partitioning of the continent (P. Vanyoro, 2019; Nyamnjoh, 2015). The 'temporal turn' has shifted the focus to the insomniac realities of waiting at the border, legal temporalities of asylum and visa, as well as contingent temporalities that include disrupted plans and journeys (P. Vanyoro, 2019; Khosravi, 2017; 2021; M. Jacobson et al, 2020). The field underwent a paradigm shift as early as the 2000s, as it moved to overcome the fixity and territoriality of borders in favor of a 'processual approach' that attends to bordering practices of containment and exclusion (Gazzotti, 2021).

While this flurry of epistemological turns enriches our conception of the spatiotemporal realities that shape border violence, their 'ontological trap' precludes possibilities to investigate postmortem violence. Michel Foucault's biopolitics, Giorgio Agamben's bare life and Achille Mbembe's necropolitics have served as theoretical touchstones for border scholars interested in border death and violence. Agamben considers the political refugee as a perfect exemplar of bare life, understood as what remains after human existence is stripped of all social and political rights under the heavy juggernaut of sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). Mbembe explains how the ultimate expression of power resides in the power to dictate who must

live and who must die (Mbembe, 2003), as the postcolony creates death-worlds for its subjects (Mbembe, 2001). Such a conceptual framework has repeatedly been adduced to examine how racialized migrants from the Global South are caught up in the necropolitical gridlocks of border violence and death (De León, 2015).

My interest in the spectral turn derives from its capacity to go beyond and above such ontological borders of time and space, past and present, life and death that are peculiar to border violence, thus moving away from the stale debates of necropolitics that foreclose new horizons of resistance and agency. With its forceful deconstruction of ontological borders, the ghostly paradigm opens up new possibilities of resistance and agency that are often missing in border violence research. Esther Peeren notes that, “Any contemporary project dealing with ghosts, especially figurative ones, has to situate itself in relation to the so-called spectral turn” (2014, p.9). Taking my cue from this ‘spectral turn’, I seek to test the conceptual viability of ghosts and haunting against the backdrop of what has been dubbed by Nicholas De Genova ‘border spectacle’. What is meant by the latter is the entire visual gamut that frames public opinion about the (im)mobility of racialized and otherized migrants (Mazzara, 2019; Loughnan, 2020).

The spectral metaphor is so powerful in that it transcends such rigid dichotomies. Derrida writes that the “spectre exceeds ontological oppositions between absence and presence, visible and invisible, living and dead” (2002, p.25). In this way, this study examines the methodological viability of ghosts and haunting by extrapolating it to the field of border studies, thus recasting the scholarly focus from *border ontology* to *border hauntology*.

I use border hauntology as a forensic tool to invoke the persistence and the resounding echoes of past injustices of border regimes into the present, thus bringing under critical scrutiny the present absence, the hyper-visible invisibility of the ghostly, ungrievable and racialized migrants. In principle, it proposes a radical mode of knowledge production about the ghostly register of modern border regimes, about the haunting effects of those lost, dead, or ontologically invisible. By transcending the

visible/invisible divide, border hauntology contests what W. J. T. Mitchell terms “the regime of the visual,” which is mobilized to normalize the ghostly necropolitics of bordering institutions (1994, p.13). Indeed, such visual representations have always been central to the formation and maintenance of border regimes through a coalescence of migration, law and iconography (Mazzara, 2019).

As a conceptual framework, visibility here operates exclusively within the discursive limits of the visible and the sayable, requiring merely a rearrangement of the relation between the visualizer/the visualized and visibility/countervisibility (Mirzoeff, 2011). It explores only one form of invisibility, thus giving short shrift to other forms of invisibility which I aim to explore in this study. This ‘visual trap’ precludes the possibility of exploring the political salience of that which is a-visual or quasi-visual—the present absence of the ghost and the living dead. Derrida distinguishes between the visible in-visible and absolute invisibility. The former refers to something that is physically concealed from view but can be rendered visible were it exposed in the open. Derrida cites the example of internal organs as part of this order of invisibility. Absolute invisibility is twofold: the first one spans things which “fall(s) outside the register of sight” (qtd in. Peeren, 2015, p. 35). The other dimension of this invisibility explores the agency of the present absence or quasi-visibility of the specter:

The spirit in the sense of the ghost in general, is doubtless a supernatural and paradoxical phenomenality, the furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible, or an invisibility of a visible (1994, p. 7).

The spectral agency of the ghost here lies in its flexible capacity to oscillate between visibility and invisibility, confounding the distribution of the sensible with its ability to see without being seen.

This applies notably to unwanted migrants who remain hidden from border patrols, but also who fall outside the purview of social visibility, or what Judith Butler envisions as figures *apprehended* as living but not *recognized* as lives (2009, p.8). In this sense, I consider the ontological realm of apprehension as a quintessential form of

ghostliness, since the ungrivable lives it reproduces are living dead. Running counter to Derrida's conception of the ghost as a figure of agency, apprehension conjures up the ghost as a figure of exploitation and precariousness.

These two orders of ghostliness are both central to the notion of border hauntology. It signifies a generalized condition of precariousness and ghostliness induced by bordering practices, while it also seeks to unpack ontological borders of the visible and the invisible. Bordering institutions inflict ghostly violence on marginalized and racialized migrants and, in turn, this violence causes something of a metamorphosis by which migrants are reproduced as living dead. On the other side of the spectrum, these ghostly figures—be they specters of dead migrants or living migrants whose invisibility amounts to ghostliness—haunt necropolitical regimes of separation and demand historical justice. In what follows, I examine the conceptual viability of the ghost metaphor in the film *Atlantics*, putting into display the ghostly violence that the postcolony and bordering institutions inflict on marginalized and racialized subjects. I also look at haunting and being haunted as complex, interchangeable forms of subversion and subservience.

Beyond Life and Death: Escaping the Prison-House of Necropolitics in *Atlantics*

Atlantique (*Atlantics*) won the Grand Prix at Cannes Film Festival in 2019, making Mati Diop the first black female filmmaker to win that prestigious competition in its 72-year history (Independent, 2019). Set in the squalid suburbs of Dakar in Senegal, the film recounts the story of a young woman, Ada, who loves Souleiman, a construction worker, but is betrothed to an affluent businessman named Omar.

The film opens with a tongue-in-cheek juxtaposition: a mammoth tower overlooking the Atlantic Sea is built by a state-run company that curtailed Souleiman and his friends of three months' wages. Enamored of each other, Ada and Souleiman arranged their moonlight tryst by the seaside, but by the time Ada managed to sneak out of her room window Souleiman had already set sail

in a rickety boat towards the Spanish Archipelago. Ada's indomitable affection for Souleiman blinds her to the luxurious lifestyle of Omar, despite being persuaded by her friends to brush off Souleiman. Her much-coveted nuptial bed was, out of nowhere, set ablaze—leaving her suspected of scheming arson along with Souleiman.

The diegetic texture of the film is skillfully woven with colorful threads of mystery, metaphor, and voodoo-like supernaturalism. As forensic investigations are carried out to detect the main culprit behind the attempted arson, the film sways intermittently to scenes where a handful of roaming ghosts wreak havoc on the streets at night. We are not immediately told what these roving specters are, until we see them hold a conversation with Andi—presumably the director of the company in charge of the tower construction project—to reclaim their protracted wages. It is only with hindsight, when one ghost relates their drowning at sea to Ada in the bar, that we realize that the ghosts that haunt the director include the dead body of Souleiman.

One may initially presume that the film is a love story. However, the film is a ghost story, dealing with both literal and figurative ghosts. The top line of the film cover reads, 'Every love story is a ghost story'. In a Muslim majority country like Senegal, Ada and Souleiman can only meet in hiding, since their social milieu disparages their love affair. The couple is thus pushed into the underground of social invisibility, recasting them as ghostly figures. The couple's first date did not take place in a restaurant or bar, but in a derelict building by the seaside. Derelict buildings are haunted places, ones that are the usual habitat of ghosts. Not only literal ghosts, but also ghostly subjects—such as homeless migrants who inhabit and take shelter in abandoned houses.³ However, no sooner had they entered the unoccupied building than a passerby disrupted their tryst and chased them out. Ada, swaying between a furtive love affair with Souleiman and an imminent marriage with Omar, transgresses the boundaries between visibility and invisibility, between tradition and modernity.

The opening scene of the film shows Souleiman and his friends as ghostly figures of capitalist exploitation. The scene is a caustic critique

of Senegalese leaders' dream of building a \$2 billion futuristic city less than 20 miles outside Dakar by 2035. The construction project of the tower in the film alludes to the country's development projects. The French-Senegalese filmmaker vilifies its bloodsucking mode of labour exploitation. In response to Derrida's *Spectres of Marx*, Antonio Negri suggests that "the 'specters of Marx' are therefore, in some way, the specters of capital" (2008, p. 6). He argues that the ghostly violence of capitalist production is a bloodless movement that "vampirizes all of the worker's labor and, transforming itself into surplus value, becomes capital (ibid., p.7)." Diop's critique of these spurious development promises is even more trenchant with its visual insertion in the background of the scene. A poster in the foreman's office reads 'Muejiza Tower', apparently referring to the futuristic tower in Diaminiado Lake city in Dakar, which is set to be part of Senegal's development project. The poster may escape the sight of the audience, but its visual politics is as important as the complaints of the unpaid laborers.

In this scene, we are confronted with visuality and counter-visibility. The poster in the scene represents the former, while the visual realism of the film, along with its aesthetic rearrangements of the social life in Dakar, represents the latter. The film successfully redistributes the sensible of developmentalism in the postcolony, unveiling the ghostly terror and exploitation it inflicts on its subjects. I find Mbembe's re-conceptualization of the relationship between the ghostly terror of the postcolony and the Lacanian mirror effects of immediate relevance to Diop's filmic engagement in the context of Senegal. The poster of the 'Muejiza Tower' in the foreman's office is not a mere reflection of developmentalism. The spectralizing exploitation of laborers belies all the semantic connotations of grandeur and progress that the Arabic word *Muejiza* (Wonder) carries. The scene is refracted by the ghostly narratives of labor exploitation that the visual content of the poster seeks to render invisible. This *specular* (mirror) property of the film is juxtaposed in the scene with the *spectral* violence of capitalist exploitation in postcolonial Senegal. This specular subversion is conceptualized by Jean-Pierre Vernant, whose understanding of the mirror is

deployed by Mbembe to unmask the relation between the specular and the spectral (qtd. in Mbembe, 2003). It likewise surfaces the present absence of unemployed and unpaid laborers who are vampirized by such developmental projects and promises, whose unpaid labor translate into a form of modern slavery.

Nowhere is this ghostly exploitation more pronounced in the film than in the complaints of the so-called 'free laborers'. After three months of wage protraction, workers could not afford to hear the placating words of the foreman. One laborer says, "You know, just keep that money with you. But remember that our families reckon on us." "I have a huge debt to pay *that* I wait until it's dark to go home," Souleiman intervened. The debt here foreshadows the sum paid to the smuggler who will later facilitate their macabre crossing through the 'Barcelona or Die' route which claimed the life of Ms. Diouf's son a few years earlier. The fact that Souleiman waits until it's dark to go home should not escape our attention. The indebted Souleiman is a ghostly figure who remains hidden to escape the daily haunting sight of his lender.

With no prospect of attaining his unpaid three-month wage, Souleiman's decision to take a debt—obviously to pay the smuggler—is a quintessential form of exchanging death for life, by constantly being vigilant to escape the wrath of the debtor and, second, by embarking on the death boat for a better life in Spain. In reality, many returnee migrants in West Africa are subject to daily threats from their debtors. According to a recent study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 68% of returnee migrants are affected by debt in six West African countries, including Senegal. 8% of indebted returnees have been assaulted by their creditors.⁴ A Malian participant in the survey reported that "a gunshot administered by his lender" dismembered his right leg (IOM, 2021). Souleiman's efforts to work to pay back his lender should thus be understood as an attempt to stave off dismemberment and death at the hands of his lender. Taking debt has already impelled Souleiman to exchange his life—or future in Spain—with a body part or, at worst, his death. His efforts to work and pay back his creditor epitomizes what Achille Mbembe fittingly phrased

'work for life', which he defines as "the ability to dissociate oneself from one's own body." As such, as a prerequisite for taking the debt, Souleiman dissociated himself from his own body, or at least part of it to stay alive.

As I mentioned earlier, Souleiman's, as well as his friends', decision to cross the treacherous Atlantic Sea for a better life in Europe is already an exchange with death. However, the tragic drowning of Souleiman and his friends adds a twist to the ghost metaphor in the film. We are no longer confronted with living beings who, in suffering social invisibility in the death-world of postcolonial and post-industrial Senegal, lose control of their own life. The film conjures up the literal ghosts of the dead bodies of Souleiman and his friends. They are ghosts who equally lose control of their own death. As living dead and dead-livings, these 'things' as Derrida calls them represent two forms of spectrality. What the film achieves, then, is nullifying the registers of life and death, considering the two as modes of being in the world, not properties that one possesses as such.

Border Death and the Haunting Authority of the Dead

Mati Diop's *Atlantics* does not exclusively deal with the socio-economic malaise of postcolonial Senegal. It establishes itself as a critique of the EU's deadly border regimes as well. The film denounces the ghostly architecture of border regimes through its *haunting countervisuality*. It takes haunting as a politicized subject to subvert deadly migration policies of the EU, on the one hand, and the ghostly violence of postcolonial Senegal on the other. In deploying literal ghosts in the film, Diop engages with ethical quandaries linked to border death, burial disappearance, identification of dead bodies and search and rescue operations, most of which are hitherto not given due attention in policy debates. As such, by piercing into the postmortem repercussions of bordering practices, the film moves away from the current preoccupation of migration and humanitarian policies with 'the life of the living being' to the ghostly realm of the dead.

As figures of return, the ghosts in the film bring into sharp focus the unsavory underbelly of

migration policies, resurfacing past injustices of border death that remain hidden from public view. We are not allowed a direct visual experience of what actually happened to Souleiman and his friends at sea. Yet, the odyssey of their boat distress and eventual drowning was recounted by a female ghost to Ada in the bar. The bleached eyes of the dead bodies also indicate that these are not just any type of ghosts, but 'nautical ghosts' of people who exchanged their lives with death. The female ghost with Ada notes how 'everyone was shouting desperately' as the boat was sinking. This scene is particularly reminiscent of the life stories of women and children who, desperately shouting for rescue through the hotline of Alarm Phone, haunted the activist Babacar Dallio. We, as the audience, are similarly haunted by the harrowing drowning of Souleiman and his friends. Their return into the world of the living augurs bad and "registers the harm inflicted or the loss sustained by a social violence done in the past or in the present" (Gordon, 1994, p. xvi). As a subversive visual technique, haunting redistribute the sensible of the border spectacle and makes an urgent plea for what Avery Gordon calls, "something-to-be-done" against the deadly migration policies of the EU (ibid., p.xvii).

The deconstructive force of haunting rests in its potential to collapse the borders between the real and the fictional, the visible and the invisible, presence and absence. The way the filmmaker conceptualized the present absence of Senegalese youth, their ghostliness and the deadly regimes of separation enacts a sharp move from ontology to hauntology. The film engages with a hauntology of borders, which should not, all the same, be limited to the study of haunting repercussions of border institutions like the EU as such. What can one glean from such an analysis is that *hauntology is a deconstruction of ontological borders* that the filmmaker redraws in her conception of the death-in-life, present absence, visible invisibility of Senegalese youth.

Indeed, through its plain views and its deployment of first-time actors, the film collapses the borders between the real and fictional as well. The haunting cadavers of dead migrants suddenly run amok in the streets, wreaking vengeful havoc on the



Figure 1 Still: Mati Diop, *Atlantics* (2019).



Figure 2 Still: Mati Diop, *Atlantics* (2019).

properties of Andy, the owner of the Muejiza Tower project. At one moment, the police break into the scene to restore public order and arrest the ghostly rioters. They arrest one female ghost and locked her up in the car. However, when they open the car in the morning, the policemen are puzzled at the disappearance of the dead body of the female ghost.

The spectral agency here manifests itself in the ability to riot and escape the interpellation of local authorities. This incarnates the ability of the dead

bodies to escape “the grip of power and projection in ways that are less readily available to the living” (Balkan, 2019, p.1126). Lost in the bottomless Atlantic Sea and not honored with dignified burials, the cadavers of dead migrants return to rebel against the very forms of dehumanization and domination that pushed them to the edge of necropolitical ungrievability.

The ghosts in the film threaten the corrupt project owner who was behind the protraction of

their wage payments, asking him to come to the cemetery with their money. After checking the sum of money Andi brought, the ghosts ordered him to dig out graves for their burial. At this junction, the authority of the dead body is, as Mbembe notes, both “spectral and palpable” (2003, p.20). The hyper-visibility of the corpses confers authority upon the dead migrants, thus posing a constant threat to the vampirizing exploitation of postcolonial Senegal, while at the same haunting the postpanoptic border regimes that structure their death in the Atlantic Sea. This spectral agency, however, is not exclusively conferred upon the dead. Its incarnation is extended to encompass the living and inanimate objects. The interface of Ada and the turbulent sea that dominates the final scenes of the film firmly enacts this ghostly agency. Erected at the utmost edge of the Atlantic, the tower stands in allegorically as a colossal gravestone for the as yet unburied migrants and their ancestors.⁵ In this way, the rich poetics, or rather necropoetics, of the film makes it difficult to reduce the tower to a synecdoche for labor exploitation. It stands in as a token of commemoration all the same. The final scene featuring Ada barely brought finality to the film. In fact, it is a quintessential form of disjointed temporality that exemplifies Derrida’s spectral agency. Ada states, “Last night was with me to remind me of who I am and show me who I will become. Ada, to whom the future belongs.” This temporal disjuncture invoked by Ada is reminiscent of the ghost as a figure of returned(revenant)—of the dead who passed away—and haunting as a possibility of imminent reappearance(arrivant). The conceptual viability of spectrality for critical border studies lies thus in its capacity to call attention to things that are lost or gone missing under the duress of social and historical practices of marginalization. ■

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Intra-Africa Humanitarianism: A Qualitative Case Study of the Somali Business Community in Zambia

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This paper examines the participation of the Somali business community in Zambia in relief and humanitarian assistance to Somalia during times of emergencies, crisis and disasters. The study examines the unique experiences of the Somalis in Zambia, their connection to Somalia, how they express their urgency in relief provision, their giving practices, how they demonstrate solidarity, and their motivations for sending support. The paper also explores the disaster relief campaigns and assesses the institutions used in sending support, the types of assistance they mobilize, and the modes of communication they employ vis-à-vis the historic and evolutionary origins of the Somali business community in Zambia and their wider implications.

The first group of Somali migrants arrived in Zambia in 1966 as truck drivers, and the other groups of Somalis moved to Zambia due to the political situation in Somalia in the early 1990s and the search for economic opportunities. Many Somalis had ventured into entrepreneurship with businesses like; hotels, oil business, transportation, and mobile money transfer businesses. The respondents interviewed were aged between 36 and 68 years of age from Ndola and Lusaka cities. The interviewees had lived in Zambia between 10 and 38 years and they had a strong connection with Somalia with frequent visits to Somalia. The majority (8) of the respondents interviewed were women.

Somalis in Zambia are instrumental in sending humanitarian assistance to communities and families affected by emergencies in Somalia. Remittances and cash transfers were identified to be the main contribution to Somalia. The Somalis in Zambia use informal channels in sending money because of the low cost, although they have more recently embraced other fundraising digital

technologies such as crowdfunding platforms like go fund and just giving. They also use social media outlets to communicate and access information on Somalia such as WhatsApp groups, Paltalk groups and Facebook. Further still, it was discovered that Somali women have been actively engaged in doing business despite the social and cultural barriers.

The study found that the motivation to give is driven by religious and social factors. Female migrants interviewed cited marriage reasons and the search for economic opportunities as the main factors that inspired them to move to Zambia. The findings from this study could help the Zambian government in documenting revenue mobilization within the Somali communities. The Somali government, specifically the government of Puntland, could use this connection to promote business opportunities.

2. BACKGROUND

Ever since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Somalia has experienced a series of humanitarian emergencies ranging from conflicts instigated by armed groups, conflicts by clan militias, famine, and drought (DEMAC, 2021). These factors have driven many Somalis out of Somalia. The United Nations (2015) on Somalia Migration Routes in the East and Horn of Africa, cited by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, asserts that there are over 2 million Somalis living outside Somalia. The main countries of destination include; Kenya, Ethiopia and followed by other African countries. Outside of the Africa, Europe comes first (14.01%), then Asia (13.16%) and North America (8.25%) (MGSoG, 2017).

Zambia is one of the African countries hosting Somali communities. Though there is no official

data on the number of Somalis in Zambia, it is estimated there are over 5000 Somalis specifically in the cities of Lusaka and Ndola. The Somalis in Zambia are involved in business and trade, the transportation sector, hotels, restaurants, and the oil and gas sector. The Somali community in Zambia was selected because of the growing number of Somalis in the country as well as the strong historical ties and current ties it has with Puntland. These ties include cultural, religious/spiritual, business, development and also humanitarian ties.

There is increasing recognition of the role that the Somali diaspora plays in responding to humanitarian crises (Kleist 2008, Horst 2008, Hammond 2011, et al.). Different authors have approached this from different angles and provided insights into how diaspora humanitarianism functions. A significant contribution has been an increased understanding of Somali diaspora humanitarianism in complex crises and why people give to the cause. Horst (2008) focused on the neglected role of assistance provided by refugees within the framework of international aid practices in long-term refugee camps. The author's main argument is that refugees need to be acknowledged as both assistance receivers and as providers of aid, balancing the power dimensions implicit in the act of giving. The Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) is currently making attempts to harness the benefits of the diaspora community in relief extension and economic development of Somalia. The Federal Government has established the department of Diaspora Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal specifically with diaspora engagement. However, an institutional framework to integrate Somali diasporas into a wider national development process does not exist.

The inclusion of Somali diaspora communities in humanitarian relief support has received wide coverage and attention in the last 20 years (Kleist 2008, Horst 2008, Hammond, 2011, et al.). The diaspora in Africa have received little focus. Despite the enormous contributions of these Somali diaspora communities in humanitarian assistance, the potential of this group is yet to be explored sufficiently. In sub-Saharan African countries, data on the scale of Somali diaspora humanitarianism

within the African continent is still inadequate. It is, however, broadly acknowledged in Somali society, based on the increasing visibility of businesspeople in the diaspora, that there has been a steady increase in their involvement in the past few years, particularly during disasters and crises. This increase marks a new phase of diaspora engagement in Somalia. Remittances sent by this group as well as by the globally dispersed Somali diaspora continue to provide vital support to families in Somalia.

Much of the history of Somali migration in Africa has been told through the lens of refugees whose experiences are driven by civil war and challenging economic conditions, such as drought and famine (Bakewell, 2016). However, Somali mobility in Africa is shaped not only by both regional crises but by opportunities (Iazzolino & Hersi, 2019). To date, there has been inadequate empirical research conducted on the migration patterns of Somalis on the African continent and the entrepreneurship of Somali business migrants in Zambia. Given this, this research seeks to respond to this lack of knowledge and understanding of the migration and entrepreneurship models of Somali migrants in Zambia.

Why Zambia?

I selected Zambia because it was among the first African countries to host Somalis in 1966. This group further invited their families. This group was followed by other Somalis in the early 1990s that moved out as a result of the Somali civil war and the government breakdown. This increasing number of Somalis in Zambia and their contribution to Somalia through humanitarian assistance, are another reason why Zambia was selected. The existing business links between the Somalis in Zambia and those in Somalia create interest to explore the motivation to understand this relationship.

Zambia stands out from other Somali migrant hosting countries in Southern African, for instance in South Africa. Somali communities in Zambia were established in the country as early as the mid-1960s. Some came there as expatriate drivers



Map Nr 1: Map of Zambia showing the towns where Somalis first settled

to work in Zambia, as came as political dissidents who fled the country under the Mohammed Siyad Barre regime because their lives were in danger. Both groups settled there and began a business enterprise that spanned from transport to oil and gas, real estate, to retail businesses and so on and so forth. Somalis in South Africa are a new community which was established in post-apartheid South Africa when the country embraced democracy in 1994 and Somalia's state collapsed in 1991. Notwithstanding, the Somali business communities in South Africa has also attracted scholarly attention see for example others, Omeje and Mwangi (2014), Tengeh (2016), Thompson (2016).

2. METHODS AND MATERIALS

The study adopted a qualitative case study approach as it aimed at exploring the in-depth understanding of respondents on their role in humanitarian assistance extension to communities in Somalia affected by emergencies and disasters. The study used descriptive data as it would respond to their

natural setting (Yin (2017)). The primary data was collected over three months from 19th March 2021 to 30th May 2021. The study embraced Key Informant Interviews, Focused Group Discussions (FGDs), field observations, and archival data. The researcher interviewed ten key respondents selected through snowball sampling in Lusaka and Ndola towns in Zambia.

The respondents included company owners and business owners. Snowballing was used as the respondents would lead the research to other respondents with the required information needed for the study. Focus group discussions targeted business owners, businesswomen, and women's groups were involved in the study. Selective snowballing was used because this type of sampling was found to be conducive to this study of this kind, which involves social networks and transnational practices across communities. The study used different entry points to create snowballs, obtaining diverse viewpoints. The respondents included senior Somalis some of whom have lived and worked in Zambia for over 50 years.

Participant	Gender	Age	Marital Status	Education	Residence	Length of Stay (Years)	Send assistance to Somalia	Send assistance alone, in groups or both	Send info on how to mitigate disasters to people in Somalia	Frequency of sending humanitarian assistance	Institutions used to send money to Somalia	Do you travel to Somalia	Frequency of travelling to Somalia
1	Female	38	Married	Secondary School	Lusaka	30	Yes	Both	Yes	More than 20 times	Remittance Institutions such as Taji	Yes	1 go once every few years
2	Female	51	Married	Secondary school	Lusaka	30	Yes	Group	Yes	More than 20 times	Remittance Institutions such as Taji	Yes	1 go once every few years
3	Male	29	Single	Diploma	Ndola	10	Yes	Both	Yes	10 times	World Remit	Yes	Every year
4	Male	40	Married	Diploma	Ndola	15	Yes	Both	Yes	10 times	Banks	Yes	Every year
5	Male	36	Married	University	Ndola	36	Yes	Alone	Yes	11 to 20 times	Banks	Yes	Twice a year
6	Male	34	Single	University	Ndola	34	Yes	Alone	Yes	11 to 20 times	Banks	Yes	Twice a year
7	Female	60	Widow	Primary School	Lusaka	38	Yes	Both	Yes	5 to 10 times	Remittance Institutions such as Taji	Yes	Every year
8	Female	63	Married	Secondary School	Lusaka	38	Yes	Both	Yes	5 to 10 times	Remittance Institutions such as Taji	Yes	Every year
9	Female	57	Widow	Primary School	Lusaka	30	Yes	Both	Yes	5 to 10 times	Remittance Institutions such as Annual	Yes	Every year
10	Female	61	Married	Primary School	Lusaka	27	Yes	Group	Yes	5 to 10 times	Remittance Institutions such as Annual	Yes	Every year

Table 1: Sample Characteristics Key Informant Interviews

Since 2020, the researcher has been observing the interaction between the Somalis in Zambia and those in Somalia and other parts of the world on social media and through online forums to assess how advocacy and resource mobilization for disaster relief is initiated. The analysis categorized data to classify, summarize and tabulate it into themes guided by the research objectives.

The locations in Zambia were selected due to the following reasons. Ndola was selected because it is the first town in Zambia where the first Somalis who arrived resided, particularly in a place called in Somali ‘*Gotka*’, meaning ‘the deep hole’ just on the outskirts of the town. Ndola is a city located in the Copperbelt Province of Zambia and the place where most Somalis drivers worked. On the other hand, Lusaka was selected because it is the Zambian capital with many business opportunities. As the Somalis increased in number and a good number moved to Lusaka and eventually to many other places in Zambia. In these towns, the historical presence of the Somalis in Ndola can be seen and felt. Some of the oldest elderly Somalis live in this city, and some of the garages and houses they bought to live and work, and the trucks they used then, still exist.

3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS

Characteristics of the respondents

To explore the opinions of participants, the researcher engaged 10 participants (6 female and

4 male). While selecting these participants, the researcher considered gender, age, location, and the length of their stay in Zambia. Almost all the participants interviewed were born in Somalia. Six of the participants interviewed were married, 2 participants were single, and 2 participants were widowed. As far as the age of respondents is concerned, the youngest participant was aged 29, while the eldest was aged 61. The majority of the participants involved in this study were in the 36-to-40 age group. The researcher involved participants from two major cities namely; Ndola and Lusaka. These two cities were identified as the main areas of residence of the participants and also the first locations where the Somalis settled when they first came there in the 1966.

4 of the 10 participants involved were from Ndola, while 6 participants were selected from Lusaka. Three participants involved in the study had primary education, 2 participants had a diploma, and another 2 participants had a university bachelor’s degree. In terms of education, this section explored the level of education attained by the participants. The highly skilled and educated and the less educated Somalis make significant contributions to their motherland Somalia. Nine of the respondents involved in the study were born in Somalia and the findings further discovered that the participants had lived in Zambia for over 10 years and other participants had lived for over 30 years. The participants also revealed that they visit Somalia at least once a year to meet their family members.

The Somalis in Zambia – Who are they and why did they come to Zambia?

The Somalis businesspeople who took part in the study revealed how they entered Zambia and the activities they conducted that led to their business success as well as the connections they have with Somalia. One respondent revealed “I came to Zambia in 1970 to look for a job as a driver at OHAN Transport Company. Later my wife and children joined me. “I have been here ever since, but I do travel regularly to the *wadankiii* (homeland).”

Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, and since the country was landlocked, it needed help in building the nation. The Zambian infrastructure at the time was very bad and the roads were dangerous to the extent that they were called “the Hell Run”.¹ The government of Italy responded to the plea for assistance with the delivery of Fiat trucks which were then driven by the Somali drivers. In a focus group discussion with some of the first members of the group of Somalis who arrived in Zambia in 1966, it was revealed that the government of Somalia sent 66 Somali truck drivers to support the Zambian government with road and other infrastructure development.

They further revealed that at first only Somali men were sent, but that they later brought their wives, families, and relatives to Zambia. The group shared that the first group of Somalis settled in Ndola town in the Copperbelt province and later in Lusaka, and then later moved to many other towns in Zambia for residence but also to grow their businesses (Marchand, 2017). These Somali long-haulage drivers facilitated the transportation of copper and petroleum oils between Zambia and the Congo. They came to Zambia to work as expatriate truck drivers within a partnership agreement between the Somali government led by late President Sharmarke and the Zambian government led by late President Dr. Kenneth Kaunda. They thereby contributed to the economic development of Zambia (Simbeye, 2020). Further still, all of the original 66 truck drivers sent to Zambia in 1966 originated from Puntland, and the majority of the Somalis in Zambia continue to be ethnically from Puntland (Herero Universal TV, Video, 2018).

Somali women have also migrated across international borders independently in search of economic opportunities; the majority of women involved in this study were married and were either invited by their spouses to join them or directly migrated and joined by their husbands. Most of the women are employed and were connected to Somalia by sending goods and financial remittances for development and for humanitarian assistance. Somalis mostly visit Somalia to reconnect and socialize with their families and friends; others go for holiday and pleasure purposes, yet others travel for business or investment purposes.

The respondents revealed that the majority of Somalis in Zambia left Somalia because of economic factors such as the search for employment or business opportunities; other respondents cited marriage as the main reason their driver for moving to Zambia. The respondents involved in key informant interviews revealed that entrepreneurship and investment were the main occupations. Somalis in Zambia are very open to investment as revealed in the key informant interviews as well as in the focus group discussions. One of the respondents explained, “I believe that business is one of the best ways to get out of poverty”.

Somali businesspeople in Zambia use their experiences in doing business as qualifications, and this is a useful source of information that others could use upon arriving in Zambia to do business. However, this wealth of knowledge is not harnessed nor documented. In the focused group discussion, it was further revealed that Somalis in Zambia see themselves as different from other migrant groups who are living in Zambia because they came there as expatriate drivers and not as refugees. This was evidenced also by several responses from also the key informants who revealed that there has always been a good diplomatic relationship between Zambia and Somalia, and this had started in the early 1970s. Somalis take pride in the fact they helped build the country of Zambia at a time when its people needed that help. Furthermore, the Somalis also speak proudly of the diplomatic relations that later developed between President Kaunda and Somalia.²

These diplomatic relations later resulted in President Kaunda visiting Somalia in Mogadishu in the 1970s when Somalia hosted the continental meeting for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the Somali government providing training programs to the Zambian military in the 1970s. The Somali business community whom this study interviewed, speak passionately about these historical events which are archived by both Zambia media and the national archives. They believe that they were the steppingstones that led to the current good diplomatic relations between Somalia and Zambia. These good relations manifest in various ways and every now and then a Somali delegation visits Zambia. Sometimes it is the other way around whereby a Zambian delegation visits Somalia, the most recent one in Hargeisa in 2015.

In July of 2018, the former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire visited Zambia to take part in a Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) meeting which was held in the capital Lusaka. This happened after Somalia became the 21st member to be admitted to COMESA. At the summit, final rites were performed under the heading “What Somalia brings”, and the former Prime Minister added final signatures to the accession documents. After this formal attendance, and as a part of his tour, he visited the Somali community and gave a long speech to the Somali community in Zambia about the importance of Somalia’s participation in this trade agreement.

In 2020, a new female Somali Ambassador to Zambia was announced, and the Somali community in Zambia single-handedly renovated the entire Somali embassy with their funds and resources. In terms of their legal stay and legal status, thousands of Somalis have taken up Zambian citizenship either by birth or by naturalization. Everyday civic and diaspora humanitarianism is being strengthened as part of long-established practices where compassion, social obligations, and religion may play central roles such as assisting others in need. These practices of giving are passed down from generation to generation in Somalia. Some Somalis came on their own to Zambia from Somalia to do business as investors,

others came from the diaspora such as from the UK, Canada, and the US.

One of the objectives of this study is to explore the precise nature of the Somali business community in Zambia being a long-term group of diaspora people. This is an interesting contrast to refugees who arrived in Zambia in the early 1990s as a result of the civil war. Both groups have established profitable businesses and both are well-integrated into Zambia society, owning mosques, schools, and land, and running diverse businesses such as in the transport sector but also in oil and gas, in real estate and in hotels and restaurants.

Zambia relied on private companies and operators for its road construction projects some of which were owned by the Italian Fiat Company. This was the same company that recruited the Somali drivers from Somalia with the support of President Sharmarke and Minister Yassin Nuur Hassan of Home Affairs. Minister Yassin would later flee from Somalia as political dissident and settle first in Saudi Arabia and later in Zambia as a business owner.

The first transportation company to be set up in Zambia was called I. Nahar Transport Company in 1967 and it belonged to a Mr. Ismail Nahar. Later other companies such as OHAN transport Company, accrued from the names of Mr. Osman Haji Hassan, an MP in the Somali government at the time, and Mr. Abdirahman Nuur Hassan, the brother to Minister Yassin, would be established. One of the respondents said that “I am one of the 66 drivers whom the Somali government sent to Zambia in March of 1966. We didn’t have hotels or anything. We slept in our trucks, and there were many mosquitos everywhere. Some of the men I came with died on those treacherous roads while on duty. I now live in Kismayo, and I am a businessman here.” The Somali business community in Zambia also actively contributes to humanitarian and other social problems faced by the indigenous Zambians. For example, they provided support when cholera broke out in the country and in 2020 when COVID-19 affected its prisons.³

Who is a diaspora and who is not?

Very little research has been conducted to shed light on African diaspora formation within the African continent. The term “diaspora” is disputed. Bakewell (2016), among others, ushers in new and critical thinking about African diaspora and asks are there diasporas in Africa and why have they not been studied enough? Bakewell and Binaisa (2016) studied diaspora practices and relationships and their identification with people, places, and networks on the African continent. They argue that the African diaspora has not been fully studied because this term has not been applied to them. Despite the longstanding patterns of mobility across Africa, relatively few migrant groups have established a diasporic identity that persists into 2nd or 3rd generations. This raises many questions about identifying the formation and the relations between migrants and ‘host’ societies. Diaspora, they argue, should be seen as a ‘social form of groups characterized by their relationship-despite-dispersal, and not as a ‘type of consciousness’ or ‘mode of cultural production’ as others have.

For the term diaspora to not to lose its analytical and descriptive value, it needs to be reserved for certain people with distinctive relationships with each other and a homeland. But the reality is that, often times ‘diaspora’ refers to Somalis living in the West and not to the thousands of Somali refugees in neighboring countries. In Somalia the word “diaspora” brings with it great expectations of the transfers of skills and resources from the West for the reconstruction of the country, Kleist (2007).

Africa is portrayed as a continent of people on the move (de Bruijn et al. 2001). There is a danger in looking for diasporas within Africa because we may ‘invent’ diasporas by naming them, e.g the colonial invention of tribes. Cohen (1997) proposes a mainstream definition for the diaspora, arguing that it comprises a strong ethnic community settled away from their home country, with mutual interest, concern, and a collective memory toward a home country. Another view of diasporas comes from Bostrom et al. (2017), who describes diaspora as a range of “transnational communities.” At its


most basic, ‘diaspora’ is said to refer to people operating across or outside national boundaries.

Brubaker (2000) studied how the term diaspora has expanded since the late 1980s to imply concepts such as excluded, dispersal, and uprootedness. Studying the diaspora can help in their social construction. The mobility and migration within the African continent have been studied through the lens of refugees whose experiences are documented through the years of civil wars in difficult economic conditions, drought, and famine. Somali migrants have been labeled a “conflict-generated diaspora” (Bakewell & Binaisa, 2016).

Intra-African migration involves the surge in migration within the continent, with around 19 million moving between the African countries. The surge in the movement is contributed by efforts to enhance regional integration. The African Union defines African diaspora as any people of African origin living outside the continent irrespective of their citizenship and nationality. Still, these people remain willing to contribute to the development of the African continent and the countries of origin. The concept is the movement of the Africans and their descendants to the world in modern and pre-modern periods.

Can the Somalis in Zambia be considered a diaspora group? Do these communities describe themselves as such? In this case, the boundaries are those of Somalia, and the diaspora includes ethnic Somalis and members of Somali society living or operating in other countries. One feature of the Somali diaspora is that many of its people return to Somalia, whether occasionally or regularly, to visit, do business, participate in local politics, or invest their time and expertise in relief and development (Hammond et al., 2011).

It is important to consider local definition and perception. The Somalis in Zambia don’t define themselves as the diaspora. Halima Mohamoud summed it up: “We are not diaspora, we are Africans in Africa, we belong here.” The Somali community in Zambia attaches meaning to belonging for example distance and geography were



Map Nr 2: Map of Somalia showing Puntland State of Somalia

mentioned as defining belonging. For example, it was mentioned that Somalia is in Africa and also is not far away from Zambia compared to Western countries. This geographic distance has implications for the level of social distance and attachment with the Zambian community and with Africa in general. But who is to define such concepts as diaspora, humanitarianism, and aid? What does it mean to conceptualize them and what are the implications of naming some groups? These questions are important for this research because this study hopes to contribute to our understanding of the Somali business community who fall under the so-called group of 'diaspora' in Africa as aid providers. From an academic point of view, this group is considered to be diaspora because of the descriptions from several descriptions by other researchers. The majority of the Somalis just migrated from Somalia to Zambia they have no proper documentation and have a strong connection with their mother country.

Adamson (2019) also studied how migration states of the Global South manage cross-border migration. She uses a comparative framework to analyze how states differ on balances of power

and how they monitor migrants for example the Somali/Ethiopian communities in London. She poses four alternatives; the neoliberal migration policy, the nationalizing migration policy, the developmental state migration policy and the transnational authoritarianism policy. The nationalizing migration policy could apply to this study because many Somalis have not yet been documented by the Zambian government despite their increasing number in the country. Documenting Somalis especially those who have stayed there for a long time could assist in proper monitoring of their business activities.

Studying Somali humanitarian giving through Somali vernacular

Recent scholarship has also highlighted the ambiguity of the term 'humanitarianism'. Davies (2018: 15) argues that there is no general definition for the term humanitarianism and that there is not only one humanitarianism but 'multiple humanitarianisms'. The mainstream definition of the word 'humanitarian' is an action that is intended to "save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-

made crises and disasters caused by natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur”, (Donini, 2010, cited by Davies, 2018). Humanitarian action is governed by key globally accepted humanitarian principles such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. However, the concept is not only driven by war or conflict but also by disaster-stricken conditions, it also predates war and conflict and has been existing in the life of pre-colonial Africa (Davies, 2018).

Even though Davies’s theorization comes close, it does not fully explain why Somalis help those they don’t know. What other modes can we then use to explain phenomena instead of relaying only on existing western theories? Normative social science approaches lack a culturally appropriate and realistic interpretation of African reality and researchers who use them do not take into consideration the historical, social, or contemporary experiences of African people. Somali vernacular humanitarianism could serve the purpose of a non-western research approach and a basic mode of explaining the Somali phenomenon.

To understand Somali diaspora humanitarianism better, one needs to first understand the Somali vernacular of giving and humanitarianism. In the Somali culture, giving and providing humanitarian assistance precedes the civil war and has its roots in pastoralism and the nomadic way of life, in the Somali culture and in the Hadith. Pastoralist families travel carrying very little or no food or drinks for days as they navigate through challenging environments in search of pasture and water for their livestock. They depend on the brotherly giving of the villages they pass through. This act of hospitality and of giving to one another lays in the long and tradition of helping one another and of providing mutual aid. It is deep interwoven with the culture and the Islamic way of living.

From a cultural perspective, analysis can be sought in, for example, Somali oral literature. Some of the traditional coping mechanisms for crisis response includes helping one another. As such, there are many words, phrases, and proverbs (maahmaah) that describe relations and practices of giving and

receiving aid between communities in Somalia. These oral traditions are passed on from generation to generation and are kept alive by the hundreds of Somali proverbs, poems, and songs narrated and sung by Somalis worldwide, making Somalia gain the international title of ‘the Nation of Poets’.

According to the Qaamuuska Af-Soomaaliga or the Dictionary of the Somali Language written by Professor Cabdalla Cumar Mansuur in 2012, these cultural expressions reference mutual aid, sharing and generosity, through concepts like *abaa* (indebtedness), *wadaagid* (sharing/reciprocity), *martisoor* (hospitality) and *faxalnimo* (selflessness). Take for example the word *tooling* which describes milk that has been collected from neighbors and meant to be given to a family whose livestock isn’t producing sufficient milk. The word *irmansi* means to lend a lactating camel to a family whose animals are not producing milk at all.

More evidence of this can also be read in history and literature books such as in Nuruddin Farah’s 1993 book *Gifts* whereby a young lady called Yussur tries to share her resentment against portraying western aid as a “gift” to a European aid worker. These two famous Somali proverbs explain why giving and helping each other is important for the Somalis *Iskaashato ma kufto* – If people support each other, they do not fall; and *Gacmo is dhaafaa gacalo ka timaaddaa* – Love emerges when hands give something to each other.

In another book, *Maps*, Nuruddin further goes on to discuss the moral and political implications of gift-giving, arguing that gift-giving from the western world is meant to help affluent countries to incorporate the poorer countries into their sphere or to construct the identities of the impoverished nations. Set in modern-day Somalia, these novels are about how the West treats poor nations like Somalia and other countries that have no choice in transactions that are decided solely by Western NGOs when it comes to the borders between state and non-state support. It’s a cultural definition of what a gift is, or is it a gift or something else, like a lifetime commitment to a benefactor. The institutionalization of how Somali humanitarian principles are organized can generate a basis for

methodological approaches that are rooted in Somali people's realities.

Somali resource mobilization collections are built around cultural and moral values such as reciprocity, and kinship but also faith. Faith plays an important role in giving among Somalis as most of these transnational practices of giving between the Somalis in Somalia and the Somalis in Zambia are embedded not only in these traditions but also in the Hadith. The majority of Somalis are said to be Muslims and they believe in the prophet Mohamed and practice the Hadith which is a record of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims refer to the Hadith as a major source of law and moral guidance, second to the authority of the holy Qurān. The Quran and Hadith repeatedly emphasize the importance of giving sadaqah regularly. Muslims are obliged to give Sadaqah, or voluntary charity, which is a selfless act of one's gratitude to the Creator and an investment in this life and the hereafter. Respondents cited the following example 'Give the sadaqah without delay, for it stands in the way of calamity.'

Experiences in Zambia and connection to Puntland

"I am not at home, but I am also not away from it". A respondent revealed. This is because technology and society have become extremely interlinked. Access to information between people who are far away from each other is not difficult to find. One does not need to physically be somewhere to access information or to be informed about something. Technology allows people to interact beyond the boundaries of location and identities. Somali diaspora advocacy and resource mobilization efforts as practiced by Somalis in Zambia, as elsewhere in the world, is both old and modern, creatively blending centuries-old traditions with current information and technologies.

Social networks exist at various levels, making it easy for Somalis to stay updated about developments in Somalia and to take part in sending humanitarian relief support. Even though they are far away from their home country, they continue to find belonging by joining and participating in the activities of hometown

associations which provide instant access to information, solidarity, protection, culture, value, and ethnic orientation. They show great interest in following events as they unfold in their country of birth. One of the respondents from the group discussions explained, "I am in various social media groups. There is one for my family but also one for affairs about Puntland and then I am also in another general group about Somali affairs. So, I am not at home, but I am also not away from it because I am connected to all the news bringers." They receive information from Somalia immediately because there are members in these groups who reside in Somalia and who report issues as they occur with pictures and videos.

These Whatsapp groups foster new ways of connecting local dynamics and translocal practices, they shape relationships built on trust and sophisticated forms of kinship mobilization. Men and women have different WhatsApp groups and they each mobilize resources differently. For example, business owners prefer to bring over young Somali male relatives from their villages and towns in Somalia and offer them employment as drivers upon arrival in Zambia. These drivers then eventually started their businesses after some time. They would go home to find a marriage partner and later have them brought over to be an establishing family. Somali business owners maintain transnational ties to Somalia through investment as well. Some of them are shareholders of the newly constructed Garacad seaport in the Mudug region of Puntland, and others own greenhouse farm estates in Somalia.

Social media has decreased inequalities of access to socio-technical infrastructure as we are seeing more women, and youth from all clan backgrounds fundraising for a cause. Even Islamic sheiks are TikTok live and Facebook preaching while also mobilizing support. The evolution of Somali (diaspora) humanitarianism has changed over the decades especially with the emergency of the internet that provides real time information to the Somalis the diaspora. The emergency of swift transfer methods also facilitates the process of cash transfers.

Type of assistance mobilized, channeled, and delivered to Puntland

The respondents revealed that they face challenges in mobilizing resources and delivering the mobilized resources to Somalia from Zambia. Among the challenges encountered include; High transaction costs, delays in delivery, and unreliability of methods were mentioned. Lack of trust and difficulties regarding fundraising and sustainability of initiatives in the long-term was also cited, as well as limitations caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and economic hardship. Furthermore, Somalis like many other migrant groups, are subjected to arrests, brutality, and imprisonment.

The respondents revealed that they send relief assistance to Somalia in different forms when disasters occurred. Participants revealed that they helped their families and communities in Somalia by sending financial help, while others sent goods and supplies, technical assistance, or services. Of the 10 respondents interviewed eight revealed that they assisted their families and communities in Somalia by sending them money and only 2 participants supported their communities by providing technical assistance or services. Somalis in Zambia have long-established practices where compassion, social obligations, and religion play central roles. In 2012, the Somali community sent police uniforms to Galkayo. They also took part in supporting Zambians in times of hardship.

The respondents revealed that they sent relief assistance through their families, and community groups. Six of the participants interviewed revealed that they sent their help either individually or as a group. It was also discovered that the Somalis in Zambia play a significant role in providing valuable information to their communities on how to mitigate emergencies and disasters. Some participants revealed that they engaged experts who guided them on the best course of action for the disasters experienced. The Somali business community in Zambia gets information about humanitarian disasters and other crises in several ways. Some use their Facebook pages, others use Somali websites and TVs, while others share information in WhatsApp or Paltalk groups.

Visits to the home country are one of the major manifestations of the transnational linkages maintained by the Somali diaspora in Zambia. Migrants who have strong links with their home country are more likely to visit their home country more frequently than those whose ties with the home country are weaker.

The respondents in both the individual key informant interviews and in the focus group discussion revealed that they frequently visit Somalia at least once a year. Somalis have many transnational hubs globally. There are strong connections with civic groups that are more accessible. Somalis in Zambia are transnational communities, and as such, they connect across transnational linkages. After their arrival, Somalis brought their families and relatives over to look after their businesses. Young Somalis came to Zambia in search of employment. After several years, these youth started their businesses and established families in Zambia.

The remittances sent home to their families and relatives help the families left behind with education, livelihood, food, housing, and health access. Somali businesspeople in Zambia are also connected to Somalia, and they have initiated business in both countries. The Somali government invites them to participate in investment meetings, for example, the Puntland Investment Forum. They own investments in Somalia, e.g., Garacad. A Facebook page called “Reer (family) Zambia” has over 600 Somali members.

Though the respondents revealed that they send cash speedily and efficiently, they are hampered by prohibitive transaction costs. As a result of the above prohibitive transactions, the Somalia diaspora in Zambia transfers remittances to Somalia mainly through informal channels. They send cash through friends. The informal channels have lower costs of transactions. Suggestions have been made for the Central Bank of Somali to mandate the establishment of diaspora desks within the local banks to handle diaspora financial remittances at lower cost and without delays to the end-users however that hasn't happened. The primary reason for remitting is to provide financial support to family and friends, personal investments,

and personal obligations. A good number of respondents revealed that they send contributions to the community and social development through faith-based organizations and mosques.

The motivation to give and frequency of giving in the last 20 years

The participants revealed that they give because they have been able to establish businesses to sustain their livelihoods as emphasized by a respondent “I believe that business is one of the best ways to get out of poverty.” The experiences of the Somali diaspora in Zambia are important in understanding not only their connectedness to Somalia but also the challenges they face in sending support. Out of the 10 respondents interviewed, 6 revealed that they send assistance back home because they felt compassion for the needs of their fellow community members. 4 participants were motivated to motivated by family relationships, community solidarity, and religious obligation.

4 participants revealed that they had sent assistance five to ten times in the last 20 years. Another 4 said that they had sent assistance more than 20 times, and two respondents revealed that they had sent assistance between 11 and 20 times, in the last 20 years. The assistance sent by the Somali diaspora has helped victims affected by floods, drought, and hunger. Four respondents revealed that they assisted communities affected by pests and diseases, and 2 participants revealed that they assisted families affected by terrorism and the COVID-19 pandemic. Seven of the participants used Somali remittance institutions to send assistance to Somalia, whereas three of the participants used banks. Remittance institutions were, therefore, the most common means of sending assistance. Several Somali social customs bind Somalis to each other. Others mentioned the 2017 Zobe Mogadishu attack but also mobilizing for COVID-19 materials.

Understanding Gender in Somali diaspora humanitarianism: Somali businesswomen in Zambia

Feminist research has highlighted the possible effects of migration on changing gender relations,

increasing women’s power and status, and creating conflicts within transnational households (Wong, 2006). However, it is generally recognized that economic migration improves the socio-economic status of women, which can have notable impacts on countries of origin (Bachan, 2018). The feminist scholarship aims to produce knowledge and contribute to transforming societies (Acker, 1989). In this case, it seeks to empower Somali migrant women by recognizing the increases in their responsibility. This study aims to expand on the need for further research and to expand knowledge of the role that gender plays in Somali diaspora humanitarian support to the home region of Puntland. The study is expected to reveal the connection between humanitarianism and connectedness and business decisions and the role of Somali women’s diaspora migration in Africa. Gender relations undergo negotiations in migration, and it can provide an opportunity for women to pursue new roles and challenge subordinate duties, Schaffer (2013).

Gender roles are changing, and more and more Somali women are taking part in businesses, including types of ventures which previously were dominated by men. One reason for these changing cultural roles is the civil war in Somalia, “and the consequent socio-demographic changes impelled by life in the Diaspora have significantly contributed to shifting gender roles.” The war destroyed the old cultural roles and traditional patterns because many men have to fight and are away from their families and some have died, leaving women in widowhood. They have to take care of their families now and be the breadwinner. These women have had to adopt new gender roles to survive hence killing the idea that only the man has the responsibility of providing for his family.

However, these gender roles can still be challenging for Somali women. The fact that married Somali businesswomen cannot travel a big distance or abroad by themselves for business trips but that they have to be accompanied by their spouse or a close relative is an example of a major constraint for Somali businesswomen. On the other hand, there are also positive developments when it comes to women. Female children in the Somali refugee

community in Nairobi are increasingly getting higher education opportunities, while male children are encouraged to take part or start their businesses early, without having the opportunity to get a higher education. But this does still reflect the idea that the man should take care of an income, giving the woman time to get an education.

The inclusion of businesswomen is important because it helps us understand diaspora humanitarianism. The role of businesswomen in developing their home regions and providing humanitarian support is especially significant for the Zambia case because Somali women in Zambia own big and medium-size businesses and companies. These women own trucks, shops, gas stations, restaurants, taxi companies, milling factories, clearance companies, etc. They frequently travel to Somalia and Arab countries to do business and buy merchandise that they sell in Zambia. The women have formed a strong community using social media and advocate for Puntland support.

The lack of knowledge of gender issues can contribute to a lack of sensitivity, understanding, and awareness about gender (in)equality in a Somali context. The available literature on humanitarianism shows that little research has been done on gender and intra-African migration and that more in-depth and careful research is essential. It is critical to understand further the complexities and importance of gender in discussing and addressing humanitarian efforts. Another gap in this literature concerns how gender and women negotiate their positions as diaspora, connectors, and remitters.

4. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND IMPLICATIONS

The results of this study validated the results of previous research on the impact of the Somali diaspora population and offer insight into how the community operates and sustains itself today. Hammond (2010), Horst (2017), and Lindley (2009) indicate that Somalis view assistance to those in need as an absolute responsibility of the individual as a member of a larger family, clan, community, or umma. The obligation to give is

seen as a religious and cultural obligation to assist those who are struck by crisis and contribute to the livelihoods of one's close relatives.

The study also highlighted the digital tools and technology that contemporary Somalis use to build and maintain the sense of community that drives the continued participation and support of Somalia emigrés. The technology used includes; Facebook pages, Somali websites, and TVs, while others shared the information Via Paltalk or in their WhatsApp groups. It was revealed that all the participants in the study have in one way or the other supported victims of floods, drought and hunger, pests and diseases, terrorism, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The majority of the participants sent assistance because they were compassionate towards the needs of their fellow community members. Others were motivated by family relationships, solidarity, and religious obligation. The digital connections are essential to keeping participants informed and engaged with what's happening back in Somalia and providing support as needed.

The diaspora of developing countries can be a powerful developmental force for their countries of origin through remittances and, importantly, by promoting trade, investment, research, innovation, and knowledge and technology transfer. The Somali migrant population in Zambia largely comprises first-generation migrants who lived in Zambia as expatriate drivers in the mid-1960s and their descendants. Some came there as refugees following the civil war in Somalia in the 1990s. The Somali population is the second-largest migrant community in Zambia. Previous studies have investigated these diasporas as new actors who can mobilize and deliver faster, as well as the types of support they provide and motivations for doing so. There is also more known about the hardships they face as they send support and the difficulties of earning a decent living as asylum seekers in the West (Hammond 2011).

Research studies on diaspora humanitarianism have contributed to a better understanding of the motivations to give by the diaspora. For example, Hammond (2010), Horst (2017), and Lindley

(2009) all indicate that Somalis view assistance to those in need as an absolute responsibility of the individual as a member of a larger whole, whether this is the family, clan, community, or umma. The obligation to give is seen as a religious and cultural obligation to assist those who are struck by crisis and contribute to the livelihoods of one's close relatives. The support helps them feel that they play an important role in the family and community at large. The participants revealed that the remitters face such great pressures that they often incur great debts to fulfill all their demands. Failure to remit leads to social pressure as expressed by Lindley (2009). Similarly, the use of funds is another source of conflict between the two groups.

Carling (2008) explored why migrants connect to their non-migrant social circles not through a mere feeling of guilt but rather through repaying the gift of commonality as a central moral framework. The article further argues that remittances sent by the diaspora cannot be used for development as the social function and rules of obligations surrounding them do not permit them to be used outside livelihoods and basic needs. Any attempts to divert the support to development initiatives will attract the requirement of the diaspora to remit extra financial support, which the senders cannot meet as they are already overstretched. The action was particularly an interesting line of inquiry for this study and involved examining the diaspora's social and moral rules around the assistance. We noted that the context of the Somali diaspora in Africa is noticeably lacking in previous studies and not widely reported. In this study, we also observed that there is minimal identification of various diasporic communities within the African continent, and few discussions about their gendered contributions to their home countries, as in the case of Somalis in Zambia. ■

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Endnotes

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- 2 Interviews with both key respondents and focus group discussion participants
- 3 <https://tinyurl.com/3k34jcne>, <https://tinyurl.com/jj7s93ar>

Migration Internet and Social Networks in Africa

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Migration has recently risen to the top of the global agenda. According to the most recent World Migration report (IMO:2020), the number of migrants at the global level has risen more than threefold in the fifty year period between 1970 and 2020. Although precariousness and vulnerability are major factors in the decision to migrate, not every poor individual - especially the poorest workers - is forced to migrate (Adams, 1993). There are many drivers of migration, and the complexity of that phenomenon varies according to the social, cultural and economic environment, political exclusion and individual desire to migrate.

Several studies have assessed the key drivers of migration. Hatton and Williamson (2002) have observed that economic and demographic factors are the main drivers of migration. Others have looked at unemployment as a source of migration (Naude, 2010). Recent literature has reported that the inability of African countries to create economic opportunities for their citizens is a major push factor for emigration from the continent (Kainth, 2015; Stanojoska & Petreveski, 2015; Gheasi & Nijkamp, 2017). For their part, Flahaux & De Haas (2016) contend that social and political factors contribute greatly to increased emigration. Likewise, Stark and Taylor (1991) have shown that economic development that does not address the issue of income inequalities can be associated with migration. These factors would arguably contribute to the decision among the youth and more educated citizens in Africa to emigrate (Appiah-Nyamekye, Logan, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2019) However, Nayyar (2000) confirms that it is difficult to understand migration considering only economic analysis, seen from the perspective of migrating for work opportunities. Sometimes people migrate because they are forced by the laws in force in a country, or because of natural disasters, famine, etc.

This essay focuses on the role of the internet and

social media technologies in migration. Several authors have studied the link between social networks and migration, focusing on the use of technological tools. These studies view new technologies as constituting stimuli to migration. McGregor and Siegel (2013), for example, have contributed to the literature on the link between social networks and migration by addressing four key points which are (1) the use of social media to trigger and facilitate migration; (2) the role of social media and the integration of migrants; (3) the use of social media in diaspora engagement; and (4) the use of social media to conduct research on migration. Dekker and Engbersen (2012) advance a similar argument when they contend that new communication technologies can transform migrant networks and thus facilitate migration. In addition, Kimto (2011) found that new communication technologies strengthen internal cohesion within the same community. While encouraging a sense of belonging to communities, individuals use social networks linked to new communication techniques to exchange views. Information technology allows those who migrate to have access to information during and about their journey.

Thus, other than the standard drivers of migration, social networks related to new information and communication technologies should also be considered as one of the key factors in understanding the migration calculus. But at the same time, migration can also determine the use of social media tools to obtain information. Getting information through social networks depends on the access to mobile phone services and increased use of the internet.

This paper fills a gap in the literature on migration, in particular its link to social networks, by testing the effect of using the Internet to receive information on decisions to emigrate. Using rich national and representative surveys in several

countries on the African continent and data from the World Bank, we demonstrate that social media networks are an important ingredient in the decision to migrate. Social networks are viewed in this article by not only receiving information on politics and other topics from certain channels such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and the internet. After having migrated, individuals may not continue to use this same channel to obtain information on several issues from their places of origin. This highlights the consequences of migration for social networks. This dual effect highlights the endogenous nature of using social networks to justify the decision to migrate.

With individual and aggregate data obtained in 34 African countries, this paper explores the drivers of the decision to emigrate and of net migration. Using multiple OLS regressions, we found out that exposure to the internet and social media through Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter strongly contributes to the decision to migration. This result remains robust when we control for economic factors such as lived poverty, receipt of remittances from abroad, unemployment and income. The results do not differ when we also control for satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Finally, we offer evidence that there is a causality between internet exposure and migration by using a battery of instruments such as mobile phone coverage, population, and elevation.

The findings augment previous research which suggests that demographic factors such as age and educational level, as well as economic factors such as conditions of vulnerability, precariousness, and unemployment push people to emigrate. Our results further illustrate how social networks, and the use of the Internet are also an explanatory factor for migration. Specifically, we demonstrate that the use of the internet creates a convex relationship with migration. It is thus likely that the proliferation of internet users will lead to further increases in migration, which will in turn allow more people to use social networks to receive information. However, we suspect an endogeneity relationship with the use of the internet and social networks such as Facebook, WhatsApp or Twitter. This is because after migrating, people may also

want to receive information from their home places, through the same technological channels.

Hypotheses

This section provides the hypotheses that are tested in the paper. Firstly, the article investigates the relationship between exposure to internet, social network, and migration. We assume that more and more citizens are exposed to the internet and get information through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. With the explosion of the internet and social media, people have the flexibility to get information from their home about their destination. The paper then asks how this shapes the decision to emigrate. Secondly, we test the link between economic conditions and migration. Citizens that do not have better economic opportunities, like those looking for better job or having experience lived poverty may end up migrating. Thus, the lack of economic opportunities may increase the likelihood of the decision to emigrate. We also factor in thirdly, the political environment as a driver to emigration, by testing the link between a stable democratic environment and the decision to migrate. The assumption behind this is that citizens that are satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in their country are less likely to intend to emigrate. Finally, other factors may also drive the decision to migrate. There are for instance the previous travelling experiences or demographic groups. We test these against the decision to migrate and assume that citizens travelling experiences background may likely intend to migrate. In addition, the more that people age, the less they intend to migrate. We do not expect any difference between men and women regarding the decision to emigrate.

Data

To test these hypotheses, we used two different sources of data. Data on migration intentions are drawn from the Afrobarometer, which covers 34 African countries. Afrobarometer is a nationally representative survey of adult citizens with margin of error that varies from +/-2 to +/-3 percentage at the 95% confidence level. The data used a sample

of 45,823 citizens of 18 years old and above collected between 2016 and 2018. The second source of data is for the World Bank. The data from the World Bank is secondary data and capture information for each country that are considered by the Afrobarometer surveys.

Descriptive Statistics

According to the Afrobarometer, nearly three of every four (73%) African Citizens have never considered moving to another country to live (Table 1). However, there are variations from one country to another as is shown in Table 2. The World Bank defines net migration as the difference between net number of migrants over a period, i.e., the total number of immigrants minus the annual number of emigrants, comprising both citizens and non-citizens.

Afrobarometer findings indicate that in West and North Africa, most citizens from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali,

Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia, do not consider moving to another country to live. Most citizens from Cape Verde, Gambia, Liberia, and Togo, however, have considered moving to other countries to live. Yet, the World Bank data provides a different picture of the movement of the population in those countries. The net migration is negative, except Niger, indicating that the population of people (citizens or non-citizens) that leave those country to live abroad is more than those that come in those country to live. The situation is similar for the other countries covered by the Afrobarometer surveys between 2016 and 2017, except Botswana, Gabon, and South Africa. In those countries, Afrobarometer findings show that most citizens do not consider emigrating in other country to live according to Afrobarometer findings, while World Bank data shows that more people go to those countries to live than leave to live abroad. These findings presented in the table 2 are very crucial to figure out the direction of the movement of the population in those countries that are considered for the paper.

Table 1: Considered to migrate

	Effective	Percentage (%)
Missing	45	0,1
Not at all	25526	63
A little bit	4251	10
Somewhat	3437	8
A lot	7234	18
Refused	74	0,2
Don't know	232	0,6

Question asked to respondents: How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?

Table 2: Considered to migrate per country and net migration

Countries covered by Afrobarometer	Not considered to emigrate (%)	Considered to emigrate (%)	Actual Net Migration (WB¹)
Benin	60.42	39.52	-10000
Botswana	71.21	28.79	14999
Burkina Faso	74.58	25.42	-125000
Cameroon	59.47	40.53	-24000
Cape Verde	42.82	57.18	-6709
Côte d'Ivoire	69.56	30.44	-40000
eSwatini	68.42	31.58	-41764
Gabon	55.05	44.95	16301
Gambia	42.82	57.18	-15436
Ghana	57.92	42.08	-50000
Guinea	65.08	34.92	-20000
Mauritius	73.39	26.61	0
Kenya	65.43	34.57	-50000
Lesotho	61.50	38.50	-50234
Liberia	49.92	50.08	-25000
Madagascar	86.50	13.50	-7500
Malawi	55.05	44.95	-80263
Mali	79.83	20.17	-200000
Morocco	63.64	36.36	-257096
Mozambique	66.49	33.51	-25000
Namibie	76.92	23.08	-24030
Niger	73.08	26.92	20001
Nigeria	65.00	35.00	-300000
Ouganda	63.07	36.93	843469
Sao Tome and Principe	44.79	55.21	-8401

Countries covered by Afrobarometer	Not considered to emigrate (%)	Considered to emigrate (%)	Actual Net Migration (WB¹)
Senegal	59.05	40.95	-100001
Sierra Leone	41.17	58.83	-210000
South Africa	66.74	33.26	727026
Soudan	51.09	48.91	-250001
Tanzania	85.75	14.25	-200381
Togo	45.67	54.33	-9999
Tunisie	64.97	35.03	-20000
Zambia	74.33	25.67	-40000
Zimbabwe	53.17	46.83	-584288

Question to respondents: How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?

Now the paper defines an arithmetic variable that factors in the frequency of getting information from internet and social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp, etc. Basically, 62% of respondents never get news from the internet or social media, while 38% of African citizens that were interviewed said that at least less than once a month, they received news from both internet and social media (Table 3). The findings suggest strong correlation between social network and the decision to migrate. The citizens that have no social network access are less likely to consider moving to another country to live (Table 4).

Table 3: Social Network Connectivity

	Effective	Percentage (%)
Never	25181	62
Less than once a month	1563	4
A few times a month	2728	7
A few times a week	3201	8
Every day	7562	19

Question asked to respondents: How often do you get news from the following sources: Internet? Social media such as Facebook or Twitter ?

Table 4: Relationship between intention to migrate and social network access

	Intention to migrate (%)	
	Not considered moving to another country	Considered moving to another country
No social network	72	28
Social network	50	50

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 2.2e+03$ Pr = 0.000

Source : Author's Calculations

In addition to access to social media networks, the descriptive findings further suggest a link between experience of poverty and contemplation to migrate. Bratton et al, 2006 defined lived poverty as a composite variable that captures the experience of poverty along five dimensions, namely: going without enough food to eat; clean water for home use, medicines or medical treatment, fuel to cook food and cash income. When correlated against considerations to migrate, the data suggests that African citizens that have never experienced lived poverty are less likely to consider moving to another country to live (Table 5).

Table 5: Migration and lived poverty

	Considered moving (%)			
	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	A lot
Never	14	14	13	12
Just once or twice	37	37	38	38
Several times	31	33	30	31
Many times	18	16	19	19

Pearson $\chi^2(9) = 40.9618$ Pr = 0.000

Source : Author's Calculations

The findings from Tables 4 and 5 enable us to say that considering to move to another country to live may strongly depend on the poverty status and news that are received from internet and social media.

As economic factor may be one of the key drivers to the decision to migrate, the paper then maps out the countries included in this study, regarding the level of their income and the net migration. It appears that countries with low or middle low income are typically countries where emigration is higher than immigration. Among the countries that are considered as middle and upper income, Namibia is the only one for which emigration is higher than immigration.

Table 6: Mapping of countries based on Net Migration and income

Income	Net Migration	Afrobarometer countries
Low income	Negative	Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry, Gambia, Liberia, Morocco, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger*, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Ouganda
Middle low income	Negative	Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Soudan, Senegal, Sao Tomé et Príncipe, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Middle upper income	Positive	Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia**, South Africa

*Niger is the only country low income for which the net migration is positive

**Namibia is the only country middle upper income for which net migration is equal to zero.

Source: World Bank

Model

To test the hypotheses, we use Ordinary Least Square -OLS- and run regressions with the following equation

$$Y_{ik} = \alpha X_{1ik} + \beta X_{2ik} + e_{ik} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_i is the decision to migrate for individual i in the country k

X_{1ik} is for the respondents that connect to social network and internet

X_{2ik} is for control variables such as

- Economic factors: lived poverty, cash transfer, unemployment
- Satisfaction with democracy
- Demographic factors and previous travelling experience.

e_{ik} Constant

The second model that is also OLS reflected through the following equation

$$Y_k = \alpha X_{1k} + \beta X_{2k} + e_k \quad (2)$$

Where Y_k is the natural logarithm of the net migration net for country k

X_{1k} Internet use

X_{2k} Unemployment, active population

e_k constant

Results

Firstly, the first three columns (1) - (3) of Table 6 point out the findings regarding the decision to emigrate on connectivity to social networks, lived poverty, the fact of receiving remittances from the outside and employability status. The results indicate that African citizens who receive news information from the internet and social networks are more likely to decide to migrate to another country in order to live. Likewise, the more citizens experience a greater lack of basic necessities, the more likely they are to contemplate emigrating. The findings further suggest that receipt of remittances from abroad increase the likelihood to consider emigrate. This suggests that there is a social network created around the relatives who sent the remittances and therefore affect the decision to

migrate. In addition, unemployment status has not changed the decision to migrate. Whether or not people have a job, those with networks abroad still consider moving to another country to live. Hatton and Williamson (2002) have shown that the expectation of getting better working conditions leads those who are looking for work or have a situation of employability to emigrate. Finally, the findings also indicate that those who are satisfied with how democracy works do not decide to migrate abroad to live. When controlling with those that have experience of travelling, age, sex, place of residence and level of education, the findings are still consistent.

Secondly, regressions in Table 6 explain the net migration by the use of internet, unemployment, active population, mobile phone subscription, country income classification. The findings suggest increased internet use or mobile phone subscribers are associated with the likelihood of emigrating. The positive correlation means those that use internet or subscribe to mobile phone are more likely to consider moving from their country to another in order to live. Moreover, there is a convex relationship between internet use and net migration. The findings are the same for the active population and unemployment.

By controlling with income, the results indicate the positive correlation with net migration. In the country with low middle income and upper middle income, emigration is more observed than low-income country. In addition to this, likelihood of emigration is more observed in East and Central Africa compared to West Africa. To the contrary, in Southern and North Africa, immigration is more noted than in West Africa. People prefer moving to South and North Africa compared to West Africa. Southern and East Africans tend to migrate within the continent, while migration from West and North Africa is usually transcontinental, mostly to Europe and the United States. Migrating within the continent is relatively easier and therefore a more likely option for many compared to transcontinental migration.

Instrumental variables

This paper has investigated the drivers of the

decision to move to another country to live and the net migration. The main determinants are the social network and the internet use. The social network in this paper is defined by the arithmetic mean of the getting news from internet and social media such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter. The assumptions are that internet use and social network can also be explained by mobile phone coverage, the elevation and the density of active population. Those variables are instruments to the internet use and social network.

This section seeks to underline the causality that may exist between consideration to move to other country and the social network. Likewise, the causal relationship that may occur between the net migration and the internet use. Thus, the following model is describing as such:

$$Y_i = \alpha X_i + e_i \text{ where } X_i = \eta Z_i + u_i \quad (3) \text{ and } Y_i \text{ is the decision to migrate for individual } i \text{ in the country } k \text{ or net migration, while } X_i \text{ is stand for social network connectivity is explained by mobile phone coverage, the elevation as GPS coordinates, and the density of active population.}$$

The findings are still consistent with previous results. They suggest that the internet use and social network explain the prospects for migrating and net migration through mobile phone coverage, place of residency, elevation, and density of the active population. This mechanism is quite straightforward. In fact, mobile phone coverage allows many people to get connected and create their own social network by getting and exchanging information through internet and social media. That information is essential in their decision to migrate, and it permits them to communicate with their relatives that are abroad. It may enable them also to seek information about their potential destination. On the other hand, the same process will allow them once they arrive to their destination to communicate with their relatives to give or get information. Elevation shapes mobile phone coverage. This means depending on their location, users will have fully access to internet and then can communicate with their relatives for information. Likewise, mobile phone coverage, elevation and active population also explain the use of internet

that drives the net migration. People that are more exposed to the internet are more likely to emigrate because it allows them to get needed information for their trip.

Conclusion and Discussions

This paper has brought a contribution to the literature by identifying causality between migration and the use of internet and social media. Typically, the paper allows to claim that the rural areas or remote places where there is weak internet coverage because of weak mobile coverage, citizens are less likely to emigrate because they cannot get news from internet and social media. The use of internet and social media have become widely relevant for the emigrants, and it brought the idea that incumbents have also to play a role to provide the necessities that allow Africans to decide whether to migrate or stay. The findings also have suggested that poverty lived is associated with the decision to migrate. Typically, those that with high poverty lived are certainly looking for better outcomes. In fact, economics opportunities are the most important reasons for emigrating. There is a need for incumbents to put in place what can prevent for huge traffic of migration. Among them, better jobs, better democratic environment, better social protection. It is evidence that despite better conditions, there are citizens that may decide to emigrate because they have other perspectives. The paper has also brought the density of the population as one of the key drivers of migration. Although some have jobs, active population seems to be a time bomb as inequal equation for the incumbents. African states need to look for better industrialization as a solution to maintain validated arms on the ground.

This paper also points out the link between migration and exposure to the internet and social networks on the one hand and economic and political factors on the other. Individual data informs the decision to emigrate, while aggregate data on net migration. The findings suggest that that there is a positive correlation between internet and social media exposure and the decision to emigrate. By considering aggregate data, the results indicate that the more internet is used, the

more will African citizens consider the option of migrating. The paper proves the causal effect of internet exposure on the decision to emigrate or net migration using a combination of variables such as mobile phone coverage, active population and elevation. The results suggest that internet exposure explains migration through those instruments. ■

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Appendix

Table 6 : Consider to emigrate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Connectivity to social network	0.15*** (0.003)	0.16*** (0.004)	0.15*** (0.004)	0.08*** (0.004)	0.09*** (0.005)	0.09*** (0.005)
Lived poverty		0.08*** (0.007)	0.07*** (0.007)		0.07*** (0.007)	0.06*** (0.008)
Remittances		0.11*** (0.008)	0.11*** (0.008)		0.05*** (0.008)	0.05*** (0.008)
Looking for job (Ref. Not looking for job)		0.34*** (0.014)	0.32*** (0.019)		0.25*** (0.014)	0.25*** (0.015)
Full or part time job (Ref. Not looking for job)		0.14*** (0.018)	0.14*** (0.019)		0.09*** (0.018)	0.1*** (0.019)
Satisfaction with democracy			-0.09*** (0.007)			-0.07*** (0.007)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Never tried to cross the borders (Ref crossed the border)				-0.27*** (0.015)	-0.25*** (0.017)	-0.26*** (0.02)
Vivre plus de 3 mois hors de son pays				0.51*** (0.013)	0.48*** (0.014)	0.47*** (0.015)
Age 36 old year and more (Ref. 18-35)				-0.30*** (0.011)	-0.25*** (0.013)	-0.25*** (0.014)
Education				0.08*** (0.006)	0.1*** (0.008)	0.08*** (0.008)
Female (Ref. Male)				-0.12*** (0.011)	-0.13*** (0.013)	-0.12*** (0.013)
Place of residence				-0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)
Constante	0.62*** (0.007)	0.32*** (0.016)	0.58*** (0.024)	0.72*** (0.013)	0.45*** (0.022)	0.67*** (0.3)
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
R2	0.0436	0.0743	0.0773	0.1130	0.1309	0.1307
N°Obs	44,787	32,625	30,490	41,284	30,188	28,447

Écart-type sont entre parenthèses. * Significatif à 10%, ** Significatif à 5%, *** Significatif à 1%

Table 7: Natural Logarithm of Net migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Internet users	0.11*** (0.002)	-0.38*** (0.009)	-0.43*** (0.009)	-0.50*** (0.009)	-5.33*** (0.009)	-0.19*** (0.009)	-0.46*** (0.009)	-0.27*** (0.009)
Internet users ²		0.01*** (0.0001)	0.01*** (0.0001)	0.007*** (0.0001)	0.01*** (0.0001)	0.003*** (0.0001)	0.006*** (0.0001)	0.003*** (0.0001)
Telephone subscribers (for 100 habitants)			0.04*** (0.001)	0.02*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.02*** (0.001)
Unemployment				0.28** (0.006)	0.3*** (0.006)	0.34*** (0.006)	0.22*** (0.006)	0.36*** (0.006)
Active population					0.12*** (0.004)	-1.28*** (0.02)		-1.47*** (0.16)
Active Population ²						0.009*** (0.0001)		0.01*** (0.0001)
Low middle income (Ref Low income)							-0.58*** (0.08)	1.45*** (0.07)
Upper middle income (Ref Low income)							15.52*** (0.13)	16.72*** (0.12)
East Africa (Ref West Africa)							4.29*** (0.09)	4.16*** (0.08)
Southern Africa (Ref West Africa)							-3.73*** (0.07)	-5.44*** (0.07)
North Africa (Ref West Africa)							-3.70*** (0.13)	-6.18*** (0.13)
Central Africa (Ref West Africa)							0.07*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.1)
Constant	-10.8 *** (0.07)	-4.7*** (0.13)	-6.8*** (0.16)	-5.96*** (0.15)	34.36*** (0.81)	34.36*** (0.81)	-2.31*** (0.13)	44.39*** (0.64)
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
R ²	0.0633	0.1195	0.1324	0.1709	0.2703	0.2703	0.5297	0.6494
N°Obs	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

Table 8: Regression with instrumental variables

Consider to emigrate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Connectivity to social network	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.022)	0.3*** (0.02)
Lived poverty	0.08*** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.009)	0.1*** (0.009)
Remittances	0.11*** (0.009)	0.11*** (0.009)	0.02* (0.009)	0.02** (0.009)
Looking for job (Ref. Not looking for job)	0.35*** (0.016)	0.33*** (0.017)	0.25*** (0.015)	0.24*** (0.015)
Full or part time job (Ref. Not looking for job)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.1*** (0.008)		-0.05*** (0.007)
Never tried to cross the borders (Ref crossed the border)			-0.24*** (0.018)	-0.25*** (0.019)
Vivre plus de 3 mois hors de son pays			0.44*** (0.016)	0.43*** (0.016)
Age 36 old year and more (Ref. 18-35)			-0.14*** (0.018)	-0.14*** (0.019)
Education			-0.04** (0.016)	-0.05** (0.017)
Female (Ref. Male)			-0.09*** (0.014)	-0.08*** (0.014)
Place of residence			0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)
Constante	0.35*** (0.03)	0.62*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.04)
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
R ²	0.0742	0.0765	0.0758	0.0774
N°Obs	32,298	30,218	29,897	28,204

Table 8: Regression with variables instrumentals

Natural Log Net Migration	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Internet users	0.12*** (0.003)	-0.07*** (0.005)	-0.12*** (0.003)	-0.15*** (0.005)
Internet users ²		0.35*** (0.007)		0.23*** (0.007)
Telephone subscribers (for 100 habitants)		0.042*** (0.005)		0.006*** (0.002)
Unemployment			-0.70*** (0.09)	-1.02*** (0.09)
Active population			19.67*** (0.17)	17.36*** (0.16)
Active Population ²			2.62*** (0.09)	3.24*** (0.09)
Low middle income (Ref Low income)			-2.7*** (0.07)	-3.5*** (0.08)
Upper middle income (Ref Low income)			0.51*** (0.12)	-2.26*** (0.14)
East Africa (Ref West Africa)			1.01*** (0.12)	0.47** (0.12)
Southern Africa (Ref West Africa)	-10.99 *** (0.09)	-12.32*** (0.12)	-5.47*** (0.09)	-6.46*** (0.11)
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
R ²	0.0628	0.0959	0.4676	0.4720
N°Obs	34	34	34	34

Endnotes

1 World Bank data

Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa and the potential impact of their transnational identities on the Ethiopian state

Namhla Matshanda

Introduction

It has become increasingly important to understand the linkages between political identities and migration. This paper is interested in how intra-African migration facilitates the emergence of transnational identities among Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa. According to existing research most of these immigrants are from Southern Ethiopia (Feyissa and Garba, Nd). We know that when they arrive in South Africa they often use kinship networks, some of which facilitate their journeys to the country (Kefale and Mohammed, 2015). However, it is not clear how political identities manifest themselves in these migrants and how these might influence their politics in South Africa and at home. This paper highlights the potential political push factors of Ethiopian migrations to South Africa and considers how these might impact the migrants' expressions of national identity. Using theories of transnationalism and long-distance nationalism, the paper foregrounds the production and reproduction of an Ethiopian national identity abroad. The paper highlights the often-neglected political drivers of Ethiopian migration in addition to the social and economic drivers. The continued rise in intra-African migration on the continent calls for a closer interrogation of this trend from different perspectives. Finally, the paper asks which concepts and theories of migration travel across disciplines, as it explores the possibilities of a truly interdisciplinary agenda for the study of migration in Africa.

In South Africa, the burgeoning field of migration studies is dominated by narratives of xenophobia (Classen, 2017) with an overwhelming focus on immigrants from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Crush

et al, 2005; Gebre et al, 2011). The rich history of these migration patterns has facilitated an established body of literature. In this literature, immigrants from East, North and West Africa are often either portrayed as victims of xenophobia or their experiences are analysed within a development framework. The movement of African migrants to South Africa, including those from the Horn of Africa, is generally framed in socio-economic terms, with politics downplayed as a causal factor relative to the social and economic push factors. This broad framework does not adequately account for the political implications of intra-African migration. Some immigrants from East Africa in places such as Ethiopia and Somalia become prominent entrepreneurs in the South African informal economy, which gives them notable power (Gastro and Amit, 2013). Their socio-economic experiences cannot be separated from their political lives. Because of the constantly changing nature of the Ethiopian national landscape, and the ongoing pressures on the state, the number of Ethiopian immigrants making their way to South Africa continues to increase. Ethiopians have traditionally travelled to South Africa for a number of reasons, chief among them the need to make a better life for themselves. Kefale and Mohammed (2015) note that most Ethiopian migrants that travel to South Africa intend to return home once their economic conditions improve. However, in the past five years political and security developments in Ethiopia have shifted notions of home and belonging quite significantly. Prior to 2018 we saw major political upheaval in the form of protests in Amhara, Oromia and Southern regions, and in November 2020 the civil war began. This suggests that there might be more political and security factors that have led to recent migrations, in addition to the socio-economic factors.

The main objective of the broader research agenda from which this short paper is drawn is to understand how the Ethiopian national identity is produced and reproduced in a transnational setting, particularly in light of growing contestation over the nature of the Ethiopian state. Ethiopian migrants who travel to South Africa are not a homogenous group. When they leave home, many come from specific regional states, which are divided along ethno-national identities. These identities have implications for how homeland politics and diaspora identities intersect (Thompson, 2018).

Political push factors

The Horn of Africa, and Ethiopians in particular, offer vital insights into the study of African migration and transnationalism. Since 1991, the Horn of Africa has been a zone of political turmoil that has led to large scale migrations from the region. In this volume, Abdullahi Hassan notes how Somali immigrants arrived in South Africa in large numbers after 1991, following the collapse of the Somali state. In this case, the Somali push factors were clear and the fact of statelessness produced specific notions of place-making and generated certain patterns of collective action among Somali immigrants (Hassan, 2022; Thompson, 2016). However, there is limited research on the events that prompted large-scale migration from Ethiopia to South Africa. It is generally believed that it is socio-economic push factors that have led large numbers of young Ethiopians to South Africa. In recent years there has been investigations into what is known as the “Ethiopia- South Africa migration corridor” (Estifanos and Zack, 2020). These studies suggest that large numbers of Ethiopians are leaving and crossing a number of African national borders on their way to South Africa (Estifanos and Zack, 2019; Kefale and Mohammed, 2015; Estifanos, Nd.). However, one cannot fully understand these migrations without considering the political push factors.

In the 2000s Ethiopia enjoyed double-digit growth and was hailed as an economic miracle where the country drastically reduced poverty, raised life expectancy and prioritised education

(Carnegie, 2011; IMF, 2018). However, these successes came at a price as they existed within a contested political landscape that saw a rising democratic deficit. The country’s hopes for democratisation regressed to the extent that some argued that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government was sliding back into the authoritarian practices of the pre-1991 military regime (Abbink, 2006). The political crisis and the absence of democracy became so wide spread as to threaten the ethnic-based federal experiment. It became clear that the idea of a “revolutionary democracy” remained at the level of rhetoric (Abbink, 2011). The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was a proponent of “Authoritarian Developmentalism” (Dowden, 2012), the idea that Ethiopia could not enjoy democracy before achieving economic development. Cracks within this strategy began to show and it became clear that this approach could not be sustained in the long term.

Conflict and violence in the federal regional states began to shape Ethiopian politics. Human rights violations and abuses of power became the norm as the government pursued economic highs at all costs (Looney, 2015). In the absence of democracy, disgruntled citizens struggled to find outlets for their grievances. The EPRDF government repeatedly made a mockery of elections, where the opposition was silenced (Abbink, 2006). Anger grew among the population, especially young people who began to organise themselves along ethnic lines. The rise of a violent ethnic consciousness was necessarily an outcome of the absence of democracy, it was also a consequence of the ethnically defined federal system that was adopted after 1991. From 2015 violent conflicts between ethnic groups over a range of issues shaped Ethiopian political discourse (Yusuf, 2019). These violent clashes were met by a fragmented ruling coalition and a fragile state. This is the context for why many young Ethiopians embarked on desperate journeys to South Africa and elsewhere. It can only be expected that the civil war that started in November 2020 between the government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) will also result in waves of migration from Ethiopia.

Transnational identities

Transnational migration is the “process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1995:48). This classic definition places emphasis on the experiences of immigrants and the “ongoing and continuing ways in which current day immigrants construct and reconstitute their simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society” (Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1995:48). This theory of migration brings us closer to understanding the role of the nation-state in how migrants develop their transnational lives. Benedict Anderson (1991) demonstrates and argues in *Imagined Communities* that there are clear emotional and cultural forces at play when nations are forged. These emotions carry with them myths and images of a romanticised and distant past. It is commonly believed that these connections can remain quite strong as migrants settle in their new host countries. What remains of interest among different immigrant groups is how these identities are maintained and how they intersect with diaspora identities. Previous literature, argues Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1995), has tended to highlight the erasure of these memories of transnational connections. Empirical evidence continues to demonstrate that this is clearly not the case, as many immigrants, including the first wave of Ethiopian immigrants to South Africa, retain strong connections to home (Kefale and Mohamed, 2015).

According to Schiller (2005) long-distance nationalism is a “set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographic locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home”. Somalis from the Ethiopian Somali region are the most studied diaspora group from Ethiopia. This may have to do with the broader Somali migration discourse that has been driven by the condition of statelessness. It is also evident that the Somali diaspora has much influence in homeland politics, as noted in Sahra Ahmed Koshin’s paper in this volume. However, there is limited data on the ways in which Ethiopians from other regions maintain

their ties to home. This is an important area of study that has implications for current and future reconstructions of the Ethiopia state. The actions of the long-distance nationalists vary and take on different degrees of connections to the ancestral home. Similar to the mainstream form of nationalism, long-distance nationalism takes as truth the existence of a nation that consists of a group of people that share common history, identity and territory. The specific point of difference between conventional nationalism and long-distance nationalism is that the latter is a product of transnationalism (Sobral, 2018: 51). In the Ethiopian case, because of ethnic federalism, transnational identities hold the potential to challenge the dominant discourses of the nation and state.

Existing scholarship offers good reasons to expect ethnic and regional identities to carry over from Ethiopia to new host communities. Thompson (2018) explores the intersection of ‘homeland politics’ and diaspora identities by assessing whether geopolitical changes in Ethiopia affect ethno-national identifications among Ethiopian origin populations in Canada. His study interrogates the Ethiopian-Somali ethno-national identity as an attempt to consider more broadly the relationship between homeland politics and diaspora identities. He demonstrates how changes in the homeland (Ethiopia) influence and reshape diaspora identities, which give rise to transnational identities. Other research demonstrates this intersection by focusing on the Ethiopian Somalis whose homeland politics in Ethiopia have undergone several transformations in addition to being highly contentious (Hagman and Khalif, 2006). Ethiopians have a profoundly strong sense of their national identity but since 1991 this identity has been mediated by ethnic nationalism through ethnic federalism. Kebede (2012) notes the different expressions of transnational identities that exist among different generations of Ethiopian immigrants in the United States. In the past two decades when Ethiopians left their homes as migrants, they left with specific political identities, which were informed by ethnic federalism. Therefore, we can expect migrants from different regional states to develop quite distinct transnational identities.

The term 'identity' is not used arbitrarily in this paper, because it is ambiguous, contradictory, confusing and is characterised by reifying connotations (Brubaker and Cooper, 2005: 5). The challenge of using the term 'identity' multiplies when it is used in the context of migration. However, in all its ambiguity, 'identity' looms large in the political discourses of the Horn of Africa, not least in Ethiopia (Tronvoll, 2009). In this paper 'identity' is used not as an analytical category but as a category of practice (Becker and Schulz, 2017). The paper thus takes identity not as fixed, but as transient. Migrants move between identities as they navigate their new transnational identities.

In the case of Ethiopia, national identity has been a fluid and contested concept since 1991 and diaspora identities have been largely influenced by ethnic federalism. Vertovec (2004) proposes that transnationalism moves beyond describing transnational migrant experiences, that it must also consider the "more deep-seated patterns of change or structural transformation" that come with such practices. The Ethiopian state and its identity have undergone and continue to undergo significant transformations and the role of migrant transnational identities in that reconstruction remains crucial. Political dimensions of migrant transnationalism are deeply embedded in particular kinds of structural change which can be seen to test the long-standing ideals of "identities-borders-orders" (Vertovec, 2004: 980). A case in point is how authorities in the Somali Regional State (SRS) instrumentalised federal provisions in order to manage cross-border trade, and the role of the Ethiopian Somali diaspora in this process (Thompson, 2021). These structural transformations are located at the local level, the level that most explicitly reveals the particularities of migrant transnational identities.

Conclusion

This paper draws our attention to the need to understand the political implications of the link between identity and migration. It has discussed how and why the investigation of transnational identities can provide us with insights into the different manifestations of intra-African migration.

The paper proposes a research agenda that probes the political dynamics of the "Ethiopia-South Africa migration corridor". There is an overall need to understand how migrants from other African countries, beyond the SADC region, navigate their transnational identities in South Africa. With regards to the Horn of Africa, migration studies in South Africa are dominated by the Somali experience, which in turn is focused on Somali entrepreneurship and their experiences of xenophobia. The number of Ethiopian immigrants on the other hand has increased in recent years, yet not much is known about their experiences. Since the advent of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, Ethiopian political identities have become quite fragmented. This heterogeneity suggests that the development of transnational identities will differ from one person to the next. Furthermore, socio-economic push factors are only one part of the story of Ethiopian migration trends to South Africa. This paper argues that it is perhaps more relevant to think about how migrants' transnational identities influence homeland politics and how these might bring about unintended deep-rooted structural transformations to how politics is imagined and performed in their home countries. ■

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‘Exploring the axe of fracture and creative currency in Anglophone West Africa’s Cities of Cool’

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1. Introduction

Acting as platforms to engage with processes and territories elsewhere, cities are Africa’s future. Highly mobile young Africans are migrating between cities on the continent under conditions in which spatial interconnectedness to other localities – domestic and international – is becoming the norm. These sites of continual transition, described by AbdouMaliq Simone (2004) as the laboratories of change, produce different modes of being that deviate from classic urban sociology. African urbanism research principally focuses on the material objects of cities, with few scholars exploring the performed actions of actors within African cities (Foster and Siegenthaler, 2018). This paper looks to contribute to the lacuna in youth studies research around the lifeworlds of young creatives in African cities, while detailing their dynamic and poorly understood forms of membership within these urban environs and the way that young creatives contribute to processes of social change in the places in which they reside.

The African creative industries comprised of artists, musicians, writers and intellectuals in Accra and Lagos proactively and intentionally manage cultural traffic that shapes informal narratives, identities and a sense of belonging within these cities and beyond (Gikandi, 2011). The cities in turn shape their civic engagement and creative practice. Within the rapidly changing cityscapes, creatives in varying ways domesticate spaces, straddling local and global identities and fostering a culture of conviviality.

This interdisciplinary paper explores the common habitus within and between the West African cities of Lagos and Accra amongst African creative and cultural leaders. Through the voices of West African creatives, it studies the often-subconscious tension within the creative habitus and the interconnection between space and identity. In doing so, it illuminates the tension and struggles

between global and local orientations and shows how this juncture in belonging is utilised for self-actualisation and shapes associations and relations within the cities through analysing movement, social tastes and practices. It concludes that a performed sense of ownership and belonging within the city is currency for a form of acceptance in future undefined spaces, however fleeting, while simultaneously plotting futures elsewhere. These cities are shared and individual sites of imagination, places of mobility and extraction. These tensions played out in daily interactions are complex, and while gathering social and cultural capital within these worlding cities these creatives appear to ascribe to a lightly rooted or aesthetic cosmopolitanism and culture of conviviality that shape how Lagos and Accra look and feel.

2. Approach and data

Rooted in sociological and anthropological enquiry, the descriptive analysis in this paper attempts to understand the lifeworld of young West African creatives through triangulation methods. Research conducted between December 2020 and October 2021 was comprised of unstructured face to face interviews, a public discussion and online focus groups. Participant observation and analysis of online secondary content and engagement supported enquiry scripts. Influenced by Bauman (2013), these interviews focused heavily on itineraries and cultural mental maps to better understand how respondents navigate within cities.

West African coastal cities of Lagos and Accra were selected as Anglophone cultural hubs. The cultural production that emanates from these cities are recognised globally as shaping culture with a specific focus on music, fashion and visual arts (Das, 2019). Both cities benefit from ECOWAS labour and trade policies supporting mobility. It should be noted that this paper is not a comparative

city study, rather an exploration into commonalities in experiences between creatives that reside in Lagos and Accra.

Thirty participants were selected in total, fifteen each from Lagos and Accra chosen through snowball sampling. Attempts were made to ensure an even gender split, however, final data shows an over-representation of men. The data presented has been anonymised. All participants are self-identified creatives, who lived and worked within either Lagos or Accra and are between the ages of eighteen to forty years old. Respondents in Lagos were predominantly Nigerian, with one Ghanaian exception. In Accra, the picture was much more varied, with respondents from Cameroon, Ivory Coast Nigeria and Ghana. Due to the limitations of COVID, social media (specifically Instagram) was an essential tool in building creative connections and cultural maps. While not explored in this paper, the role of social media in building global and local engagement within the African creative industries requires greater analysis and research. The limited sample size does not allow larger conclusions to be drawn around the accommodating nature of cities towards non-nationals.

The frontiers of the creative industries globally are known for their permeability, perhaps best demonstrated by the ongoing dispute over an exact definition of who should or should not be included within them (Shorthose, 2004). As an ever evolving concept the creative industries selected and used for participant selection takes inspiration from Richard Florida's categorisation (2003) and UNCRAD's definition includes poets, writers advertisers, broadcasting (TV and radio), novelists, artists, cultural curators, entertainers, actors, designers and architects as well as cultural figures and creative analysts. Essentially speaking these are the knowledge based economic activities which drive creative and artistic industries globally. Florida extends his definition to include engineers, academics and think tank researchers, though arguably they do not shape the African cultural production but rather analyze, study and make sense of the world around us.

3. Findings

The following sections explore how young West African creatives, nationals and otherwise, forge their lives within the West African cities of Lagos and Accra, exploring city imageries and creatives connections to other localities. What is evident across all accounts and between cities is that all forms of membership and belonging are built past the state. Belonging in Lagos and Accra is a combination of individual agency and collective projects and for the most part show citizens engaging in forms of collaboration and conviviality that is fragile and fleeting, as a means to greater self-actualisation. This shallow level of engagement should not however be dismissed as undesirable or unwelcome but rather seen as a functional and resilient means to survival and in many instances thriving in diverse, turbulent and changing African cities. The findings below are presented in the following subsections; firstly, glocal transit spaces and places, secondly, survival strategies in shifting sands and lastly cities as cultural currencies.

3.1 Glocal transit spaces and places

The African city has been historically understood as a thoroughfare, a temporal space not to settle but as a place to extract and access opportunities, and then leave (Ndi, 2007). Landau and Freemantle (2010) argue that in African cities, with specific reference to Johannesburg, urban spaces act as stations for ongoing journeys rather than final destinations, even if final destinations remain unknown.

West African creatives had complex relationships with Lagos and Accra. Translocalism was evident in accounts with respondents claiming an attachment to several spaces simultaneously, while almost always rejecting the cities they lived in as home. There was a reluctance to belong to the city of residence; despite expressing levels of attachment, it was not seen as aspirational. Cities were discussed as places to increase personal value to have a better footing to opportunities elsewhere. Elsewhere was not always known, but when mentioned aspirational destinations included global cosmopolitan cities such as London, New York and Paris. Fola*, a Nigerian women fashion designer

claimed, “Lagos is a market, you go to the market to take. Nobody wants to live in the market”.

Her sentiment was shared by Tayo*, a writer and curator based in Lagos who struggled with the idea of living there, and five years into his experience had reluctantly succumbed to the identity of a Lagosian. He found the idea that he lived somewhere that does not care for him deeply troubling, with specific reference to the End SARS Lekki Tollgate Massacre, where on the 20th October 2020 Nigerian army officials shot, injured and killed unarmed protesters without provocation at Lekki Tollgate in Lagos. He discussed a creative life beyond the present and was awaiting an interview for a visa to the United States. His account of his experience as a creative in the city was weaved with statements of ownership and belonging and highlighted the contradictions of global and local tensions in identity formation and the difficulties in blending them.

Attachments to non-physical spaces were common amongst the group. Ayo*, a photographer based in Lagos, pondered the question about identity and belonging, a minute passing before he claimed, “home is in my head”. Ayo was not alone in assigning the feeling of home to an imagined non-physical space. Many of the creatives interviewed claimed they adapted so that there could be a separation of space from place. Yet, when discussing the cities where they lived and worked, there was a loose sense of entitlement and ownership over spaces that they had initially appeared to reject. Home as a non-physical space was followed by claiming a sense of belonging beyond the state, whether this was as a West African, a pan-African or most popularly, “a global citizen”. Mobility, detachment and polygamy of place was a central component of the creative identity.

Lagos and Accra were described as places that enable aspirations to be realised while not being “aspirational” to those that live within them. All creatives questioned discussed moving out of the city, through their narratives describing these spaces as a stepping stone to elsewhere, zones of transit to individual recognition and success. The lack of attachment to the city can partially be

attributed to the absence of national or municipal creative infrastructure in the creative ecosystems and everyday life, which arguably adds to the level of detachment from civic duty towards the city or investment in it (Simone, 2004). Lagos and Accra are examples of places where the state shows partial interest, the decline of factories in the area of Nyaniba estate in Accra has for example driven private investment and enterprise, this has happened without the aid of public planners. Nana* claimed the only engagement she had with formal structures of governance was her light and water bill, arguing that the government doesn't value her or her industries and anything achieved came as a result of her own efforts.

The phenomenon of cities as transactional spaces with loose levels of attachment is not in itself new. Hans Peter Hahn has written about African cities as transitional stages for young people, with many individuals gazing beyond the city and using it as a stepping stone to another destination (Hahn, 2010). Meanwhile, Bauman (2013) describes cities as places where strangers meet and continue to meet while remaining strangers. Given the size and scale of growth, in both cities but especially Lagos, it is unsurprising that there is a lack of accepted civic engagement. The accounts suggested that accepting oneself as part of the city would almost be as if limiting one's aspirations.

The interesting and novel part of the creatives' urban experience is the strategies formed to succeed within these urban spaces. These bottom-up initiatives of conviviality, tactical cosmopolitanism and creative placemaking are discussed within the next section. All initiatives are embedded in simultaneous local and global identities. They highlight internal identity struggles and tensions through attempts to domesticate or reterritorialize the city so that it is more representative of a place they would like to live and yet it is not claimed as home.

3.2 Survival strategies in shifting sands

In cities that are increasingly fragmented, dispersed and outward-looking, inhabitants within them build identities that span across cultures, languages,

spaces and places. Rapid growth in cities has been paired with confrontations over the use of urban spaces, mediated largely by those on the ground (Landau and Bakewell, 2018). West African creatives can be seen to carve out spaces within the city for themselves. They mould these spaces and position them to be globally aspirational cosmopolitan symbols of the city they want to see. They, meanwhile, can be seen to straddle local and global identities and build shallow communities guided by sentiments of conviviality and rooted cosmopolitanism.

3.2.1 Creative Placemaking

Creative placemaking was an intentional, ongoing project evident within both cities, influenced by global subcultures and suspended in time that enabled individuals to forge lives in multiple locations. These reconstructed cultural ‘homes’ were described as safe and free, transcending the local to speak also to global ambitions and connections. Carmen Leccardi (2016) calls this phenomenon the reterritorialization of space, claiming that these border zones are efforts to reconstruct the city to somewhere people want to live, the city they want to see.

In Accra, the area of the city that attracted the most attention was Nyaniba estate. Claimed by some as Osu, it sits to the South of the city, close to the sea and older fishing communities but also a stones throw away from the busy commercial hub of Osu and the old money affluent areas of the city; Labone and Cantonments. With a number of gallery spaces, studios, café and bars with creativity at their core you could be mistaken that it is a microcosm of the rest of the city. In Jamestown Café you will hear Ghanaian, American and South African accents intermingling discussing new projects and events with complaints of poor internet, rains and the unreliability of Bolt.

One respondent claimed he only frequented these spaces, as they provided freedom which he couldn't find elsewhere due to his sexuality. These spaces were guided by global cosmopolitan norms both unspoken and upheld. Images of these spaces circulate globally and become symbolic signs of

aesthetic cosmopolitanism (Lombrano, 2016). Creative communities show predictable patterns of engagement within the city with cultural maps overlapping with inhabitants moving and interacting with places and people with familiar and similar tastes and dispositions (Melber, 2017).

In Accra, Ekow*, a fashion designer and cultural communicator, during a panel discussion mentioned Republic Bar as a signifier of change within the creative community. Republic Bar and Grill, nestled on a side street in Osu is an upscale take on a local “spot” and was mentioned in several accounts from Accra-based creatives as somewhere that married different social and creative scenes.

In Lagos, six locations reoccurred in the narratives of respondents’ cultural maps. These were: Bogobiri, H Factor, La Taverna, Nok by Alara, 16by16 and the New Afrika Shrine. All of these creative spaces are middle-class establishments, globally focused in their visions and largely within a five-kilometre radius of each other, mainly on “the islands”.

The instrumentalization of very specific spaces enables creatives to build a space of fluid and loose acceptance and belonging, however shallow the engagement with a distinctive image of the city and subsequently themselves through their knowledge and connection to these places. While the spaces differ, they are all similar in their local and global visions, and are all unique from the everyday spots within the city and subsequently strengthen the city brand. As privately-owned spaces, the creative communities can enjoy and frequent them without having accountability or responsibility for maintaining the space or the community, therefore fostering loose but vital connections. The performances and impressions of the city by creatives shape how African cities are portrayed in the global press (Das. 2020/Nwosu, 2020). It could be argued that the performance is instrumental to the value of the city when used as currency and subsequently the individual value of creatives.

3.2.2 Conviviality and rootless cosmopolitanism.

Conviviality and loose notions of cosmopolitanism are used as survival strategies of locally embedded

but globally focused creatives to navigate the cities they reside in. The marrying of global and local identities is discussed by Skovgaard-Smith and Poulfelt (2018), who argue that cosmopolitanism is often used as a cultural resource. In their study of international expatriates living in Amsterdam, they find that individuals find “commonality in indifference”.

Kwame Anthony Appiah describes the balancing of global and local identities as ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah, 1997). Cosmopolitanism is often dismissed as a concept when describing mobile African communities as it is associated with rootlessness. Appiah describes rooted as someone who has a level of attachment to cultural practices or a place they consider home, or several *and* an affinity to a more significant global vision (Appiah, 1997, p. 618). He further argues the pursuit of individualism can only happen as a result of collective identities. The term seems oxymoronic yet goes some way to understand the experiences of the creatives in both cities. Appiah (1997) claims it is possible to have roots in one place or many places and yet be a citizen of global ambition and that they complement each other and are inseparable.

Multi-layered and sifting identities that straddle the local and global enable conviviality through their quest for intimacy and distance. Francis Nyamnjoh (2017) reminds us that complex identities and relations between city dwellers need not be dismissed as undesirable or unusual. Incompleteness can be the order of the city, identities and even communities. Conviviality fits well with the idea raised by creatives of the cities as markets, bringing together mutual need and mutual gain. Callahan (2012) argues that conviviality is fundamental to being human, claiming that it enables self-realisation while enabling mutual accommodation within a space, and arguably a loose sense of civility. Conviviality is focused on non-linear futures and fits with a flexible, rooted cosmopolitanism that looks back to look forward, a term that is called Sankofa in Akan, a Ghanaian language. The entanglement of the global and local and the tension caused as a result can be viewed as natural.

Accra and Lagos are sites of imagination, as discussed by Mbembe and Nuttall (2019), enacting shared and individual visions. Creatives within them create strategies for survival outlined as aforementioned, and yet it is important to state that tensions occur between the global vision and the reliance on spatial knowledge and cultural heritage arguably to loosely root oneself and build an occupation-based community with like-minded people. Conviviality is king amongst creative communities where there is an acceptance of their present and attempts to improve it through creative placemaking without the willingness to embed themselves due to the fear of immobility, real or imagined. Conviviality and rootless cosmopolitanism allow creative connections to multiple localities simultaneously and a fluid sense of belonging to the cities they reside that doesn’t curtail mobility aspirations.

3.3 Cities as cultural currencies

“Sometimes I see people say they are based in Lagos, but I know they live elsewhere when they are in Nigeria. Lagos has become trendy. It is the brand.” Tayo*

Space was unfalteringly described as a form of currency, Tayo, based in Lagos describes the city as a brand and the theme of cities as a currency was reoccurring throughout experiences. Knowledge of cities was used to gain social capital and acceptance outside of it with Lagos and Accra being positioned globally as the centre of West African cultural production (Das, 2020/ Amachi, 2020). Lagos and Accra, rather, have become creative global brands, through an organic process of negotiation led by creative tastemakers through online marketing (ibid). West African cultural production itself is a careful blend of local and global influence. The positioning of these cities by creatives and the creative concentration within them have established these cities as currency, reinforcing their global value. As Africa is having its media moment, attention is turning towards its cities that make the most noise through cultural production and the most visible and ‘authentic’ creatives within them are those at the front of the revolution.

Being perceived as local amongst locals was seen to be incredibly important, even for non-natives. Respondents could be seen to draw on collective memory to reinstate local belonging and yet such narratives contradicted with global identities and attempts to distance oneself from the city. Many creatives wanted to create a 'local' city identity for international authenticity without the associated attachments, as the value of the currency of the Lagos and Accra was seen to be rising globally. The global exchange rate working in their favor. By referencing the evolution of cities respondents attempted to own and legitimise their space within the cities. Gervais-Lambony argues that memories and discourses about the past relate to the production of identity and an urban attachment (Gervais-Lambony, 2014, p. 358). Collective memories in the accounts provided were not mutually accepted, but their negotiation and cultural scripts legitimised presence within spaces. The contention of memory, Gervais-Lambony argues, is a demand of legitimisation and recognition often by urban dwellers within space, a quest for a sense of ownership and belonging (Gervais-Lambony, 2014, p. 367).

The emphasis on local attachments and belonging was never discussed in interviews, yet highlights a tension at the boundary of the habitus. Many of the creatives interviewed shared relatively similar socio-economic backgrounds, with similar life trajectories and connections. The ability to work within the creative industries with its precarity and instability and persist and forge a career depended largely on economic and social capital. While not all creatives were from the same socio-economic background, significant trends were evident with many creatives dismissing their social class and the access it afforded and downplaying privilege within very fractured and divided societies.

Validation for creatives needed to be both local and international. Each sphere with its level of value and means of exchange. The creative communities in Lagos and Accra could arguably be seen to have the same spheres of exchange with an emphasis on place-specific knowledge and legitimacy. The value of European or American experience increased social capital within the space, enabling greater

access through existing networks. One famous Nigerian chef claimed they wouldn't have been able to start their business in Lagos had it not have been for their experiences and time spent in the United States. They openly admitted without their global mobility currency it is unlikely they would have been accepted within the creative space or have been able to access the opportunities and clientele available to them. Global middle-class subjectivities around Western education play out in the narratives of various creatives.

Through the narratives, there appears to be an intrinsic need for social recognition that detached and thin digital engagements alone cannot provide. The space and connection to other cities act as currency to increase individual values. For the currency to stay valid it needs to be used. Collected spaces and attachment to them, performed or otherwise equate to relevant and accepted social and cultural capital, that often also connected creatives to other creatives on the continent leading to what could be seen as an accepted and valid form of creative currency.

4. Conclusion

This paper highlights the use of cities to build social and cultural capital to enable mobility and progression elsewhere, whether it is realised or not with self-actualisation as the goal. Cities are invested in so much as they can be leveraged for individual gain, this investment is loose and detached. There is considerable importance by the studied group placed on utilising localised knowledge to manage a local identity and attachment while pivoting towards a global ambition. West African creatives questioned adopt a loose rooted cosmopolitanism and culture of conviviality to survive and thrive within the spaces that they live, meanwhile reterritorializing spaces and showcasing their vision of their cities to the world. West African creatives could be seen to use cities as cultural currency, knowledge and claims of the city exchanged with ease to allow for life to be lived across multiple physical and imagined worlds. This form of currency relies on being used consistently to ensure it retains its value. Its relevance is guarded, specific and

spatialised and under threat from new technologies and forms of creativity. At its core, this paper attempts to contribute to forms of membership and engagement within African cities and provides themes of departure for further study on how African creatives are shaped and shape-built environments and what that means for future mobility and growth of African cities and those within it. ■

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